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ART. I.—EVOLUTION AND FAITH.

*The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.* By CHARLES DARWIN, M.A. 2 vols. London : Murray. 1871.

*Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection.* By A. R. WALLACE. Second Edition. London : Macmillan. 1871.

*L'Instinct ; ses Rapports avec la Vie et avec l'Intelligence.* Par HENRI JOLY. Paris : Thorin. 1870.

*The Genesis of Species.* By ST. GEORGE MIVART. London : Macmillan. 1871.

MR. CHARLES DARWIN is a writer whom it is difficult to answer, for two reasons. In the first place, he deals with such an enormous number of facts that a complete answer must be as voluminous as his own writings. Otherwise, if any of the facts are left unnoticed, his sophistry will always seem to have still a covert to lurk in. In the second place, he is one of those writers who implies far more than he proves, or even pretends to prove ; and thus his arguments may be successfully met whilst his *animus* remains unaffected and the weight of his character as a man of learning is still as much as ever on the wrong side. And a man who has written a great book, which has been successful and has been widely circulated, invariably acquires a greater reputation than he deserves. His brilliant and striking theories, which he himself had announced as only probable or at least as not completely proved, are just the points that the general mind seizes hold of ; and by dint of repeating them the majority of people come to regard them as settled things. Mr. Darwin's great theory is the evolution of all living beings by means of natural selection alone. He has not proved this ; he does not pretend to have proved it ; yet his own mental bias is so evident, and the reading world has talked about his theory so much, that in all probability most people will be very much surprised to hear us say so.

"The Descent of Man," which appeared in the spring of this year, is, in a certain sense, the crown of Mr. Darwin's labours.

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Some eleven years ago, when the famous "Origin of Species" came before the world, a hint was given that "more important researches" were awaiting the naturalist in the distant future. "Psychology will be based upon a new foundation—that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light also will be thrown on the origin of man and his history." (P. 577, *fifth edition*.) The new work purports to supply this light, and to establish this foundation. The conclusions at which the author arrives are somewhat as follows.

From the similarity of man to the lower animals in many points of structure and constitution, and especially in embryonic development, and also from the rudiments of parts and organs which he retains, and the reversions to which he is liable, Mr. Darwin has no doubt that man is descended from some less highly organized form. He even attempts a history of his evolution and a sketch of some of his ancestors. One of these was "a hairy quadruped, furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old World."\* Still further back, we have an ancient marsupial, himself developed from a reptile, who in his turn descended from a fish; until at length, in the dim obscurity of the past, we faintly picture to ourselves the first progenitor of all the vertebrata in a very imperfect "aquatic animal," of which perhaps the best idea will be given by the familiar tadpole. In regard to the difficulty of seeing how, in this theory, the intellectual powers of man can ever have taken their rise, Mr. Darwin considers that the mental powers of man differ from those of the higher animals, not in kind, but only in degree. Since, therefore, such powers, in all their various grades of development, would always be highly advantageous to their possessor, natural selection would account for their continued growth and improvement. As to the "more interesting and difficult problem" of the development of the moral qualities, he takes for granted that the foundation of morality lies in the "social instinct." The continued presence of the social instincts and of their derived emotions, such as love and sympathy, in conjunction with great mental activity, with the vivid impression of past events, and with the power of foresight, is sufficient, he thinks, to account for dissatisfaction with certain actions, and for a resolution to act differently for the future—in which resolution he places the essence of conscience. These are the main conclusions of the book; but although they are very completely argued out, and an immense array of facts is brought forward to support them, they do not represent the half of what the book contains. The greater portion of the two volumes is taken up with a discussion of "Sexual

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\* "Descent of Man," ii. p. 389.



Selection," chiefly as to its effects on difference of race in man. Although this is a subject that it is difficult to treat in any Review but a strictly scientific one, we are bound to say that, as far as we have noticed, Mr. Darwin handles it in a way that entirely strips it of all offensiveness. But as it has but little to do with the first part of the book, and is in fact a distinct essay, it will not be necessary for us to do more than occasionally allude to its arguments.

We are not disposed to attach too much importance to Mr. Darwin's speculations, considered from the point of view of Faith. It has been too hastily assumed that the "evolution" theory is a smashing assault upon orthodoxy that is carrying terror and confusion into the ranks of all believers in Revelation. It is nothing of the kind. We have no doubt that some of its advocates devoutly intend it to be all this. But the truth is, that as long as the scientific men confine themselves to their science, and do not set it to prove more than it is adequate to prove, Revelation remains just where it was. Meanwhile it must be admitted that, as Catholics, it is our duty to meet fairly such a question as this. It is a great pity that Mr. Darwin, or Mr. Darwin's friends, should pursue their valuable and original physical researches in a spirit that contemns, or at least ignores, revelation. But we cannot alter facts; and since certain questions are mooted, we must examine them and give them an answer, even if in order to do so we are obliged to draw lines where simple faith may not have hitherto made distinctions. We are quite aware—and this is another reason for our writing—that educated Catholics, who read what is written from day to day, feel the difficulty of taking up satisfactory views on the questions to which we refer, and whatever we can do towards assisting them will at least be welcome, even though it should prove insufficient. Besides, Catholic theology lives by growth, and in the designs of Providence nothing has stimulated its growth so much as the contradictions which in every age it has had to sustain. The truths of the Faith have been discussed in every century, and if they are discussed in the present it will not be less to their advantage than it has been. Their illustration and their development—the "*species, forma, distinctio*," of Vincent of Lerins—have been the duty and the glory of our fathers, and their children must continue the work. It need not be said that we write "under correction." There are at least one or two points of the present controversy on which authority has not had occasion to speak clearly; but if we make mistakes, our mistakes themselves, when they are pointed out, will ultimately lead to greater certainty and a wider development of truth.

Whilst not overrating the seriousness of the present state of the evolution theory, it is, of course, quite possible to make too little of it. It is, no doubt, not without grave importance in several

respects. It seems to contradict the fact of the distinction of matter and spirit; because the theory is, that all faculties whatsoever, in man as in the lower animals, have been evolved from one or a few primordial forms. It seems to deny the special and separate creation of the human soul, which is a point of Catholic faith. It appears to oppose the received opinion, that the living principles of the animal and vegetable kingdoms were likewise the result of distinct creative acts, and that the bodies of the first human pair were miraculously formed by God. Nay, there is but too much reason to be apprehensive that the greater number of its advocates have no adequate idea of the dogma of Creation itself, and that they think they are more than sufficiently respectful when they set down the notion of a Creator among the things that are "unknownable."

As far as we are aware, Mr. Darwin does not deny Creation or a Creator. Nay, he not unfrequently speaks of both the one and the other in terms of respect. Perhaps the most unfortunate passage in his writings is the very conclusion of his interesting work on "Domestication," in which he comes across the old difficulty of reconciling the idea of an omniscient and all-wise God with evil, and, in fact, with anything at all except an optimist universe.\* With his characteristic weakness whenever he faces a metaphysical problem, Mr. Darwin here simply throws up his hands and shakes his head, and winds up his book with a sentence or two of "regretful" scepticism which might have been written by Voltaire, if Voltaire could have been dull and respectable. But, as he admits himself in the same place, this kind of speculation is "travelling beyond" his "proper province." And, in fact, in his "Origin of Species" he distinctly recognizes that his theory is not opposed to primordial creation, for he speaks (p. 579) of life "having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one." But it is quite evident, from what has just been stated, that, like a good many more of our modern physiologists, he has never fully wrought out in his own mind what ideas are necessarily involved in the word "Creator"; and therefore it is no wonder that, whilst verbally admitting Creation, these writers, and Mr. Darwin amongst them, frequently stick fast in that most difficult of all the regions of metaphysics which is concerned with the possibility and the consequences of this all-important fact. We call the reader's attention to this, for it will help to explain some seeming contradictions. That the theory of Evolution itself is not opposed to Creation, we need not stop to show. It is quite possible that it may be opposed to the actual way in which Creation was brought about, as revealed in Holy Scripture; and this question we shall examine

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\* "Plants and Animals under Domestication," vol. ii. p. 431.

presently. But whether it be held that all existent living beings are evolved out of four or five distinct types, or even that they are growths out of one sole primordial substance, as Mr. Darwin is inclined to think, still those who hold either of these views may admit, and generally do admit, that the one substance, or the several types, were originally called out of nothing by the *fiat* of the Creator.\*

When, however, we come to compare the Darwinian Evolution theory more in detail with Revelation and Christian Faith, we are forced, however unwillingly, to see that it contains points which no orthodox Christian can accept. There can be no doubt whatever in the mind of the most cursory reader of the new volumes on "Man," that their author holds the human soul to have been developed gradually from the powers or principles of animal life. Mr. Darwin does not often use the word "soul." Man, to him, is only a complex of faculties, emotions, or instincts. But, as we have said before, he professes to prove the probability, and even to explain the possibility, of the intellectual and moral powers having been a gradual growth out of blind instinct. He admits, indeed, that the greatest difficulty of his theory arises from man's intellect and morality; but he maintains that the mental powers of the higher animals are "the same *in kind* with those of mankind, though so different in degree."† He alludes in one place to immortality, and anticipates that many will find it hard to conceive how or when in the gradually ascending organic scale man became "an immortal being."‡ This, he says, cannot possibly be determined; just as it cannot be determined in the case of any particular infant.‡ It is impossible to consider this passage without concluding that he does not recognize the independent creation of the human soul, in the evolution either of the species or of the individual. It is well known that Professor Huxley agrees with Mr. Darwin in this matter, though his point of view is entirely different. In the article "On the Physical Basis of Life" he states, with greater precision of language than logical cogency, that his studies on "protoplasm" have driven him to the conclusion, "that our

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\* It is not to be supposed that we consider that modern physical science is satisfactory in its treatment of Creation; but we think we are right in saying that it generally admits the *term*, though often meaning very little by it. Perhaps the most curious example, in recent books, of an attempt to get rid of the idea, is that of Mr. Herbert Spencer ("First Principles," pp. 30 et seq.), in which he proves with great elaboration, following in the wake of Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel, that no possible hypothesis as to the world's origin is even conceivable, because self-existence, self-creation, and creation by an external cause, are all alike outside the limits of the "thinkable."

† "Descent of Man," vol. ii. p. 390.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 395.

thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life" (protoplasm) "which is the source of our other vital phenomena."\* It need not be said that there are many scientific writers of less name who loudly, and sometimes offensively, express their materialistic sympathies. On the other hand, Mr. Wallace, who, we venture to predict, will one day be recognized as a sounder philosopher than Mr. Darwin, has emphatically declared that no material element, no molecule, no number of such elements, even though infinite in number and combined in any degree of complexity, can have the slightest tendency to originate consciousness.† Professor Tyndall, in an address delivered at the Norwich meeting of the British Association, in 1868, spoke in striking words of the utter impossibility of passing, by any intellectual process, from the physical processes to the facts of consciousness.‡ If the passage to which we refer means anything, it seems to imply that science can never prove, or even hear of, any evolution or correlation between organism and mind. It is true, however, that Professor Tyndall has been accused, since he uttered those words, of being a materialist; and it must be confessed that if he is not a materialist, that is, even if he does not (as he says he does not) make out all force to be what the vulgar call "matter," yet he seems at least to do away with all difference, except difference of degree, between matter and spirit.§ And as to Mr. Wallace himself, it is not quite clear, from the elaborate paper which he contributed to the "Academy" on the appearance of Mr. Darwin's book on "Man," whether that book has not shaken his convictions on the subject of matter and mind. At any rate he has made no protest against what every Christian thinker, it would seem, should at once protest against, viz., the assertion that the soul of man is a mere development of the forces that have shaped the world and made the grass grow. Perhaps it did not require so many words to prove that the Darwinian Evolution theory, as explained by its author, denies the separate creation of the soul, and that his views are only too much in agreement with those of the greatest physical philosophers of the day. But it is as well that it should be clearly understood. That so-called science opposes a Christian dogma is, of course, serious, but it is not overwhelming; whilst to accept, to favour, to propagate such science, with hazy notions as to what its authors intend it to lead to, is to put our faith in danger.

The special creation of the soul of Adam is a dogma of Catholic

\* "Lay Sermons," p. 138.

† "Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection," p. 365.

‡ "Fragments of Science," p. 121.

§ P. 165, *note*.

Faith, and is accepted by most of those who profess to believe in the Holy Scriptures. It is of faith, moreover, that the origin of the human soul, in each individual of Adam's posterity, is not a mere metamorphosis or evolution of organic or inorganic forms of existence. There was a certain kind of *Generationism* (Traducianism, it has been called) which at one time prevailed to some extent in the Church, which has been revived in these latter times by certain German theologians, and which has never been formally condemned by a dogmatic decision. This theory holds that, just as body begets body, so soul begets soul. But it seems certain that this is opposed to the voice of the "ordinary magisterium" of the Church; and if so, of course it is contrary to Faith.\* With regard to the soul of man, then, no evolution-theory can be held. Each human individual receives his soul, as Adam did, immediately from the "breath" of Almighty God.

The teaching of Faith is, therefore, clear with respect to man's soul. But it is more difficult to say what must, or must not, be said with respect to the formation of the bodies of our first parents, and also with respect to the "creative periods" which are alleged to be revealed in the first chapter of Genesis. On these heads there is no mistaking Mr. Darwin and those who are with him. Modestly as the author of "Natural Selection" speaks of his own labours, he does claim to have given a fatal blow to the commonly received doctrine, that each species was separately created. And he feels no remorse for what he has done. "When I view all beings," he says, "not as special creations, but as the lineal descendants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian system was deposited, they seem to me to become ennobled."† "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning, endless forms, most beautiful and most wonderful, have been, and are being, evolved."‡ "Analogy would lead me . . . to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some *one prototype*. But analogy may be a deceitful guide."§ Thus we may briefly state Mr. Darwin's present views to be,—first, that a somewhat dubious analogy leads him to consider all organic nature to be descended from one primordial form; secondly, that he is

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\* We do not prove this point at length, because there is no probability that any one will deny it; but the proofs may be referred to in the pages of the "Civiltà Cattolica," Serie V., vols. ix. x.; especially in an article entitled *La Creazione dell' Anima umana e il Dogma cattolico*, vol. ix. p. 677.

† "Origin of Species," p. 578.

‡ P. 579.

§ P. 572.

convinced that all animals had at most only four or five progenitors, and plants an equal or lesser number; thirdly, that he has no doubt that man and some of the apes are co-descendants of the "extinct form," whose description we gave in his own words a page or two back. Of the nature of Mr. Darwin's arguments we say nothing here, as we shall have to consider them later on. What we wish to settle just now is, how far it is allowable on the part of a Catholic to assent to his conclusions.

There is nothing more curious in that important treatise by S. Augustine, which is called "*De Genesi ad litteram*," than the certainty he seems to have, that very little indeed was known to him or to his contemporaries about the true literal interpretation of the mysterious record; and the fear that seems to haunt him, lest foolish believers arouse the infidel to scorn, by talking nonsense about the physical world and appealing to Moses to prove what they say. The Duke of Argyll has quoted\* a remarkable passage from the "*Confessions*" (lib. xii. c. 31), in which the holy Doctor seems to assert the widest possible liberty of interpreting the book of Genesis. However interesting it might be to have a doctor of the fifth century a prophet of the future possibilities of science, it is to be feared that he was thinking, when he wrote the passage cited, rather how the sun and the moon are figures of the preachers of the Gospel, than how the sun and moon were made. But whatever we make of his words in the "*Confessions*," there can be no doubt as to what he says in the literal commentary on Genesis. He speaks of the obscurity of the divine revelations, and of the possibility of arriving at different conclusions as to their interpretation; and he warns us that, in taking up any particular line of interpretation, we must be ready to abandon it if, on discussion, truth be found to be against it.† Non-Christians, he says, often know a great deal about physical matters, by means of reason and experiment; and they know it so well as to be quite certain.‡ . . . . And he goes so far as to say that the great lesson or fruit of his own attempts at the interpretation of Genesis is, that he has taught himself not to take up any man's particular view when upholding the Faith against infidel scoffers; but that whenever they undoubtedly (*veracibus documentis*) prove anything to be a fact in physical nature, he considers it to be his duty to prove it

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\* "*Primeval Man*," p. 35.

† In nullam earum nos precipiti affirmatione ita projiciamus, ut si forte diligentius discussa veritas eam recte labefactaverit, corruamus.—"*De Gen. ad lit.*," lib. i. cap. xviii.

‡ Plurimque accidat ut aliquid de terrâ . . . . de naturis animalium, fructuum, lapidum atque hujusmodi cæteris, etiam non Christianus ita noverit, ut certissimâ ratione et experientiâ teneat.—*Ibid.*, cap. xix.



not to be contrary to Scripture.\* We must hold fast to "sound faith" and the "rule or canon of piety": but in matters which do not oppose Faith he advocates "discussion"; he is ready to trust "reason and experiment"; and all he requires is "veracious proof." And he sums up in one of his epigrammatic sentences, by a double warning, against the seductions of loquacious philosophy on the one hand, and against superstitious timidity on the other.† It is pleasing to go back to the fountain-head, and to seek the true spirit of Faith and science from the living waters of the great source of Western Theology.

The question, then, is, how far is it allowable to a Catholic to deny special creations after the first creation, and to deny the special formation of the body of Adam, or of Eve?

We begin with the question of special second creations. It appears, on the face of the sacred narrative, that after the creation of the world out of nothing, after, perhaps, long periods, during which it was shaped and fashioned by the laws of inorganic matter and by heat, there were created at separate periods first the plants, then the animals, both in their several species. Is it allowable, in spite of the text of Holy Scripture, to assert that all living beings, both plant and animal, sprang from one primordial form—or even to go so far as to say—what, however, Mr. Darwin does not say—that even this primordial organism is evolved out of the inorganic?

There is a controversy, now over and done with, which has not been without its fruit in the interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation. No one now doubts that it is perfectly allowable to hold that the "six days" mentioned in the Sacred Record need not, as far as faith is concerned, be interpreted to be six ordinary solar days of twenty-four hours each.‡ The settlement of this point has given us two principal lessons. It has taught us, first of all, that the literal meaning of Holy Scripture does not always lie on the surface, or even in the sense that is popularly attached to the words of the text. It has thrown light, in the second place—and it is a most important lesson—on what is meant by the "unanimous consent of the Fathers," as applied to the interpretation of Scripture. Every one knows the famous declaration of the Council of Trent and of the Creed of Pope Pius IV., which forbids us to interpret the written word of God, "*nisi juxta unanimum consensum Patrum.*" As to the "six days," there

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\* "De Gen. ad lit.," cap. xxi.

† Ut neque falsæ philosophiæ loquacitate seducamur, neque falsæ religionis superstitione terreamur.—*Ibid.*, cap. eodem.

‡ See the discussion of this point in "*Cosmogonia naturale comparata col Genesi,*" by F. Pianciani, S. J. (Rome, 1862), *Introduzione*.



can be no doubt that the large majority of the Fathers consider them to be six ordinary days.\* They are so "unanimous" that there really appears to be no Father of any name, except S. Augustine and perhaps Origen, who holds a different opinion.† But, for all that, they are not sufficiently "unanimous" to bind us to interpret the "days" in their sense. Either then the singular voice of a great Father like S. Augustine on the opposite side, as long as his opinion had not been formally condemned, was enough to make the question uncertain; ‡ or else (which at last is probably the true view) we must lay stress on the qualification actually expressed by the Council (Sess. IV.), limiting its restriction to "*res fidei et morum ad ædificationem doctrinæ Christianæ pertinentium.*" Now nothing most certainly has been defined in any Creed or document of the Church, with respect to the origin of species, or the question of second creations. At all events then it is well worthy of inquiry, whether the text of Genesis is so clearly and unambiguously explained to mean second creations, that to reject that theory is to contravene the "*unanimes consensus Patrum.*"

It is well known, as we have already hinted, that there are two great Patristic schools of the interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis. One is that of S. Augustine: the other is that which we may perhaps be allowed to call the school of S. Basil; for S. Ambrose follows S. Basil so closely, and S. Ambrose and S. Basil together have been so exclusively the storehouse from which following ages have drawn, that the name of the great Greek Doctor may well stand for all who do not follow S. Augustine. The school of S. Basil, then, hold views as to the Mosaic narrative of creation, which may be briefly enumerated under the following heads:—(1) It considers the "six days" to be ordinary days. (2) It asserts several distinct "creative periods"—periods separated by time from the first creation of inorganic elementary matter, and separated also by time from one another, but all occurring before the end of the sixth day. (3) The earth, that is the primordial elementary creation, spoken of in Gen. i. 1, had, when created, the power of producing organic life—but only in a certain sense, for (4) the earth had *not* this power, in another sense (and that, perhaps, a more important sense), but awaited (5) the Command, or Word, of God. This command, however, is not called, simply, creation, but is distinguished from the exercise of power implied in

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\* S. Basil, S. Ambrose, S. Chrysostom, S. John Damascene, S. Gregory the Great, Ven. Bede, and others.

† Petavius, "*De Opificio sex Dierum.*"

‡ Si *unius* aut paucorum [Patrum] opinatio non fuit ab Ecclesiâ rejecta, tum plurimorum auctoritas quemadmodum diximus, nihil certum firmiterque conficiet.—Melchior Canus, "*De Locis Theol.*" lib. vii. cap. 3, n. 3.

the primary creation. For instance S. Ambrose constantly employs several parallel pairs of words to express the two kinds of operation; as "Primo fecit—postea venustavit;" "Creavisse—ornasse;" "Facere—componere." And this "secondary creation" is the commencement of the Laws of Nature; in fact, the very command of God becomes the Law of Nature, as that command successively brings forth each fresh department of things. (6.) Though this school is not perfectly unanimous as to what is the exact enumeration of the particular periods of creation—as to how many there were, and what was created in each—yet for the most part it follows closely the exact words of Holy Scripture, and considers that whenever the sacred writer says that God did anything, he implies that He did it immediately, or at least by the ministry of angels. Nevertheless they do admit that some things were created *in aliis*, that is, by the creation of other things which would naturally produce them. And hence it may be noticed at once that the question as to how many things were created, whether the "how many" has reference to departments, or to the number of genera in each department, is treated by this school as, *to some extent*, a matter of detail. But (7) they are agreed in holding that at least a great many of the organic genera did not come into existence by a gradual process of growth, as things do in the ordinary course of nature, but sprang up perfect, "suddenly," "quickly," "at once." "Imagine," says S. Basil, "the cold and sterile earth heaving, at that little word and that brief command, with the sudden throes of birth and breaking forth into fruitfulness, throwing aside her garb of mourning and casting around her that grand robe of joy, her own glorious vesture, as there burst from her bosom the myriad species of the plants." \*

Here we have the spirit of the school to which we have given the name of S. Basil. And the authority of the view here detailed can be seen in the fact that it is adopted and defended by Suarez.† Whilst following S. Basil almost exactly in the several points mentioned above, Suarez explains himself on many of them more fully than his authorities had done. For instance, he defines the power, primarily bestowed upon the earth, of bringing forth life, to be mere potentiality—the "material" cause of the living being, as the scholastic phrase is—not by any means its proximate efficient cause.‡ That is to say, life was in the power of the inorganic creation as much as the finished statue is in the power of the rude marble block, and no more. He is definite in his description of what the "word" or "command" of God was. It was a different

\* S. Basil, Hom. V., on the "Hexæmeron," vol. i. p. 97 (Migne's ed.)

† "De Opere sex Dierum," tom. iij. (ed. Vivès).

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. xii. n. 13.

operation from creation proper, because it supposed the pre-existence of matter that could be transmuted; it was rather a change than a creation, yet a change of a much higher kind than any created agent could bring about;\* it might be called "secondary creation";† it is, as it were, a mean between creation and strict generation, and is therefore sometimes called creation and sometimes generation.‡ He is quite clear that the principal genera of the organic kingdom came into existence suddenly and in adult perfection.§ It need hardly be added that both Suarez and the Patristic school of interpretation which he follows assume that species are immutable. "No lapse of time destroys the *idiomata* of animals," says S. Basil.|| And some theologians, who flourished a long long time before Mr. Darwin, here notice that fact of the sterility of hybrids, which is one of the chief difficulties in the way of the indefinite mutability of species which is postulated by the Darwinian theory of evolution.¶ Nevertheless it is to be observed that the gist of observations like this is rather that the species created by God Himself are not subject, on the whole, to degeneration, than that no new species can be formed, or even propagated, for the last two processes are sometimes expressly admitted.\*\* The immutability of species is taken by this school (as indeed by most ancient writers of every school) as a simple evident fact, which it has never occurred to any one to deny. They set it down, and they undertake to find reasons for it, just as they set down that gold was generated by the sun. It is important to observe this, because there are two kinds of "unanimous consent of the Fathers" to be distinguished; one, when they *materially* agree—that is, simply say the same thing; the other, when they use words expressing their *formal* opinion that such a sense is the sense in which alone a given passage can safely be taken. Bearing this in mind, it is not too much to say that nearly the whole of the interpretation above ascribed to the school of S. Basil is merely material agreement. The only point on which there is formal consent seems to be that God made all things (in some way or other) out of original nothing. We put forward this view with diffidence, but it seems to us strongly probable. There is one argument that seems peremptory. There is no point of the whole interpretation on which the school is more unanimous than the point that the "six days" are natural, ordinary days; but it is granted, by universal consent, that

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\* "De Opere sex Dierum," lib. i. cap. x. n. 25.

† *Ibid.*, lib. iii. cap. n. 13.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. xii. n. 14.

§ *Ibid.*, lib. i. cap. vii. n. 15.

|| Hom. IX. on the "Hexæmeron," p. 190.

¶ See Gazzaniga, "De Opere sex Dierum," diss. II. cap. vii. n. 209.

\*\* See Cornelius à Lapide, "Commun. in Genesim," ad cap. i. v. 8.

this mode of interpreting the sacred writer is not obligatory. Therefore, it appears to us that even if the school of S. Basil could be proved to represent the sense of the Church, there is not one of the points of its interpretation given above (with the exception named) that could be considered to be authoritative, precisely as being attested by the "consent of the Fathers."

But the truth of this last assertion appears still more evident when we turn to the consideration of the other great Patristic school—the school of S. Augustine. The holy Doctor has treated of the Mosaic narrative of creation in more than one of his works. He wrote two books on the spiritual and allegorical sense, against the Manichæans. He afterwards began a second treatise, intended to be a literal commentary, but this he has left imperfect. The spiritual commentary contained in the three last books of the *Confessions* came next; and finally he wrote the elaborate treatise "*De Genesi ad litteram*," in twelve books, which is our chief source of reference on the present subject. No one can go through it without feeling the enormous difference there is between it and the "*Hexæmeron*" of S. Basil. The Greek Doctor writes rather for edification than for instruction: he explains, indeed, and he confutes, as occasion offers; but he raises no difficulties of his own, and his answers to heretics and gainsayers, if solid, are still the regular prescriptive answers of the pulpit; and he is glad to dismiss them and float once more into his broad current of eloquence, deep and abundant, with occasional reaches of sparkling rhetoric. But S. Augustine, in his commentary on the Mosaic narrative, is a philosopher of faith rather than a preacher of morals. He meets the objections of enemies, but his greatest difficulties are the product of his own thought. He ponders and reflects, he analyses and doubts, he returns again and again to what he has dismissed; and when he rises into eloquence, it is the eloquence of depth of thought, of earnestness, and of piercing intellect. The result of this difference between these two Saints is, that the reader feels the Latin to be earnestly facing intellectual difficulties, whilst the Greek is thinking of prayer and praise and holy living. Now the view of S. Augustine on the Six Days of Creation is very easily and briefly stated. (1) He held that the whole of what is detailed in the first chapter of Genesis came to pass at once, in one instant. The reason why the narrative is arranged in six distinct days is to assist the incapacity of those who are unable, without details, fully to take in what is meant by simultaneous creation.\* (2) All things that were created were created at once, but not in their perfect or adult state; they were created in their *seminal* or *causal* *ratios*. There has been some hesitation expressed as to what S.

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\* "*De Genesi ad lit.*," lib. iv. cap. 23, n. 52.

Augustine means by these primordial innate principles out of which he asserts all things to have sprung. But there can be little doubt that he really intends to say that God, at the instant of creation, gave to the earth the power or capability of producing in due course the whole of the organic genera which it was afterwards to produce, and this without any further necessary action of Almighty God himself than that by which He co-operates in all the operations of second causes. Let it be observed, however, that he does not say that no miraculous or extraordinary and immediate action of God *has not at times* caused the development of plants or animals. But sudden, and therefore miraculous, development he does not consider to be the rule. We say that we think there can be little doubt this is S. Augustine's meaning. The *potentia* which he attributes to primordial creation is the "innate" efficiency of a real "cause." His often-repeated expressions of "seed" and "germ" mean the same thing. The only two kinds of Divine operation which he distinguishes are, first, that by which the Almighty wrought during "six days"—an instantaneous act, from which He rested on the seventh; and, secondly, that by which He continues to work "until now," that is, the ordinary course of His providence.\* The "conditio" or first establishment, of the universe, was complete instantaneously; never since that instant has its Author created anything new (in material substance); He has only governed and directed its development (administravit); † "explicat sæcula," says S. Augustine, "quæ illi [creaturæ suæ sc.], cum primum condita est, tanquam plicata indiderat." ‡ And to remove all doubt, he compares the efficacy of the seminal and causal ratios innate in the world at its creation to the way in which there lies invisible in the grain of seed all that is afterwards to grow up to be a tree.§

But, it may be asked, can it be true then that S. Augustine actually admits that the earth, thus fecundated by Almighty power at its first creation, developed its organic life by degrees, and during long spaces of time? To this we answer that S. Augustine stops short just at this point. He certainly does not say so; and we believe that he had no conception of the existence of those long ages which modern geology has revealed. Yet just as certainly he does not deny it. There is one remarkable passage in which he almost seems to anticipate modern science. He asks himself || what kind of thing these "seminal ratios" were; were

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\* "De Genesi ad lit." lib. iv. cap. 12, n. 28.

† *Ibid.*, lib. iv. cap. 12, n. 22.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 20, n. 41.

§ *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 23, n. 45.

|| *Ibid.*, lib. vi. cap. 14, n. 25.

they such as passed through their varied intervals of time, each according to its kind, just as we see organisms do now? Or was it their nature to come to maturity *at once, without progressive growth, as is believed of Adam?* He answers; Why should we not believe that they had *both* these descriptions of nature?—so that what was afterwards done with them depended upon the good pleasure of their Maker. That is to say, they had the power to develop in the ordinary, gradual way; and they had likewise the power, if their Maker pleased, to develop suddenly and miraculously. But whether or no organisms did, as a rule, develop miraculously and suddenly, S. Augustine does not decide. It seems to us that he was hindered from saying they did by a feeling that there was no necessity for it; and yet he could not say they did not, because the idea of geological time did not occur, and could not have occurred, to him. But he uses certain expressions in speaking of development, such as “per temporum moras,”\* “per congruos temporum motus,”† “omnia suis quæque temporibus jam per sæculorum ordinem [fiunt]”‡ which might be adopted without alteration by an evolutionist. And it must be remembered that besides this process of development, which he expressly says is going on yet, he admits only one other species of operation of Almighty God, viz., the simultaneous primordial creation.

From this summary of the two chief schools of Patristic interpretation of Genesis, it seems clear enough, that, with respect to all organisms lower than man, Catholic faith does not prevent any one from holding the opinion that life, both vegetable and animal, was in the world, in germ, at its creation, and afterwards developed by regular process into all the various species now upon the earth. We do not by any means say this is the true opinion. It is certain that hardly one scientific man holds it in its whole extent; and Mr. Darwin himself does not pretend to have proved it.§ And we do not admit that its proof altogether depends on physical science; there are other considerations, both metaphysical and moral, to be weighed. But it seems to us to be free at least from any suspicion of dogmatic heterodoxy.

There are no doubt very many who object, with a sort of objection which almost seems like a religious scruple, to think that life, whether vegetable or animal, could make its appearance in the

\* “De Genesi ad lit.,” lib. v. cap. 23, n. 45.

† *Ibid.*, lib. v. cap. 5, n. 14.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. vi. cap. 5, n. 8.

§ Mr. Darwin, indeed, does not profess to treat of the origin of life. “Science as yet throws no light on the (far higher) problem of the essence or origin of life.”—“Origin of Species,” p. 568. His endeavour is, taking life for granted, to prove that all living things have come, chiefly by a law which he calls “natural selection,” from, at most, a few primordial living types.



world without the immediate action of Almighty God. Perhaps they would not admit that such immediate action was *miraculous*; for they would say it is the commencement of a law of nature. Still, even if not technically a miracle, it would be, with reference to the order of things before it happened, quite as extraordinary an exercise of Divine power as the changing of water into wine at Cana. Now we do not by any means deny that such miraculous creation may actually have happened: human science will never prove it did not. But it certainly cannot be asserted that it is unorthodox to deny it; and this is all that we here assert. It is a point on which Revelation is silent, and on which philosophical arguments can only establish a probability; and it is a point, therefore, on which the arguments and discoveries of physical science may be, and ought to be, counted for what they are worth. We may even add—without positively declaring our approval of any particular system of development—that physical science, and especially what it tells us of geological time, seem to make it more probable than not that, even if we maintain that life was not evolved out of matter in which vital germs had been primordially created, yet the first creation of life was not a creation of a multitude of perfect species, but rather of rudimentary organizations which were left to develop chiefly by natural law.\* Suarez has two rules or canons on this subject which seem remarkably applicable to a view that differs considerably from his own. His first is this (he is speaking particularly of the work of the “six days”): “Opera miraculosa vel extraordinaria absque necessitate vel sufficienti testimonio audienda non sunt;” † and the other is as follows: “Deus ea tantum immediate produxit, quæ nonnisi per Ipsius actionem in rerum naturâ introduci poterant quoad species suas.” ‡ These rules, which are found in almost identical words both in S. Augustine and in S. Thomas, should, it seems to us, have the widest possible application. God made all things; He governs and directs all things; He foresaw from all eternity the minutest change of all the millions of changes that have been and that will be, and they all happened because He willed. It is not in any way derogatory to these Catholic truths to hold that life-germs were created at the first instant of creation. Let it be noticed that this is not saying that the inorganic can, as such, develop into organism; although, as regards vegetable life, even this seems to be admitted as *possible* by Catholic philosophers.§ It seems to be

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\* Not, however, let it be observed, by natural selection only.

† “De Opere sex Dierum,” lib. ii. cap. vii.

‡ *Ibid.*, lib. ii. cap. x.

§ We refer particularly to F. Tongiorgi, S.J. He says, after denying that organs and organic bodies can be constructed by chemistry: *Certe*



proved that living organisms may exist in such minute forms in matter as not only to defy the microscope but even to resist disintegration by a heat of 150° Cent. ; being ready, after this fiery trial, to discover their existence by coalescing into masses that can at length be detected by the lens.\* Now it is quite conceivable that these infinitesimally minute life-germs may have remained latent for many cycles of ages, until those conditions came about under which, by virtue of their divinely-established nature, they were able to coalesce and produce by gradual stages one living thing after another. S. Augustine might have had this very thought in his mind. There are numberless difficulties in the way of such a theory ; there is little or no direct proof of its truth ; but what we are at present concerned with is its admissibility. Once grant it to be a possible solution, and then physical science (assisted by metaphysics and authority in various details) may be left alone to prove it or disprove it. The most insuperable objection, from a metaphysical point of view, to a consistent theory of evolution, is no doubt the apparent impossibility of admitting that creatures capable of sensation, like the higher animals at least, could have come from vital germs whose sensibility, on such an hypothesis, must have been latent for an enormous lapse of time. It must be remembered, however, that though sensibility always supposes life, a living thing may be sensitive under some circumstances and non-sensitive, whilst still alive, under others ; so that it is possible that the germs of animal life, without sensibility, may have existed for any length of time, undeveloped, but fully capable of sensation under certain conditions, such as coalition in brains or ganglia. Those who maintain that the soul of sentient animals is a simple, immaterial substance, independent of the body as to being, hold, of course, that it is specially created in the case of each individual animal and insect ;† and development can present no difficulties to this theory. We may notice, however, that neither S. Basil, S. Augustine, nor S. Thomas had any notion that it was necessary to postulate the special creation of the soul of each animal. But the

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si homo oculos haberet satis acutos ad atomos materiæ tam ponderabilis quam imponderabilis singillatim discernendas, manusque aptas ad atomos easdem prensandas ac disponendas juxta typum primum a Deo extractum, tunc, credo, posset homo plantas efficere." ("Institutiones Philosophiæ," vol. iii. p. 26.) The author intends this for a *reductio ad absurdum*. But if vegetable vitality is reducible to *arrangement*, why should such vitality be less a law of matter than crystallization is ? And why should not chemists, who can see and handle invisible molecules without eyes or hands, some day, whether by accident or otherwise, hit upon that peculiar arrangement of them which constitutes a cell ?

\* See Dr. Bastian's experiments, "Nature," vol. ii. p. 170.

† F. Tongiorgi, S.J., "Instit. Phil.," vol. iii. p. 42.

settlement of such a question as this would depend upon a full analysis of what sensation is—sensation in the animals, be it observed, not in man, in whom its phenomena are difficult to discover pure.

No one can deny that the theory of Evolution (which Mr. Darwin was by no means the first to put forth, and about which very much remains to be discovered and discussed) is full of fertile views in natural science, and therefore also in theology and morality. The axiom "*Natura non facit saltum*" was well known in the ages of the Scholastics. And the more width of design and system the mind finds in the works of God, the more is its idea of Him exalted. It has been so always. It was so with the discovery of the antipodes, with the knowledge of the realms of the stars, with the laws of modern chemistry, and with the conception of the secular changes of the earth and its inhabitants. And it will be so, there is no doubt, with all that science has to tell us of the order of the vegetable and animal world, by means of those comparatively new researches in morphology, embryology, and heredity which are now advancing so rapidly. "*Infinum supremi attingit supremum infimi.*" Aristotle saw that, as far as regards structure. It is perhaps reserved for our days to see it clearly in evolution also. The evolution of a tree from a seed is apparently a very different thing from the evolution of a tree from a lichen. But in the extent of change and in the absolute impossibility of following the steps of the process with the senses, it may serve as a parallel. And it seems to be well ascertained that the highest animals, and man also as to his body, grow up in the womb from a germ which does not differ, as far as can be seen, from the germ out of which every animal and plant is evolved; a germ which then grows to resemble that of a worm, then that of a reptile, then that of a mammal, passes afterwards through grades of resemblance to that of various divisions of the mammalia, then comes to be indistinguishable from those of the higher quadrumana, and finally, in the case of man, receives its differentiation as a human foetus. In this process we know, from Revelation and the practice of the Church, that the spiritual soul is infused before birth; but we have no revealed grounds for saying that any other soul was created or infused previously; we are therefore thrown upon science. It is the same, possibly, with the primordial evolution of life. The plant-germ has been transmuted into the animal-germ, and whether such power of evolution was primarily given to matter, or suddenly created for its work, a Catholic, as such, seems not to be called upon to decide.

It will be remembered that in beginning to speak of the development of life, we expressly excepted from our remarks the question of the evolution of the body of the first man. That question, therefore, now comes before us. Can we believe it possible that

the body of the first man was not formed instantaneously in full perfection, but that it was the result of ordinary natural laws? In other words, can we believe that the human body existed as an animal before it was informed by the rational soul? Let it be observed that the question is not about the instantaneous formation of *man*. There is not the slightest doubt that man became man in the instant that his spiritual soul was breathed into him,—no sooner and no later. But what was that into which the soul was breathed? Before inquiring into the teaching of tradition, it may be stated that only two hypotheses seem admissible on grounds of reason. Either the soul was breathed into a previously existing anthropomorphous animal, or else a special anthropomorphous body was instantaneously formed from pre-existent matter, and in the same instant was vivified by the soul. Two other suppositions need only be mentioned to be dismissed. To say that the body of the first man was created in an infant state, and *à fortiori*, to say it was created in an embryonic state, would require us to suppose not one miracle but a series of miracles; for miraculous conservation would have then been as necessary as miraculous procreation. In like manner to say that an anthropomorphous statue or *cadaver* was formed, by degrees or not, and that time elapsed before it was animated by the soul, would also be a gratuitous assumption of the miraculous. We are left, therefore, it would seem, to choose between an instantaneous triple act, that is to say, the formation of the body, the creation of the soul, and their union, in one and the same instant, and on the other hand, the assumption by the soul of a previously developed animal.

There is no need to say that the whole school of Fathers which has been called the school of S. Basil, takes for granted that Adam's body was formed by the immediate act of God, in the same instant as the soul was breathed in. There are one or two indeed who seem to think that an appreciable time elapsed between the formation of the anthropomorphous "statue" and the vivification by the soul.\* But this hypothesis we need not entertain, for, as has already been stated, it is more miraculous than its alternative; it is put forward by its authors more as a ground for moral teaching than as an interpretation, and, as opposing evolution, it is virtually the same as the opinion of the rest of the school of S. Basil. Confining our observations, therefore, to those who hold the first view, it is to be remarked that the whole of this school—which is nearly the same as saying the whole "*traditio Patrum*"—is unanimous in observing that Adam's creation is related in different words from that of all other things. And their words, in many instances, apply specifically to his body. S. Irenæus notices that Adam is

\* For instance, S. John Chrysostom, Hom. XII. and XIII. on Genesis.

formed "by the hands of God."\* Tertullian draws a contrast between God's "imperial word" in the case of other creatures, and His "familiar hand" in the case of man.† Others remark on the particular word "Formavit" or "Finxit" instead of "Fecit." S. Gregory the Great notices how man is "fashioned out of slime, as it were studiously" (*quasi per studium*).‡ Severianus of Gabala, a contemporary of S. John Chrysostom, has a suggestive passage, in which he observes that in the case of other living things God said, Let the earth bring forth, and body and soul came out together; but with man He made first the body and then the soul.§ No one will deny that the Fathers as a rule speak after this manner of Adam's body, and it may therefore be argued that whatever weight their authority lends to the opinion of the instantaneous creation of other living things, it lends more to a similar theory about Adam's body. At the same time it must be said that when the Fathers speak in these terms they are rather seeking to show the *dignity* of man than the precise point of the speciality of his body's creation.|| And they never use the word "immediate" or any equivalent; though it is true they deny the "ministry of angels." On the whole, what they do say may, it would seem, be reduced to this: God formed man, as to his body, in some special way, and with special intention, out of the slime of the earth. By the word "formed" it is suggested that the making of man's body was not a true creation out of nothing, but a fashioning out of pre-existent matter. As to the "special way" of this formation, except that it was instantaneous, nothing definite is to be found. And with regard to the material out of which the body was fashioned, viz., the slime, it is not expressly said that it was the immediate and proximate material; except for what is implied by the word *instantaneously*, it might have been merely the original and remote, just as it is in the case of men who are born in the ordinary way. And the great number of Scriptural and Patristic texts that allude to man's formation out of dust or slime, are all susceptible of interpretation in the sense of original or primordial matter; as is proved from the fact that many of the texts refer at once to Adam and to his posterity; now Adam's posterity are certainly not formed *immediately* out of slime or dust. It may here be observed, also, that from the Scriptural expression "dust" or "slime" the holy Fathers do not understand that no other substances entered into

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\* In *Prefatione* lib. iv.

† Lib. ii. *contra Marcionem*, cap. iv.

‡ Lib. ix. "*Moralium*," cap. 27.

§ Hom. V.

|| This is easily seen from a comparison of the passages in Petavius, "*De Opere sex Dierum*," lib. ii. cap. 1, nn. 4, 5, 6.

the composition of Adam's body. They admit that it is probably composed of all the elements, in various proportions; but that Moses, speaking with a special purpose and to an unenlightened people, thought it necessary to mention only the most obvious.

Let us now turn to S. Augustine. In accordance with his view that the work of the six days was simultaneous, he considers that a twofold creation of man is mentioned in Genesis; the first on the sixth day, when man, like everything else, was created in seminal ratio; the second (Gen. ii. 7) when, after a time, God "formed man of the slime of the earth." He also thinks that the evolution of Adam's body out of these causal ratios took place, not after the ordinary way of progressive growth, but "repente, in ætate perfectâ";\* and he compares such a "formation" to the changing of the water into wine and the turning of the rod of Aaron into a serpent.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the universal tradition of the Fathers is that Adam made his entrance into the world as a grown man; and also, though this is not quite so clear, that the body which, when united with the God-inspired soul, made up the man Adam, was instantaneously, or at least not by any usual process, evolved out of the elements of matter. We say this last is not so clear, because, though the Fathers everywhere undoubtedly imply it, they do not formally say it; because the question as between sudden production of the body and completely progressive evolution could not have occurred to them. It is remarkable that the one who speaks most clearly is S. Augustine himself in the passage just cited; and yet there is a certain amount of hesitation in his words;† and he might certainly be taken to be speaking of the question whether *Adam* was formed an infant, and not whether *Adam's body*, infantile or not, had grown by natural processes before the soul came into it; which latter is the question here at issue.

We can hardly help, therefore, taking it as "Catholic doctrine," that Adam first took his place in the world as an adult man, without having previously been either an embryo or an infant. But if this be so, it would have been less miraculous to fashion his body expressly for him and to unite soul and body together in the instant of fashioning, than to have taken a previously developed animal and, expelling or superseding the animal soul, breathed into it the soul of a man. This reason, together with the *superficies* of the literal sense of Genesis ii. 7, and the implied, if not express, consensus of the Fathers, and, we may add, the *sensus fidelium* also, which, though not well defined on the question, undoubtedly

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\* "In Genesim ad lit.," lib. vi. cap. 13, n. 23.

† An potius hoc non requirendum?

leans to the side of immediate formation,—all these reasons combined would make it—we are inclined to think—at least rash and dangerous to deny, that the body of Adam was formed immediately by God, and quasi-instantaneously, out of earth.\*

And what we have here concluded about the body of Adam, may be said still more confidently about the body of Eve. No one can deny that the Fathers are unanimous in asserting that, just as Adam's body was formed of the earth, so the body of Eve was formed of a rib of Adam, in the literal sense. Suarez declares this to be "Catholic doctrine"; and the only eminent man that has maintained a metaphorical sense for Gen. ii. 21, is Card. Cajetan,† who has never had a disciple. Eugubinus (Jerome of Gubbio, a celebrated Italian physician of the sixteenth century) held that the first created human being was *androgynous*, and that the formation of Eve was the separation of the two sexes. But he is quite alone, and his assertion has only served to furnish a paragraph of refutation to orthodox writers.‡ The body of Eve, therefore, was formed after the creation of Adam, out of his rib, immediately by God, and instantaneously; the last condition implying not necessarily strict instantaneity, but at least the briefest and shortest stages; not, perhaps, one instant, but at all events, not many.

Men whose minds are much occupied with physical science at first hand, or even who read books and enter earnestly into scientific problems and victories, and who at the same time are weak in supernatural faith, cannot fail to be shocked and repelled by the miraculous. God, when He works by nature's laws, works in such

\* *Propositio temeraria* apud censores Theologos ea est quæ in materiis theologicis sine sufficienti fundamento vel auctoritatis vel rationis asseritur; vel aliter ea est quæ communi SS. Patrum doctrinæ adversatur, aut quæ constanti theologorum sententiæ contradicit absque gravi rationis vel auctoritatis fundamento.—Montaigne, "De Censuris," n. 6 (apud Migne, *Curs. Theol.*, tom. i.)

† Patres omnes et universa Ecclesia usque ad Cajetanum ita Scripturam intellexerunt, ut tanquam rem certam et catholicam crediderunt Evam ex costâ Adæ fuisse formatam.—Suarez, "De Opere sex Dierum," lib. iii. cap. 2, n. 4.

‡ We have not quoted S. Thomas, nor even the later *schola*, such as Suarez and Berti, as authorities on the questions here discussed; because what they say, as distinguished from their arguments, is only a repetition of some statement of an earlier writer, and we are here inquiring for Patristic authority. Of course we have been guided throughout by their interpretation of the Fathers, and we could easily load our pages with voluminous citations. But they throw no light upon the precise question of *evolution*, because, of course, they had never heard of it. We think, however, that Suarez, for instance, will be found to go no further than we do, if it be borne in mind that the question is, what is right or safe from the point of view of Catholic faith.



silent ways, making every step hardly a step and every change so imperceptible, that the observer of nature finds his imagination beginning to make a sort of worship of the *gradual*. The miraculous becomes not merely a falsehood, but an impiety; it seems to contradict God's own acted word. But the eye that looks too exclusively on physical nature loses the habit of considering that nature is not the whole of God's plan. Nature was not made for nature's sake. The world is for man, and man means reason, free will and conscience. God's dealings with man are not confined to the mere conservation of nature. Every one who admits the Incarnation must admit the extraordinary—not to say the extra-natural. It would seem that, considering man's reason, and God's manifested care of him, we should even expect that the extraordinary will intervene at certain important points of his history. And it would seem, also, that his first appearance in the world was a fitting occasion for it. Taking for granted that man was to be a spiritual and immortal soul, and that his soul therefore was a special creation out of nothing, it does not seem incongruous that his body should have been "fashioned" after an extraordinary way.\* The first beginning of an order of things should correspond to the whole course. Man's body was to be the instrument of a spiritual essence, and to be ruled and guided according to far other laws than those of chemistry, of locomotion, or of instinct. Therefore it is right that it should have been specially formed. It is even questionable whether any animal organization whatever, not surpassing the wants of an animal, could have been a fit instrument of a rational soul, without special, and therefore miraculous, adaptation. We know, for instance, that the weight of brain in proportion to bulk is at least four times as great in man as in any animal whatever. And considering the enormously complicated play of fantasy, of emotion, and of sensitive memory, which is introduced by reason, it seems at least a reasonable supposition, though it can never be verified, that no apparatus of nerves and nerve-matter which would suffice for an irrational creature, would be fine enough

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\* Mr. Wallace's admission that man was not altogether developed by natural selection, is an example of how "scientific" men dread the shadow of the extraordinary. "The inference," he says, "which I would draw from this class of phenomena is, that a superior intelligence has guided the development of man in a definite direction, and for a definite purpose. . . . At the same time I must confess that this theory has the disadvantage of requiring the intervention of some distinct individual intelligence, to aid in the production of what we can hardly avoid considering as the ultimate aim and outcome of all organized existence—intellectual, ever-advancing, spiritual man." (*Contributions, &c.*, p. 359.) The "ultimate aim and outcome" of the act of a man who presents me with a house and estate is, in a certain sense, myself; but what "disadvantage" is there in the theory that I myself am not grown on the estate?



or extensive enough to provide that sensitive accompaniment which ever goes together with the independent spiritual action of the soul. And is there not much violence and improbability in trying to imagine the conversion of an animal into a man? All things are possible to God; but it would surely require a clear revelation to make us dream of supposing that an adult animal, with all its organs adapted to the narrow circle of a rough and elementary sensitive experience and fixed in the instinctive pursuit of a few objects of appetite, should suddenly vibrate with consciousness, and feel itself master of its choice and knowing right and wrong. But all who do not admit that the spiritual soul can grow, would, on the hypothesis that an ape suddenly became a man, be obliged to hold this. It is quite true that Mr. Darwin would not be affected by the absurdity of such a view; for he admits no soul in man that is different in kind from that of the brutes. And so the debate seems to resolve itself into this; shall we maintain special creation and the spirituality of the soul, or continuous evolution, and confound intellect with sensation? The spirituality of the soul is really the point at issue. If it can be shown that man's soul is proved by facts to be of a widely different *kind* from any power we know of in the brutes, no amount of experiment and no analogical physiology will ever bridge over the chasm between the two, or show that the higher can issue out of the lower. If, on the other hand, reason be only an extension of instinct and the spiritual only the material in a refined state, evolution becomes at once so probable that in examining its proofs we should set out with a strong presumption in its favour.\* We maintain, of course, that the spirit is one thing, the animal-soul quite another. And as we think that facts show this as convincingly as they can show anything, we will give here an outline of our case.

Powers, agents, or forces, can be known by their effects or phenomena. This is so true, in physics at least, that there are many who assert that all we can know of the constitution of a force or power is the synthesis or complex of its effects upon ourselves or upon other beings. But it is convenient to use the word "power," as expressing that nature or *φύσις* which, when in contact with other natures, is seen or known by certain resulting phenomena. Even if it be true—which of course we distinctly deny in the case of the human soul, at least—that there is nothing beyond

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\* No mention is here made of the argument from the revelation of the original justice in which man was constituted by his Maker; because it is defined, not that man was so *created*, but that he was so *constituted*; so that there might conceivably have been a time in which he had only natural gifts. But we need not say it is the more common and far the more probable opinion that our first parents at the moment of their creation received supernatural sanctity at the same time with the gifts of their human nature.

the group of phenomena, nevertheless the stability and unity of the group may fairly be represented by such a name as power. If, therefore, it be proved that two sets of effects or phenomena are different, it is evident that the powers or natures from which they proceed are different in the same proportion. But a difference may be of two kinds,—mere difference or disparateness, and proper difference or opposition. Opposites not only differ from, but exclude, each other. When two sets of phenomena differ so far that they exclude each other, there can be no doubt whatever that they proceed from powers or natures which exclude each other. Thus the analyst uses his test-papers and his tubes, and according to the phenomena which he obtains, he classifies the substance or nature under its proper name; or if the phenomena are altogether new, and exclusive of all others with which science is acquainted, he concludes that he has discovered a new substance, and gives it a new name. Exclusiveness of effects, then, is a test of difference of nature. But exclusiveness may be either relative or absolute. Properties or effects may exclude each other under certain circumstances, but not under others. A portion of gas may exhibit the phenomena of burning; another portion, under different circumstances, may refuse to burn; but it cannot be inferred that these two portions of gas are different substances; they are perhaps only relatively different. Now relativeness is of various degrees of transcendentalness. In plainer words, a fact that is absolutely true in one order may be only relatively true in another. Thus it is said that the very distinct sensations which we respectively call sight and hearing may be analysed, as to their exciting cause, into a repetition of one and the same primitive infinitesimal element. Thus, again, two highly complex and completely distinct organic substances may really consist of the same molecules, and these molecules, differing as they do in all their properties, may perhaps consist of homogeneous ultimate atoms. And we believe that philosophers make a further generalization, and think that the ultimate elements of all matter, ether, light, heat, or by whatever name force is called, may probably be found to be of one and the same substance. It may seem, therefore, that no two known natures absolutely exclude each other, except the last, unattainable elements of all natures. But we have now to notice the important fact that even these ultimate particles do not exclude each other absolutely. It may be said that a being gifted with an eye sufficiently penetrating could make sure that one of such atoms was not the same as another, from the very fact that it never could be another, or resolved into the other's elements (elements not being possible in the ultimate). The phenomena being always individual, the nature must be individual too, and thus they would be different individuals. It would be impossible to think of one atom as occu-

pying the same space, time, or place as another atom ; and thus it would seem, though this would not constitute a great difference, it would be an ultimate and absolute difference, impossible to transcend. But is it so ? Can we not conceive that neither space nor time nor locality exist ? Then, it will be replied, the atoms would not exist either. This we at once admit. But that is not the point. The question is whether there is a view of matter more ultimate and absolute than analysis into its own elements ; or rather, it is to show that if there exist such a transcendental analysis, it is absolute and ultimate in a true and proper sense. And it is evident that if an atom can be viewed independently of space and time, the atom so viewed will differ from the atom viewed under space and time in a way which is certainly well expressed by the word absolute, because it is an incomparably more fundamental difference than any other difference which our faculties know, or can know, in matter.

Two things follow from this last proposition. First, it will be evident that any independence of space and time which there is in the atoms (or, to leave the atoms, in material nature), will not be there by virtue of material nature itself—on the hypothesis, it is understood, that any such independence exists. Secondly, between the cognitive powers which apprehend the phenomena as under space and time and as not under space and time, respectively, there will be a great difference—a difference analogous to the difference in the phenomena ; that is, a difference as *absolute* as our faculties can conceive ; or at any rate, a difference so absolute that even if the word absolute be refused to it, man must invent some special word to express it, just as the difference between the phenomena under the two several aspects must be described at least by some word which transcends even the ultimate conceivable elements of matter.

For the sake of convenience, we may call a notion which pre-scinds from space and time the *abstract*, although the word has several other acceptations, and, indeed, is rather indefinite. But it will answer our purpose here. Now it certainly seems that few will deny that this “abstract” exists in our consciousness. But in order, not so much to prove that it exists, as to define more closely what it is, let us take one or two facts of consciousness, and try if we can discover it in them.

Let it be supposed that I am the spectator of a great battle. Posted upon the vantage-ground of a lofty tower, I see it begin, continue, and come to an end. Early in the morning, whilst the rays of the summer sun are yet slanting nearly level across the plain below, one host is coming into view and massing its battalions where the slight rise of the ground meets the sky. Opposite to it is the vast irregular semicircle of the enemy, half hidden in dips and hollows, one flank resting upon a wood, and a broad high-

road running through the centre of his position. The battle begins with the advance of a strong division on one side, and a heavy fire of shells from batteries of both the armies. The advancing forces are met by others; the sharp cracking and rattling of the rifles mingles with the roar of the cannon; more forces engage; the battle is general all along the line. The noise and the smoke confuses the spectator. There is retreat, advance, flight, first on one part of the field, then on another. Bodies of troops are broken, the dead begin to strew the field, and the bearers of the wounded pass swiftly between the battle and the rear. Brilliant masses of cavalry thunder down upon bright lines of bayonets that wither them with far-reaching death. Officers gallop hither and thither; the reserves come up; shouts as of victory are heard, and with a general advance of one army, the other is driven back, broken, put to flight, slain, or taken, until the wave of war seems to pass away over the sky-line from whence in the morning the attack had been made. The sun sets and the moon rises upon wreck, blood, dead and dying men, plunderers, slowly vanishing smoke, and what seems like silence.

All this scene I have taken in with my senses. Complicated as it has been, I have followed it with accuracy, estimated distances and velocities correctly, and formed a fair impression of what has actually been transacted. What is more than this, I have that scene with me still, although it is past never to return. I can recall it on the following day, a year after, now. And when I recall it, it seems to be the same in its details as when I saw it. The battle-field comes back to me with its apparent space and breadth, the horizon, the wood, the hollows, and the road. I realize the colour—the green of the grass and of the springing corn, with their different shades, the darker wood, the red and the blue of the massed troops, the glitter of helmet, bayonet, and scabbard, the flash of sabres, the lightning and black storm of the guns, great and small. I seem to hear the sounds. The din of roaring culverin and bursting missile, the noise of men and of horses, the far-off rushing, audible and desperate, though so far away—how clear they come back! And I distinguish in my fancy all the movements and manœuvres of that hard-fought day—the charges, the *mêlées*, the retreats, the pursuits. Many a slight and momentary scene or sound revives—the gallant rider throwing up his arms as the fatal bullet found him out, the plumed hat with which the field-officer on the white charger waved on his men, the mad riderless horse that galloped my way, the wild shriek that once and again had come up out of the uproar and appalled me. It all remains; not, perhaps, as fresh to-day as it was yesterday, but quite unmistakable; and it is probable that I shall carry it with me to my last moments. If I lose any of the details, I can often

recall them by first of all recalling what preceded or followed ; one fragment of the picture suggests another. And even if I meet with similar details in quite other scenes, my battle is brought back to my imagination. The harmless firing of volunteer artillery recalls the fearful volleys of that day. I cannot see the smoke of a weed-fire hanging in the air of a March afternoon, or watch the mists curling along the sides of a wooded hill after rain, without having the lurid canopy of that field in my thought again. When I mount a church-tower and look out over Yorkshire wold or Cornish moor, I range my armies as they once stood on another plain far away. The smell of the blue-bells never fails to make me think of that day, for there was a patch of blue-bells under the trees by my post of observation. Whenever I see again that peculiar arrangement of the clouds that marked one moment of the day, I recollect the tremendous rush of cavalry there was just then. Nay, if I had reason during the fight to fear for my own life or safety, there are moments when a tremor of my nerves, proceeding from fear or from ill-health, or from surprise, will carry me back from the midst of a crowd and from the engrossment of interesting conversation to the moment when I stood solitary and anxious so long before upon the tower.

Upon such undoubted facts as these, which of course no one denies, it is observed, first, that there is a certain internal process by which we reproduce in our consciousness what has once impressed our senses. Shall we call this process *Thought* ? There is no doubt that nearly all modern English and French metaphysicians call it *Thought*. But it is not the custom of Catholic philosophy to use the word *Thought* in this sense. The reason of this is on the surface ; for it is evident, in the second place, that all the internal process that has been described above is a mere reproduction of the sensible. I have nothing more when I recall the battle than I had when the battle was going on ; indeed, not so much. If there was colour, locality, external shape, motion of body, and the passing of time, in the phenomena of the battle, all these reappear in my reconstruction of it. Take the point of time, which may seem the least likely to be reproduced. It is certain that if I recall the battle exactly as it happened, I shall be just as long over doing so as it really lasted when it was fought. An incident is made up of other incidents ; and the ultimate element of all sensible incidents is an infinitesimal "shock of the sense" ; the feeling or consciousness of time consists in the consciousness of "before and after" in sensible impressions. It is unavoidable, then, that if an incident or a succession of incidents be reproduced in the imaginative way just described, the time occupied in doing so must be the same as that which the incidents occupied when they really occurred. But incidents never are reproduced with

absolute exactness, or with anything like it. A continuous impression is made on the senses when such a scene as a battle is transacted in their presence; but of the enormous multitude of minute "shocks" only certain of the more vivid groups can be reproduced; just as the wind that moves the leafy branches of the trees leaves no record of its ceaseless activity except when it has risen to a gale and torn away trophies of its force. Thus time is always found in the pictures drawn by the imagination, as far as the imagination reproduces. And indeed that time and all the other sensible accompaniments should be there as they were when the impressions were first made is only what might have been predicted beforehand. For this image-producing or picture-painting is nothing but a continuation of the actual sensible impression. Whatever be the nature of the thrill or vibration or undulation that is the condition of sensation in brain and nerve, that condition has a tendency to continue, and will continue, until it meets with conditions powerful enough to expel it; just as a long chain suspended from a high vault swings for hours after it has been set in motion. And even if the nerve-condition—which, however, be it observed, is not the whole of the fact of sensation—even if this condition be thought to have ceased, it can be made to begin again without any such external impression. In either case the nerve-condition is precisely the same in reproduction as in actual experience. And this alone is sufficient to prove that whatever there was in the sensible experience, so much and no more is there in imaginative reproduction.

We all know that it is said of some people that they never reflect. Taken literally, of course, the case never happens. However habitually a human being may be taken up with what his senses tell him, he cannot help making some kind of rudimentary reflection on what passes before him. But let us suppose that we had actually found a man who never had had any ideas or consciousness except such as imply place, space, colour, and time. Let us suppose that the man who witnessed the battle already mentioned had lived for several years after it, and neither during its occurrence, nor since, had travelled out of the region of impressions and reproduction described above. And let it be supposed that, one day, under circumstances of peculiar quietness and solitude, there suddenly arose within his mind a reflection—the reflection, for instance, that the battle after all was utterly *useless*. Surely this is a step into a higher atmosphere. He did not see that in the battle itself. "Utility" did not come in through his eyes and ears. It certainly did not exist in the battle. For the same reason it could not have existed, and so been impressed on his sense, in any other battle or in any other incident whatever. Besides, even if it were possible that it had existed elsewhere, and been caught by the



sense, the difficulty would still remain of accounting for its connection with that particular battle—connected, be it observed, not as when one sight or sound suggests another without suggesting a relation, but by a definite process of affirming the battle to be what it did not at all declare itself to be. Can a relation, or an affirmation be given in sensible impression—in reiterated shocks of the sense? This is the deeper question which is forced upon us. We may leave out of consideration the abstract “utility” and the difficulties attending its origin and application. The question is, Can the sense say anything, make a judgment at all? Can it furnish the blank formula of judgment—the “is,” in “A is B”? The grass of the battle-field was green, and the sense gave both the grass and the greenness; but did it *affirm* that “the grass is green”? It may be answered that “grass” and “green” together form one complex sensible object, which is an object under space and time, and therefore of sense. But against this the rejoinder at once is, that the sense may indeed take in and report (so to speak) a complex object, but that in this case the question is, not about the complex object, but about the *complexity* of the object. It is one thing to see “green grass,” and evidently quite another to affirm the *greenness* of the grass. The difference is all the difference between seeing two things united and seeing them *as united*. It may be further contended that “grass” is an object of sense, and “greenness” also is an object of sense, being the remembrance or revival of a certain frequently-repeated sensation, which, in order to label it, has been denominated greenness; and since both the terms of the judgment are objects of sense, the juxtaposition or composition of the terms may also be effected by the sense. But the reply again is evident. “Green” in the sense of “greenness” cannot have come from the sense—that is from any faculty which is impressed only by a repetition of shocks in space and time; for, first, it is not the greenness of any particular object, but greenness in general; secondly, it is not the greenness of all the green objects experienced in the past, but, as is admitted, a general idea acquired from these, and labelled or named; and, thirdly, even if it were the greenness of a particular sensible object, the sense, as we have already contended, could not have given it, because the sense only gives “green.” A further important consequence follows. If in the judgment “the grass is green,” “green” cannot have come altogether from sense; then neither can “grass” have come altogether from sense. In other words, “grass” seen or known by sense is a different mental object to “grass” as the term of an affirmation or judgment. For, in this particular judgment, of what is “green” affirmed? Of this plant called “grass.” But “green” is a part of the object “grass,” as it comes to the sense. The sense knows no such thing as green and no such thing as grass as existing



separately, over against each other, comparably ; it only knows a particular plant which would not (by hypothesis) be this particular plant at all unless it were green. And therefore, just as the term "green" in the affirmation contains in it an element not furnished by sense, so does the other term "grass." It is evident then, that not only must we say of a judgment that the relation it expresses by the word "is" cannot have been furnished by sense-impressions, but we must also say that the very *terms* of that relation or judgment must also have been derived from another source.

It need hardly be insisted that the terms of this judgment, let alone the "is" of the judgment, are independent of space and time. Not only so, but they so absolutely exclude and transcend space and time that to think them under space and time would be to destroy them. "Green," as we have so often said, is not this greenness, but greenness in general ; but no such thing as greenness in general exists in *rerum naturâ*, or can be conceived to exist. But if greenness be thought under space (so much) and time (so long) then it is no longer greenness, but some green thing. And "grass," also, in the judgment, is independent of space and time. For to judge that grass is green implies, as we have said, a mental separation of this grass from its greenness ; for you cannot compare two things between which no separation exists. But this grass does not exist in space or time separated from its greenness ; and so far as it is thought under space and time, it actually is (the same as) green. Therefore as it occurs in the given judgment, it excludes space and time. And the same reasoning might be made as strongly in regard to the copula, "is." If a brute could think "is," brute and man would be brothers. "Is," as the copula of a judgment, implies the mental separation and recombination of two terms that only exist united in nature, and can therefore never have impressed the sense except as one thing. And "is," considered as the substantive verb, as in the example "This man is," contains in itself the application of the copula of judgment to the most elementary of all abstractions—"thing," or "something." Yet if a being has the power of thinking "thing," it has the power of transcending space and time by dividing or decomposing the phenomenally one. Here is the point where Instinct ends and Reason begins.

If it were not a fact that such books as Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Principles of Psychology" are written and read by intellectual men at the present day, it would seem superfluous to go on to say that the faculty which elaborates what we have called "the abstract" cannot be the same faculty as that which receives and conserves the sensible. The simple reason is, that they necessarily exclude each other. The faculty which is affected by the shock or impact of the external object, must convey the object under space-

conditions and time-conditions, and, if so, must revive it and reproduce it under the same conditions. But the mind, as we have shown, has notions or ideas which, as a condition of their thinkableness, exclude space-conditions and time-conditions. Therefore it is impossible that the latter class of notions can reside in or be elaborated by, the faculty which takes note of the former.

In making the foregoing observations the simplest example has been taken, an example hardly one degree removed from the blank formula of judgment. But it is evident that the spectator of our battle, if he were a reflecting man, and much more if he were an educated thinker, would have thought much and made innumerable reflections on that battle—reflections which, if set down, would make the evidence for the existence of a higher order of thought (or as Catholic philosophers prefer to call it, thought proper) not perhaps more evident, but much more vivid and impressive. He might have written a description of the battle, and in the course of it he would no doubt have speculated and reasoned about it from various points of view. He would have examined the End or purpose with which it was fought by both sides respectively, and how far each had succeeded or failed. In the course of this examination he would have spoken of such highly abstract ideas as the State, the Family, the Individual; he would have generalized on Religion, on Politics, on Finance; he would have touched, perhaps, on difficult questions of morality and looked into the obscure depths of Free Will. Amid the smoke and the noise of the field he would have seen the Hand of God and read the lessons of Providence. The massed squadrons would have been in his eyes Christian men and immortal souls; the idea of Judgment would have made him shudder as death was busy, and the terrors of a Future State would have made that scene of carnage indefinitely more serious and terrific. Or if he confined himself to mundane reflections, he might have entered into a wilderness of hypothetical calculations and possibilities, tending to prove the tactics a mistake and the commanders foolish blunderers; and he might have filled page after page with chains of consequences and serried demonstrations. All this complex reasoning would rest, so to speak, on that scene which he bore away in his imagination when he descended from his tower of observation; but it would be a new world—a world colourless, bodiless, out of space, out of time; a world that his eye had not discovered on the earth or in the clouds, but which a higher vision than that of the body—a power so high that it is an image of the Highest—had furnished forth to his intelligence and made quite as real as the world that struck upon his sense. A broad comparison between the world of sense and the world of reason, we say, tends to impress the observer with the truth of the assertion, that sense and reason themselves are two absolutely different things. On the

one hand there is the concrete singular, alone or grouped and combined, capable of affecting the sensory nerves of the human body with repeated shocks, from whose quicker, slower, and variously combined impressions, there arise all those differences of consciousness that are called colour, hardness, distance, locality, space, time, and the rest. On the other hand, there is the equally varied realm of reason and reflection, of antecedent and consequent, of doubt, opinion, certainty, of analysis and classification, of daring views and profound speculation, of infinitely progressive syllogizing and never-ending intellectual advance, of grand thoughts and worshipful ideas; all of which phenomena of our inner world are the evolution and the synthesis of the primitive "abstract"; of that primary operation whereby the mind views the quality or thing as separable from its conditions of existence, and as comparable with, or standing over against, something which is actually part of it as far as it is presented by the sense. For obvious reasons, especially in these days of analysis and evolution, we have compared together the primary elements of these two realms of consciousness—the primordial shocks of sensibility with the primitive constituent of thought. Their difference seems to be completely evident. And their centres of elaboration must be different also—as different as any two things can be conceived different within the circle of the created. The one power, sense and imagination (which for the purposes of the present discussion need not be distinguished) man has in common with the brutes; and the power of action which is its correlative, a power acting, necessarily, without knowledge of means and end as such, and automatically, is called Instinct. The other power, reason, is solely human; and its activity is free, spontaneous, and completely reflex, and is called Intelligence. Intimately as the two are connected in man, yet there are phenomena in which their distinction seems almost discernible to the eye. One of these is the remarkable effect produced on each respectively by the excessive activity of their respective objects. Any excess of a primary object of sensibility, such as colour, is first painful and ultimately destructive to the sense. The reason is easy to see; excessive rapidity of impact in the primitive elements of sensible excitement acts upon the organ in such a way as to disintegrate its tissues. But with regard to the "abstract" or anything compounded of "abstracts," no amount of clearness, luminousness, definiteness or intensity produces any effect of pain. The sensible eye may be blinded by light, but the eye of the mind was never blinded by Truth. The idea is absurd. And there is another fact closely allied to this. It is the suggestive fact of the co-existence of contradictory states of activity in the mind. Allusion is here intended, not so much to the way in which the seeing-power of reason gradually calms the blind outbreak of the sensibilities;

but to the fact that a man sometimes has what seem to be two contradictory sets of activities going on at once within him. Take, for instance, the case of hunger. On the one hand, the hungry man experiences a feeling of discomfort and pain owing to a physical condition—the inaction of the alimentary canal; and this is accompanied by a desire for food, and, if food be present, or only imagined to be present, by the nascent activity of all the muscles and organs that are used for seizing and taking food. Here we have hunger as a pain, food as a desire, and activity actually commenced. On the other hand, let us suppose the hungry man to have resolved, for some reason or other, not to eat just then. In this case we have, at the same time, hunger as a pleasure, food rejected and activity controlled. Surely it is impossible that these *contradictory* states and activities—pleasure and pain in the same thing—desire and rejection of the same—activity striving and controlled about the same—it is impossible that these contradictions should exist in one and the same immediate subject. As soon could a man sit and run, be asleep and awake, be in a fever and be quite well, at one and the same moment.

It seems to us, then, that the absolute difference between Imagination and Reason, Instinct and Intelligence, rests upon the ground of incontrovertible fact. But in order to meet the many specious objections which we admit may be raised, we must dedicate the remainder of our space to a consideration of Instinct and its phenomena.

There is no doubt that the apparent knowledge of end and means possessed and acted upon by some of the brutes is among the most difficult facts to be accounted for without allowing them the possession of reason. Mr. Darwin quotes the following two anecdotes in his recent work; they are perhaps the strongest facts he has adduced, though, of course, there are plenty of such stories to be met with both in books and out of them.

Mr. Colquhoun winged two wild ducks, which fell on the opposite side of a stream; his retriever tried to bring both over at once, but could not succeed; she then, though never before known to ruffle a feather, deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned for the dead bird. Colonel Hutchinson relates that two partridges were shot at once, one being killed, the other wounded; the latter ran away, and was caught by the retriever, who on her return came across the dead bird; she stopped, evidently greatly puzzled, and after one or two trials, finding she could not take it up without permitting the escape of the winged bird, she considered a moment, then deliberately murdered it by giving it a severe crunch, and afterwards brought away both together. This was the only known instance of her ever having wilfully injured any game. Here we have reason, though not quite perfect, for the retriever might have brought the wounded bird first, and then

returned for the dead one, as in the case of the two wild ducks.—“Descent of Man,” vol. i. p. 48.

This is a fair example of what induces Mr. Darwin and others to assign reason and intelligence to the brutes, and to assert that they differ from man on this head only in degree. But what is it that is implied in such actions as these just described? \* Animals, as all admit, have the capability of feeling internal states or conditions of their organism, as for example, hunger, thirst, and other kinds of pain. Moreover, they have external sensations; the circumstances round about not only move them, but make them feel. Now, the analogy of our own experience proves that this combination of internal and external feeling gives rise to a tendency; the animal that feels hungry and sees food, feels an attraction or longing for it. This tendency, which is physiologically a nascent excitation of the organs by which the pain or inconvenience is overcome, at once, therefore, puts in play any apparatus that may exist in the animal which may be suitable for the attainment of its want. That is to say, the animal feels its own organization and is borne forward, by the fact of its being alive, to certain ways of acting; sensibility conveys to it the presence of those external objects which are suitable to it; the twofold consciousness, causing excitement of the nerve-fibres, causes also contraction of those muscles which are intimately united with them, and external action is the result. All this is implied in instinct. And yet all this does not imply the “abstract,” even in its most primitive element. Doubtless instinct has an infinite number of gradations. Between the hydra that has no nervous system at all, and holds its food fast by the mechanical squeezing of the simple *sac* that constitutes nearly all its organism, and the hunting cat, that calculates its distance to a hair’s breadth when it leaps upon the bird in the hedge, the degrees of complexity of nerve-centres and muscular centres are innumerable. But they are only degrees—degrees of greater or less complexity in the reflex action that is the result of nervous excitation.

But two important observations must here be made. The first is, that animals, since they have sensation, have also imagination. That is to say, their nervous system has the faculty not only of receiving, but of retaining impressions; and not only of retaining, but of reproducing them. The nerves which constitute the sensorial organs are grouped in distinct centres. In proportion as these centres satisfy certain conditions, so are sensations retained in them

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\* We here acknowledge some obligation to M. Joly’s book upon Instinct, named at the head of this article. It is a work in which the difference between instinct and intelligence is explained and proved at length in the most solid and satisfactory manner.

more vividly; and, being retained, they of course influence other connected centres, and produce various motions in the locomotive organs. If, therefore, it be granted that locomotion is a consequence of sensation, it must also be granted that locomotion may result from revived sensation, that is, from the operation of the imagination. And when several sensations are revived (just as when several sensations are present) the action of the animal will correspond to that sensation, or group of sensations, which, for whatever reason, is most strong and lively.

The second observation is, that not only the sense, but the muscular system is liable to the influence of what is called Habit. The organs may become *habituated* to certain determinate motions. In proportion as these motions are repeated, they grow more and more easy; intermediate sensations, by which, in the first instance, the motions had been brought about, disappear, and the connection between a want or a sensation and a movement becomes so constant and necessary, that the one follows the other, so to speak, unconsciously. A canary, for instance, that at first draws his water with difficulty, soon draws it easily and quickly. Thus, habits modify instincts; or, rather, they are additional instincts. An instinct is a congenital habit; a habit is an acquired instinct.

If we bear these facts in mind, it is not difficult to explain what is meant by the "education" of animals. To educate an animal is to excite certain artificial relations between its sensations, and so to superinduce a habit or habits of movement which are not natural to such animal. Here is Brehm's description of the education of a personage who has been rather prominently before the public lately. The learned naturalist is speaking of the ape: "It is easy," he says, "to teach an ape to do a thousand feats. You show him clearly what you want him to do, and then you thrash him until he does it as you want. This is the whole art of educating an ape! As a general rule, an ape will learn any feat you please in the course of a couple of hours; and then you have only to make him repeat it from time to time, for he soon forgets what he has learnt."\* And it is well known that bears are taught to act by putting them on hot tiles, and playing a drum and fife. Here an artificial relation is produced between the sound of the fife and pains alleviated by motion; and the corresponding motion follows and becomes a habit. So with the ape. A connection is established in the sensitive system of the animal between a gesture, a beating, and the performance of a certain trick; and this relation reproduces itself in the nerves whenever the gesture is repeated.

The explanation, therefore, of the actions of the two retrievers in Mr. Darwin's example does not seem far to seek. Let us take

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\* Brehm, *Les Mammifères*, p. 12.



the first. The animal had been educated to carry and not to kill; that is, its natural instinct, which would have urged it to destroy and tear what it found, had been modified by means resembling those used in the case of the ape and the bear, so that it carried game to its master's feet. It had been well educated, and the habit was very strong. Under these circumstances the animal has two wounded wild ducks before it. A great complication of instincts and habits at once besets it. First, the instinct to kill and tear; secondly, the instinct to hold fast; thirdly, the habit of carrying without killing; fourthly, a desire or emotion to be at its master's feet with something or other, dead or alive (for it had often carried dead birds). We may take for granted that it would act in accordance with the most vivid of these habits or instincts. Taking the actual results, therefore, a fair hypothesis would be that the instinct of holding, or not allowing to escape, was the strongest feeling, and therefore the dog killed one of the birds. The act would be a not very complicated case of instinct, such as one sees in every hunting animal; the wounded and fluttering bird irresistibly suggesting the sensation of escape. But as soon as one bird was dead, the same phenomena were not suggested by the other, because the dog had it fast; and, therefore, the "taught" habit of carrying without hurting was not interfered with. Exactly the same kind of answer may be given in the second case. The instinct of holding or keeping (not allowing to escape) was decidedly the predominant feeling, and the dog acted in accordance with it. It looked "puzzled," no doubt; any animal with conflicting desires would look puzzled, like the traditional ass between the two bundles of hay. The reason is, that the mechanism of sensation, and corresponding muscular action, is not adjusted *in instanti*, but requires a lapse of time, greater or less, according to the complexity of the circumstances.

Every single case that has ever been brought forward, or that can be brought, of the "intelligence" of animals—and no one admits more readily than ourselves the marvels to be met with in animated nature—may be explained on such principles as we have stated. It must be remembered that we establish the spirituality of the human soul—that is, the absolute difference of reason from sensation—on grounds taken from internal human consciousness. What we have to do, then, when answering difficulties such as those here noticed, is not to prove that certain visible results produced by the movements of animals might not conceivably under other circumstances be the result of reason like that of man, but that they can be explained fully and adequately, in the given case, without assimilating their motive principle to human reason. Animals may have many of the external attributes and gestures of man; they may seem to adapt means to end, to be conscious of

right and wrong, to speak and understand language ; but all these phenomena are sensible, not properly conscious, without reasoning, without judgment such as man has, in a word without the "abstract."\* It would, of course, take a volume to draw out all the differences of detail between man and brute corroborative of this fundamental distinction. But perhaps enough has been said to show some *à priori* grounds for expecting that the human soul should have been specially created, and why no consistently reasoning thinker can ever hold that a monkey can develop into a man, understanding man as soul and body together.

We are so convinced that the question of the difference between matter and spirit is at the bottom of both Mr. Darwin's theories and of his blunders, that we have been led to dwell upon the subject, rather to the exclusion of any direct criticism of his book. The truth is that if we criticised in detail those chapters which speak of the intellectual and moral evolution of man, we should have to repeat the same complaint at every paragraph ; the complaint that he makes no difference of kind between the highest operations of man and the lowest ; between the operations of the animal and those of the man. It is this fundamental obtuseness that makes nearly everything in the "Descent of Man," except the stark facts, so unsatisfactory and even so contemptible. How can you reason with a man that can see no difference, except in degree, between the purely sensitive "talk" of a parrot, and the "universal" that is contained in the sentence of a man ? Between the animal affection of a dog for his master, and the abstract judgment implied in man's worship of God ? Between the act of a dog licking a friendly cat in its basket, and a man judging of right and wrong ? How, at least, can you argue with him except by showing, once for all, in some such way as we have endeavoured to do, that there are two absolutely distinct orders of internal phenomena in the human mind ? The position of Faith, then, with regard to theories of evolution appears to be this. It is not contrary to Faith to suppose that all living things, up to man exclusively, were evolved by natural law out of minute life-germs primarily created, or even out of inorganic matter. On the other hand, it is heretical to deny the separate and special creation of the human soul ; and to question the immediate and instantaneous (or quasi-instantaneous) formation by God of the bodies of Adam and Eve—the former out of inorganic matter, the latter out of the rib of Adam—is, at least, rash, and, perhaps, proximate to heresy.

It is to be expected that scientific men will answer Mr. Darwin's

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\* "All these (apparently human) tendencies in the lower animals are stopped dead, as it were, by the want of the faculty for apprehending universals."—Sir A. Grant, "Contemporary Review," May, 1871, p. 277.

"Descent of Man" on his own ground. Mr. St. George Mivart has already put the difficulties against natural selection in general in a light which must strongly influence the thought of the day, as his book becomes more widely known; and we expressed in our last number how very highly we estimate his labours. If he undertakes to criticise Mr. Darwin's latest effort, he will find his task the more easy in proportion as that work is weaker in argument and more fanciful in that propensity for extracting universals out of singulars which is a besetting sin with theorizing men of science. But while we most fully admit the value and the necessity of scientific answers to Darwinism, it must be remembered that a merely scientific answer cannot possibly refute such errors as we have been noticing. If the evolutionists were merely scientific, our answer could afford to be merely scientific. But the thorough-going evolutionist is one who appends a metaphysical, or, we might say, a mythological, conclusion to an induction of facts that can never be complete.\* To argue from the fact that men once dead do not come to life again, to the conclusion that Lazarus did not come to life again, is illegitimate; because there is another set of facts, viz., a God, a moral order, and a revelation, which are quite as real as the facts of death and non-resurrection. Hence to conclude peremptorily that Lazarus did not rise again, would be a mythological guess, not a scientific deduction; not to say that it would be a mythological blunder. It is the same with the beginnings of life and of existence. The limited number of facts which the observation of all possible observers can take note of has only as much value for purposes of deduction as natural uniformity has in the question of miracles. That is to say, uniformity in natural law, just as it is not absolute in the future, so it has not been absolute and indefeasible in the past. Therefore the certainty which it affords as to the nature of the beginning is only certainty in the absence of *à priori* probability to the contrary. But the evolutionists do not admit the possibility of *à priori* probability to the contrary. They set aside and deny such probability. Therefore their conclusions are not scientific, in any true and proper sense, but mythological; as mythological and as baseless as the speculations of the Antiquary in the romance, who thought he had discovered the site of Agricola's camp in the remains of a moorland hovel. And as they go beyond the lawful bounds of science, so those who answer them are obliged to insist upon much that is antecedent to science. This is, and must be, the position of all who hold a revelation and a moral

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\* An able article in the "Rambler," New Series, vol. ii. p. 361, uses the word "mythological" with regard to Mr. Darwin's first great work, "The Origin of Species," and argues somewhat as we do in this paragraph. The article is well worth reading.

order; and whatever it may be good and useful to attempt afterwards, it must first be clearly laid down that the pretensions of our adversaries are unwarrantable, that their method is illogical, and that nothing can be more truly unscientific than to make science responsible for conclusions, which the mere observation of facts cannot by any possibility prove.

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## ART. II.—THE RULE AND MOTIVE OF CERTITUDE.

*La Philosophie Scolastique Exposée et Défendue.* Par LE R. P. KLEUTGEN, S. J. Paris: Gaume.

*An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., of the Oratory. Third Edition. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

*Essays Philosophical and Theological.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. London: Trübner & Co.

*An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. London: Longmans.

IN July, 1869, we published an article on the "authority of the scholastic philosophy." We said that the foundation by Descartes\* of what is called "the modern philosophy" may fairly be accounted the severest intellectual calamity which ever befel the Kingdom of Christ. We spoke in detail of the disastrous results which have ensued from the divergence, now so widely extended through the Church, on the very foundations of philosophy: and we expressed our opinion, that the philosophical union of Catholics is the one pressing Catholic intellectual need of our time; the first, second, and third thing intellectually necessary for the Church's well-being. We affirmed (giving reasons for our affirmation) that there is one philosophy in particular—the scholastic—to which all eyes should turn as to the nucleus of such unity; and of which indeed the essential and fundamental principles should be

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\* The philosophical character of Descartes is very differently estimated by great authorities of this day. Professor Huxley accounts him as, more than any other man of his time, a representative of "the philosophy and science of the modern world" (*Lay Sermons*, p. 352): whereas Mr. Mill considers, that he carried "the abuse of deduction" "to a greater length than any distinguished thinker known to us, not excepting the Schoolmen"; and that "the premises from which his deduction set out" are still more exceptionable (pp. 610, 611).

admitted by all Catholics to be infallibly true. We pointed out at the same time how far this statement is from implying, that scholasticism is a perfect and fully satisfying philosophy; or that it may not need very important additions and more than a few corrections in order to present needs. And we proceeded to cite F. Kleutgen's strong testimony to both these conclusions. Then—the deference due to scholasticism having been entirely based by us on the Church's authority—we proceeded to vindicate her *claim* to authority within the philosophical sphere. And we concluded our general argument by indicating various readily accessible means—over and above her express *pronouncements* which in themselves are very momentous—for knowing (in order that we may humbly accept) her judgment on things philosophical.

In a notice of the same number, we mentioned that no less an authority than F. Franzelin, in treating no less vital a dogma than that of Transubstantiation, proceeds on the very principle which we had put forward.\* “What philosophy he uses is scholastic, and principally from Suarez; yet he introduces theories about *force*, wholly unknown to the scholastics, as an improvement and a complement of their doctrines.” “He adopts their main principles, yet he does not hesitate to improve upon and complete them. In one sense his theory is even a correction as well as completion.” It is a philosophical theory, devised by himself for the theological purpose in hand; though he subsequently found that it had originated with Leibnitz.

Now—so far as England at least is concerned—one great cause of philosophical disunion within the Church admits, as we have been always quite confident, of very easy removal. Many Catholic thinkers, of whom Dr. Meynell is one chief representative, have thought that philosophers of the scholastic following—Liberatore, Dmowski, and the rest—deny the existence of “an *à priori* objective element of thought stamped with the character of necessity and universality.” Now for our own part, as we frankly said in October, 1869 (p. 317), we hold with firmest conviction that such denial “lays its axe at the very root of all philosophy, of all religion, and of all morality. It is the one speculative misery of our time.” We cannot therefore be at all surprised, nor can we at all regret, that those who thus understand scholasticism should view it with profound aversion; though we do regret that they can have been led so grievously to misapprehend its teaching. We

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\* We should explain that this notice was not furnished by the present writer; but by a contributor, vastly his superior in philosophical knowledge and acquirement, who had seen and approved the article on scholasticism.

devoted therefore a second article in the same number, on "Philosophical Axioms," to the task of clearing up this misconception. We admitted that such writers as *Liberatore* devote their principal energy to those particular errors with which they have been brought into conflict; and that those errors—the doctrines of ontologism, e. g., and of innate ideas—are in the very opposite pole to those of Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley. But we pointed out (p. 168) that Dr. Meynell himself could not use stronger language than does *Liberatore*, on the cognizableness of necessary and immutable truth; and that F. Kleutgen—whom we must consider immeasurably the greatest Catholic philosopher of the present time—is constantly laying emphatic stress on the same verity. The chief purpose of our article meanwhile was to draw out various propositions, which, as we consider, are on the one hand in perfect harmony with theology and reason and recognized Catholic philosophy; while on the other hand they are precisely and saliently opposed to that desolating system (or rather negation) of thought, against which we have spoken so severely.

With a similar view of assisting to marshal Catholic forces against the enemy, we wrote an article in the following number on "Psychologism and Ontologism." Dr. Meynell was under an impression, that the tenet of "ontologism," against which various Catholic philosophers inveigh so severely, is no more nor less than the cognizableness by human reason of necessary truth. While such mutual misunderstanding as this exists among Catholic philosophers, they have no more power of co-operating against the common foe, than at this moment of our writing have the Versailles and Paris governments of combining against the Emperor of Germany. We were therefore eager to point out, that the existence and cognizableness of necessary *à priori* verities is not more firmly held by the ontologists themselves, than it is held by F. Kleutgen, their recognized opponent; nay, and by none of them has been set forth so powerfully and masterfully as by him. The characteristic tenet of ontologists is, that God is presented immediately to the human intellect as its Object; a tenet false in philosophy no less than in theology, and which, if it were admitted by Catholics, would only hamper them in their war with empiricism. At the same time we protested, in company with F. Kleutgen, against inflicting the very inappropriate name of "psychologism" on all who oppose "ontologism;" or, in other words, on all who deny that in this life man is gifted with the immediate vision of his Creator. We proposed that the word "psychologism" should be rather reserved to express that error, which is most extremely opposed to the ontologicistic, and no doubt immeasur-



ably the more disastrous of the two. Between both stands the fundamental Catholic verity—the doctrine of “objectivism,” as we proposed to call it—that there exists a large body of objective necessary truth, cognizable with certainty by man through that created gift which is called the light of reason.

Our preparations against the enemy having been thus more or less completed, our next business would have been, in accordance with our expressed intention, to begin the assault on our own account. In other words, having ascertained the conclusions which Catholics should combine to advocate, we were to have attacked the foe with those arguments, which might seem to us most solid and most available. Catholic education is on the advance; and educated Catholics are every day brought into closer and closer contact with what is sometimes called “modern thought.” Now “modern thought” in this technical sense, as is most truly observed in the “Pall Mall Gazette” of May 11th, “is a rising flood, which, if it rises high enough, will drown all the Christian congregations in their churches.” Either English Catholics must be much more completely equipped than they are now to encounter it, or the result will be far more serious than some are apt to suppose. To ourselves it had been a matter of constant regret, that we had not been able to do more service of this necessary kind; and we had at length every hope of commencing in one particular direction. Yet at this point we have unfortunately been detained by circumstances for almost two years; and we have thought it better to begin with the above recital, as we could not hope that our readers would carry with them for so long a period a memory of what we had projected. In our former articles we addressed Catholics alone; but in those now commencing we address all English philosophers without exception.

These for our present purpose may be divided into two sharply-contrasted classes, whom we may call objectivists and phenomenists respectively. The latter think that man has no knowledge whatever, except of phenomena, physical or psychical; nay, more correctly psychical alone;\* whereas the former stoutly maintain that man has cognizance of objective truth. We desire to take our own humble part in this momentous controversy. We hope firstly to demonstrate by argument, that there exists a body of necessary truth cognizable by man: and secondly to consider particular *portions* of that truth; such as the intrinsic distinction between moral good

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\* It admits of “no doubt,” pronounces Professor Huxley *ex cathedra*, “that *all our knowledge* is a knowledge of states of consciousness” (Lay Sermons, p. 373).

and evil, the axiom of causation, and the existence of God. We shall throughout consider Mr. Mill our chief antagonist; as being at once by far the ablest and by far the most highly esteemed of English phenomenists. We consider it indeed a singular benefit to the cause of truth, that we have to contend with one, so singularly clear in statement, accessible to argument, and candid or rather generous towards opponents. And we should add, both as a farther benefit to truth and as a peculiar attraction to ourselves, that he is always so intensely in earnest; that he regards philosophy as no mere matter of otiose speculation—as no mere instrument of intellectual drill and intellectual excitement—but as all-important in its bearing on man's daily life and practice. But before joining direct issue with him, a preliminary question has inevitably a prior claim on our attention. We wish to prove, that necessary truth is cognizable by man with certitude: but it is evidently impossible even to argue this question, until it is first agreed between him and ourselves what is the *test* of certitude; what are the conditions requisite and sufficient, that certitude may be established. To this preliminary question we must confine ourselves in our present article.

The question itself may be stated thus. Orthodox philosophers—we must be permitted to use the term—have built up a large body of theological (we refer of course exclusively to *natural* theology), metaphysical, psychical, social, physical verities, resting on sustained processes of reason: and these processes of reason have been partly deductions from intuitive truths, partly inductions from experienced facts, partly various combinations of the two. But before any scientific trust can be reposed in these conclusions, a previous inquiry must be answered. How is a thinker to *know* that these assumed truths are intuitive; that these assumed facts have been experienced; that these deductive and inductive processes are really valid, or in other words adapted to the inferring of true conclusions from true premisses?

Phenomenists will at once throw off part of the difficulty, by saying that there are no intuitive truths to be assumed. But they in no respect lessen their difficulty by this allegation. They may deny to man all *other* intuitional faculties; but they must still ascribe to him that intuitional faculty, which is called *memory*, and which indubitably no less needs authentication than the rest. This is a point of quite central importance, and to which we beg our readers' most careful attention. The distinction is fundamental, between a man's power of knowing his *present* and his *past* experience. Certainly he needs no warrant to authenticate the truth of the former, except that

present experience itself. To doubt my present inward consciousness, as Mr. Mill most truly affirms (p. 166), "would be to doubt that I feel what I feel." So far then the phenomenist and ourselves run evenly together; but here we may come to a very broad divergence. "I am conscious of a most clear and articulate mental *impression*, that a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is one judgment: "a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is another and totally distinct judgment. That I know my present *impression*, by no manner of means implies that I know my past *feeling*.

We would thus then address some phenomenistic opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible; and that the fact is proved, by various experiments which you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know, that you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply that you have the clearest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that present *impression*, which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that the present *impression* corresponds with a past *fact*? See what a tremendous assumption this is, which you—who call yourself a cautious man of science—are taking for granted. You are so wonderfully made and endowed—such is your assumption—that in every successive case your clear and articulate *impression* and *belief* of something as past, corresponds with a past *fact*. You find fault with objectivists, for gratuitously and arbitrarily assuming first principles: was there ever a more gratuitously and arbitrarily assumed first principle, than your own?

You gravely reply,\* that you do *not* assume it as a first prin-

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\* What follows does not apply personally either to Mr. Mill or Mr. Bain. The former, with that candour which characteristically distinguishes him, frankly confesses (p. 203, note) that "our belief in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate: no reason can be given for it, which does not presuppose the belief and assume it to be well founded." This admission was the more signally candid, because Mr. Mill must have seen that it furnishes his antagonists with a very powerful "argumentum ad hominem," of which indeed we hope to avail ourselves in our next number. Mr. Bain makes the same admission: "Deductive Logic," p. 273. On the other hand Professor Huxley (Lay Sermons, p. 359) says that "the general trustworthiness of memory" is one of those "hypothetical assumptions which cannot be proved or known with that highest degree of certainty which is given by immediate consciousness; but which nevertheless are of the highest practical value, inasmuch as the conclusions logically drawn from them are always verified by experience." The argument in the text applies directly to this view. Professor Huxley cannot legitimately even guess that *anything whatever* has been "verified by experience," unless he *first* knows that certain acts of memory testify truly.

ciple. You tell us you trust your present act of memory, because in innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory have been true. How do you know—how can you even guess—that there is *one* such instance? Because you trust your present act of memory: no other answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of urging, that *à priori* philosophers argue in a circle; whereas no one ever so persistently argued in a circle, as you do yourself. You know forsooth that your present act of memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true: and you know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true, because you trust your present act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round and round a "circle" incurably "vicious."

Remarks entirely similar may be made, on the validity of the inductive process. The proposition, that all the diamonds, which *I have myself seen* consumed by fire, were at that moment combustible—of *this* proposition we can well understand phenomenists saying, that it requires no further authentication than the trustworthiness of my memory. But the proposition that *all* diamonds on earth are always combustible—or even that the very diamonds which I saw burned were combustible *one day earlier*—who can say that *this* proposition requires for its knowledge nothing more than experience? It is *inferred* from experience; and its truth cannot possibly be known by me, unless I first know the validity of the inferring process, whatever that process may be.\*

Without at all prejudging then any question really at issue between objectivists and phenomenists as such, we may say that "primary truths" consist of two classes: viz., (1) *primary premisses*; and (2) the validity of one or more *inferring processes*. We may add, that the cognition of a primary truth as such is precisely what is called an "intuition." If these primary truths are guaranteed with certitude—but not otherwise—

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\* Mr. Bain admits *this* statement of ours as frankly as Mr. Mill admitted the former. "The most fundamental assumption of all human knowledge" is "expressed by such language as 'nature is uniform'; 'the future will resemble the past'; 'nature has fixed laws.' . . . Without this assumption, *experience can prove nothing*. . . . This *must be received without proof*. . . . If we seem to offer any proof for it, we merely beg it in another shape" (Deductive Logic, p. 227).

In case any of our readers should think it doubtful whether it *be* absolutely necessary for phenomenists to assume as a separate principle the validity of their inferring process—Mr. Mill indeed apparently does *not* account this necessary—we would point out (what will be very obvious as our article proceeds) that no part whatever of our argument depends on this particular statement.

there is a stable foundation for human knowledge in its entirety and totality. The inquiry then to be instituted is this. Firstly, what *characteristics* must be possessed by those truths, which the thinker may legitimately accept as primary? and secondly, *on what ground* does he know, that the propositions are true which *possess* those characteristics? Or to express the same thing in F. Kleutgen's words (n. 263),—firstly, what is the *rule* of certitude? and secondly, what is its *motive*?

There never was any answer but one given to this question by Catholics, before the deplorable darkness spread abroad by Descartes over the whole region of philosophy. (1.) Primary truths are those, which the human intellect is necessitated by its constitution to accept with certitude, not as inferences from other truths but on their own evidence: this is the *rule* of certitude. (2.) These truths are known to be truths; because a created gift called the light of reason is possessed by the soul, whereby every man, while exercising his cognitive faculties according to their intrinsic laws, is rendered infallibly certain that their avouchments correspond with objective truth: this is the *motive* of certitude. "It is conceivable," says Professor Huxley (Lay Sermons, p. 356), "that some powerful and malicious being may find his pleasure in deluding us, and in making us believe the thing which is not every moment of our lives." Quite conceivable, doubtless; but the light of reason makes man infallibly certain, that such a supposition is absolutely contradictory to fact.

This is the doctrine accurately and carefully elaborated by F. Kleutgen, in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th chapters of his Third Dissertation. "It is the light of reason which makes us certain of what the *sensus intimus* attests" (n. 263). "Proceeding from the facts furnished by experience, we advance to further knowledge by the principles of pure thought; but the truth of those principles and the reality of those facts are not certain to the mind, except through the light of reason which is inherent in the human mind" (n. 264). "The mind in thinking by reason has the consciousness of possessing truth, so long as it knows the agreement [which exists] between its thoughts and those principles which we call the laws of thought" (n. 274). Since the creature's "faculty of knowledge is created and therefore limited, no creature can be infallible in this sense, that by his own strength he can judge of *every thing* with certitude. In the creature infallibility is always united with fallibility, as being is united with not-being. Yet, just as the creature's being, though finite, is nevertheless true being,—so his *infallibility*, though limited, is nevertheless *real infallibility*" (n. 277.) "The principles wherewith we

begin, the logical laws which we follow in deduction, are *infallible*, as the rule whereby we judge the truth of our experimental knowledge" (n. 278).\*

We may be allowed to call this doctrine the doctrine of intrinsic certitude. We would so call it, in order to distinguish it from those theories, which rest certitude on some basis extrinsic to the mind itself: from Descartes's e.g., who rests it on the veracity of God; and from Lamennais's, who rests it on the consent of mankind. According to this, which we must be allowed to call the one Catholic doctrine on the subject, the mind's intrinsic light declares the objective truth, of whatever man's cognitive faculties subjectively avouch. Would we demonstrate that there are necessary verities? Would we demonstrate that this or that particular proposition is among this number? In either case it is requisite, and it is sufficient, to demonstrate that the human intellect, acting on the laws of its constitution, so declares. This is the foundation we wish to lay in our present article, for the controversy with Mr. Mill which is to follow. But before proceeding to vindicate its truth, we must guard against two possible misconceptions of our meaning.

In the first place it is abundantly possible, that men may *misinterpret* the avouchment of their intellect; and this indeed would constitute an important addition to the causes alleged by F. Kleutgen (see our preceding foot-note) for their proclivity to error. Both schools of philosophy admit this. The objectivist says to his opponent—If you will only look fairly at this and that intellectual fact to which I draw your attention,—you will not be able to deny, that such and such is the declaration of your cognitive faculties. And the phenomenist is not slow in making a similar retort. We hope ourselves indeed in our

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\* We should not fail however to quote the important elucidation which F. Kleutgen subjoins: "And that we may understand how little this prerogative [of partial infallibility] would justify human pride, let us observe the limits of that sphere within which [alone] it is ascribed to him. In our investigations we need experimental knowledge, not only in commencing our inquiries but during their whole progress; especially when we would apply science to the conduct of life. Now how many things are necessary in order to our arriving at full certitude by means of personal experience and other men's observations! What calm! what attentiveness! what impartiality! what efforts! what perseverance! How often it happens that a new observation, a more profound examination, an unexpected discovery, have overthrown the most accredited systems by taking from them their basis! If then our age glorifies itself for its progress in the experimental sciences, men should not be unmindful at the same time of the lesson in humility which should be learnt from that very progress," &c. &c.



next number vigorously to illustrate this fact: we hope to show, by appealing to this that and the other mental experience, that phenomenists have not a leg to stand on, when they deny that their cognitive faculties declare the existence of necessary truth. What we are maintaining in *this* article is, that such is the sole legitimate controversial ground; that the avouchment of man's cognitive faculties is his final and his infallible standard of truth.

But secondly we appeal to the mind's positive, not its negative constitution; or in other words we lay our stress on its *affirmations*, not on its *incapacities*. It does not follow, because the human mind cannot conceive a proposition, that such proposition may not be true; nay that it may not be most certain and inappreciably momentous. We express this qualification here, that we may distinctly explain the precise bearing of our main thesis; but we reserve our argument on the matter to a later part of our article.

Our main thesis then is this. "Man's cognitive faculties, while acting on the laws of their constitution, carry with them in each particular case their own evidence of absolute trustworthiness. All human knowledge has its commencement in various truths—whether of memory\* or of other kinds—which are self-evidently known as true, each by itself, under the light of reason." It would of course be a contradiction in terms, if we professed to adduce direct arguments for this thesis: because such profession would imply, that the self-evidence of these truths is a verity inferred from premisses; whereas the thesis itself states, that the knowledge of one or other of them as self-evident is an absolutely essential *preliminary* to all inference whatever. But we will (1) adduce for it strong *indirect* argument; and (2) (which is much more important) suggest to our readers such mental experiments, as shall (we trust) satisfy them of its truth. We state our indirect argument as follows.

Every one really knows, that he knows something besides his present consciousness: that he has had this or that definite past experience; that, through this or that moral or intellectual training, he has arrived at this or that interior result; and the like. There are some few most singularly constituted men who, at particular moments of their life, persuade themselves

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\* We are amazed that both Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mill concur in censuring Reid for his statement, that "memory is immediate knowledge of the past." (Mill on Hamilton, p. 134.) The statement seems to us not only indubitable, but even elementary; and we are sanctioned in this opinion by the high authority of Mr. Martineau (vol. ii. pp. 258-263). That which I immediately think of, in remembering, is surely my past experience. But the question is wholly irrelevant to our present purpose.

that they *doubt* whether they possess such knowledge; and we will presently consider their case: for the moment however we will put them out of account. Speaking generally then, every one knows that he knows something besides his present consciousness. But he *cannot* possess that knowledge, except through the exercise (past or present) of his cognitive faculties; and he cannot accept it, as *being* knowledge and not delusion, except by knowing that the declarations of those faculties are true. Now how can he know this? By the authentication of God? by the testimony of his fellow-men? But it is only by trusting the declaration of his cognitive faculties, that he can know or even guess the existence of God and his fellow-men; and still more, that he can know or even guess what God and his fellow-men testify. Unless therefore his cognitive faculties authenticate *themselves*, they cannot be authenticated *at all*. And if they are not authenticated at all, no man on earth knows anything whatever, except his own experience of this particular moment. Than this there can be no more clenching *reductio ad absurdum*.

Passing now to the direct establishment of our thesis, we appeal to each man's consciousness in our favour. That which his faculties indubitably declare as certain, he finds himself under an absolute necessity of infallibly knowing to be true. I experience that phenomenon of the present moment, which I thus express: I say that I remember distinctly and articulately, to have been much colder a few minutes ago when I was out in the snow, than I am now when sitting by a comfortable fire. Well: in consequence of this present mental phenomenon, I find myself under the absolute necessity of knowing, that a very short time ago I *had* that experience which I now remember. Professor Huxley may talk of "some powerful and malicious being," who "finds his pleasure in deluding me" and making me fancy what never happened; but I am absolutely necessitated to know, that I am under no such delusion in regard to this recent experience.\*

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\* In a passage which we quoted in a previous note, Professor Huxley seems to say, that the truth of what memory distinctly testifies, is not known "with that highest degree of *certainly* which is given by immediate consciousness," but is nevertheless in the very highest degree *probable*. If we rightly understand him,—with very great respect for his usual power and clearness of thought,—we must nevertheless say, that this seems to us the most unreasonable opinion on the subject which can possibly be held. If my memory may be trusted, those things which it distinctly testifies are known with most absolute certainty: if it cannot be trusted, its avouchment does not render them even remotely *probable*. Indeed what can be more violently unscientific—from the stand-point of mere experimental science—than to assume without grounds, as even probable,

And so with my other intellectual operations. My faculties pronounce, that my present impression of colour differs from another of which I retain a distinct idea; or they pronounce, that this trilateral figure, which I distinctly image in my mind, is triangular; or when I see two strips of wood lying in an oblong box close together and parallel to the sides, my faculties pronounce, that the one which reaches beyond the other is nearer than that to the further end of the box. In all these cases I am necessitated to know, that which my faculties declare as true.

As we have already said, there are some few most singularly constituted persons who, when contemplating their own mental phenomena, become for the moment dizzy with self-inspection; seized with vertigo (as one may say) with gazing down the abyss: and these men persuade themselves, that they do possess a power of distrusting their cognitive faculties. We would thus address such a sceptic, if we could obtain his attention. We appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. You are giddy for the moment and beside yourself, like a man in liquor. If you would correctly appreciate your mental constitution, look back at some given period of your life, when your faculties were braced and in full play, not paralyzed by morbid introspection. You were engaged in that anxious commercial speculation; or in that important lawsuit; or you were taking measures to avert imminent gout. Had you at that time the power of doubting, whether you had previously entered on that speculation, or engaged in that lawsuit, or experienced premonitory symptoms of gout? Or when your mother was at last pronounced out of danger, could you really prevent yourself from infallibly knowing, that you *had* been anxious? Or had you really the power of doubting, whether you had ever seen that sweet face before? You will reply perhaps—and indeed you are bound (we admit) in consistency to reply—that you have no reason to know you ever *were* in such circumstances; that you know nothing whatever about yourself, except your present consciousness. In that case we will practise on you a *future* experiment. Employ yourself in whatever most interests you; in studying mathematics or taking a part in glees. While you are so engaged, we will suddenly come up and seize you by the arm. Can you *now*, we will say, prevent yourself from infallibly knowing, that a very short time ago you were immersed in mathematical study or engaged in singing that glee?

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the very singular proposition, that mental phenomena (by some entirely unknown law) have proceeded in such a fashion, that my clear *impression* of the past invariably corresponds with my past *experience*?

However, whether or no we would succeed in curing this monomaniac, is an irrelevant question: for that he is a mere monomaniac, and moreover, that he has no real power of persevering in such scepticism, will be admitted by all our readers. For the consistent sceptic cannot possibly be a reader. He cannot understand one single sentence—unless, while *reading* the last words, he trusts his *memory* for the first. Now if he trusts his memory so far as this, he has ipso facto abandoned his sceptical position.

Phenomenists then, as we have urged, act suicidally in disparaging the light of reason; for it is only by surrendering themselves to that light and so trusting their memory, that they can know anything whatever *about* phenomena. They are very much given however to such disparagement; and they are very fond of alleging certain supposed difficulties. I see a straight stick in the water, and my faculties (they urge) confidently pronounce that the stick is crooked; or if a cherry is placed on my crossed fingers, my faculties confidently pronounce that my hand is touched by *two* substances. It is apparently for some such reason, that Mr. Mill lays so much stress on Berkeley's theory of vision. Men fancy themselves—such is Berkeley's theory—to see distance immediately; but in fact that conviction of distance is *an inference* and no immediate judgment whatever. Now we do not admit this theory except for argument's sake; and Mr. Abbott in his little volume called "Sight and Touch" professes to disprove it.\* But we cannot at all agree with the latter writer, when he says (Preface) that if Berkeley's theory were admitted, "consciousness" would be proved "delusive" and "doubt must reign supreme:" for on the contrary—so far as the controversy with scepticism is concerned—we consider the question one of complete indifference. All these superficial difficulties are readily solved, by resorting to a philosophical consideration, which is familiar to Catholics, though (strangely enough) we do not remember to have seen it in non-Catholic works. We refer to the distinction, between what may be called "undoubting" and what may be called "absolute" assent.

By "absolute" assent we understand an assent so firm, as to

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\* The present writer has never given his mind to it, and has no bias whatever on either side. Dr. McCosh ("Intuitions of the Mind," p. 114, note,) thinks Mr. Abbott's argument sufficient for part, not the whole, of his conclusion. Mr. Mill (p. 300) considers that Mr. Abbott has been conclusively answered by Professor Fraser in the "North British Review" for August 1864. On the other hand the last writer on the subject, Professor Huxley, takes part *against* Mr. Mill and Professor Fraser. See Macmillan's Magazine for June, p. 153.

be incompatible with the co-existence of doubt: but by "undoubting" assent we mean no more, than that with which *in fact* doubt does not co-exist.\* Now the mere undoubtingness of an assent does not at all imply any particular *firmness*; but arises from mere accident. For instance. A friend, coming down to me in the country, tells me that he has caught a sight of the telegrams as he passed through London, and that the Versailles government has possession of Paris. I had long expected this, and I assent to the fact without any admixture of doubt. In an hour or two however the morning paper comes in; and I find that my friend's cursory glance has misled him, for that the army has only arrived *close up to* Paris. The extreme facility, with which I dismiss my former "undoubting" assent, shows how very far it was from being "absolute." Its true analysis in fact was no more than this: "there is an *à priori* presumption that Paris is taken." But as no particular motive for doubt happened to cross my mind, I was not led to reflect on the true character of the assent which I yielded.

Now to apply this. Evidently it cannot be said that my cognitive faculties declare any proposition to be certainly true, unless they yield to that proposition "absolute" assent. But a moment's consideration will show, that my assent to the crookedness of the stick or the duplicity of the cherry—may accidentally indeed have been undoubting—but was extremely far from being absolute. Its true analysis was: "there is an *à priori* presumption, that the stick is crooked or that there are two objects touched by my fingers:" and *this* declaration of my faculties indisputably corresponded with objective truth. A remark precisely similar may be made, on my putatively immediate perception of distances; and we may bring the matter to a crucial experiment, by some such supposition as the following.

I am myself but youthful, whether in age or power of thought; but I have a venerable friend and mentor, in whose moral and intellectual endowments I repose perfect confidence. I fancy myself to see a crooked stick, or to feel two touching objects; but he explains to me the physical laws which explain my delusion, and I surrender it with the most perfect facility. He further expounds and demonstrates Berkeley's theory of vision; and here, though I have a little more trouble with myself, yet after a short consideration I entirely acquiesce. He proceeds however—let us suppose, for the purpose of probing the

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\* In our last number we used the word "undoubting" as synonymous with "absolute;" but we think that our present terminology is more conducive to clearness of thought.

depth of my convictions—to tell me, that I have no reason whatever for knowing that I ever experienced a certain sensation, which my memory most distinctly declares me to have experienced a very short time ago: or again that, as to the particular trilateral figure which I have in my thoughts, I have no reason whatever for knowing it to be triangular, and that he believes it to have *five* angles. Well—first of all I take for granted that I have not rightly understood him. When I find that I *have* rightly understood him, either I suspect him (as the truth indeed is) to be simulating; or else I pluck up courage and rebel against his teaching; or else (if I am too great an intellectual coward for this,) I am reduced to a state of hopeless perplexity and bewilderment, and on the high road to idiocy. So great is the distinction between merely “undoubting” and “absolute” assent; between my faculties testifying that there is an *à priori* presumption for some theory, and their testifying that it is *certainly true*.

Another objection, raised by phenomenists, turns on the divergence which exists among objectivists, as to what their faculties do testify. Thus many men do not think themselves to intue any axiom of *causation* at all; and of those who do allege such axiom, there are different schools each differently analyzing it. Many again do not think themselves to intue the intrinsic distinction between moral good and evil; and among those who do recognize this distinction, there are differences which may in some sense be called fundamental. This objection cannot however be maintained, unless its advocate first makes good a preliminary position. He must show that the difference, on which he insists, is a difference between what the intellect of different men declares, and not merely between what they *interpret* it as declaring. But we are perfectly confident that he cannot show this, for that it is not true. We shall examine the phenomena on which he relies; when we come to treat the respective questions of morality and causality.

A third objection has been urged against us, founded on the indubitable fact, that we may not, at this rudimental stage of our argument against phenomenists, assume the Creator's Veracity. Could not a mendacious creator, it has been asked—Professor Huxley's “powerful and malicious being who finds his pleasure in deluding” mankind—so have constituted the human intellect as that it should testify falsehood, and nevertheless have given men the same trust in its declarations which they *now* feel? We reply easily in the negative. To say that mendacious faculties can be infallibly known as trustworthy, is a contradiction in terms. No possible creator could any more achieve such a result, than he could form a crooked straight line.



We have now then sufficiently illustrated our fundamental thesis, that every thinker infallibly knows each successive declaration of his faculties to be true. And we have also sufficiently illustrated the first explanation, which we appended to that thesis; viz., that what he can ultimately trust, is the *declaration* of these faculties and not his own *analysis* thereof. We proceed to the second qualification which we made at starting. We appeal, we said, to the mind's positive, not its negative constitution: we cannot admit that what is inconceivable is therefore untrue. We side here with the vast majority of phenomenists,\* against certain objectivists; but we believe that our divergence from the latter is exclusively verbal. They say, e. g., that no trilateral figure is quadrangular, and that two straight lines never enclose a space, because in either case the supposition is *inconceivable*: but what they intend is, that such supposition *contradicts* what I know as true, by my very conception of a trilateral figure or a straight line. We think it however a real calamity that they have used the expression which we criticise, because it permits such writers as Mr. Mill to rest contented with a most inadequate apprehension of the objectivist argument.

In justice however to these writers, we must distinguish carefully between two different senses of this word "inconceivable": and this procedure will lead us, into what our readers may at first be tempted to suppose a digression, but which they will ultimately find to be no digression at all. Sometimes the word "inconceivable" is taken to mean "unimaginable," at other times "unintelligible" or "unthinkable." Now there is a large class of unimaginable things, which are by no means unthinkable; and no objectivist ever alleged, that the *unimaginableness* of a proposition is incompatible with its truth. We may express the distinction in Mr. Martineau's words; though we are not aware that this most able philosopher has ever adopted the particular formula which we are criticising, of inconceivableness being conclusive against truth. Ideas, he says (vol. i. p. 193), may be clear and thinkable, which "do not come before the *imaginative* or *representative* faculty." "You may deny the idea of the 'infinite,'" he adds (p. 194), "as not clear: and clear it is not, if nothing but the *mental picture* of an outline deserve that word. But if a thought is clear when it sits apart *without danger of being confounded with another*, when it can exactly keep its own in speech and reasoning without forfeit and without encroachment,—if in short

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\* Mr. Herbert Spencer is, we believe, the only exception; and that on grounds of his own which we need not here consider.

logical clearness consists not in the idea of a limit but in the limit of the idea,—then no sharpest image of any finite quantity . . . is clearer than the thought of the infinite." And so at p. 205, the author contrasts an "idea of the *reason*" with one "of the *phantasy*." "It is no objection," he adds (p. 238), "to either the reality or the legitimacy of a thought, that it is not of a kind to be brought before the mind's *eye*." So Dr. McCosh. "The thinking, judging, believing power of the mind is not the same as the imaging power" ("Intuitions," p. 195, note). Similarly speaks Mr. Mill from the opposite school. Take the case of some large number: suppose e. g., it were said that over a certain tract of ground there had been counted 27182818 potatoes. It is simply impossible to have this number in my *phantasy* or *imagination*, so as to distinguish it from 27182817 and 27182819. Yet says Mr. Mill (p. 100), "We have a" sufficient "*conception* of it, when we have conceived it by some one of its modes of composition, such as that indicated by the position of its digits." This "limited conception enables us to avoid confounding the number in our calculations with any other numerical whole"; and we can also "by means of this attribute of the number ascertain and add to our conception as many more of its properties as we please." In other words, this large number is most easily *thinkable*, though by no means *imaginable*.

This distinction, between propositions *imaginable* and propositions only *thinkable*, is in some degree correspondent, though not precisely so, with a distinction made by F. Newman, between what he characterizes respectively as "real" and "notional" assent.\* He adds also this obvious qualification, that multitudes of men, from indolence or other causes, give no more than a "notional" assent to propositions most easily "imaginable." And this circumstance, as F. Newman emphatically repeats in various passages, is often a very serious moral or intellectual calamity.

Now, as we have said, those objectivists against whom we are now arguing, undoubtedly use the word "inconceivable" to express not "unimaginable" but "unthinkable." We are led then to consider, whether any proposition can (in this sense) be truly called inconceivable, except those which actually *contradict* what is known by my very conception of their "subject." If there are none such, then our only quarrel with these philosophers will be, that their language understates the *positiveness*

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\* He thinks however (p. 43) that men cannot have even a "notional" apprehension of a very large number, such as a billion or a trillion. We are certainly disposed to dissent from him on this small episodic question.

with which man's cognitive faculties declare certain propositions to be necessarily false. But we think there *are* propositions, which may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable, yet which all Theists regard as indubitably true. We refer to religious *mysteries*.\*

Let us begin with an illustration, which has often been given by F. Newman. It is most easily supposable that there may be rational creatures to whom, as being incorporeal themselves, the union of soul and body is a veritable mystery. If it were revealed to them—or again if it were deducible from premisses with which they were acquainted—that the soul of man is on one hand spiritual and indivisible, while on the other hand it is integrally present throughout every particle of an extended body—such a proposition would be inconceivable to them. It would be inconceivable, in what Mr. Mill calls (p. 90) “the proper sense” of the term: it would be “that which the mind is unable to put together in a representation.” Their first impulse would be to think that it is a contradiction in terms.† But subsequent

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\* It is said in Göschler's “Dictionary of Catholic Theology” (article “Mysteries”), that theologians are extremely far from accord in their acceptance of this word. F. Perrone (“de Verâ Religione,” prop. 3) uses it substantially in the same sense with F. Newman, and we ourselves so adopt it in the text. F. Franzelin however (see e.g. “de Deo Trino,” thesis xvii.) employs the word quite otherwise; viz., to designate those truths, which can in no sense be intrinsically established by reason, either before or after their revelation. But it is very difficult indeed to find a substitute for the word, as expressing FF. Perrone's and Newman's idea: whereas F. Franzelin may most easily express *his*, by a phrase which also he often uses; viz. “superrational verities.”

† “The soul is not only one, and without parts, but moreover, as if by a great contradiction even in terms, it is in every part of the body. It is no where, yet every where. . . . No part of a man's body is like a mere instrument, as a knife or a crutch might be, which he takes up and may lay down. Every part of it is part of himself; it is connected into one by his soul, which is one. Supposing we take stones and raise a house, the building is not *really* one; it is composed of a number of separate parts, which viewed as collected together we call one, but which are not one except in our notion of them. But the hands and feet, the head and trunk, form one body under the presence of the soul within them. Unless the soul were in every part, they would not form one body; so that the soul is in every part, uniting it with every other, though it consists of no parts at all. I do not of course mean that there is any real contradiction in these opposite truths; indeed, we know there is not, and cannot be, because they *are* true, because human nature is a fact before us. But it is a contradiction *when put into words*; we cannot so express it as not to involve an apparent contradiction; and then, if we discriminate our terms, and make distinctions, and balance phrases, and so on, we shall seem to be technical and artificial and speculative, and to use words without meaning. . . . What (we should ask) was the meaning of saying that the soul had no parts, yet was in every part of the body? what was meant

consideration might bring to their mind, that, as F. Newman expresses it (Grammar, p. 44), their "notion" of a thing so entirely external to their experience "may be"—nay is almost sure to be—"only partially faithful to the original"; that the word "presence" may have a far wider sense, than any which they can ever so distantly apprehend. That their *notions* therefore of subject and predicate are more or less mutually contradictory, is no proof whatever that there is incompatibility between the *archetypes* of those notions. And we human beings indeed, in *this* case, are so well aware of the ludicrous mistake which would be made by these immaterial creatures if they reasoned otherwise, that we are mightily tempted to forget, how prone we are ourselves in other instances to a similar paralogism.

A proposition then may be called "mysterious" to some given thinker, when it would be rightly accounted by him self-contradictory, if he supposed that the notions which it conveys to him adequately represent their archetypes. It should be carefully observed however, that his faculties themselves convey to him an assurance of his notions *being* thus utterly inadequate, and of no contradictoriness being therefore necessarily involved in the proposition itself. And it is further worth pointing out, that such mysterious propositions may nevertheless give real—possibly therefore vitally important—information: though it would carry us too far from our theme, if we here enlarged on this truth.

Now as the union of soul and body might be utterly inconceivable to certain immaterial creatures, however strong their evidence for the fact;—so there are various propositions concerning God, rigidly demonstrable by human reason, which are nevertheless inconceivable to the human intellect. That He Who is absolutely Simple and Indivisible, is present throughout all space—that He in Whom is no succession of time, is ever diversely energizing—that in God there is no real distinction whatever between His Nature and His Acts—here are proposi-

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by saying it was every where and no where? how could it be one, and yet repeated, as it were, ten thousand times over every atom and pore of the body, which it was said to exist in? how could it be confined to the body at all? how did it act upon the body? how happened it, as was pretended, that, when the soul did but will, the arm moved, or the feet walked? how can a spirit, which cannot touch any thing, yet avail to move so large a mass of matter, and so easily, as the human body? These are some of the questions which might be asked, partly on the ground that the alleged fact was impossible, partly that the idea was self-contradictory."—F. Newman's Oxford "Parochial Sermons," vol. iv. pp. 325-8.

tions, at once humanly demonstrable and humanly inconceivable. We should add, that no mysteries added by revelation are *more* inconceivable, than those irresistibly authenticated by reason.\*

Mr. Mill excellently explains (p. 82), why it is abundantly possible that such inconceivable propositions may be true. "The inference" that "what we are incapable of conceiving cannot exist," "would only be warrantable, if we knew *à priori* that we must have been created capable of conceiving whatever is capable of existing; that the universe of thought and that of reality must have been formed in complete accordance with each other. . . . But an assumption more destitute of evidence could scarcely be made; nor can one easily imagine any evidence that would prove it, unless it were revealed from above."†

We implied a few pages back, that a proposition is necessarily false, which contradicts what is known by my very conception of its "subject." We should here explain, that this does not at all conflict with what we have just been saying about mysteries. The reason is this. When the archetype is apprehended by me as indefinitely transcending my *conception* thereof, various propositions are *not* "known by its very conception," which otherwise *would* be.

We have given then two reasons for deeply regretting the phrase used by many objectivists, that what is inconceivable is necessarily false. Firstly, even if no proposition could be called "inconceivable" except that which actually *contradicts* what is known by my very conception of its "subject"—still it was extremely to be desired that a stronger expression than "inconceivable" should be used to express this. But secondly the word "inconceivable" may very naturally be understood, as

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\* We earnestly hope we shall not be understood to characterize *all* propositions concerning God as inconceivable. God in most of His aspects can be apprehended by man (to use the common phrase) though not comprehended. Accordingly a great majority of the propositions concerning Him are readily conceivable, thinkable, intelligible, though not comprehensible in all the fulness of their meaning; while some few are inconceivable as explained in the text. Nothing e.g. in the world conveys a more intelligible and practical idea, than the affirmation that God is Loving, Veracious, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Holy. The same distinction applies to *revealed* propositions concerning Him. F. Newman (pp. 120-137) considers those various statements, which combine to express the dogma of the Blessed Trinity; and in a very masterly way determines, which of these statements admit of "real," and which of only "notional" assent.

† We were much disappointed on coming a few pages later (p. 119, note) to Mr. Mill's disparagement of "mystical metaphysics" and "mystical theology": for there cannot be a better defence of "mystical metaphysics," than the passage quoted in the text.

applying to every "mystery"; and if it be so understood, all Theists know that certain "inconceivable" propositions are demonstratively true.

Here then we sum up. Our direct thesis has been, that whatever men's cognitive faculties indubitably declare, is thereby known to be infallibly true. To prevent misconception however, we have added two explanations. (1) This infallibility appertains to what they *declare*, not to what they may be *understood* as declaring; and (2) it appertains to their positive declarations, and not to their incapacities. Now since Mr. Mill is to be our principal opponent in various succeeding articles, it is absolutely necessary before we conclude, to see how far we are in harmony with *him* on this preliminary question. We are hereafter to argue against him, that the existence of necessary truths is cognizable with certitude by mankind: but in order to discuss this with any satisfactory result, it is extremely momentous that he and ourselves should arrive at an agreement, as to what constitutes a sufficient *test* of certain knowledge. And we shall be able on our side to make our position clearer, if we begin by distinguishing it from a ground importantly different, which has been occupied by more than one English non-Catholic objectivist.

Mr. Martineau indeed—whom (notwithstanding extreme theological divergence and some serious philosophical separation) we cannot but recognize as at once the ablest and most learned of these—entirely agrees with ourselves (if we rightly understand him) on the question we have been discussing. "We have entire faith," he says (vol. i. p. 241), "in the veracity and the consistency of the reports given in by our highest faculties." And he uses similar expressions in pp. 47, 48, 101, 232, 237. He says again pointedly (p. 104), "be the proof what it may which authenticates the belief, it is the faculty in the last resort which authenticates the proof." Yet even as to Mr. Martineau, we wish he had spoken more uncompromisingly. "Our faculties," he says (p. 238), "must be either taken at their word, or *dismissed as cheats*." We wish he had expressly said, what he evidently holds; viz., that it is physically impossible to "dismiss them as cheats" or to doubt their declaration. It is a very serious loss to metaphysical science, that Mr. Martineau has never found time for writing a systematic treatise.

Dr. McCosh, in his most valuable work on "the Intuitions of the Mind," speaks as strongly as F. Kleutgen himself, on one part of our subject; viz. the *rule* of certitude. He maintains emphatically, that whatever the human faculties avouch, is infallibly certain *as* they avouch it. The capacity of cognition



in the mind he says (p. 17), "is not that of the bent mirror to reflect the object *under modified forms*, but of the plane mirror to reflect it *in its proper shape and colour*. The truth is *preserved* by the mind, not *formed*; it is *cognized*, not *created*." But when question arises on the *motive* of certitude, he often seems to turn off into a different groove. He often partakes in fact the error of Descartes; and implies that my reason for knowing the veracity of my mental constitution, is my previous conviction of God's Veracity. See third edition, pp. 30, 113, 116: see also p. 333, where his remarks are singularly unsatisfactory. In fact we suspect that this view possesses, more or less systematically and consciously, not a few speculative minds of non-Catholic England. Yet surely never was there an error more suicidal; and Mr. Mill in a few pregnant words utterly explodes it. We quote the passage with a few verbal changes (pp. 161, 162), and we italicise two sentences.

"If the proof of the trustworthiness of our faculties is the veracity of the Creator, on what does the Creator's veracity itself rest? Is it not on the evidence of our faculties? The Divine veracity can only be known in two ways: 1st. By intuition, or 2nd through evidence. If it is known by intuition, it is itself an immediate declaration of our faculties; and *to have ground for believing it we must assume that our faculties are trustworthy*. . . . If we hold that God is not known by intuition but proved by evidence, that evidence must rest in the last resort on the immediate declaration of our faculties. Religion thus, itself resting on the evidence of our faculties, cannot be invoked to prove that our faculties ought to be believed. *We must already trust our faculties, before we can have any evidence of the truth of religion.*"

We are bound in fairness to add, that Dr. M'Cosh, in his "Examination of Mr. Mill's Philosophy" (p. 54), expresses full concurrence with this reasoning.

Dean Mansel has undoubtedly conferred important benefits on philosophy, and we hope in our next number to profit largely by his labours. Yet we must frankly say, that on the matter discussed in our present article, his doctrine differs from Dr. M'Cosh's, signally for the worse. He concurs with that writer in holding, that God's Veracity is my reason for regarding my faculties as in any sense trustworthy; but he considers that argument as availing—not for the conclusion that their declaration is always *true*—but only that they are not so utterly *mendacious* as to be the mere "instruments of deception." "We may believe and we ought to believe," he says ("Prolegomena Logica," p. 81), "that the powers which our Creator has bestowed upon us are not given as *the instruments of deception*. . . . But in believing this we desert the evidence of Reason to rest on that

of Faith." According to this view, I could not know or even guess that my faculties are not mere instruments of deception, except for my belief that they are given by God. But *on what ground* do I believe that they are given by God? Because they by their exercise lead me to that conclusion. But how do I know that, in thus leading me, they are not mere instruments of deception? Because they were given me by God. But how do I know that they were given me by God? And so on with a vicious circle ad infinitum.

We would only add here, to prevent possible misconception of our meaning, that God's Veracity is undoubtedly a most legitimate philosophical premiss for the establishment of any conclusion, which is not *itself* required as a premiss for the demonstration of God's Veracity. For our own part, we think that a consideration of God's Attributes might with advantage be much oftener employed in philosophical argument, than is commonly the case. But this by the way.

We are now then to consider, how far we may count on Mr. Mill's agreement with ourselves, in holding that the genuine declaration of man's faculties is in every case infallibly true. It is by no means so easy to answer this question confidently, as might at first be supposed. At p. 152 indeed, he seems to speak unmistakably in our sense. "The verdict of . . . our immediate and intuitive conviction is admitted on all hands to be a decision without appeal." Again in p. 166: "As regards almost all if not all philosophers" he says—and by his very phrase he implies that *he* at all events is no dissident—"the questions which divided them have never turned on the veracity of consciousness."\* What Sir W. Hamilton "calls the *testimony* of consciousness to something beyond itself, may be and is denied; but what is denied, has almost always been that consciousness gives the testimony, *not that if given it must be believed.*" In the preceding page he says that no philosopher, not even Hume or Kant, had "dreamed of saying that we are compelled by our nature to believe" error. At page 161, note, he cites with approval Mr. Stirling's excellent statement, that it is the business of man's cognitive faculties to consider carefully what it is which they themselves declare: and adds pointedly and justly, (p. 166) that "we certainly do not know by intuition what knowledge is intuitive."

Yet in p. 171 he introduces a very ominous qualification of this doctrine. Men should only accept, it seems, "what con-

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\* It should be explained, that here and elsewhere he adopts under protest Sir W. Hamilton's use of the word "consciousness," to express, not merely "self-consciousness," but man's intuitive faculty.

sciousness," i.e. their intellect, "told them *at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity.*" There are "mental conceptions which become so identified in thought with all our states of consciousness, that we seem and *cannot but seem* to receive them by direct intuition." (Ib.) Some thinkers (p. 177) "may be personally quite incapable of not holding" a fundamental error. "We have *no means of interrogating* consciousness," i.e. our intellect, "*in the only circumstances* in which it is possible for it to give a trustworthy answer" (p. 172). "Something *which we now confound with* consciousness may have been altogether foreign to consciousness *in its primitive state*" (p. 185). He seems really to distinguish between the *primitive* and the *adult* state of man's cognitive faculties. He seems to imply, that the laws of man's mental constitution are changed during his progress from infancy to manhood; and that it is to their earlier not their later declarations, that we are to look for authentication of truth.

We cannot believe that Mr. Mill really intends this; and we will therefore for the moment content ourselves with a brief reply to his possible meaning. We will say this then. If the laws of man's mental constitution do really change in his progress from infancy to manhood,—then never was there a philosophical proposition more preposterously unfounded, than that assumed by Mr. Mill throughout; viz., that man's *primitive* faculties testify truth. On what ground does an adult trust his faculties? We know of no other answer, than we gave in an earlier part of our article. In each individual case he finds himself necessitated to know infallibly, what his faculties indubitably declare as certain; and he generalizes this by degrees into the universal proposition, that they are veracious. But all this applies to his *adult*, not his *primitive*, mental constitution; and if the former in any respect contradicts the latter, his reasoning so far does not apply to the latter at all. Mr. Mill professes, as strongly as we do, that no knowledge or experience is possible, unless the thinker first trust the distinct declarations of his *memory*. Is it only then the clear declarations of man's *primitive* memory, which Mr. Mill accounts self-evidently true?

For ourselves we cannot but entirely agree with Mr. Mill's critic, whom he mentions in his note to p. 173. We think it would be "contrary to all analogy," if man's cognoscitive faculties did not need and did not receive, as time advances, "development and education."

An argument, precisely resembling the above, applies à fortiori to a view which Mr. Mill ascribes (p. 175, note) to Mr. Herbert Spencer: viz. that "our primary forms of thought" are in many cases "inherited by us from ancestors by the laws

of the development of organization," and need not therefore correspond with objective truth. It is plain—we may observe in passing—that such a theory applies no less to *memory*, than to man's other cognitive faculties: and the view thus stated impresses us as indicating the lowest point of speculative degradation, at which "the progress of thought" has yet arrived. We should add however, that all readers of Mr. Spencer are unanimous in accounting him a writer of rare subtlety and genius.

Returning to Mr. Mill,—we cannot persuade ourselves that he really means what he seems to say; that he really regards man's mental constitution as undergoing a change between infancy and maturity, in such sense that its declarations of a later period can possibly contradict those of an earlier. Nor again do we interpret a singular expression in his "Logic," as indicating a real difference between him and ourselves, on what has been the theme of this article. Yet we cannot refrain from adverting to that expression. He says (vol. ii. pp. 97–8, seventh edition) that "the truth of a belief" would not follow even from an "irresistible necessity" of entertaining it; and that mankind might conceivably be "under a permanent necessity of believing what might possibly not be true." But though Mr. Mill here speaks very obscurely, we understand him as referring to a certain imaginary state of things, which *might* have existed; and not as denying that *in fact* man's reason infallibly authenticates its own authority. It seems to us, from his language in both works, that Mr. Mill has failed indeed (as we should estimate the matter) in clearly and consistently apprehending and bearing in mind the true doctrine; but that he has never intended to advocate a different one in preference. We shall take for granted therefore in our next number, unless we are admonished of being mistaken, that the controversy between him and ourselves turns in no respect on the *authority* of man's faculties, but exclusively on their *avouchment*.

On the other hand we fully admit, that again and again inferences are so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most easily mistaken for intuitions; and that, in arguing hereafter against Mr. Mill, we shall have no right of alleging aught as certainly a primitive truth, without *proving* that it cannot be an opinion derived inferentially from experience. It is our strong impression that this, and no more, is what Mr. Mill intends to urge, in the distinction which he draws between the primitive and the adult avouchment of men's faculties.

We think so highly of F. Newman's philosophical acumen, that it would not be fair if we did not in conclusion place before our readers a passage, in which he apparently gives the

weight of his authority to a different view from that which we have supported throughout this article:—

Sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle; but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning. We are sure there was a yesterday, and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than the side. So far as this we may be said to trust the mental act, by which the object of our assent is verified; but, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or of any capability or affection of our minds, over and above the particular act. We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience. Nor do we trust in the faculty of memory or reasoning as such, even after that we have inferred its existence; for its acts are often inaccurate, nor do we invariably assent to them.

However, if I must speak my mind, I have another ground for reluctance to speak of our trusting memory or reasoning, except indeed by a figure of speech. It seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves. We are what we are, and we use, not trust our faculties. To debate about trusting in a case like this, is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing we had had a choice if we would be created or no, or speculating what I should be like, if I were born of other parents. "*Proximus sum egomet mihi.*" Our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or assent. We act according to our nature, by means of ourselves, when we remember or reason. We are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution, as our being. We have not the option; we can but misuse or mar its functions. We do not confront or bargain with ourselves; and therefore I cannot call the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles (pp. 58-9).

We cannot doubt, that these comments are aimed by F. Newman at opinions, entirely similar to those of this article, which were advocated by Dr. Ward in his "*Philosophical Introduction.*" We heartily concur however with the first of the two paragraphs, as all will have seen who have read our remarks; nor did Dr. Ward express himself otherwise in his work. Of F. Newman's *second* paragraph we confess ourselves unable to apprehend the bearing; though very probably our inability to do so arises from some narrowness of intellectual vision. We can hardly be mistaken however in saying, that the objection is directed against our method of *expressing* our doctrine, and not against that doctrine itself; and we will beg our readers to give F. Newman's comment their attentive consideration.

In our present article then we have maintained, that whatever man's cognitive faculties indubitably declare as certain, is thereby known to be infallibly true. In our next number we are to maintain against Mr. Mill, that there is no one thing which they *more* indubitably declare as certain, than the existence of necessary verities.

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### ART. III.—DR. HAMPDEN AND ANGLICANISM.

*Some Memorials of Renn Dickson Hampden, Bishop of Hereford.* Edited by his Daughter, HENRIETTA HAMPDEN. London: Longmans. 1871.

THE publication of this volume has of necessity revived a controversy long dead and buried, but which five-and-thirty years ago excited a deep and wide interest. It is with sincere regret that we find ourselves compelled to revert to it, and we have not done so until the grave moral charges which it contains against all those who felt it their duty to protest against the nomination of Dr. Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, and afterwards as Bishop of Hereford, have been repeated, not only as indisputable, but as admitted by the parties concerned, we believe by every one of the leading newspapers of the day.

Before we say anything on this subject, we must say a word about the book itself. Miss Hampden's own share in it seems to us much to her credit. She writes with sincerity so undoubting, that it evidently has never occurred to her that any one could take any other view of the facts than that which she details. It is impossible not to see that that view is not her own, but her father's, and that she has accepted it as virtually infallible, in the pious simplicity with which she worships his memory. It is a view which obviously implies that all those who opposed his teaching were hypocrites, who for motives "political and personal," to quote her own expression, loaded him with charges which they did not themselves believe, and persisted in doing so for years, all the while solemnly protesting that they were acting against him with sincere reluctance, and compelled by a sense of imperative duty towards God and His truth. Anything more deliberately and malignantly wicked and base than the conduct thus imputed to that



"party" it would be impossible to conceive; yet so much is Miss Hampden's pious simplicity counterbalanced by her genial charity, that although she cannot help knowing the names of the individuals whom Dr. Hampden thought fit to group together under this collective title, we do not think that in the whole volume a single word of her own writing could be found, which expresses or even implies any unkindly feeling on her part towards any of them. We are anxious, then, explicitly to declare beforehand, that in the remarks which the book itself compels us to make, we do not intend to express the least blame of Miss Hampden. We consider it as virtually an autobiography, to which she has supplied nothing except the arrangement and some of the language, while the whole responsibility for the views expressed, both of events and persons, is her father's.

Of Dr. Hampden himself, far be it from us to say so much as one unkind word. Indeed, we have no temptation to do so. There is no need even to advert to the solemn consideration, that he has passed beyond the sphere of man's judgment, and has already given an account of himself and his works to Him who to a knowledge of men's hearts and actions, absolute and unerring, unites infinite mercy and righteousness. Before that tribunal may he have found a judgment such as we hope and desire for ourselves. But in truth, the men who felt it their duty to protest most earnestly against his theology, all of whom had before enjoyed his acquaintance, some of them his friendship, were throughout careful not merely to abstain from anything approaching to personality (from all temptation to which indeed their habits and education exempted them), but to express in the strongest language their respect for him personally. It is little likely that any one who feels with them would now be tempted to begin in cold blood what at the time, and under the strongest provocations, they most carefully avoided. It gives us also real pleasure to add, that the picture of his life and character (painted, no doubt, by a most loving and partial hand) exhibits him, with one painful exception, in a very amiable light. He was consistently loving and affectionate as a husband and a father. As a friend, we are informed by those whose personal experience enabled them to judge, that he was more than charming. We have been assured by ladies who were admitted to his family circle in his old age that his smile and gracious manner were full of fascination, and reminded them strangely of the aspect of the Father of the Christian world, Pius IX.—while he charmed all who approached him by the high polish of his scholarship and the easy play of his intellectual powers. The expressions of his

personal religious feelings and affections, especially in his later years, were such as became a man who, although so unhappy as to be without the pale of the Church, sought and found his strength and consolation in those detached fragments of Catholic truth which Anglicanism, amidst all its errors, has retained. Of his theological statements, if truth allowed it, we should prefer to say nothing. But it gives us sincere pleasure to be able to hope that even in this matter the blame may lie upon the school in which he was brought up, and the circumstances by which he was surrounded, rather than upon himself.

But our business is not with Dr. Hampden, but with the men whom he is pleased to call "the party." His charge against them, repeated by himself scores of times in this volume, supported by Lord Melbourne, Lord Radnor, and others in the House of Lords, and by Dr. Whately, Protestant Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Arnold, and others, in letters here published, is, that they never sincerely objected to anything in Dr. Hampden's theological statements. Accordingly, his Bampton Lectures were first preached and afterwards published without exciting the least opposition. Nay, the University lavished honours upon him. A year after the Lectures were preached he was made Principal of St. Mary Hall; the next year Professor of Moral Philosophy. In this position he took a decided part in support of the Whig ministry, which was then very unpopular with the majority of Oxford men, and in opposition to the endeavours that were making to Romanize the Church of England. In particular, he advocated the admission of dissenters into the University. This political liberality of course offended the political bigotry of Oxford; and the leading bigots, looking about for some weapon against Dr. Hampden, bethought themselves of the Bampton Lectures, "published years before," and "never before objected to," in which they pretended to find statements subversive of Christian Faith. They refused, however, to bring any definite charge, which could easily have been answered, and confined themselves to general charges of heresy. Neither would they bring these before any proper tribunal (as they might easily have done, and were earnestly desired by him to do), but appealed to the passions of the multitude, calling on the members of the University scattered over the whole country to assemble at Oxford and carry by tumultuary votes a statute against Dr. Hampden, which was, says Whately, a privilege in the most odious sense of the word. What was most observable was, that not merely the great majority of those who voted against Dr.

Hampden, but even the leaders in the opposition, gave evident proof that they had never read the works they assailed. They used, however, all the most vulgar electioneering tricks, and at last carried their measure. Meanwhile, the most remarkable characteristic of Dr. Hampden's conduct was that "amidst troubles and difficulties that would have unnerved an ordinary mind, he never lost the calm temper with which he was pre-eminently endowed" (p. 161, note). He was always ready to explain, although he could not, without betraying the cause of truth, retract or alter anything that he had said; and the result was that even those who were at the time most violent against him, before long acknowledged their error, and recognized in him an orthodox and sound Anglican divine. True, the same political opposition was renewed in 1847, when he was nominated to the See of Hereford, but it soon subsided, and all men acknowledged him to be an excellent bishop.\*

Every separate clause of this indictment is absolutely opposite to the truth. It would be tedious to go in detail through each particular, pointing out its unverity. Perhaps the best course is to state what really happened. Before 1836 the theology of Oxford had long been lying in a deep sleep. The so-called Evangelical movement, which had acquired so remarkable a degree of influence in the sister university, had hardly succeeded in disturbing its dreams. The disciples of that movement were almost entirely confined to a single community, which, truth to speak, was little noticeable for anything else, and hardly one of them was known even by sight to the students of the more aristocratic colleges who set the tone of Oxford society. What is described in "Loss and Gain" is no exaggeration. When Reding was invited to one of their parties, he found that "he had got into another world; faces, manners, speeches, all were strange, and savoured neither of Eton, which was his school, nor of Oxford itself." The little knot of men no doubt had the consolation of feeling that they were the only converted characters in Oxford, the only spot of light amid the general Egyptian darkness. The mass of the undergraduates of course were "students who never studied," who came to Oxford to complete their training as gentlemen. The "reading men" were content with *Æschylus* and *Thucydides*, *Cicero* and *Aristotle*;

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\* Any one who has read the volume before us must feel that this account of the motives, character, and conduct of those who opposed his appointments, as described by himself and his supporters, is not exaggerated, but greatly understated.

and neither one class nor the other gave themselves any trouble about theological disputes. In the main it was not much otherwise with those known in Oxford language as Dons. They were chiefly very young men, just elevated from the condition of pupils and employed in teaching others. They took the Anglican system pretty much on trust, and, as a general rule, gave themselves little trouble as to its theological grounds or its logical defence. Many of them were, in their way, religious men. They were conscientious in their conduct, and had no doubt of the truth of the Christian religion, "especially that pure and Apostolical branch of it established in this kingdom," as the preachers before the University used to rejoice in declaring. "Popery" they sincerely believed to be so absurd, that if (to put a case which certainly never happened, and could hardly have happened as things were) any one of them had heard of a man he knew "turning Papist" he would have exclaimed, like Sheffield, in the same delicious volume, at the time when such things did begin to be heard of, "the idea of his swallowing of his own free-will the heap of rubbish which every Catholic has to believe!—in cold blood tying a collar round his neck and politely putting the chain into the hand of a Priest. . . . And then the Confessional! 'Tis marvellous,"—and he began to break the coals with the poker. "It's very well if a man is born a Catholic. I don't suppose they really believe what they are obliged to profess; but how an Englishman, a gentleman, a man here at Oxford, with all his advantages, can so eat dirt, scraping and picking up all the dead lies of the dark ages—it's a miracle."

It need hardly be said that in such a state of things dogma, as such, could not possibly hold any high place. The simple fact was that no one knew anything about it. Dr. Lloyd, tutor to Sir Robert Peel, Professor of Divinity, and Protestant Bishop of Oxford, used to tell his pupils—"D' ye see, I take it that the old Church of England mode of handling the Creed went out with Bull." But it is important to observe that, all along, these men not only thought themselves orthodox, but had a belief, vague indeed yet on the whole quite sincere, that orthodoxy was generally necessary to salvation. We believe this wholesome prejudice (for it really was very little if anything more) was mainly kept up by the periodical reading of the Athanasian Creed. That the Creed was true was an axiom, and those who admitted it could not help feeling that belief at least in two dogmas (those of the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation) was necessary to salvation. No doubt this feeling did not fit in very logically with the rest of their system, but it was highly salutary.

While things were in this state, two important changes came over the spirit of Oxford. The first was the rise of what was then called "the Oriel school." It began with Copleston, afterwards Protestant Bishop of Llandaff; Davison, the well-known author of the "Discourses on Prophecy," and Arnold may certainly be reckoned among its numbers; perhaps even John Keble, different as his tone was from that of most of the others. But in truth the characteristic of this school was not any peculiarity in theological opinion, but rather superior ability and activity of mind. It came to its zenith in Whately. No doubt his habit of mind was very un-Catholic, yet he was far from being what is now considered a Broad Churchman. The "Apologia" mentions him as the person from whom F. Newman first learned "the existence of the Church as a substantive body or corporation, and those anti-Erastian views of Church polity which were one of the most prominent features of the Tractarian movement." No two opinions could be more opposite to those of the Broad Churchmen of the present day. The fact is that the Oriel school of that day was little more than a group of men superior in abilities and independence of thought to their contemporaries in Oxford, who had naturally been gathered together by the system of election by merit which then prevailed strictly in Oriel, and in Oriel alone,\* and some of whom it must be admitted were on that account disliked, and accused, perhaps not wholly without foundation, of an assumption of intellectual superiority which could not be otherwise than unpopular. Living, as they did, in one college, and meeting daily in hall and common room, they were almost of necessity classed together, even when, as was the case with John Keble at least (and to a considerable degree with others), they were in many respects widely different. This state of things had lasted for years. But the character of the school had lately been materially changed by the personal character and tone of the man who with his immediate followers (his clientela, as F. Newman has called them) now constituted it. "He was a man of generous and warm heart. He was peculiarly loyal to his friends, and, to use the common phrase, 'all his geese were swans.'" We cannot help thinking however that there was a condition *sine quâ non* of the continuance of this high estimate. Oxford used to be surprised to hear the somewhat exaggerated applause which Dr. Whately heaped upon the intellectual powers of men whom it knew well, and in whom no one else had ever seen anything extraordinary. But there was one quality in

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\* See "DUBLIN REVIEW" for April, 1869, page 312.

which none of them must be wanting. Whatever else they were, they must be, and notoriously were, worshippers of Dr. Whately. No one was surprised when "the formal break came" between him and the ablest of his friends, for Mr. Newman was not disposed to take all his opinions on his authority. And unhappily so keen-sighted a man could not fail to discover that the influence of Dr. Whately was giving a wholly new turn to what had formerly been called the Oriel school, a turn towards rationalism, or what Mr. Newman himself called "liberalism."\*

Thus there were two parties, one which represented the old Oxford society, and comprised the great majority of the University, the other a small body of men far superior to them in ability and not to be separated from Dr. Whately, both of whom must have been seen by any sagacious observer to be held to dogma merely by habit and accident; nor could it be doubtful that if things went on long as they were going, the University would gradually and unconsciously slip down the inclined plane, till it found itself sunk in mere rationalism.

But this was not to be. It contained very many men called by Divine Grace, although as yet none of them knew the meaning and final objects of that voice which they were following in the dark and with many misgivings, waverings, and inconsistencies, yet called to emerge from darkness into the full light of the Church of God. If things had gone on silently and unopposed from bad to worse, it is impossible to imagine that they could have failed gradually to sink with the University itself into the abyss of unbelief. But this was prevented by the rise of what is still known as the Oxford school, the first seeds of which had been sown by John Keble, seeds which had already begun to spring up in the deep rich soil of the mind of Hurrell Froude, and which, taking root in that of a man of whom we can speak less freely because he is still spared to us, so filled it as gradually to destroy (by a process similar to that now called "natural selection") whatever remained of Protestant thoughts and feelings in John Henry Newman.

Of the early growth of that school we need say less because it is much better known to our readers than those of which we have already spoken, and because it has been to a considerable degree explained in the work to which we have already referred.† In 1836 it had already spread widely in Oxford,

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\* Appendix A. to the "History of my Religious Opinions."

† "My Religious Opinions."



and its tendency was as decidedly towards the Catholic Church as that of Whately and his school was to absolute infidelity, although as yet both parties were sincerely unaware whither they were tending.

In a university all the intellectual members of which were already grouping themselves into schools so opposite, and among a people in whom there was (and thank God still is) so much of religious earnestness, that men could not possibly hold strong opinions upon practical matters of momentous importance without giving expression to them and acting upon them; in a polity moreover in which complete civil liberty gave them every possible opportunity of speaking out, it was simply impossible that a collision should not very soon have taken place. It was Dr. Hampden's fortune (most unconsciously as now appears) to fire the train which had been so long preparing.

He was a man of unquestioned ability, a distinguished pupil of the old Oriel school, but could not be considered as belonging to it, because he had married and left Oxford almost immediately after passing out of the condition of a pupil. He went down to the country, and for several years had served curacies, when it was reported in Oxford that he was disappointed at his slow progress in his profession and had returned to the University. Of such a step we doubt whether there was then any example. He had great influence among the body of Heads of Colleges, who had, in those days at least, little either of social life or intellectual intercourse with the other members of the University. The ablest men usually stayed in Oxford a very few years, and then left it either as clergymen or lawyers, some few following the medical profession. Hence the great body of the talent of the University was in men, all single, and chiefly between twenty and thirty. But a man promoted to the headship of his college was expected to marry and to settle in Oxford for life. There was hardly an instance of a Head who disappointed the expectation. Thus the Heads formed a society almost by themselves, and a married clergyman of about their own standing who took up his residence in Oxford naturally fell into it. By the Heads of Colleges alone a person is annually chosen to preach the Bampton Lectures, and no one was surprised when Dr. Hampden was appointed to preach them in 1832.

He selected for his subject "The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology." It is most curious that with all his ability he was evidently quite unconscious, not only at the moment but throughout his whole life, of the momentous character of the speculations which he

put forth in them. He assured Dr. Philpots (Protestant Bishop of Exeter) in 1836, "In my Bampton Lectures I had no other object but to give a history of some leading technical terms of theology." What he did say is too long to be quoted here. A singularly clear and succinct summary of it was given by Mr. Newman,\* and it is important to observe that although Dr. Hampden and his supporters have indignantly denied the justice of Mr. Newman's statement, neither he nor they have ever attempted to show that his words are capable of any other meaning. Mr. Newman gives copious extracts from Dr. Hampden's statements,—1. concerning Doctrinal Truths; 2. on the doctrine of the Trinity; 3. on the doctrine of the Incarnation; 4. on the doctrine of the Atonement; 5. on the Sacraments; 6. on the doctrine of Original Sin; 7. on the Soul; 8. on Morals; lastly, Positive Statements. At the close of each section he appends some remarks, and concludes at the end—"Dr. H.'s views then seem at length to issue in the following theory: that there is one and one only truth; that that truth is the record of facts, historical and moral, contained in the text of Scripture; that whatever is beyond that text, even to the classifying of its sentences, is human opinion and unrevealed; that a thoughtful person cannot help forming opinions and theories upon the Scripture record, and is bound to act upon and confess those opinions which he considers to be true, yet he has no right to identify his own opinion on any point, however sacred in itself, with the facts of the revealed history, or to assume that a belief in it is necessary for the salvation of another, or to impose it as a condition of union with another; that though he considers he cannot be more sure of being right than another, and does not hold his own opinions to be more pious than another's, and will not pronounce heretical opinions (so-called) to be dangerous to any being in the world, except to those who do *not* hold them, yet he himself firmly believes the Church's dogmatic statements concerning the Trinity, &c., and at a proper season would contend as zealously against Arian or Socinian doctrines, as those who think that in the case of others belief in them is of importance to eternal salvation; and this although he considers these statements, as such, and so far forth as they are distinct from Scripture facts, which Arians and Socinians hold as religiously as himself to be 'a system of technical theology by which we are guarded,' only 'in some measure, from the exorbitance of theoretic enthusiasm,'

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\* In a pamphlet entitled "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's. Theological Statements."

a system of phrases borrowed from those who differ from us, and useful only in excluding *their* use of them.\*

What is indeed most strange is, that Dr. Hampden was so little able to see things which concerned himself from the point of view of other men, that not only during the struggle but to the end of his long life he was wholly incapable of believing that any man who professed to object to these statements could possibly be sincere. His advocates more wisely took the line of urging that the objection to them came too late. Arnold wrote at the time, "Was there ever an accusation involving its unhappy promoters in such a dilemma of infamy? Compromisers of mischievous principle in 1832, 1833, 1834, and 1835, or slandering a good and most Christian man in 1836—disqualified for the office of religious instructors, upon their own showing, by four years of either dulness or indifference, during which they could not understand, or did not notice, what was mischievous—or else by one month of audacious and unprincipled calumny." If that good and able man had not (as too often happened to him) allowed his passion to blind his judgment, he would have remembered, what no man knew better than he, that the men who were "dull and indifferent" were not the same—nay, had no resemblance to those by whom the opposition to Dr. Hampden was made. The fact was that the Board of Heads of Colleges—a body in the appointment of whose members, or even of any one among them, the University had no voice or influence, direct or indirect, and the great majority of which most fully and worthily represented

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\* To examine in detail the Bampton Lectures and Dr. Hampden's "Observations on Religious Dissent" in order to show that this is a fair summary of his statements, would fill not an article but a volume in itself. We might easily have written what would make a much stronger impression upon most readers, by extracting offensive passages. But this would in fact be less fair. Short extracts may, of course, be so selected as to give an unfair impression of an author's meaning. It is a much more fair and sure course to take the short statement of that meaning given by a man of unquestionable acuteness and at least equal fairness and candour, after a careful study of the works themselves. To say that in this case the summary was made by an unfriendly hand is merely to beg the question. Mr. Newman was not, and never had been, on unfriendly terms with Dr. Hampden. Even in this very pamphlet he speaks of him personally with uniform kindness and respect. It is to his theological statements, and to them alone, that he is opposed. To object, therefore, to his account of Dr. Hampden's doctrine only because he does not agree with it, is in fact to say that no man, however able, upright, and otherwise qualified to form a judgment, is to be believed when he asserts that such and such a book contains such and such a statement, unless he himself agrees with what is stated. Some of the details of Dr. Hampden's statements are almost too painful to quote. They are given with as much of the context as space allowed in Mr. Newman's "Elucidations."

whatever of "dulness or indifference" there was in Oxford at that time, held (by a usurpation which to most men seemed consecrated by long possession) almost absolute power over everything that was done in Oxford.\* The great body of the University was allowed only the liberty conceded by "Napoleonic ideas" to the universal suffrage of some province so unlucky as to tempt the Emperor to annex it to his dominions. It was allowed to say "Yes" or "No" to any proposition laid before it by the Heads of Houses, but they had usurped (in opposition to the statutes) the sole and exclusive power of proposing anything. No one else was permitted even to move an amendment to their proposals. Of this Board of Heads Dr. Whately was confessedly and beyond all comparison the ablest member—Dr. Hampden himself became a member of it in 1833. The great mass of its members were men advanced in years, wholly separated from all the movements of the University, whether intellectual or religious; and although there could be little doubt that some of them grumbled at what they heard, no one who knew them could expect that they would do anything on the subject, or indeed on any other, except as a concession to pressure from without;—and whence was such a pressure to come?

It must be confessed that Dr. Hampden was singularly unlucky in the moment at which his lectures were preached. Only five or six years earlier he might have said all he actually did say without any great danger of awakening the University from its sleep. But in those years a great change had taken place. The revival of old-fashioned Anglican doctrine and of theological study, commonly known as the Oxford movement, had spread widely among the younger masters of arts. Above all, Mr. Newman had, as he himself expresses it, come out of his shell. Perhaps if Dr. Hampden had not left Oxford for so many years, and had watched the gradual change, he would not have preached what he did, or, if he had, would have been less surprised at the indignation he excited. At the same time there was much to make any immediate movement exceedingly unlikely. As members of the University, the great body of the masters had been deprived of all means of taking a single step, except that of voting "Yes" or "No." Nothing could be more distasteful to their whole character and habits than anything like agitation. They were, to a man, in the best sense of the word, Conservatives—lovers of order, and preferring submission

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\* The abolition of this usurped power of the Heads was the first and most necessary part of the reform afterwards introduced into the University.

to resistance. At last no doubt they were driven by intolerable wrongs to combine together, to hold meetings, and call upon the authorities to act, or, as Dr. Hampden himself complains, to "agitate." Dr. Arnold's complaint really means only that when Dr. Hampden delivered his Bampton Lectures they did not at once break through all their cherished habits, and without waiting a moment to see whether or not the authorities would do their duty, adopt the extreme measures to which, much against their will, they were ultimately driven. How loud, and how just, would have been his outcry of indignation had they really done so!

This is enough to explain why the University was so late in expressing its indignation. But there were other reasons. Of those who afterwards so strongly censured the Bampton Lectures, probably not one in fifty knew anything about them when they were preached. Whatever may be the case now, Bampton Lectures, with two or three exceptions at most, were then a proverb for want of interest. Except those whose positions made their attendance a matter of decorum, very few indeed were those who heard them, and, as for readers, it may be doubted whether they ordinarily had any at all. Perhaps the best course which any man could have adopted, who wished to put his opinions safely on record and yet keep them a profound secret from the whole human race, and even from his most intimate friends, until he thought the time come for calling attention to them, would have been to publish them in that particular form. It was much safer than the plan sometimes adopted, of locking them up in a box, not to be opened till fifty years after the author's death. There was nothing in Dr. Hampden's Lectures to make them an exception. The volume before us boasts that they were delivered to "very large congregations." We heartily wish those congregations had been counted; and strongly suspect that the undertaking would not have been very difficult.

Mr. Isaac Williams, afterwards well known in the Anglican communion, in which he died not long ago, both as a sacred poet and a writer of devotional works, used in after-years to say that Mr. Newman himself heard only the first of them, and that he himself, walking with him out of the church on that day, was shocked at his friend's strong expressions of dislike of what he had heard; for Mr. Williams at that time accepted the principle laid down to the hero of "Loss and Gain" by his father,—*"all sermons are good."* It is probable that Mr. Newman, then working very hard at his first book, thought no more from that moment either about Dr. Hampden or his lecture. In the autumn the lectures were published,

and Mr. Newman at the same time left England for the Mediterranean, and, as all the world now knows, lay for weeks, in the following summer, between life and death, in a remote village in Sicily. He reached home, as he tells us, on the 9th of July, 1833. Any busy man, who has ever been for near a year absent from home, knows something of the vast accumulation of demands upon his time which rush in upon him on his return; in addition to all which, it must be remembered that Mr. Newman was carrying through the press his first work, "*The Arians of the Fourth Century*." Under such circumstances no wonder he did not find time to examine a heavy volume of Bampton Lectures. In the next year Dr. Hampden published his "*Observations on Religious Dissent*," in which he developed the principles laid down in the lectures, and called special attention to them. Here it is especially that he enters into the case of the Socinians; urging that the points in which they differ from other Christians are merely human opinions, not revealed one way or another, and that what he chiefly dislikes in them is, that they are too "dogmatic" in that they insist upon separating themselves from other Christians merely for the sake of their own theological opinions, which (though Dr. Hampden himself disliked them) he admits to be neither better nor worse than those of other people, his own included.

While things were thus getting worse and worse, the Heads of Colleges, who had made him Bampton Lecturer in 1832 (an appointment over which the University had no control), continued their patronage of him. In 1833 he became a member of their Board, by being made Principal of St. Mary Hall, on the nomination of the aged Chancellor, Lord Grenville, whose knowledge of him could only have been gained by the report of the resident authorities. In 1834 he was appointed, by a Board consisting of four Heads of Colleges and the two proctors, to the Professorship of Moral Philosophy. In all this the University had no part except that of suffering. Dr. Hampden and his supporters had evidently no anticipation of the coming storm. Like some child meddling with a piece of machinery worked by a steam-engine, he went on, in utter unconsciousness, trifling with a power the force of which he little suspected—the deep conscientious convictions of the mass of the younger graduates. But the storm was almost ready to break out, and there were already symptoms which would have suggested to any prudent man that the great body of the University would not much longer suffer in silence.

The first of these was the letter (published in the "*Apo-*



logia"), addressed to Dr. Hampden himself, by Dr. Newman, on the 28th of November, 1834:—\*

DEAR MR. PRINCIPAL,—The kindness which has led to your presenting me with your late pamphlet encourages me to hope that you will forgive me, if I take the opportunity it affords me of expressing to you my very sincere and deep regret that it has been published. Such an opportunity I could not let slip without being unfaithful to my own serious thoughts on the subject.

While I respect the tone of piety which the pamphlet displays, I dare not trust myself to put on paper my feelings about the principles contained in it; tending as they do, in my opinion, altogether to make shipwreck of Christian Faith. I also lament that, by its appearance, the first step has been taken towards interrupting that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place, and which, if once seriously disturbed, will be succeeded by dissensions the more intractable, because justified in the minds of those who resist innovation by a feeling of imperative duty.

I am, dear Mr. Principal, yours faithfully,

J. H. NEWMAN.

One would have been inclined to imagine that any one who, like Dr. Hampden, had the advantage of being personally acquainted with Mr. Newman, would have understood that this letter was an omen of something serious. The suspicion, strange to say, does not seem to have occurred to Dr. Hampden, who at once replied, in a somewhat jaunty tone, calling for a public controversy.

DR. HAMPDEN TO MR. NEWMAN.

MY DEAR NEWMAN,—I thank you for your candour, and I fully appreciate your motives in what you have said.

But I think the same candour and good motives should incline you to wish rather for a full discussion of a question, and a fair hearing of parties on both sides, instead of ruling it at once by the feelings on one side only. I do not intend to enter into any *personal* controversy on the subject; but

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\* The letters published in this article were written by men some of whom have already passed into the unseen world, and some of whom are still Anglicans, and might therefore be reluctant to be themselves a party by any direct act to their appearance in a Catholic Review. At the same time, their publication is rendered necessary by the recent publication of other letters written at the same time, and containing serious moral accusations against those who felt it their duty to oppose Dr. Hampden. Nor do we think it possible that any one could now object to it, especially as the letters were, even at the time, made almost as public in Oxford as their appearance in the papers could have made them. Under these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion not to ask authority for the publication of any of them. We have, therefore, suppressed the names of the writers in all cases in which it was possible; that is, in all except the cases of Dr. Hampden himself and F. Newman, who has already published with his own name at least one of the letters we are about to give.

I shall be quite ready to hear any arguments that may be alleged against my notions, to examine any such with freedom—and admit my error if I can be proved to be wrong.

Believe me to remain,

Yours faithfully,

*St. Mary Hall, Nov. 28, 1834.*

R. D. HAMPDEN.

There is an air of utter unconsciousness in this letter, which is really touching. When we remember the uncontrollable and almost inexpressible wrath of the writer as soon as his views were seriously contested, one is at first puzzled to understand what he really meant when he demanded a public controversy. Probably the explanation may be found in the peculiar meaning he annexed to the words "personal controversy." This naturally suggests the idea of controversies such as were only too common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when disputants made almost a point of assailing the personal character, and sometimes even ridiculed the bodily infirmities of those against whom they wrote. Dr. Hampden seems to have meant something quite different. All who ventured to say that this or that opinion was maintained in his published works he denounced as personal. He would probably have been willing that the opinions themselves should have been discussed, if no reason had been given why they were discussed; that is, if his works had not been alluded to. Thus it would be allowable to discuss the "origin of species," but "personal" to say that such a statement about it is contained in Mr. Darwin's writings. In like manner, probably, Dr. Hampden invited a controversy upon the abstract question, whether the "theological opinions" of Socinians are as much tenable upon Christian principles as those of any one else; but considered it "personal" to point out that it was maintained in his works that they are so.

The next indication of a gathering storm was the publication in Oxford of a pamphlet, entitled "The Foundations of the Faith assailed in Oxford: a Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, &c., by a Clerical Member of Convocation." This contained extracts from the publications of several of Dr. Whately's followers, chiefly Dr. Hampden himself, Mr. Blanco White (then an Anglican), and Dr. Hinds. It contained not one personal word, either with regard to Dr. Hampden himself or any one else, except in the sense already explained,—viz. that of giving extracts from their published works for the purpose of showing what their teaching actually was. This, however, seems at once to have deprived Dr. Hampden of all power of self-control. Then no

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The Principal of St. Mary Hall is obliged by Mr. M.'s candour in acknowledging himself the responsible author of the pamphlet entitled "The Foundation of the Faith," &c., though that candour is come so late, when the mischief of his anonymous slanders has already been working its way. [Then, after making the most of the point, of which all the Oxford world was well aware, that his opponents were junior to himself—he continued] the Principal however forgives him; but he requires that Mr. M. should make the connexion of his name with the pamphlet as notorious as the pamphlet itself, that it may, in some measure at least, carry its own antidote. Who the assistant in it is ought also be known, that each may have the merit which is his due. It is but common justice also that the Archbishop should know the name of both his officious correspondents.

This letter not succeeding, Dr. Hampden, two days later, wrote again—this time to Mr. Newman.

Mr. M. not having sent the name of his accomplice in that disgraceful publication, entitled "The Foundation of the Faith," &c., the Principal of St. Mary Hall is induced to trouble Mr. Newman, as the person through whom the pamphlet in question was conveyed to the Oriel common-room, with a request that he will inform him, if he should know the fact, who the other author of it is, in conjunction with Mr. M. It is but right that society should have its eye on persons who can so unfeelingly scatter their venom under a mask; that at least one may not mistake them for *friends*. The publication indeed is self-contradictory and foolish; but the mischief done is not always to be measured by the weakness of the instruments.

The boast is so often repeated by Dr. Hampden himself in the volume before us, that he had been uniformly mild and gentle in the whole course of the opposition to him,\* that it may

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We have enlarged on the circumstances connected with this pamphlet because its publication and the correspondence we have given, which took place a year before Dr. Hampden was made Regius Professor, prove the utter falsehood of the charge everywhere repeated in this book, namely, that Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements were merely the "ostensible," not the real cause of the opposition to him, and that the real causes were "political and personal," chiefly his nomination by Lord Melbourne, and his wish to admit the dissenters to Oxford. His doctrinal statements were merely the pretext, so we are assured, for the gratification of "acrimonious feelings," which had really nothing to do with them. When we remember that the leaders of the opposition to Dr. Hampden were Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, and Mr. Keble, we incline to wonder that this charge did not carry its own refutation even to Miss Hampden herself. If anything more were needed, the date of the correspondence we have just given would of itself be enough. A little later the proposal was urged to abolish the subscription required from members of the University. Many pamphlets

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DR. HAMPDEN TO THE REV. J. H. NEWMAN.

St. Mary Hall, June 23, 1835.

SIR,—I have ascertained to my great disgust that you are the editor of a collection of pamphlets professing to be on the Matriculation question just put forth, and the author of some remarks prefixed to them. I say I have heard it with disgust, for no other feeling, I am sure, is so due to the conduct of a person who can act with the dissimulation and falsehood and dark malignity of which you have been guilty.

I charge you with dissimulation, because you have concealed your name in the background, and have only put it forward when it was extorted through your publisher. You have been among the "crafty firsts," who have sent their "silly seconds" to fight their mean and cowardly battles by their trumpety publications. You have worked the machine but hid yourself behind it.

I charge you with falsehood, because you have sent out to the public what you knew to be untrue. You have insidiously repeated the calumnies, originally advanced by Mr. M., both by placing his pamphlet in the collection and by your remarks prefixed to the whole, notwithstanding my indignant denial of the imputations conveyed in it. You have acted falsely again in including Mr. N.'s pamphlet (the only one which has any real merit) in the collection, when it had been expressly stipulated by Mr. N. that Mr. M.'s disgraceful pamphlet, and any others which might be personally offensive, should be excluded. Mr. N., greatly to his honour (and I sincerely respect him for it),\* has distinctly disclaimed being a party to such a proceeding, and yet his name and authority have been shamefully applied to support the iniquitous cause. Further, the very title to your publication is false, four of the pamphlets being almost exclusively attacks on me, and the rest little to the purpose, nothing to the defence of matriculation-subscription.

I charge you with malignity, because you have no other ground of your

\* The profound respect entertained by Dr. Hampden for Mr. N. at this moment, under a mistaken impression of his having objected to Mr. M.'s pamphlet, which led to the statement that his pamphlet is "the only one which has any real merit," did not prevent his writing of him two years later as "that namby-pamby N.," and rejoicing that he was not elected to a high office.

I shall be quite ready to hear any arguments that may be alleged against my notions, to examine any such with freedom—and admit my error if I can be proved to be wrong.

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I charge you with falsehood, because you have sent out to the public what you knew to be untrue. You have insidiously repeated the calumnies, originally advanced by Mr. M., both by placing his pamphlet in the collection and by your remarks prefixed to the whole, notwithstanding my indignant denial of the imputations conveyed in it. You have acted falsely again in including Mr. N.'s pamphlet (the only one which has any real merit) in the collection, when it had been expressly stipulated by Mr. N. that Mr. M.'s disgraceful pamphlet, and any others which might be personally offensive, should be excluded. Mr. N., greatly to his honour (and I sincerely respect him for it),\* has distinctly disclaimed being a party to such a proceeding, and yet his name and authority have been shamefully applied to support the iniquitous cause. Further, the very title to your publication is false, four of the pamphlets being almost exclusively attacks on me, and the rest little to the purpose, nothing to the defence of matriculation-subscription.

I charge you with malignity, because you have no other ground of your

\* The profound respect entertained by Dr. Hampden for Mr. N. at this moment, under a mistaken impression of his having objected to Mr. M.'s pamphlet, which led to the statement that his pamphlet is "the only one which has any real merit," did not prevent his writing of him two years later as "that namby-pamby N.," and rejoicing that he was not elected to a high office.

assault on me but a fanatical persecuting spirit. Have you (to take the lowest ground) acted towards me in the manner due from one gentleman to another? Would you have dared to act in such a way if you had not taken the advantage of the sacred profession? I should be sorry, sir, to bear in my heart such a practical refutation of my religious views as you have evidenced by your conduct. I would readily submit to the heaviest charge of erroneous doctrine which your proud orthodoxy could bring against me, rather than exchange your state of mind for my conscious satisfaction, at having neither willed, nor thought, nor done anything to hurt the feelings of a single person, by what I have written, or by any part that I have taken in the late question. I have been roused to resent injurious treatment, and to call improper behaviour by its right name, but I have not provoked resentment, nor have I shown my own resentment in any other way than becomes a man and, I trust, a Christian.

I require that your name should be put to the collection of pamphlets as the responsible author of the several anonymous attacks—or I may be induced to take further steps to expose to the public the shameful party-spirit which has been brought into play on this occasion. Why did you employ coadjutors if you are ashamed of them? and why should they be ashamed to own themselves the followers of such a master?

I am your humble servant,

R. D. HAMPDEN.

MR. NEWMAN TO DR. HAMPDEN.

Oriel College, June 24, 1835.

MR. NEWMAN observes, in answer to the Principal of St. Mary Hall's letter received yesterday, that he cannot enter at length into the details of it without doing violence to his own feelings of self-respect.

He makes the following remarks by way of protesting against some of the points contained in it.

He seriously and gravely protests, first of all, against the idea implied in the following sentence—"Would you have dared to act in such a way if you had not taken the advantage of the sacred profession?" words which he considers to convey an unjust reflection on Dr. Hampden's own principles and consistency as well as his own.

He altogether disallows Dr. Hampden's imputation that he has been "guilty" of "dissimulation and falsehood and dark malignity."

As to the charge of "dissimulation," he observes, with reference to his not having announced himself in print as the editor of the collection of pamphlets on the question of Subscription to the XXXIX. Articles at Matriculation now published by Mr. Parker, that although this is true, he cannot conceive that the fact of his being editor has been "extorted" from him, as Dr. Hampden asserts, considering that Dr. Hampden learned it without any difficulty immediately on his inquiring.

As to the charge of his having "concealed" his "name in the background," he refers Dr. Hampden, as far as Dr. Hampden himself is concerned, to the following extract from a note on the subject of Dr. Hampden's "Observations on Religious Dissent," frankly addressed to Dr. Hampden in

November last—"While I respect the tone of piety which the pamphlet displays, I dare not trust myself to put on paper my feelings about the principles contained in it, tending (as they do in my opinion) altogether to make shipwreck of Christian Faith. I also lament that by its appearance the first step has been taken towards interrupting that peace and mutual good understanding which has prevailed so long in this place, and which, if once seriously disturbed, will be succeeded by dissensions the more intractable because justified in the minds of those who resist innovation by a feeling of imperative duty."

He observes also that while announcing himself as the responsible editor of the collection of pamphlets, he nevertheless does not mean to own (as Dr. Hampden supposes), nor does he feel himself called upon to own, the authorship of "some remarks prefixed to them."

As to the charge of "falsehood," as far as grounded upon his including Mr. N.'s pamphlet ("the only one," as Dr. Hampden proceeds to say, "which has any real merit,") in the collection, when it had been expressly stipulated by Mr. N. that Mr. M.'s disgraceful pamphlet, and any others which might be personally offensive should be excluded," in consequence of which "his" (Mr. N.'s) "name and authority have been," as Dr. Hampden continues, "shamefully applied to support the iniquitous cause," Mr. Newman acquaints Dr. Hampden that Mr. N. had the remarks on Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures prefixed to the volume left in his hands *in proof*.\*

As to the charge of "dark malignity," which Dr. Hampden asserts to be founded in Mr. Newman's case on "a fanatical persecuting spirit"; and Dr. Hampden's remark that he has "done no wrong or unkindness to" Mr. Newman "but on the contrary always treated him with civility and respect," he observes that he should rejoice at nothing more than a return to that state of good understanding with Dr. Hampden which he has before now enjoyed, and that he shall be ever watchful and eager to discern any approach to a removal of the differences which separate him from Dr. Hampden. At the same time he certainly does recognize as conceivable the existence of motives for approving or disapproving the conduct of another, distinct from those of a personal nature.

Mr. Newman protests against the "conscious satisfaction" which Dr. Hampden professes himself to feel, at not having "done anything to hurt the feelings of a single person by what" Dr. Hampden has "written"; believing, as Mr. Newman does, that Dr. Hampden's published statements of doctrine, running counter to received opinions, have much distressed a number of religious persons.

Less than a year after this Dr. Hampden was appointed by Lord Melbourne Regius Professor of Divinity. As Miss Hampden says, the announcement that such an appointment was intended at once kindled Oxford into a flame. A large

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\* These "remarks" not only expressly mentioned Mr. M.'s pamphlet, "The Foundations of the Faith," as being included in the collection, but defended a passage in it to which exception had been taken.

number of graduates, chiefly, but not exclusively, the younger men, met at Corpus Christi College, and chose a committee to draw up a "declaration" and an address to the Crown. It was at this time that Mr. Newman published the "Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements," from which we have already extracted a few words. Although his modesty restrained the author from putting his name on the title-page, it could hardly be considered anonymous, for it was stated at the commencement.

It may fairly be asked of any resident in this place, who at this time directs attention to Dr. Hampden's works, why he has not done so in the considerable interval which has elapsed since their publication. The present writer's plain answer to this demand would be that he had hoped to have been spared the necessity of an invidious task which pertained more to others than to himself—to those who were less connected by college ties with the author in question. He felt that he had no call of office or station that way, and that he could not put himself forward without an apology for doing so. Even now he cannot persuade himself to put his name in the title-page, though he makes no secret of it to those who choose to inquire.

We shall say no more of the exposition it gives of Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements, but it may be well to quote the only passages which can possibly be considered "personal," as Dr. Hampden insists in the work before us that his own writings (of which we have just given a specimen) were contrasted with those of his opponents by the absence of a personal tone. After giving a passage in which Dr. Hampden quotes Scripture, he says—

It will be asked "What can one desire more?" Just thus much more,—proof which we may show to the whole world, not for our own satisfaction, that Dr. H. says something more than a Socinian; proof that he attaches some definite sense to Scripture, and that that is the Church's sense. People at a distance cannot be better for our private knowledge of him in Oxford (p. 29). He is a believer in the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation (as we might be sure beforehand from his position in the University and the subscriptions it involves), and considers them influential on conduct, though he does not believe them as revealed truths (p. 41).

We can find no other reference which can in any sense be said to be to Dr. Hampden himself, not merely to his works, in the whole pamphlet.

In reading Dr. Hampden's account of these proceedings, whether in his own words or his daughter's, what most strikes us is his utter incapacity to imagine that there might be at least some persons who were sincere in their solemn profession that they felt a conscientious objection to his statements



of doctrine. He was aware that he had written of such subjects as the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments in a manner wholly "new even to the great majority of studious persons," (that is his own statement,) and yet it never occurred to him as possible that any one of them should really object on religious grounds to his novelties. He was to the last as incapable as ever of "recognizing as conceivable the existence of motives for approving or disapproving the conduct of another, apart from those of a personal nature." Accordingly, assuming it as admitted that every person who declared against his appointment was actuated solely by personal malignity against himself, he was horrified to find among them many of his own acquaintances, nay, some of his intimate friends. This state of feeling naturally leads to the complaint—

He could not walk down the High Street without passing many whom he had been accustomed to greet in a friendly manner, who, without one note of warning, had set themselves to act against him to the utmost of their ability.

But he was even less pleased with those who did give the "note of warning" which he blames others for not giving. It is complained that he received letters "from those whom he had considered as friends, who wrote as a sort of salve to their consciences, to inform him that they had suddenly become hostile;" words which imply, of course, that every friend who acted against his appointment did violence to his own conscience; for if not hurt it would not have required a salve. Of these letters, and of the temper with which they were received, it may be worth while to give a specimen. Such things show the character of both parties. One of his friends, a man without any leaning to the Catholic Church, nearer his own age than the mass of his opponents, who had already ceased to reside in Oxford, and who was afterwards a dignitary in the Anglican Church, wrote to him as follows :—

April 9, 1836.

MY DEAR HAMPDEN,—There are occasions (happily but few) in one's life on which we are compelled to sacrifice private feelings to public duty. Your recent appointment to the Divinity Chair necessarily creates one of these painful occasions to all those who, while they object to that appointment, entertain towards yourself personally feelings of sincere regard and esteem. Of this number I am one—and I can assure you that on no occasion have I had so painful a struggle between conflicting feelings.

I have always misunderstood your character if I have not reason to feel assured that in such a case I should sink in your estimation if I allowed private feelings to take precedence of public duty. At the same time, while acting in the discharge of the latter, I feel more forcibly the other; and

with this feeling am induced to give expression to it while taking a public part against you.

I have felt it my duty to put forth a pamphlet on the subject of your appointment, in the form of a letter to Lord Melbourne, in which I have been obliged to express opinions, which, if you deem them worthy of any notice at all, may be calculated to give you pain. Of this I am aware. But I am not aware that I have said anything to *hurt* your feelings, or that I have used any expressions less softened than the peculiar nature of the case would admit of. If I appear to have done otherwise, it is farthest from my wish, and after the most careful endeavours to avoid it. I can only say now, as I should always have said, that while I would do anything consistent with the feelings of a gentleman and the spirit of a Christian to prevent your appointment in the first instance, or your continuance in it now, (and I am sure for your own happiness it is earnestly to be desired,) I would do anything in my power to serve you personally.

I did not like to appear against you in print without conveying to you personally these assurances, and with every wish for the welfare and happiness of you and yours, allow me both to subscribe and consider myself sincerely your friend.

To this letter Dr. Hampden made no reply. But as soon as he had received it, and without waiting to see what the pamphlet, which was not yet published, really contained, he wrote a letter containing the following passage to another friend of his, and a neighbour of Mr. O. in the country :—

April 11, 1836, Oxford.

Mr. O. has just sent to inform me of his publishing a pamphlet against me in the form of a "Letter to Lord Melbourne." Now I have no objection to his writing or publishing what he pleases, because that I may read or not as I please. But it is rather too bad to send me private letters, at the same time expressing friendship and respect, and so forth, when there is nothing but war in the heart. I consider such a proceeding a gratuitous insult, and a mockery of one's common sense. As I do not mean to answer it, therefore, I thought I would at any rate write to tell you of the cause, that if you have an opportunity you may express my feeling on the case, though not, of course, in the way of a message from me; as such conduct merits neither message nor reply. I am sure you will sympathize with my view of the matter, and feel for me as being the object of such mean, and I am tempted to say unprincipled attacks. It is like fighting with a party of gladiators armed with their nets and tridents, and knowing nothing of honourable war.

Some days later, when he might if he so pleased have read the pamphlet itself, he wrote again—

Pray disown for me Mr. O. as any intimate acquaintance. He never was any intimate of mine. I tried, at his request, to get him appointed examiner, but the proposal was rejected with great disapprobation. Henceforth, at least, he is no acquaintance at all of mine.

To appreciate the generosity of this letter we must add, from a memorandum made at the time by Mr. O., what the facts about the examinership really were. Mr. O. (who was a man of much distinction) had been public examiner in 1827-8. Since that he had "many times" been requested to take the office again, and had declined it. When Dr. Hampden was public examiner, he expressed to Mr. O. a wish that he would serve the office with himself. This Mr. O. was for several reasons unable to do. Moreover he had only just gone out of office. "Some time afterwards, being then able and willing to take the office again, I wrote to him to that effect, if there was a vacancy on the Board, and if he, being on the spot, would arrange it with the Vice-Chancellor or proctors."

Although the last of Dr. Hampden's letters was written when he might, if he pleased, have read Mr. O.'s pamphlet, yet he had not thought it worth while to do so. In a letter published in this volume he expressly states that he had never read it. Both these letters therefore show his feelings towards a man who had given him no provocation, beyond what may be found in Mr. O.'s letter given above.

The system of considering as a personal enemy every old friend whom he even suspected of not thoroughly liking the theology of the Bampton Lectures, he carried to a strange extreme in the case of Mrs. Davison, the widow of the well-known author of the "Discourses on Prophecy." Mr. Davison had been his tutor, and on leaving Oxford had sent him, as Miss Hampden shows, an affectionate letter and a flattering present. The friendship had been kept up, after Davison left Oxford, and Dr. Hampden had visited him in his country parsonage. He died after the publication of the Bampton Lectures, but before attention had been called to them. In Dr. Hampden's published "Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury" he asserted that "Mr. Davison both read and expressly approved" them. The widow wrote him a private letter asking his authority for this statement. This he apparently took as a proof that she sympathized with "the party," "the persecution," "the gladiators." What followed will appear from her own letter to the "Christian Remembrancer," published in that Review in September, 1838.

SIR,—I presume to trouble you in consequence of a paragraph in a published letter from Dr. Hampden, the Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, to his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, in which Dr. Hampden states that "the late Mr. Davison, the highly-gifted and excellent author of the 'Discourses on Prophecy,' had both read and expressly approved his Bampton Lectures."

I have the best reason for believing that Dr. Hampden is mistaken in his

impression upon this subject. I was never absent from Mr. Davison but for one short interval after the period of the publication of those Lectures, and am well satisfied they were not read by him. Mr. Davison never mentioned the work to me, with approbation or otherwise; and I possess the presentation copy, received in August, 1833, which was *uncut* at the time of Mr. Davison's removal from me, with the exception of *two leaves*: and it remained so till the year 1836, when it was seen by several friends in its unopened state.

I have thought it hard upon me, and upon the friends of Mr. Davison, that his name should, at a distant period, be implicated in the controversy arising out of these Lectures; and under the circumstances, I felt it to be due to his memory to ask of Dr. Hampden his authority for the assertion contained in the letter to the Archbishop; but, to my surprise and mortification, I have had from him a *positive and final refusal*. I am therefore obliged to take the only means in my reach of relieving Mr. Davison from the responsibility in which Dr. Hampden has involved his name.

I shall feel obliged to you to give this letter a place in your *Christian Remembrancer* for the following month.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient, humble servant,

MARY DAVISON.

College Green, Worcester,  
7th August, 1838.

We are sure that if Miss Hampden had been aware of these facts she would not have republished her father's statement in the present volume without giving any proof of its correctness. Our conjecture is that Mr. Davison expressed the confidence, which he would naturally feel, that a volume put out by his friend and pupil would be useful, without having been able to read it, and that Dr. Hampden, erroneously, but without intentional falsehood, assumed that he must have read it. The whole question really was whether he had read it or not.\*

Of course there was from the beginning no chance of preventing the consummation of his appointment. It was absolutely in the hands of Lord Melbourne, and we must admit that, upon Anglican principles, he did right in not giving way. What was orthodoxy or heresy in a case in which the will of the Sovereign had already been declared? Lord Melbourne, it seems to us, could hardly have withdrawn a nomination

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\* We would take the liberty of suggesting to Miss Hampden, that she will best carry out her sound principle of allowing the subject of her notice to speak for himself if, instead of accumulating assurances of the extreme gentleness of Dr. Hampden during the opposition to his appointment, she were to publish with all the names, the letters we have given and any others bearing on the subject. She can easily obtain the necessary permission to do so.

already approved by the Sovereign, merely because the nominee was found to be a heretic, without sacrificing the most sacred principle of the Anglican Church. All that the University could do, therefore, was to protest, and protest it did very effectually, though in a very unsatisfactory manner. The Board of Heads would not have done anything if they could have helped it. The strong feeling of the University compelled them to act, and they acted on the whole as ill as was consistent with doing anything. Instead of bringing Dr. Hampden's doctrinal statements to a formal trial, as was desired by those whose pressure compelled them to act at all, they proposed a statute, which declared that, whereas the University had invested the Regius Professor with certain functions, beyond those which he obtained by the nomination of the Crown, and whereas the actual Professor has so treated theological matters that the University can have no confidence in him in that respect, therefore he shall be deprived of those functions until such time as the University shall otherwise decree. Such a statute, carried by the votes of the whole University, was no doubt a miserable way of censuring dangerous and false doctrines.

It is to be observed that those whom Dr. Hampden delighted to call "the Party," Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, Mr. Keble, and those who acted with them, were in no way responsible for it. They had never asked for it—they had never been consulted about it; nay, they were highly dissatisfied with it, and openly expressed their dissatisfaction—all they had to decide was, whether, on the whole, it was safer to vote for it or against it. Most of them thought that, if it were thrown out, the impression produced upon the country at large would be that the University approved Dr. Hampden's theology. They, therefore, reluctantly determined to support it; not as what they would have chosen, but as the best thing attainable under the circumstances. What followed is told by Miss Hampden. The statute was proposed, was supported in a Latin speech by one master of arts, who, if we remember rightly, strongly complained of its unsatisfactory character, pointing out that what ought to have been spoken about was *Fides*, while the statute spoke only of *Fiducia*. It was then put to the vote, and vetoed by the united voices of the two proctors. These are officers of the University who hold office for one year only, and have the power, when they are agreed, of vetoing any statute. Whether that power had ever before been exercised there was, we believe, no member of the University antiquarian enough to know. A few weeks later, new proctors having come into office, the statute was again brought forward

by the authorities, and carried by an overwhelming majority. It was to these proceedings that Mr. Gladstone referred, in a letter to Dr. Hampden, which was copied into all the newspapers, as soon as Miss Hampden's book was published. Mr. Gladstone did not actually vote, but when his attention was turned to the subject some twenty years later, he found, by consulting his journal, that he had intended to vote for it, if his attendance had not been prevented by an accident, and he thought it his duty to express to Dr. Hampden his regret at having taken any part in promoting "a condemnation couched in general terms, which did not really declare the point of implied guilt, and against which perfect innocence could have had no defence."

So far as the proceeding was a "condemnation" at all, Mr. Gladstone's language must be admitted to be strictly correct. It is another question, into which we need not now enter, whether, under the circumstances, the University being precluded by the Board of Heads of Houses (of which Dr. Hampden was himself a member, and in which his supporters were all but a majority) from bringing the question to any real trial, it was not well that those members of the University who were convinced that his teaching was subversive of Christianity, should accept rather than reject a vote which declared that "the University had no confidence in him as a theological teacher." What is important to observe is, that those whom Dr. Hampden stigmatized as "the party," "the persecution," &c., were only thus far and no farther responsible for what was done.

Some time later Dr. Hampden's supporters obtained a majority in the Board of Heads, and a proposal was made to repeal this statute, which was rejected by a large majority of the University.

Dr. Hampden was Regius Professor from 1836 to 1847. It is curious, but perhaps not surprising, considering that he had obtained the office by his opposition to tests in the University, to find that the only events which varied the usual routine of his professorship were two attempts made by him to extend the system of tests to a degree never before thought of. These were in the cases of Mr. M'Mullen and Mr. Ward.

In the first he adroitly availed himself of a practice, now nearly obsolete, but which had come down from the earliest times of the University. It had always been required that candidates for degrees in divinity should "hold disputations" on some points of theology. This was originally intended to be, and as a matter of fact always had been, merely a trial of their learning and talents. The idea of making it a test had



never occurred to any professor, Catholic or Protestant, High Church, Evangelical, or Puritan—it was Dr. Hampden's own. In fact it was an absurdity, because the old custom was, that one man undertook to defend certain theses, and any qualified person was allowed to come and argue as well as he could against them, the Professor presiding as moderator. In time, however, the disputation had come to be little more than a Latin essay read by the candidate. It seemed to Dr. Hampden that by requiring men to write on some subject in dispute between the parties in the Anglican Church and then refusing the degree if they did not take the side he liked, he could turn these disputations, into a test—and of all tests the most stringent, because, instead of being called upon to sign certain propositions, the candidate would have to agree with whatever the Professor might chance to hold. This was what he tried to bring about in Mr. M'Mullen's case, and he actually did succeed in keeping Mr. M'Mullen a long time out of his degree, by which he lost his place in his college. He seems, however, to have found that public feeling would not tolerate his establishing such a test as a general rule.

In the other case, Mr. Ward had published a book ("The Ideal"), many things in which shocked the Protestant feelings even of High Churchmen. The heads of houses accordingly proposed that he should be deprived of the degree of master of arts on the ground that men were required to subscribe the Thirty-nine Articles when they took the degree, and that his book was inconsistent with the Articles. We need not point out that this was carrying the principle of a test much farther than it had ever been carried before. Thousands of graduates had published books avowedly inconsistent with the Thirty-nine Articles and even with Christianity itself; yet no one had ever proposed to deprive them of their degrees once received. Yet Dr. Hampden, the great enemy of tests, strongly supported this proposal also. Moreover he had never ceased to complain that the censure against himself had been passed, not by a judicial body, but by Convocation—the general parliament of the University, consisting of all masters of arts. Yet he strongly supported the carrying of a far more severe censure against Mr. Ward by the same body. Lastly, one of his principal grounds of complaint had been, and still was, that he suspected (with great probability no doubt) that some of those who voted for the censure upon himself might not have read his own books, but only the extracts from them published by those who acted against him. But Miss Hampden, in her simplicity, publishes a letter from Dr. Hampden, to his friend Mr. Hull, urging him

to vote against Mr. Ward, and particularly insisting that the fact that he neither had read nor intended to read a word of the book was no reason against his voting.

We are far from insinuating any charge of inconsistency either against Dr. Hampden for what he did in those cases, or against Miss Hampden, who so strongly approves it. No man, however steadfast, remains always rooted in details. All that can be expected of man is that he shall be consistent in his great principles. Now, Miss Hampden has one great principle, in which she is uniformly and most amiably consistent, and which she received from Dr. Hampden. It is, that whoever agrees with Dr. Hampden is not only right in opinion, but is also honest, good, deserving, and religious; while all who differ from him are not only in error, but also insincere, wicked, base, and irreligious. He was uniformly consistent in acting on this great principle. In the present instance it is worth remembering that Mr. M'Mullen had been among the ablest as well as warmest of those who condemned his works. Mr. Ward's name also appears appended to every protest against him. Miss Hampden naturally does not think this worth mentioning. Nay, she tells us, with a *naïveté* quite charming, that Mr. M'Mullen was regarded by the Doctor merely "as an ordinary candidate for a divinity degree," until a certain point in the Doctor's proceedings, when he objected to write on the subjects proposed by him. That anybody could be so malignant as to suppose that a mind so serene as that of Dr. Hampden could have entered on the affair with any prejudice against him, she evidently considers impossible.

These were, so far as appears, the first instances in which he in any way came forward against what was then called the Oxford school. This is worth noting, because his advocates have tried to explain the opposition to his appointment, by alleging the ill-will he had brought on himself by acting against it. It is a mere illusion; for he had done nothing of the kind. Indeed without inconsistency he never could do anything against it, as his fundamental principle was that no "theological opinions" are either better or worse than others. Why, then, should he oppose the "theological opinions" of Dr. Pusey, or indeed those of the Catholic Church itself? Of course the answer is that, like other innovators, when he spoke strongly against condemning any opinions, he meant to protest only against the condemnation of his own.

He carried out his principle in another instance not known till the publication of this volume. As Regius Professor, he

became a canon of the cathedral, and was bound to reside there. The consequence was that he left St. Mary Hall. He thought fit however, on excuses transparently frivolous, to retain the Headship. Whether there ever was any other instance of a non-resident Head, Miss Hampden does not say. We never heard of any. The Duke of Wellington was Chancellor, and with his views of discipline, disliked the notion. Miss Hampden assumes (she does not profess to know it) that the Duke must have been informed that he was non-resident by some unfriendly hand. Of course there was no baseness of which "the Party" were not ready to be guilty. She admits that non-residence was "not in strict accordance with the statutes." However she exults in the fact that "this somewhat curious correspondence had no result." The Doctor's comment on it is characteristic: "I wish he could not have destroyed my illusion as to his being a magnanimous person." Magnanimous indeed! How could any one suppose a man to be magnanimous, who actually ventured to think that Dr. Hampden ought not permanently to retain an important office, without any attempt to fulfil any of its duties; when he had already shown by his conduct that his opinion was the other way?

He was certainly unlucky in his persecutors. Even gentle, meek Archbishop Howley, who in all his life never said a severe thing of any one, ventured not to like the Bampton Lectures, though not to say so openly. Accordingly Dr. Hampden writes: "I received this morning a letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury. It clearly appears from it that the Archbishop has already taken his side, not having deigned even to ask me a question on the subject beforehand, and I find that I am to expect no sympathy or even fair play from that quarter."

But then he had his supporters. We have a strong testimony to his theology from Lord Melbourne, who told the House of Lords: "I do not think there is anything to be condemned in the writings of Dr. Hampden." He went on to say: "I know very little on the subject, and yet I believe I know more than those who have opposed the Doctor's nomination." Lord Melbourne defends this assertion by saying: "They are upon points of extremely recondite and difficult scholastic learning: very few of your lordships indeed have the means of forming any sound opinion upon such extremely difficult, abstruse, and obscure points as these." Considering that those "who opposed the nomination" were Mr. Newman, Dr. Pusey, Mr. Keble, there was a fair amount of modest assurance in this estimate of himself.

When Dr. Hampden had held for eleven years the Pro-

fessor's chair with the canonry and the rich rectory of Ewelme annexed to it by statute, and the Headship which he had annexed to it in violation of statute, he was nominated by Lord John Russell to the Protestant bishopric of Hereford. The opposition, of course, was renewed; the Dean of Hereford declared that he would not join in electing him, and Miss Hampden relates, with evident delight, Lord Russell's answer, in terms the curtness of which, as well as the date,—not Christmas Day but "December 25," were evidently intended for insult:—"Sir, I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 22nd instant, in which you intimate to me your intention of violating the law.—I have the honour to be your obedient servant." But elected he was, and then came the "confirmation" of the election. In this case, as in many others in England, an ancient form has been preserved, while care has been taken to show it means nothing. The Protestant Archbishop is obliged to name a day, on which he will sit, in person or by deputy, to hear all objections to the person nominated, calling upon all who know any such objections to come forward and state them, and pledging himself that they shall be heard. On the day appointed the Court sits, after solemn prayers for divine direction, then proclamation is made summoning all objectors to appear,—and ending, "and they shall be heard." In the Court thus held upon Dr. Hampden's nomination, three clergymen, one of whom at least held office in the diocese of Hereford, formally appeared by their proctor to urge objections, and the Archbishop's official decided that, despite the solemn promise of a hearing and the prayers for divine direction, neither he nor the Protestant prelate whom he represented had by law power to hear them. He therefore proceeded to confirm Dr. Hampden's election without hearing what was urged against it. This Dr. Hampden seems to have considered as a special glory to himself. The question whether the refusal of the official was right or wrong was then tried at law before the Court of Queen's Bench, and it was decided that he had been right; that the whole ceremony of confirmation—the prayers put up—the summons to objectors—the promise of a hearing—is merely a form; that the nomination of the Sovereign is all-in-all; and that if any person should be nominated whose unfitness might be ever so scandalous, either from heresy or immorality, the Protestant Archbishop has no alternative, but must proceed first to "confirm" his election, and afterwards with all due solemnity to "consecrate" him. It was expressly laid down that there was no exception whatever to this law, even if the person nominated were a convicted felon. The Lord Chief Justice indeed pointed out,

that if the conscience of the Anglican Archbishop would not allow him to discharge his office in such a case, his only alternative was to resign his see. This is the present law upon the subject; nor can we imagine that either the present or any future Protestant Primate could in conscience refuse to act upon it; as every Anglican clergyman solemnly engages at his ordination "always so to minister discipline as this Church and realm hath received it." There can be no doubt that the absolute nullity of this ceremony is one of the things which this "Church and realm hath received."

The opposition made to Dr. Hampden's appointment was, as the work before us shows in detail, most serious. But all that was said or done was marred by one fatal blot. Of all the Anglican authorities no one ventured to say that he had taught anything false or heretical. Thirteen Anglican bishops remonstrated with Lord John Russell against the appointment: but they grounded their remonstrance, not upon their own knowledge or belief that he had taught anything contrary to the truth, but only upon the fact that the University of Oxford had "declared by a solemn decree its want of confidence in the soundness of his doctrines." Lord John, of course, did not fail to hit so manifest a blot. In fact what they asked was not that a man known to be a heretic should not be obtruded into their body, but something widely different, namely, that a majority of the University of Oxford should have the right of disqualifying any man for the Queen's nomination, and that without assigning any reason against him except that they had not confidence in his teaching. Just the same had been the case when the opposition to him had been discussed in the House of Lords. The Protestant Archbishop had complained of his nomination, but had guarded himself by saying "the question is not whether the opinions maintained by Dr. Hampden are consistent with the doctrines of the Church of England. Upon this point I will abstain from making any observation now. I will not attempt to go into the subject." What then did he say? "These opinions were announced in several publications, and I believe they gave dissatisfaction in various quarters." No doubt the Anglican authorities behaved wisely and in a manner suitable to their position; for if they had declared Dr. Hampden a heretic, that would have shown only that he entertained one opinion and they another. Who was to decide between them? But one does not see how they could seriously expect that any weight would be allowed to an objection for which they themselves dared not to assign any reason.

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tion as Dr. Sumner, who succeeded to the Protestant Primacy almost immediately after his nomination, had to give. From that day his career, so far as appears, differed nothing from that of any ordinary High Church Bishop. He performed with the utmost decorum, but without giving himself any extraordinary trouble, the routine duties of his office, made himself very comfortable, spent a life of literary ease, provided well for his family, attained to a good old age—and died. We are not aware that there is anything more to be said.

The most grave charge upon his moral character, though at first sight established by the strongest proofs, may, we are glad to think, be dismissed by a deliberate and charitable judgment. It could not be denied that several times over, at different periods of his life, he changed suddenly from one of the schools in the Anglican Communion to another most opposite to it, and that every one of these sudden changes was made at a moment when it was most calculated to advance his own interest. Of course there were those who somewhat uncharitably concluded that he changed his doctrines in order to promote his interest. Early in his clerical career he was curate to Mr. Norris, of Hackney, a good man, renowned in his day, not only as the highest, but quite as decidedly as the driest of all High and Dry Churchmen. At the same time he was editor of an "Orthodox" magazine. After having for some years given full satisfaction to this school, and satisfied himself with it, he returned to Oxford just at the crisis when Lord Liverpool, whose Church appointments were exclusively High and Dry, was succeeded by a party whose avowed object was to "liberalize the Church of England," and he immediately came out, in the "Bampton Lectures" and the "Observations on Religious Dissent," as the broadest of the Broad or Latitudinarian school. The effect of this change unquestionably was that he was obtruded on the reluctant University as Regius Professor of Divinity. His appointment created a degree of indignation never paralleled, not only among High Churchmen, but quite as much among what called itself the "Evangelical" school, a body of men who represent the Puritans of the seventeenth century, and differ from the "Evangelical Dissenters" of our own day only in belonging to a higher social class, and having therefore more of the education and manners of gentlemen. This party was as opposite as possible to both those with which Dr. Hampden had up to that day identified himself. They had always specially, and not without reason, detested the coldness of the High and Dry school, whom indeed, very unjustly, they denounced as men, not Christians at all, but needing conversion to Christianity. As for Dr.

Hampden's newer school, they saw (with almost everybody else) that the direct tendency of his speculations was to Socinianism, which (together with all who cared about Christianity at all) they felt to be but another name for entire infidelity. Besides, they disliked that school for another reason of their own, namely, that it substituted a cold philosophical diction for the peculiar phraseology which they had inherited from the Puritans, and which, strangely enough, they had brought themselves so completely to identify with spirituality of mind, that they had come to think, not only that no man could be really spiritual if he did not use it, but that no man could fail to be truly spiritual if he did. Thus Dr. Hampden, as he himself wrote at the time, had the support of "no party" in the Anglican Communion. The "Evangelicals," represented by the "Record" newspaper, indulged (after their custom) in language of condemnation against him far more violent than would ever have been used by his more refined opponents of the Oxford School. His new friends (Whately and his school, and the Whig ministers), although politically powerful, were not then numerous enough in the Anglican Communion to be accounted a party at all. But a change was close at hand, far more startling than even Dr. Hampden's sudden defection from the "High and Dry" school to the Latitudinarians. He delivered and published an "Inaugural Lecture." In it indeed he expressly declared that he had changed none of the opinions he had expressed in the "Bampton Lectures" and the "Observations;" but to the astonishment of all men, it was written from first to last, not in the tone and language of either of his old or of his new school, but in the peculiar and unmistakable phraseology of the party which most violently denounced both of them, and was opposed by both—the extreme Puritan or "Evangelical" school. The effect was most remarkable. Although he most emphatically declared that he had changed and would change not one of his doctrinal statements, which statements up to that moment the whole of that school had most passionately denounced as utterly subversive of Christianity, yet as soon as he used the phraseology which they considered inseparable from spiritual religion, they went round like a weather-cock. From that hour they declared him (in their usual terms) to be "Evangelical," "converted," "enlightened," "experimental"—all of which terms, when translated out of their peculiar phraseology into simple English, meant merely "a man of our party." From that hour he had, as long as he lived, the warm support of the party, which (although always weaker in Oxford than anywhere else) was at that period

numerically far stronger throughout England than all other parties in the Anglican Communion put together, and with which, it is most obvious, he never had in his own feelings the slightest sympathy.

No wonder if those who witnessed a change so startling in its suddenness and so convenient in its effects, and who bore in mind that it followed close upon another change equally sudden and equally convenient (by which he, a prominent member of Mr. Norris's school, had obtained the patronage of the Liberal Government), naturally, although somewhat uncharitably, took for granted that he had, twice within four years, suddenly changed his theology in order to advance his interests. The existence of this feeling is acknowledged by Dr. Hampden himself, in a letter in which he mentions that "a graduate of the University" had written to him "that it is the opinion of many, that his inaugural lecture was got up merely to serve a present purpose, and that consequently all confidence in his sincerity should cease."

These two changes attracted attention, but they were quite as suddenly followed by a third, although from its nature it was little noticed; for from the day of his inaugural lecture to the day of his death, Dr. Hampden, as his daughter boasts, was neither a Latitudinarian nor an Evangelical, but an ordinary High and Dry professor and bishop, differing in nothing from those who had gone before him, except in his bitterness against those who had opposed his elevation, and the ingenuity with which he strained matters in order to devise new tests by which they might be deprived of their position in the University.

It must be admitted that the *primâ facie* appearance of these changes was much against Dr. Hampden, yet we do not believe he was conscious of anything dishonest in them. He will be unfairly judged if we allow ourselves to suppose that the distinctions between the contending schools of the Anglican Communion, from one to another of which he passed so rapidly, are really doctrinal. In truth they are much more either social or political. It must be remembered that the Anglican Communion itself has no theology. It neither has, nor possibly could have, any system answering in any degree to that marvellous science of Catholic theology, which, as ages have gone by, has gradually been developed by the action of minds, in natural powers the highest of each succeeding century, and elevated far above nature by supernatural gifts of sanctity, and by the Divine indwelling; a science which in each succeeding generation has conquered new realms, owing to the controversies raised by the false teaching of heretics;

but which, ever growing, has always been preserved from error, because the teaching, even of the greatest and holiest men, has been sifted by the infallible wisdom which dwells in the Church, which leads her into all truth, and distinguishes between opinions into which the greatest men have been led by the action of their own fallible minds, and the developments of the original deposit into which they have been guided by the Spirit which dwells in them. Such a theology no Protestant body either possesses or could possibly possess. Highly gifted men—nay, men of great genius, there have been in such bodies, and many of these have turned their minds to religious studies, but unless they have been guided by Divine grace to the One Church, the result has usually been, that they have thought out certain particular truths, parts of the Divine system, and that these, not being balanced by others, as they are in that system, have led them into extremes, and made them founders of some new heresy. At the very best, they have adopted an imperfect inconsistent Christianity, which those who have come after them, and who began by taking them as guides, have very soon laid aside, finding it incapable of satisfying the hunger of their souls. Of late, no doubt, a small section of Anglicans, conscious of the fact that Anglicanism has no theology, have given themselves to the study of the Catholic theology, and (as could not fail to happen in the case of intelligent and sincere students) have become enamoured of it. Yet how imperfect at best must be their apprehension of its bearing (even if they do not, as generally happens, study it only in fragments—one subject here, one there—not as a whole); for, not acknowledging in fact (whatever they may in theory) the infallible authority of the Church, they must of necessity turn their minds to it as critics, not as pupils.

In Dr. Hampden's time, the few who looked at all into Catholic theology did it avowedly as critics, and as critics alone. The extremest favour they ever thought of showing to a theologian, such as S. Thomas, was indulgently to patronize him. The whole attitude of their minds was that of a superior towards an inferior. If they saw (as able men could not help seeing) his wonderful ability, they satisfied themselves with trying to explain how it was that such a man could have adopted a system so absurd, and, of course, the solution was not far to seek, in the term, "the dark ages." Such, we cannot doubt, was Dr. Hampden's only feeling when he wrote on S. Thomas for the "*Encyclopædia Metropolitana*." Small marvel that a man totally ignorant of the first rudiments of theology should have learned little from dipping, in such a spirit as this, into the writings of that profound genius, that great saint.

What was called Anglican theology therefore was no system, either true or false, but chiefly, and first of all, arguments upon the evidences of Christianity. This was, with very few exceptions, the subject of all Anglican theological books for much more than a century before the rise of the Oxford movement. The exceptions were a few on the Socinian, and at one time a good many on the Calvinistic controversy, arguments in defence of a Church establishment; and, at an earlier period, the anti-Roman and anti-Puritan treatises. But in the earlier years of the present century all these had become obsolete, and had lost their interest. The little discussion there was, was chiefly about the Bible Society, which the Low Churchmen, joining with the Dissenters, supported; while the High Churchmen denounced it as dangerous to "our venerable Establishment." There was no controversy upon theology properly so called, chiefly because no one really knew or cared anything about it. In looking back, the only doctrinal difference seems to have been that the High Churchmen thought they held Regeneration in Baptism, which the Low Churchmen denied; but the difference was almost absolutely verbal. In effect they said, "Regeneration means nothing more than the ceremony of Baptism"; the other party said, "Regeneration means conversion," and Baptism is only a ceremony. But as to any real effect produced by Baptism, one party did not hold it more really than the other. That we are not mistaken in this, nothing can prove more clearly than Dr. Hampden's own career. The peculiarity of the Norris school (to which he belonged till he returned to Oxford) was "Baptismal Regeneration." Yet when he wrote his Bampton Lectures, he put forth the view, that the belief in the grace of Baptism originated in the notions of magic prevailing in the early ages. Nevertheless, he had no idea that he had changed his theology. It is evident, therefore, that he never had really believed in the grace of Baptism; and yet he would have been regarded as a heretic by the Norris school if he had professed to disbelieve "Baptismal Regeneration." It was, in fact, merely a question of words between men who had no real difference of doctrine.

In this state of things the difference between the schools in the Anglican Communion was really social rather than theological. The bishop, the dean, the archdeacon, and the wealthy rector were orthodox. So were those among the younger clergy who had received a polished education, and who aspired to follow their steps. Of those Low Churchmen who united with the Dissenters in the "Bible Society" and such institutions, very few were of the aristocratical class.



The chief visible difference was, that the Low Churchmen were much less reserved and fastidious both in their preaching and conversation. A clever writer says, "The 'High and Dry' rector used to preach 'Salvation by scholarship alone.' It seemed to his curate, sitting beneath him in the desk, as if he were trying to persuade himself that he had a religion, but could not succeed in doing so. His object appeared to be to strip religion of all charms and deprive it of all interest, in which he was uniformly successful." At the same time he seems to have held, almost as a secret in his study, those great truths of Christianity which Protestants had not formally denied. The Evangelicals differed from him in putting them forward. The same writer says of the founders of that school: "These men revived the grand but almost obliterated ideas of a personal God, of intimate relations between each soul of man and the Divine Redeemer, of a religion of love and obedience, while the nation was still slumbering, after the horrible stagnation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." But that "they lost their influence the moment they ceased to be the only earnest preachers, because they appealed to feeling more than to Faith or Reason, the first of which they confounded with mere religious sensibility, while they offended the latter."\*

By degrees the Evangelicals became more educated and refined, and the Orthodox less afraid of speaking out; so that at last it came to this, that the more religious members of these two parties really differed little or nothing in their religious views and convictions. Neither of them had ever read any theology, or knew, in fact, anything about it. There was no standard of authority to which either of them looked up. Both of them, so far as they were personally religious, rested their hopes upon the same God and Saviour. Neither really believed more than the other, about any special way of access to Him, even through the two Sacraments which alone they both acknowledged, and which they both alike held to be nothing more than edifying ceremonies. The chief difference between them, assuming both to be equally religious men, was that one thought it right almost entirely to conceal his religious thoughts and affections, and even in preaching spoke of little else than moral duties and social virtues,† the other talked

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\* The "Comedy of Convocation."

† Cowper says,—

"How oft, when Paul has served us with a text,  
Has Epictetus, Plato, Tully preached;  
Men that, if now alive, would sit content  
And humble learners of a Saviour's word,  
Preach it who might."

and preached of his private religious thoughts and feelings more prominently than good taste would warrant, and perhaps sometimes forced himself into expressing even more than he felt.

Dr. Hampden, as we have seen, began his career among the driest of the Dry school. It was therefore taken for granted by himself and others, as this book tells us, that he must be specially orthodox. But, in truth, he did not know what orthodoxy meant. When he had to deliver Bampton Lectures, ill luck put it into his head to argue\* that religion had nothing to do with "theological opinion,"—by which term he meant dogma; that it would be much better, if it were possible, to give up dogma altogether; that dogma was only chopping logic about "theological opinions"; and his speculations carried these notions into details, which seemed little less than blasphemous to the rising generation of Oxford clergymen, who had lately begun to turn their studies in a Catholic direction. Of course, there cannot be a doubt (and our subsequent experience would prove, if it had not before been clear) that these speculations, if they had been left unopposed, and if they had not fallen (as they very likely might) still-born from the press, but had been taken up by any number of thinkers, would have led them on to the wildest extremes of rationalism and infidelity. But we fully believe that, in his sovereign and undisturbed ignorance of theology, he was not aware that this must be their necessary result, and much less desired it. There is something really pathetic in the eagerness of his assurances to the Protestant Archbishop and others, that he fully and heartily believed the doctrines of the Incarnation and the rest. We do not doubt that he was sincere in these protestations. We fully believe that he saw nothing in the Bampton Lectures inconsistent with the character of an orthodox High Church divine; but this, of course, was

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\* Miss Hampden says, "It has been repeated with a parrot-like pertinacity, that the Bampton Lectures were in part or wholly written by Mr. Blanco White." We never heard this, and greatly doubt whether it was ever said. The only authority she gives is a letter of Archdeacon Hare, who says that some anonymous writer in the *Times* writes that they are "as much the product of Mr. Blanco White's mind as certain works penned by Xenophon and Plato are virtually the thoughts of Socrates." This does not imply that Mr. Blanco White wrote a word of them, for Socrates certainly did not write the works either of Xenophon or Plato. But it is well known to persons who were at Oriel while the lectures were being delivered, that Mr. Blanco White openly congratulated himself on having introduced Dr. Hampden to certain French books, by which much that appeared in the lectures was suggested. We suspect, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Blanco White over-estimated his share in them.

only because he had never really understood what orthodoxy meant, or seen its connection with any dogma. To him it had hitherto meant merely dignity, stiffness, "our venerable Establishment," and the like phrases; and no doubt if he had been asked, when at Hackney, what difference there was between himself or Mr. Norris, and the lowest Churchman in their neighbourhood, whom he did not esteem a Churchman at all, he would have had nothing to say, except that the man he denounced supported the Bible Society; or at the utmost, that he taught the necessity of regeneration for careless Christians—although he himself would have held the same thing, and only expressed it in other words.

He was unaware, therefore, of any inconsistency or any change, when he, the most orthodox of Churchmen, came forward to declare all dogma to be an evil, even when it is a necessary evil; and, in fact, there was no real change in him. But neither, we trust, was he any more conscious of any real change when he came forward in his inaugural lecture with all the characteristic phraseology of the Low Church school. For, finding that men of all parties agreed in supposing that he did not believe in Christianity at all (and this, indeed, was the natural conclusion of any man who supposed that he saw the meaning and effect of his own words), he resolved, as he wrote at the time to Dr. Arnold, to make a sort of public profession of his own orthodoxy, *i.e.* to display his real religious thoughts, feelings, and hopes. Now, being merely Protestant, and differing, as we have seen, from the Low Church school only in belonging to a set of men who made much less open profession than they of such hopes, and fears, and affections, even when they really felt them, the natural consequence was, that when he forced himself for once to speak out, he spoke in the peculiar phraseology of the Low Church school. It would be uncharitable to suspect him of any intention to deceive them in doing so, when his conduct is easily explained by his own statement without such a suspicion. And this being the state of his mind, nothing could be more natural than that, as soon as things became quiet around him, he should once more evidently be what he had really been all along, an ordinary High and Dry clergyman, quite unconscious what dogma might mean.

One thing only has pained us in this volume. It is not the almost blind passion to which Dr. Hampden was stung in 1836 by the opposition to his preferment. It is that there is not the least appearance that that passion ever cooled in the course of the many happy, prosperous years which followed after the struggle was over. The letters which we have given above show how he felt at the time. We are sorry also

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In this state of things the difference between the schools in the Anglican Communion was really social rather than theological. The bishop, the dean, the archdeacon, and the wealthy rector were orthodox. So were those among the younger clergy who had received a polished education, and who aspired to follow their steps. Of those Low Churchmen who united with the Dissenters in the "Bible Society" and such institutions, very few were of the aristocratical class.

The chief visible difference was, that the Low Churchmen were much less reserved and fastidious both in their preaching and conversation. A clever writer says, "The 'High and Dry' rector used to preach 'Salvation by scholarship alone.' It seemed to his curate, sitting beneath him in the desk, as if he were trying to persuade himself that he had a religion, but could not succeed in doing so. His object appeared to be to strip religion of all charms and deprive it of all interest, in which he was uniformly successful." At the same time he seems to have held, almost as a secret in his study, those great truths of Christianity which Protestants had not formally denied. The Evangelicals differed from him in putting them forward. The same writer says of the founders of that school: "These men revived the grand but almost obliterated ideas of a personal God, of intimate relations between each soul of man and the Divine Redeemer, of a religion of love and obedience, while the nation was still slumbering, after the horrible stagnation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." But that "they lost their influence the moment they ceased to be the only earnest preachers, because they appealed to feeling more than to Faith or Reason, the first of which they confounded with mere religious sensibility, while they offended the latter."\*

By degrees the Evangelicals became more educated and refined, and the Orthodox less afraid of speaking out; so that at last it came to this, that the more religious members of these two parties really differed little or nothing in their religious views and convictions. Neither of them had ever read any theology, or knew, in fact, anything about it. There was no standard of authority to which either of them looked up. Both of them, so far as they were personally religious, rested their hopes upon the same God and Saviour. Neither really believed more than the other, about any special way of access to Him, even through the two Sacraments which alone they both acknowledged, and which they both alike held to be nothing more than edifying ceremonies. The chief difference between them, assuming both to be equally religious men, was that one thought it right almost entirely to conceal his religious thoughts and affections, and even in preaching spoke of little else than moral duties and social virtues,† the other talked

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\* The "Comedy of Convocation."

† Cowper says,—

"How oft, when Paul has served us with a text,  
Has Epictetus, Plato, Tully preached;  
Men that, if now alive, would sit content  
And humble learners of a Saviour's word,  
Preach it who might."

and preached of his private religious thoughts and feelings more prominently than good taste would warrant, and perhaps sometimes forced himself into expressing even more than he felt.

Dr. Hampden, as we have seen, began his career among the drier of the Dry school. It was therefore taken for granted by himself and others, as this book tells us, that he must be specially orthodox. But, in truth, he did not know what orthodoxy meant. When he had to deliver Bampton Lectures, ill luck put it into his head to argue\* that religion had nothing to do with "theological opinion,"—by which term he meant dogma; that it would be much better, if it were possible, to give up dogma altogether; that dogma was only chopping logic about "theological opinions"; and his speculations carried these notions into details, which seemed little less than blasphemous to the rising generation of Oxford clergymen, who had lately begun to turn their studies in a Catholic direction. Of course, there cannot be a doubt (and our subsequent experience would prove, if it had not before been clear) that these speculations, if they had been left unopposed, and if they had not fallen (as they very likely might) still-born from the press, but had been taken up by any number of thinkers, would have led them on to the wildest extremes of rationalism and infidelity. But we fully believe that, in his sovereign and undisturbed ignorance of theology, he was not aware that this must be their necessary result, and much less desired it. There is something really pathetic in the eagerness of his assurances to the Protestant Archbishop and others, that he fully and heartily believed the doctrines of the Incarnation and the rest. We do not doubt that he was sincere in these protestations. We fully believe that he saw nothing in the Bampton Lectures inconsistent with the character of an orthodox High Church divine; but this, of course, was

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\* Miss Hampden says, "It has been repeated with a parrot-like pertinacity, that the Bampton Lectures were in part or wholly written by Mr. Blanco White." We never heard this, and greatly doubt whether it was ever said. The only authority she gives is a letter of Archdeacon Hare, who says that some anonymous writer in the *Times* writes that they are "as much the product of Mr. Blanco White's mind as certain works penned by Xenophon and Plato are virtually the thoughts of Socrates." This does not imply that Mr. Blanco White wrote a word of them, for Socrates certainly did not write the works either of Xenophon or Plato. But it is well known to persons who were at Oriel while the lectures were being delivered, that Mr. Blanco White openly congratulated himself on having introduced Dr. Hampden to certain French books, by which much that appeared in the lectures was suggested. We suspect, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Blanco White over-estimated his share in them.



only because he had never really understood what orthodoxy meant, or seen its connection with any dogma. To him it had hitherto meant merely dignity, stiffness, "our venerable Establishment," and the like phrases; and no doubt if he had been asked, when at Hackney, what difference there was between himself or Mr. Norris, and the lowest Churchman in their neighbourhood, whom he did not esteem a Churchman at all, he would have had nothing to say, except that the man he denounced supported the Bible Society; or at the utmost, that he taught the necessity of regeneration for careless Christians—although he himself would have held the same thing, and only expressed it in other words.

He was unaware, therefore, of any inconsistency or any change, when he, the most orthodox of Churchmen, came forward to declare all dogma to be an evil, even when it is a necessary evil; and, in fact, there was no real change in him. But neither, we trust, was he any more conscious of any real change when he came forward in his inaugural lecture with all the characteristic phraseology of the Low Church school. For, finding that men of all parties agreed in supposing that he did not believe in Christianity at all (and this, indeed, was the natural conclusion of any man who supposed that he saw the meaning and effect of his own words), he resolved, as he wrote at the time to Dr. Arnold, to make a sort of public profession of his own orthodoxy, *i.e.* to display his real religious thoughts, feelings, and hopes. Now, being merely Protestant, and differing, as we have seen, from the Low Church school only in belonging to a set of men who made much less open profession than they of such hopes, and fears, and affections, even when they really felt them, the natural consequence was, that when he forced himself for once to speak out, he spoke in the peculiar phraseology of the Low Church school. It would be uncharitable to suspect him of any intention to deceive them in doing so, when his conduct is easily explained by his own statement without such a suspicion. And this being the state of his mind, nothing could be more natural than that, as soon as things became quiet around him, he should once more evidently be what he had really been all along, an ordinary High and Dry clergyman, quite unconscious what dogma might mean.

One thing only has pained us in this volume. It is not the almost blind passion to which Dr. Hampden was stung in 1836 by the opposition to his preferment. It is that there is not the least appearance that that passion ever cooled in the course of the many happy, prosperous years which followed after the struggle was over. The letters which we have given above show how he felt at the time. We are sorry also

to learn, from the volume before us, that he read and approved, before it was published, the article on "the Oxford Malig-nants," in the "Edinburgh Review"; an article written throughout with a degree of passion and violence, both in praise of himself and in abuse of all who opposed him, excusable by the infirmity of human nature in a man of impetuous feelings, who was writing in defence of a friend, but which one hopes few men would have been found to sanction in their own case. But the painful thing is that, so far as we may judge from this volume, his intense animosity never diminished to the very last. The only term by which he describes the conduct of any one who expressed an opinion against his own is "the persecution." Those who differ from him are always "the party." There were two Professors of Theology at Oxford, and although the other, on the whole, agreed less with those whom Dr. Hampden so designated than with himself, yet he was not his out-and-out supporter, and therefore is named "the party's Professor." Time came when he had what he felt a real triumph. Mr. Newman, Mr. M'Mullen, Mr. Oakeley, and others, the most earnest of his opponents, became Catholics. He is never weary of referring to this as explaining their opposition to himself; not without reason, for, no doubt, those who maintain the necessity of dogma at all, must, if they are consistent, sooner or later become Catholics, just as those who maintain his views must, if they are consistent, sooner or later abandon Christianity altogether. But not even the step which removed them so decidedly out of his way diminished his intense bitterness against them. Years afterwards the new Catholic Hierarchy was appointed. England, as all the world still remembers, fell into one of its occasional fits of no-Popery frenzy. The Pope and the Cardinal were the objects of universal abuse; and the mob, feeling by a true instinct that it could do nothing else so painful to all Catholics, proceeded publicly to burn in effigy our Blessed Lady and (who can write it without shuddering?), even our Divine and Crucified Redeemer. They knew not what they did. The insult was intended, not for Him, but for the Catholics. But in all this hubbub, Bishop Hampden was unable to see, hear, or think of anything but of the men he so unrelentingly hated. He wrote, in November, 1850:—"As to the aggression of the Pope, it is, no doubt, the doing of the apostates from ourselves. They mean by it to replace themselves in that importance which they have lost by going over to a dissenting body. But they will find out that they have made a wrong move." It is to be remembered, that the converts at that time were not, as they now are, a large body—

they consisted only of a handful, chiefly of Oxford men; some of whom had very recently become priests. Nothing could be more absurd than to attribute to their influence any step taken by Rome. But even that did not content Dr. Hampden, without (according to his usual custom) imputing to them base and personal motives. What cared Mr. Newman, Mr. Faber, Mr. Oakeley, Mr. M'Mullen, and the rest, for the interests of the Catholic Church, the salvation of their countrymen, the cause of truth? Dr. Hampden knew better. Not only had he "no doubt" that all the mischief was their doing, but he had as little doubt they were throwing their country into confusion and risking the safety of all Catholics in the British empire merely for the lowest personal motives—to regain the importance they had lost by going over to a dissenting body,—so was the great Catholic Church designated in scorn by the great champion of liberalism in 1836, by the man who hated dogma only because he so tenderly longed for union among all Christians, and who held that the points on which he differed from Catholics were no part of revelation, but merely human opinions, as to which they were quite as likely to be right as he. But the real object of all this bitterness was not the Catholic Church, but the men whom he so intensely hated.

In reading Miss Hampden's touching account of his last days, it is impossible not to long for something like an expression on his part of a wish that he had not been altogether so "good a hater." Unhappily, she speaks in a manner in which she could not possibly have spoken if he had ever expressed any feeling of the kind. This is to us the painful part of the volume before us. Long-continued prosperity usually softens the heart to old animosities. He could hardly speak as he did of "the persecution," without remembering, that its effect had been to raise him from an obscure position to one which certainly would never have been offered, at a moment when the Liberal party especially wanted the support of able speakers on the Episcopal Bench, to a man who sat one and twenty years in the House of Lords (in times when the most momentous questions—political, social, and religious—were under daily discussion) without even venturing to open his lips, if the reputation of being an heresiarch had not made him a man of note. To "the persecution" alone he owed a seat in the House of Peers, a great income, large patronage, a place at the head of his profession, a palace on the banks of the silver Wye, and nestling beneath the shadow of a glorious Cathedral, "just what I should have chosen," as he writes (p. 165), "had I had all fair England before me," a feeling, his

daughter says, "which remained with him all through his life, increasing rather than diminishing with a nearer acquaintance." Neither could he be ignorant that among those whom he called "the party" there were scores who, beginning life with brighter prospects than his, had forfeited, simply for their religious convictions, all that this world can take away; not merely the hopes of rising in it; not merely wealth and ease, but friends—nay, their nearest relations. Yet "the persecution" seems to the very last to have rankled in his soul with a bitterness which must have been a sad drawback upon his great worldly prosperity. This is, indeed, a painful object of contemplation.

Most men of any eminence have some one thing which seems to be their special vocation, the object of their existence. What that object was in the case of Dr. Hampden there can be no doubt. Nay, he seems to have gloried in it. It was, to be the man in whose case the boasted independence and Catholicity of the Anglican Church were brought to trial—the man who proved, first, that it has no control whatever over the doctrines taught in its chief theological schools, so that the minister of the day can intrust the religious training of its clergy to whomsoever he will, whatever he denies and whatever he holds—and next, to be the man who proved that it has no means of checking or opposing the nomination of any person whatever to be one of its bishops, even (as was expressly laid down) if that person should be "a convicted felon." In both these things Dr. Hampden seems to have felt an especial pride, because they were triumphs over those whom he was pleased to call "the party." He thought it an honour to be the man in whose case these two facts were forced upon the notice of a great and noble nation, of high aspirations, just at a moment when it was awakening from its long sleep, and beginning to inquire into the real nature and merit of every one of the institutions which it has inherited. This seems to have been his especial triumph, and he was unquestionably entitled to it. Whether it was any great ground of self-congratulation is a further question, upon which we should not be of one mind with him.

## ART. IV.—THE FALL OF PARIS.

*Les Odeurs de Paris.* Par LOUIS VEUILLOT. Paris : Palmé.

FOR a twelvemonth of days, the reading public in these islands has been literally hanging in suspense on telegrams and daily newspapers. The absorbing news of each morning has been, first, preparation for war, then war declared, then the clash and collision of deadly strife. And this again as prelude to a series of defeats on the one side, successes on the other, with a uniform repetition, a rapidity of succession, a completeness of result, without parallel between the armies of two nations supposed to be so equally matched. Germany, our cousin in blood, dialect, and national stamp; France, our neighbour always, our friendly ally for a long half-century, have fought it out between them to the end, within a few hours' steam from our own capital.

From the victory of Saarsbruck and the disaster of Sedan to the capitulation of Paris, the problem was in process of being worked out, of which we are now to note some of the data. From the capitulation of Paris, again, to the victorious German troops, until the extinction of the Commune by the army of Versailles, the demonstration was rendered yet more complete. We are to endeavour to ascend from results past to the causes that have produced them. The results being so great and so appalling, the causes must be surely commensurate.

In this great tragedy of two acts, we may distinguish the successive movements or (so to speak) scenes. A vaunt of military glory pervading a whole nation, a boastful demand to measure swords with an old and successful antagonist, an enthusiastic rush into arms without a justifying cause, and thus a campaign commencing with a moral wrong. Then come in the Eumenides, and tell us, as in chorus, how one signal defeat after another had followed that wrong, until the spiked helmets defile under the Arc de Triomphe, and some three hundred and fifty thousand French prisoners have been deported over the Prussian frontier. The "baptism of fire" which the Emperor, little knowing what he said, had promised to his boy, received a hideous fulfilment, hardly contemplated, perhaps, by the oracle that uttered the boding words. Then came siege, famine, surrender of the capital,—all crowded

into the first act of the terrible drama, which would not, however, be complete without an interlude—one scene which, to our minds, interprets the whole. It is the public unveiling of the statue of Voltaire, the great enemy of God, of man, and of France, with all governmental honours attending the ceremony, and by the Minister of the Interior, under an Empire even then doomed to its fall. That solemnity has a special relation to the grim dance of the Furies, who shake their torches at the Paris that gloried in a deed so execrable.

And the second act? What is to be said of the internal dissensions which arise almost before the heavy pressure of the German's foreign hand has been withdrawn? What of the outbreak of revolt against so much of government as could be hastily thrown together, to fill the gap left by an Emperor in captivity? The men of order, the *République sage*, are without the city; the men of Red revolution, the *République sociale*, are cooped up, like wild beasts, within. The shells thrown by Frenchmen into French dwellings are responded to by frantic cries of rage against God and governments. The Reign of Terror is born again. Nay, the old names and symbols of the First Revolution, after eighty years, reappear and gibber in the streets. There is "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity:"—*Liberté de mal faire; Egalité de misère; Fraternité, comme Cain avec son frère*. There is denunciation of religion, monarchy, capital. Nor are these the empty cries of a momentary convulsion, or curses that expire in the sound. Witness the fall of the Vendôme Column: witness the massacre of the Archbishop and his fellow-victims in La Roquette: witness the palaces, not Imperial only, but municipal, of gay and beautiful Paris, fired by incendiaries, maddened, despairing, and suicidal. Fill up the picture with bloodshed and atrocities beyond estimation, corpses uncounted, *pétroleuses*, fiendish women, slaying and then slain, fiendish children pouring destruction with their tiny hands.

But the causes of this accumulation of national crimes? They are not far to seek; and we may enumerate the chief of them.

(1.) The false civilization of a godless metropolis. To speak of Paris is, indeed, in another sense than that of a popular writer, to tell "a tale of two cities." There is Paris that recognizes and serves God, and Paris that insults or ignores Him. Since just Lot and his household dwelt among the reprobate in the plain of Jordan,—since Rome contained alike the Paganism of the Cæsars on the Palatine, with Jupiter on the Capitol, and the struggling infant Church in its cradle of the catacombs,—never, perhaps, have good and



evil so dwelt and energized side by side. There was the Paris of a vigorous Catholic life interpenetrating Paris of the theatres,\* the *cafés chantants*, and every other conceivable appliance of frivolity, sensuality, and sin. What can present a greater contrast than the component elements of these two cities rolled into one? Religious communities and pious associations, devoted with French energy and concentration to every good work of corporal and spiritual mercy, confraternities, *œuvres*, foreign missions, a fecundity of Catholic literature, and many other excellent things and people: these make up the salt of Paris, and have redeemed it from being one seething, reeking mass of corruption. They are the ten just, found in the abandoned city, that has been hitherto spared for their sake. We do not draw the reverse of the picture. It is well known in general; for particulars, an able hand has offered "*Les Odeurs de Paris*" to such as may wish, by an *applicatio sensuum*, to make closer and more disagreeable acquaintance with them. But our point is, that the accumulating evils of Paris have grown up under the specious name of civilization. It was pre-eminently *the* polished

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\* "It would argue great ignorance of Paris and the Parisians to suppose that the closing of the Opera would have no more effect on Paris life than the closing for a season or two of the Italian Opera in London. The Grand Opera in Paris is as much an institution there as are the Clubs in Pall Mall. In its [precincts] you meet—you used to meet, I should say—all the most noteworthy men in Paris. Ministers had always a stall or box at the Opera, just as they belong to a club in England. On a first night you met with men of 'every world.' Boursiers and danseuses, bankers and men of letters, artists and journalists, met and exchanged sentiments. If all this be suddenly swept away, it will leave a void in Paris life which will be greatly felt by the Parisians, who, after all, do so much to give the key-note to political parties. We have it on good authority, that it is dangerous to let Paris suffer from *ennui*, and that she will so suffer there can be little doubt, if her chief theatres are to be closed. I do not speak here of the number of hard-working people that the closing of the Opera would throw out of employment. Then there is the Théâtre Français, which has hitherto been in the receipt of 250,000 f. a year, or £10,000, as subsidy from the State. It is now proposed to reduce this sum to 150,000 f. The prosperity of the Théâtre Français means the prosperity of the dramatic art in France, for to it all eyes turn for example, and on the playing of its actors all performers endeavour—of course with varying success—to model their style throughout France, or might we not almost say throughout the world? . . . *Paris est mort! Vive Paris!* We have forgotten our woes and our wrongs, our battles and our defeats, for has not the fine weather begun? Is there not a roaring farce at the Palais-Royal, &c. ? . . . Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we have to pay taxes." We are unable at the moment to give an accurate reference to the paper from which these words are taken; but they occur in the Paris correspondence of the *Daily Telegraph* or *Daily News* in the course of June last.

capital of Europe, the centre from which emanated the good tone, the stamp of society, elegance, fashion, whether in phrase, deportment, dress, the art of conversation, or even the culinary science; in a word, for our rude English tongue cannot so well express it, the *savoir vivre*. Now, the important lesson which every reflecting man must draw from the downfall and prostrate humiliation of this gay place is, the utter insufficiency of mere polish and civilization to preserve a people from corruption and from the atrocities that always, like an unfailing Nemesis, wash out corruption in blood. This is saying too little. The pseudo-civilization of Paris has been intimately allied with vice. The inherent offensiveness of immorality has been carried off and partly deodorized, if you are to believe its votaries, by the art of sinning gracefully. Vice was supposed to lose half its evil by losing all its grossness. Who does not remember the flowing period, to that effect, in which the great rhetorician of the age of George III. winds up his account of the old *régime* in France? What would Burke have thought of his aphorism at this day? He would have appreciated, as we are enabled to do, the point at which extremes meet. The viciousness of Paris has been seething for generations, as in the cauldron of the prophet's vision; and we have seen the dregs boil over in the unutterable excesses of the Commune in the hour of its dissolution.

In truth, there is no greater fallacy, though we see it all around us in our day, than the theory of polishing man without the hand of his Maker. A godless civilization has always vaunted the elevation of humanity, while, in truth, it has degraded man. It proclaims itself to be his regeneration, and it returns him to the condition of the fallen Adam. Culture, and progress in the arts of life, or the "art of living,"—that is, of living apart from the restraining, elevating influence of Divine grace,—tend simply to vicious softness, luxury, effeminacy. The hardy virtues perish under the touch of a polish that is not from God. It stunts and dwarfs man, makes him shrink into pettiness and meanness. It renders him, in a word,—for here again we have a French phrase for an idea which France has realised to her cost,—a *petit maître*. Godless civilization is the Capua after Cannæ, and the prelude to defeat. This enervation, indeed, by Parisian luxury, which had become the topic of a very misplaced Parisian self-glorification, may account for the unprecedented collapse of an army of great prestige. The collision between the opposing forces was as point-blank as between two knights of ancient tourney. Both combatants were armed cap-à-pied; both well skilled in the use of their weapons; each animated with the same intense

desire of victory. In the shock of battle, it was simply the more vigorous arm that bore down the weaker. But what had nerved that conquering arm? We may cite in illustration a fact reported by those who, wearing the red cross of peaceful and brotherly help, went up and down among the prostrate forms when

War and battle fled before,  
Wounds and death remain'd behind.

They tell us, that whereas, in the knapsacks of many of the French soldiers they found photographs of a debasing kind, the German was provided with the hymn-book that spoke to him at once of God and of home. We do not know a more significant commentary on the fate of the campaign. It is, *mutatis mutandis*, Cromwell's psalm-singing Ironsides against the gay, debauched cavaliers; it is stern Balfour of Burley measuring swords with the swash-buckler Bothwell. The contrast even suggests the dignity and calm intense vigour of Sir Galahad, whose "strength is as the strength of ten, because his heart is pure."

(2.) Intimately connected with the prevalent luxury of a metropolis, is the feebleness and decay of family life. Here, again, we are forced upon a contrast between the two nations of which the fighting men of the one have simply borne down those of the other. The life of Paris, and not of Paris alone in France, has been a life spent away from under the domestic roof; or at least apart from its influences. It was, and is again, so soon as the immediate pressure of national calamities is removed, a life in clubs, in casinos, cafés, theatres, anywhere you please, only not at home. Indeed, the very language of France (it is no new remark), expressive as it is, in a high degree, of every idea that belongs to human life and society, has absolutely no one word expressing *home*. We are reminded of what the novelist himself, who gives it in a popular work of fiction, well calls "a heartless anecdote." Heartless it may be, but no less suggestive and typical. It is that of the Frenchman who had been long accustomed to spend his evenings at the house of an intimate friend and his amiable wife. The friend died: and mutual acquaintances then suggested to him the fitness of a proposal of marriage to the widowed lady, for whom he was known to entertain a great and honourable regard. "True," he answered, "that might be well; but, then—where should I spend my evenings?"

This on the one side. On the other, no one who knows anything of Germany can fail to know how deeply the cherished thoughts of home and family exist in the national heart. The

old and truly Saxon proverb among ourselves, against which Charles Lamb has launched one of the light shafts of his playful and innocent satire,—“Home is home, be it never so homely,”—conveys an intensely German sentiment. It is the breathing of the Teuton. A topographer and antiquary would tell us how many places in Germany and England, how many quiet hamlets, that may or may not have grown up later into important centres of life and energy, were named by their “rude forefathers” so as to include the expression of their being respectively, the “ham” or “heim.” The German’s “heim” is not merely the four walls and roof, to which he is compelled to return at night to sleep, and recruit for another day of clubs and cafés. It is the cherished shrine of his affections, strong and pure. It forms the cynosure to which his longings turn, from foreign campaigns, or foreign exile:—“there are his young barbarians, all at play; there is their Dacian mother.” The Gaul is the hereditary foe, revolutionary, godless, who trampled on his hearth, a generation back, and stained it with blood and crime. For that hearth, his domestic altar, if for nothing still holier—*pro aris et focis*,—he will fight and fall: nay, he will fight and win. He will stand in this Thermopylæ: they shall not pass it, but over his corpse. “They shall not have our German Rhine,” nor penetrate to his German home. “*A Berlin!*” is the enthusiastic cry of the most brilliant soldiery in the world. No! Not if husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, can stay them. And stay them they will, against all odds. They are a married Landwehr, sober and steadfast; they are *patres familias* turned into stern helmeted soldiers for all they hold dear on earth. They fight with the deep, fierce determination of men who fight for home.\*

It is no mere imagination, we think, to read in these two opposite attributes the history of the brief, emphatic campaign. The moral force that grows up under the roof-tree,

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\* Whose heart has not responded to the stirring lines of the battle-song in which Tennyson has put this very feeling? A guardian of his own home stands prepared for the battle, on the issue of which depends the fate of those whom he has left there:—

Thy voice is heard thro’ rolling drums  
That beat to battle where he stands;  
Thy face across his fancy comes,  
And gives the battle to his hands:  
A moment, while the trumpets blow,  
He sees his brood about thy knee;  
The next, like fire he meets the foe,  
And strikes him dead, for thine and thee.

no less than the weight of arm, and the endurance, unimpassioned and unflinching, which marks the German character and thence the German soldier,—it was this that won the day. If we turn, again, to what we have called the second act of the French tragedy, and contemplate Paris torn by internecine strife, the weakness is as plainly manifested, which follows on a depression of family life and influence. Who are these *pétroleuses*, who have so unsexed themselves, and fought and killed, and been killed in turn, with the relentless ferocity of tigresses athirst for blood? They are, says the demon spirit of the Commune, *citoyennes* as yet imperfectly emancipated; on their strong limbs are still the remains of those shackles which had been riveted there “by the priests and by a putrid civilization.” Let us hear the Paris correspondent of the “Daily Telegraph,” June 14:—

In England, some have been accustomed, I perceive, to approve, in a modified sense at least, the programme of the Commune; and to admit that, so far as they merely demanded municipal rights for Paris, they were advancing a demand which, in its very nature, ought to meet with the sympathy of freely-governed and freely self-governing Englishmen. But the outcry for municipal rights was a mere cloak to cover the infamous designs of the Socialists—designs which, in their fullest scope, would not merely have fulfilled the dreams of those who would abolish society, but the most impious aspirations of those who would abolish even the idea of God. It would be a subject of rejoicing if we could believe that the sentiments expressed in the speech made by Citoyen Vésinier—a member of the Commune, and its secretary—had been misrepresented. As it is, we cannot forget that he spoke thus:—

“We must conquer or die. To that end, we must boldly deny God, family, and country. We must withdraw our children from the stupefying influences of priests, of kings, and nationality. (Applause.) To deny God, is to proclaim man the sole and veritable ruler of his own destinies. It is to slay the priest, and abolish religion. In the denial of divinity, man only asserts his own strength and independence. (Tremendous applause.) As to the family, we reject it with our utmost might, in the name of the emancipation of the human race. To the ideas of family it is that we owe the enslavement of woman and the ignorance of children. The child belongs not to his parents, but to society. It is for society to instruct him, to rear him, to make him a citizen. To deny the family is to affirm the independence of man, even from his cradle—to snatch woman from the thralldom into which she has been cast by the priests and by a putrid civilization.” (Frantic applause.)

We may accord to such an orator the merit of being at least outspoken. His avowal is worth a volume of platitudes, which more timidly, and from some imaginary neutral point, or with distinctions and limitations which are nothing but words,

would half suggest, what he here wholly insists on. The family, and the social principle on which it is based, forms one great bulwark to uphold in men's minds the idea of God and of duty. We accept the axiom, and, not being prepared to deny "God and country," we hail every remaining symptom among us of hallowed associations with family. In this we are supported by one who, without the full light of faith, still held principles which might have led him up to its conclusions. One of the most meditative and distinctively philosophic of our poets, Coleridge, winds up a tragedy with words so apposite, that we must forgive their poetic dress for the sterling truths which they embody :—

Scenes so awful

With flashing light force wisdom on us all.  
 E'en women at the distaff hence may see  
 That bad men may rebel, but ne'er be free :  
 May whisper, when the waves of faction foam,  
 None love their country but who love their home :  
 That freedom can with him alone abide  
 Who wears the golden chains, with honest pride,  
 Of love and duty by his own fire-side :—  
 While mad ambition ever doth caress  
 Its own sure fate in its own restlessness.\*

And so, indeed, it is. Our Heavenly Father is He "of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." He has inspired His apostles to develop this intimate analogy between the hallowed things of earth and the eternal truths.

Being subject one to another in the fear of Christ. Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife ; as Christ is the Head of the Church. He is the Saviour of His Body. Therefore, as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let the wives be to their husbands in all things. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it. . . . He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh ; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the Church. For we are members of His Body, of His Flesh, and of His Bones. For this cause shall a man leave his Father and Mother, and shall adhere to his wife : and they shall be two in one flesh. This is a great sacrament ; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. . . . Children, obey your parents in the Lord : for this is just. Honour thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with promise. . . . Servants, obey your carnal masters, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ. Not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the

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\* Coleridge, "Zapolya," s. f.



heart : with a good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men. . . . And you, masters, do the same things to them, forbearing threatenings : knowing that the Lord both of them and you is in heaven : and there is no respect of persons with Him.\*

No one can read these inspired words and not see that Almighty God presents Himself as the archetype of the family. He is the Father of all His children, by creation and grace : He is the Husband of His Church, which He has purchased by His Sacrifice, and unites to Himself by charity and sacraments. He is the Master of servants, to whose approval their service is to be directed. He is the future Judge, and distributor of praise and blame to each member of His universal family. Take away this idea, as the tendency of Parisian life has been to remove it. We may say as Cicero says of those who deny the care of the Divinity for the affairs of men : "Quorum sententia si vera sit, quæ potest esse sanctitas, quæ pietas, quæ religio?" Nay, we may add, what national prosperity, what stability, what true cultivation, or progress, or happiness, what success in peace or in war ?

(3.) A want of sympathy, common interest, and mutual assistance, among the classes of society. We will not stay to inquire how far this great and fatal evil may be said to arise out of the want of family life, and feebleness of the domestic tie. At all events, it has accompanied it, again and again, in the history of a nation's decline and fall. Notably, the two evils have gone hand in hand in the course of events which have now prostrated Paris. It may be answered, that this is simply an inherent danger in every human government. The utopian condition of things is that in which every department of the body politic remains united and in harmonious working with the rest. It is the temporal and human reflection of the Church itself, the mystical body of the Divine Head, "from whom the whole body, compacted and fitly joined together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in charity." On the other hand, the state of revolution and anarchy is that in which the ranks and departments of society are in opposition, diametric and irreconcilable. It is true that the extremes of political good and evil may be thus stated. The former of the two conditions has been of rare occurrence on earth. Some halcyon period may be named, as in France with S. Louis on the throne, when the influence of the Church, the unselfish patriotism of the Crown, the Catholic *esprit de corps*, the concurrence of peace and—in the

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\* Eph. iii. 15 ; v. 21—33 ; vi. 1—9.

lower order of blessings—of plenty, have combined for awhile to produce an exceptional union and solidity in the body politic. The opposite extreme has been passing, almost under our own eyes, in Paris, and needs neither defining nor description.\* But between these opposite poles, kingdoms and constitutions are for the most part in fluctuation; they tend to unity and prosperity, or to the convulsions of anarchy, in proportion as the several classes composing them are in good understanding or mutual distrust. Selfish oppression in the upper and governing ranks, disaffection in the lower, are the natural inherent dangers in the social order of fallen man.

Over these elements of evil, and "dangerous classes," whether above or below, the Church casts the harmonizing power of Christianity. The Church belongs essentially to no class, and therefore is at home with all; as the tribe of Levi was to have no special inheritance, but to be sprinkled among the tribes of Israel. The Church interpenetrates, and, where not resisted, leavens, the entire mass of society. This is her ideal, though man will not have it to be fully so. Hers is more than the influence which has been assigned to an exceptional potentate, a Cæsar or a Cid, here and there in history:

The birth-hour gift, the force Napoleon,  
Of leav'ning, fusing, moulding, wielding, blending  
The hearts of millions, till they move as one.

The Catholic priesthood is, in a sense, of the order of Melchizedek, "without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life, but likened unto the Son of God." Who is that man, who walks apart, yet always at hand, severed absolutely from the personality of social ties, and therefore intimately linked, not with the in-

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\* Signor Mazzini is a witness beyond suspicion, at least of any leanings to Legitimism or Bonapartism. In an article on "The Commune and the Assembly," in the *Roma del Popolo*, quoted in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of June 16, he writes as follows:—"The orgy of fury, of vengeance, and blood, of which Paris has offered the spectacle to the world, would fill our soul with despair, if we had merely an opinion, and not a faith. (!) A people which wallows about as if drunken, raging against itself with its teeth and lacerating its limbs, while howling triumphal cries; which dances an infernal dance before the grave it has dug with its own hands; which kills, tortures, burns, committing crimes without sense, aim, or hope; which vociferates like the fool who sets fire to his own pile before the eyes of the foreign foe against whom it did not know how to fight—such a people puts us in mind of some of the most horrid visions of Dante's Hell." This writer notes the effect. It did not perhaps so well suit him to ascend to the cause—the disintegration of French society, produced by his own principles, together with other concurrent motive powers.

terests and doings of a class or a clique, but of all? Who is he—the friend, counsellor, sympathizing ear into which the tale of human miseries and weakness is poured; bound by his fidelity to rich and poor, to gentle and simple—bound to advise, to define, to adjudge, to cheer, to warn, to determine? It is one who reports the legislative, decides the judicial, and administers the executive of a tribunal before which kings and peasants alike must bow, or be broken. He is therefore the connatural antagonist of those who hate “God, family, and country.” He is the link between class and class, as between the individuals composing each. He represents the great conservative power, which, while it moves and acts on the unerring grooves of right, is equally *pro rege, lege, grege*; indifferent, comparatively, to the special form of government, so that the government, as being just and hallowed, can represent the divine; indifferent, wholly, to parties and sectional politics, so long as the balance and oscillations between them leave undisturbed the pivot of immutable law.

No wonder that, during the brief hour when Revolution has the upper hand, it seizes the priest, places him against a wall, bids the firing party level at his breast. It acts thus in accordance with an instinct, call it natural or preternatural. It is saying, in act: “One of us two: there is no room for both.” And truly. For Communists and Socialists are the men who dissolve society by disintegrating it; the priest represents the power and the system that conserve the social order. They would put asunder what God has joined; the priest’s blessing has knitted and hallowed the sacramental union of man and wife, of father and mother. Socialism professes to emancipate woman from her thralldom alike to the moral and social law. The priest has inculcated that her true dignity and freedom consist in her likeness to the type of Nazareth. Socialists claim the children of a nation, as being theirs to indoctrinate. He has already baptized them into their inheritance of truth. They cry: “Down with capital!” He rejoins: “Up with rights and law!” Their very words are the same in sound, and all the more antagonistic in sense. “Liberty!” Yes: but not that of “the sensual and the dark,” who “rebel in vain:—slaves, by their own compulsion.”\* “Equality!” Most amply: before God, and in the things of God—in graces, sacraments, hopes, rewards, responsibilities, and judgment to come. “Fraternity!” Ay, to the fullest extent, to the free and generous self-sacrifice of those who “know the love of God, that He laid down His life for us: and we ought to lay

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\* Coleridge.

down our lives for the brethren." Hopeless, impracticable man :—away with him ! He is of "the old order of society :—he must perish ; *shall* perish !" \* "Because he is not for our turn ; and he is contrary to our doings, and upbraideth us with transgressions of the law, and divulgeth against us the sins of our way of life. He boasteth that he hath the knowledge of God, and calleth himself the son of God. He is become a censurer of our thoughts. He is grievous unto us, even to behold : for his life is not like other men's, and his ways are very different. Let us examine him by outrages and tortures, that we may know his meekness, and try his patience. Let us condemn him to a most shameful death : for there shall be respect had unto him by his words." †

(4.) We have reached the last of those capital sources, from which most thinking men, we believe, with whatever modifications and additions, will derive the present afflictions of Paris. It may be stated, as an intense, intelligent, and energetic unbelief in religion. Intelligent, because it has been formed by its professors into a system, and rests, not on dull, passive negation, but on the "oppositions of knowledge falsely so called." Intense and energetic, because, like most evil things, and most French things for good or evil, it has aimed at proselytism. The said professors have been *doctrinaires*, and have scattered broadcast the petroleum of their destructive infidelity on all around. We do not say that the present age has seen the rise and commencement of this fatal operation. It has been of long growth, and gradual increase. One generation has sown the dragon's teeth, another has reaped the harvest of bloodshed and of death ; of death temporal, social, spiritual. The infidelity of France has followed on the train of its fashions, and has been eagerly accepted by the surrounding races ; who have mistaken licence of morals for independence of soul and character, and profane

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\* Manifesto of the *Internationale* : Paris Journal, June 16 :—

"Workmen ! rally round the International Association of Workmen. That society alone can lead you to freedom, and set you clear from capital and the priests. The International Association of Workmen is at this moment the great offender. All the capitulators, all the incapacities of the capital, lay to its charge the misfortunes of France and the conflagration of Paris. As regards the misfortunes of France, we cast back the responsibility on the Trochus, the Jules Favres, and the rest. As to the burning of Paris, we accept the responsibility for that. The old order of society must perish and shall perish. A gigantic effort has already made it totter, and a last effort ought to overthrow it completely. The reaction has taken from us our weapons ; it has not taken from us our voting tickets. Forward, forward ! Vive la République Sociale ! Vive la Commune !"

† Wisd. ii. 12-20.

raillery for polished wit. Some of the sources, indeed, or tributaries, of this Parisian plague are traceable higher up the stream of history than would at first appear. We might assign its early development to the influence of the so-called Reformation, half-consciously imbibed in the French Court, in the middle of the sixteenth century. Francis I., contemporary of our own Henry VIII., is said, first of all the kings of France, to have set to his people the example of a recognized, and—it might almost be termed—an official immorality. What was the influence of the Duchesse d'Étampes, and the tone of the doings and writings of that king's sister, Margaret of Valois, may be left to the historical student. We trace the same deterioration in the lilies, once of St. Louis, the same combined weakening of faith and relaxation of morals, through the reign of Henry IV., and during the convulsions and insane caprices of the Fronde. The long days of Louis XIV. and XV., when "the monarchy was growing very old," speak for themselves. That "old régime" was a Reign of Terror by the upper ten thousand; a period which saw serfs ground down, and nobles, men of cruelty and corruption, rioting over them; a period of moral anarchy, and kingly despotism; the slavery of a people, and boasted "Gallican liberties." But among all the powers at work during that essentially lawless time, there was one, more subtle and unperceived, sapping the foundations of the altar, the throne, and the platform of society. It made its way, like the waters of a rising flood, till the moment came when it appeared simultaneously at every point, and carried all before it. This influence need hardly be named. It was the scoffing levity, the keen, cold, reckless, nay,—to use a word not too strong,—diabolical satire of Voltaire. That spirit of evil appeared in Paris at a time when laxity in morals and rationalism in religion had gone hand in hand before him, and prepared his way. Court preachers had condoned the vices of a king: an effeminate nobility had copied them. The privileged classes considered themselves practically exempt from the laws alike of God and man; and Vice sat enthroned and glorified. Who does not see that such a man as Voltaire, with powers concentrated on the annihilation of a Christianity manifesting itself so feebly, was as the spark to kindle a train long and unconsciously laid by the later Bourbons? Who that has seen his ninety volumes, or many of them, and the numerous kindred works to which they have given birth, exposed in the bookshops, in the second-hand stalls on the quays, of the Paris of yesterday, accessible to rich and poor, can fail to wonder that, with such elements at hand, the ex-

plosion was so long delayed? Who that remembers the public crime against religion and morals in the official honour paid to him, at the moment when the French and German guns were levelled, can be astonished that the German leaders, who went to battle with the Name of God on their lips, should prevail, that the disciples of Voltaire, His blaspheming enemy, should succumb, in the conflict of which we have been unwilling spectators?\*

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#### ART. V.—THE OPINIONS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE.

*Œuvres inédites du Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE. (Mélanges.) Publiées par le Comte CHARLES DE MAISTRE. Paris: Vaton Frères. 1870.*

*Lettres et Opuscules inédits du Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, précédés d'une Notice biographique par son fils le Comte RODOLPHE DE MAISTRE. 2 vols. Paris: A. Vaton. 1851.*

*Mémoires politiques et Correspondance diplomatique de JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, avec Explications et Commentaires historiques, par ALBERT BLANC, Docteur en Droit de l'Université de Turin. 2e Edition corrigée. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1859.*

*Correspondance diplomatique de JOSEPH DE MAISTRE (1811-1817), recueillie et publiée par ALBERT BLANC. 2 vols. Paris: Michel Lévy Frères. 1860.*

THE De Maistre family cannot but feel indignantly surprised at the attempts which have been made of late years to falsify and misrepresent the ideas of their illustrious progenitor. For a long time it was the fashion with writers of a hostile school to treat him as an amiable enthusiast—as a

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\* We append a commentary furnished to the *Times*' Paris Correspondent by one who may be described as an International left behind by his party. Notwithstanding, this moderate man thus delivers himself:—"Christianity, whatever may have been its merits eighteen hundred years ago, has become a superstition both in Catholic and Protestant countries, where it retards moral as well as social progress. The family, as it at present exists, pits the natural ties of relationship against the divine tie of Brotherhood, puts the woman in a false position, and concentrates the energies of a man on his own personal surroundings, instead of on the well-being of society, which has the first claim upon him; and the idea of patriotism is a barbarous sentiment, very useful among savage tribes, but out of place when men have learnt to look upon each other as brothers, and every country as their own."—*Times*, June 26, 1871.



man who, educated in the traditions of mediæval times, and suddenly brought face to face with the portents of the French Revolution, had shrunk back with almost childish terror from events whose causes he did not understand, and had fled for refuge to monuments that were in ruin and to institutions that could not be restored. Yet, somehow, this champion of denounced opinions and exploded ideas had caught a fast hold of some of the best minds in the generation that succeeded him; had inspired generous and gifted spirits with his own convictions and desires; had grappled with and even overthrown the dogmas (as one might call them) of men previously recognized as sound teachers and safe guides. It was bold of a poor gentleman of Savoy to call Bossuet to account; but it was wonderful to find the countrymen of Bossuet owning that there was reason in what he said, and overcoming their natural prejudices so far as to listen, with ever-increasing conviction, to the arguments he addressed to them. Then, all at once, another tide set in. Our Divine Lord warned His disciples that nothing ever so hard would be said of them which had not first been said of Himself. This thought would have consoled Joseph de Maistre if he had lived till now, and would console him still if he were in a condition to need such consolation, for the last strange vicissitude of his fame. It is possible that Camille Desmoulins intended to be complimentary when he blasphemously spoke of the Redeemer of mankind as *le bon sans culotte*. It is also possible that those eulogists who wrote some ten years ago, in the interest if not in the pay of Camille de Cavour, thought that they were rescuing De Maistre's name from obloquy and rehabilitating him in the opinion of their contemporaries, when they endeavoured to place him in the extraordinary and unexpected position of an apologist of revolution in France and an apostle of revolution in Italy. It is true that he was neither the fanatic nor the absolutist which men of their school had previously assumed him to be. If it was in his Ultramontane opinions that his fanaticism was supposed to lie, he certainly gave very good reasons for the faith that was in him; reasons which, then as now, it is much easier to ignore or to mis-state than to confute. If it lay in the fact that he was that "rare bird" amongst the statesmen of his time, a sincere and devout Catholic, that did not hinder him from gaining and retaining, during his long residence in a country separated from the unity of the faith, the respect and confidence of the sovereign and many of the first men of the court, while consistently living all the time up to his own standard of religious duty. He made converts too, no doubt, and among persons of con-

siderable mark ; but it was not because he pursued any system of propagandism, to which his disposition in no way prompted him, and which his official character necessarily interdicted. His life and example had much to do in inclining those who knew him intimately to inquire into those truths which he was so well able to explain and defend. Such inquiries he helped and favoured : he could do no less ; but he did no more. We shall see presently, in referring to the first work on our list, in what his absolutism consisted. His ideas on that point are expressed with his usual clearness and force, and defended with reasoning which it is not easy to controvert. But it is enough to say here, that, in the ordinary and invidious acceptance of the term, he was no more an absolutist than he was an Abyssinian. It was a hardy thing, however, for men writing in the cause of revolution, to claim him as an accomplice, when all the deeds of his active and laborious life, all his public services and private studies, from the first outbreak of the French Revolution to his death, were directed to the very opposite end. There is no colour at all for the assertion that he favoured in any way, consciously or unconsciously, the revolutionary movement in France ; that he approved in any way of its causes, its progress, or its results. Common sense, doubtless, of which he possessed an unusual share, taught him that some of the things it had destroyed could not be restored again ; and no one was more ready to admit or even to proclaim facts which he saw to be indisputable. As to Italy, the case is somewhat different. He was undoubtedly an enemy of Austrian domination in the Peninsula. A zealous servant of the House of Savoy, he noted that the dynasty he served, notwithstanding the closeness of family ties, was little regarded at Vienna, and was looked upon as an obstacle in the way of Austrian aggrandisement. He was in favour, too, of Italian independence ; but his opinions on that subject, strong, deliberate, and decided as they were, yet were perfectly consistent with the rights of Italian sovereigns, and above all, with the undisturbed authority, civil as well as ecclesiastical, of the Holy See. To place the schemes of Cavour and the acts of his reckless and shameless subordinates under the shadow of De Maistre's stainless name, is to do it an unpardonable wrong. The time is coming (very soon we hope) when Cavour's work will be undone. Then, and not till then, will De Maistre's ideas of Italian rights and Italian interests come to be recognized and perhaps realized.

Count Charles de Maistre declares that one of his reasons for publishing those previously unpublished portions of his grandfather's writings which he collected last year, was "to

explain the *Diplomatic Correspondence* of the statesman writing to his Court by the solitary meditations of the thinker." Upon this we may be permitted to observe, that however thankful we are for this publication, it was scarcely needed for that purpose; and that, in fact, it contains no ideas which can be called new to those acquainted with Joseph de Maistre's other works. About 130 pages, entitled "*Bienfaits de la Révolution Française*," are substantially little more than extracts from a commonplace book—chiefly passages from revolutionary writings which he intended to hold up to ridicule or detestation—with the rudimentary form of the comments upon them which he was afterwards to develop and enlarge. Much of the same character are some sixty pages devoted to an "*Examen d'un Ecrit de J.-J. Rousseau*." In both these papers, however, as in all the rest of the volume, there are many things of considerable point and interest, some of them very applicable to the circumstances of the present time. The other essays, more complete, though compendious, may be taken as partly suggesting, partly supplementing, chapters in his "*Considérations sur la France*," and in his "*Essai sur le Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques*." The volume opens with three short essays, or "*Fragments*," on France: 1. On the Character and Influence of the French Nation; 2. On the Moral State of French Society in the years preceding the Revolution; and 3. On the French Republic and its Legislators. The first of these contains, in less than a dozen pages, what seems to us the true philosophy of French history. It was written apparently about 1794. He was writing then at the close of a century during which the fortune of the French in war had been a good deal checkered by defeat, yet, even under those circumstances, few at the time, and still fewer half a dozen years after, would have agreed with him in thinking that—

This people would be terrible for others if it could be a conquering people; but it has not received that mission. Invincible in its homes, if it carries its arms against foreign nations, we see its armies, the victims of their own victories and of the faults of the national character, melt and disappear from the astonished eye, like a light vapour. The Frenchman is not made for retaining a conquest: his character alone tears it from him; upon which the *Ami des Hommes* has rather wittily said that "the warriors who succeed in driving the French out of a conquered country may take their place in the temple of memory beside the geese of the Capitol."

It is true, he did not foresee the victories of Napoleon; but, even if he had foreseen them, he would have predicted with no less confidence that their results would not last, and,

indeed, at the time they were dazzling the world, he uttered that very prediction. He seems chiefly to refer to the conquests of Charles VIII. in Italy, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. He gives in a note an extract from Barclay's "*Icon Animorum*" in confirmation of the opinion we have just quoted, and to it appends a sagacious remark, to which it is just now worth while to call attention :—

In reflecting on these truths, so striking and so well expressed, one will feel convinced that the political influence of France was very useful to Europe, in that it sufficed to maintain the general equilibrium, and did not disturb it in a sensible manner. The very faults of the French deprived their influence of the danger it might have had. If Europe recovers her former position, she will lose infinitely in seeing substituted for such influence that of other nations more calm, more reflecting, more obstinate, more fitted to be conquering.

The real and invincible influence which France has always exercised over foreign nations is, he thinks, that of opinion. The chief source of her supremacy in this respect is her language ; "like steel, the most intractable of metals, but that which of all others takes the finest polish when art has succeeded in subduing it, the French language, handled and controlled by real artists, receives in their hands the most lasting and most brilliant forms. What is called the art of speaking is eminently the talent of the French, and it is by the art of speaking that men are ruled." The gift of good taste is also distinctively French : "the art of saying what is right, and when it is right, belongs to the French alone ; method and order are their distinguishing qualities ; and those men, so light, so impetuous, so heedless, are, with pen in hand, the wisest of all." In the various forms of eloquence, he awards the crown to France, and without a competitor. Englishmen will certainly think this unfair, though it was written so long ago, but let us remember that he is not a Frenchman, and let us hear what he says :—

In all kinds of eloquence, the French have no rivals. That of the bar, which has produced among them masterpieces of the first order, does not exist elsewhere. Italy and Spain, so religious, and mistresses of two languages so sonorous, have never been able to produce a sermon that Europe would read. Hume, whose testimony cannot be questioned, says somewhere that he is ashamed to confess that a French advocate pleading for the recovery of a horse is more eloquent than the orators of Great Britain discussing the gravest interests of the nation in the Houses of Parliament. The inestimable talent of which I speak is so particularly the appanage of the French, that it never forsakes them, not even on the occasions when it forsakes all other men. The most dismal sciences have no thorns which they

cannot remove : physics, natural history, astronomy, metaphysics, erudition, politics ; they have explained all, embellished all, brought all within the reach of ordinary good sense ; and probably nothing is well known in Europe until the French have explained it. Eloquence applied to the most serious matters, and the art of throwing light upon everything, are the two great talents of this nation. The bulk of mankind, constantly repelled from the sanctuary of the sciences by the harsh style and detestable taste of the scientific works produced by other nations, cannot resist the seduction of the French style and method. Scarcely has foreign genius brought forth something interesting when French art seizes on the discovery, works it up in a thousand ways, compels it to receive forms at which it is amazed and of which it grows proud, and sends it throughout the whole world on the wings of the universal language. Those books seek out the germs of talent, scattered over the globe, warm them, fertilize them, and bring them to maturity. They teach little to real men of science ; but, what is better, they make such men be born.

We find the substance of this essay reproduced some eighteen years after, in a *mémoire* written at St. Petersburg, with the date of December 29, 1812, for the guidance of the King of Sardinia in his political conduct at that epoch. The ideas of the writer are but slightly modified by his intervening experience, and the conclusion he draws is one of some practical importance, which M. Albert Blanc and his friends will do well to ponder.

There is no century, perhaps (he says), in which the flattering hope was not indulged of crushing or parcelling out France. What hopes were not conceived in this respect at the beginning of the last century ! Everything indicated that they were on the point of succeeding, and many Frenchmen, even among the wisest, began to lose courage ; yet all was changed in the twinkling of an eye, the throne of Spain remained to the Bourbons, and the French territory continued notably increased. At the present moment, when we see France exhausted of men and money, when Bonaparte has lost in four or five months five hundred thousand men, a thousand pieces of artillery, and his own reputation, it is natural to speculate anew on the weakening of France and to hope that all is over with her pre-eminence ; yet people would be mistaken to-day, as they were then ; and so much the worse for the neighbouring powers who have based their plans on that vain hope."—(Corres. Diplom., t. i. p. 276.)

In the essay on the "Moral State of French Society in the years preceding the Revolution," he traces the general corruption back to the "infamous Regency." From that period up to the Revolution, what was exceptionally and unprecedentedly bad in French society was, that the whole talent of the country was perverted and dedicated to immoral and irreligious ends. Science, literature, and art conspired to deprave the whole mind

and the whole heart of France with such unhappy success that in those classes, that is to say the highest, where their influence was soonest and most widely felt, the corruption was rapid and almost universal. He signalizes the remarkable fact that the most celebrated men, the greatest intellects, in one word the "philosophers" themselves, were as vile in character as they were exalted in talent. We pass over the essay on "the legislators of the French Republic" and the collection of notes on the "benefits" of the Revolution. They are worth reading, and contain many passages worth quoting, but we may, for the present, occupy ourselves more usefully with the most important part of the present collection, entitled an "*Etude sur la Souveraineté*."

It is perhaps owing to the immethodical manner in which its chapters are strung together, being written, without much regard to arrangement, at different periods between 1794 and 1796, that the author did not include this "*Etude*" in the works published during his life, though he incorporated parts of it with some of his other writings. The very irregularity, however, with which his remarks are noted down gives it a freshness and a raciness more than sufficient to compensate for what is wanting in its form. The same ideas, though better digested and more consecutively arranged, occur in the "*Essai sur le Principe générateur des Constitutions politiques*"; but there is a greater abundance of illustration in the earlier sketch. The works of Rousseau were active elements of mischief at the time, and he gives more consideration to them on that account than their intrinsic importance deserved. Two weapons which De Maistre wielded with power were especially formidable to the intellectual imposture which he was called to combat—accurate knowledge and close reasoning. He demonstrates in almost all his writings how shallow were the pretensions of those who were worshipped as the lights of their age. He pitilessly exposes the ignorant blunders of encyclopædists and the intellectual weakness of *esprits forts*. At one time it is no less an authority than Diderot who is stripped of his peacock's plumage and exhibited as a very denuded daw, when it is proved that he knew so little Greek as to misunderstand the epithet *Anadyomene* applied to the famous statue of Venus. At another time Voltaire himself is convicted of gross ignorance; \* for

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\* In the "*Soirées de St. Pétersbourg*" (*Sixième Entretien*), De Maistre proves to a demonstration that Voltaire could not have read Locke's "*Essay on the Understanding*," of which, nevertheless, he had expressed the most formal and emphatic commendation. He adds that "Frenchmen of letters



which De Maistre charitably accounts by showing how little time that illustrious personage (though he was *ex-officio* bound, like our "Able Editors," to know everything) had for learning anything about those matters upon which he was enlightening the world. But Rousseau is especially the mark for his indignant and contemptuous satire. No man ever more fully proved the force of Pope's saying, "A little learning is a dangerous thing," in a sense far more serious than its author meant; for the amount of evil done by what Rousseau wrote was out of all proportion to the very limited knowledge he possessed respecting almost every subject upon which he was pleased to dogmatize. It is in the "Contrat Social" that his crude and baseless theories are most completely developed, and that is the work which oftenest receives correction at De Maistre's hands.

The study of political philosophy, or, as he preferred to call it, political metaphysics, was De Maistre's favourite pursuit. He did not start with a preconceived theory and then go in search of facts, or invent them if they could not be found, or wrest to his purposes, by a process of torture, such facts as would not fit of themselves. On the contrary, he examined the history of mankind, in various countries and under various conditions, and he discovered in it the operation of certain general laws, which he traced to a divine source. As he humorously said, he knew nothing about, he had never met, that being whom the philosophers called "man"—an *ens rationis*, or, we may rather say, *sine ratione*; though he had met "men" of various nations. He had studied their life, habits, and history, and based his conclusions upon what those studies had taught him. This is the true "philosophy teaching by example," which history was defined to be by one who knew how to write it. It is upon such principles that the most solid and useful historical works of this century have been constructed. It is De Maistre's plan and method

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read very little in the last century; first, because they led a very dissipated life; secondly, because they wrote too much; lastly, because their pride did not allow them to suppose that they wanted any help from the thoughts of others. . . . It is a great mistake to suppose that, in order to quote a book, with every appearance of having mastered the subject, it is necessary to have read it, at least completely and with attention. You read the passage or the line required; you read some lines of the index, on the faith of an index; you pick out the passage required in support of your own ideas, and that is all you want; what matters the rest? There is also an art in making those speak who have read; and that is how it is quite possible that the book of which one speaks most is really the least known by reading!" Those who are familiar with the "Soirées" will remember the powerful denunciation of the arch-blasphemer in the *Quatrième Entretien*.

that such writers as Guizot in France, and Bancroft in America, have followed; certainly with the result (whatever errors and imperfections the writers themselves may have been liable to) of giving an intelligible and rational account of the growth of institutions which no speculator, like Rousseau, could have devised, and no constitution-monger, like Sieyès, could have proposed. It is a fundamental truth of De Maistre's system, that no constitution can be written *à priori*. In his view, political constitutions are like physical; in their origin the work of God, in their development the growth of time. France, which by her disasters for a hundred years past, has taught other nations almost every moral, teaches them this also. The host of empirics who have compiled, for her misfortune, some eighty forms of constitution in as many years, most of which did not live much longer than the time it took to print them, and all of which have resulted in failure, were ignorant of this truth, or studiously kept it out of view. We wish we could persuade ourselves that their example will warn those who at present are emulous of similar distinction, to refrain from such experiments. If we may use a familiar illustration, political constitutions resemble trees, which, though their generic properties are the same, differ very much in form and size and in the conditions necessary for their favourable growth.

Fraxinus in sylvis pulcherrima, pinus in hortis,  
Populus in fluviis, abies in montibus altis.

The oak and the chestnut are both fine trees, but with essential differences of form and fibre, which no power or art of man can alter. It might, however, enter into the head of a lunatic to strain the branches and snip the leaves of a chestnut into the nearest possible imitation of an oak, and the result of his labours would be so far successful that, for a season, no one would know what to make of it. But the leaves would fall in autumn and they would grow again in spring, and there would stand the chestnut as plain as ever, though perhaps a little injured by what it had gone through.

"The sovereignty of the people" is an expression which seems to De Maistre to involve a contradiction in terms. Over whom are they sovereign? Themselves apparently. Therefore they are subject. But to be at the same time sovereign and subject is impossible. With his usual clearness and good sense, however, he extricates the question from the confusion of terms, and puts it thus:—

It has been warmly disputed whether sovereignty came from God or from men; but I do not know if it has been observed that both propositions may

be true. It is most true, in an inferior and gross sense, that sovereignty is founded on human consent : for, if any people whatsoever agreed all at once not to obey, sovereignty would disappear ; and it is impossible to imagine the establishment of a sovereignty without imagining a people which consents to obey. If, therefore, the adversaries of the divine origin of sovereignty only mean to say that, they are right, and it would be very idle to dispute it. God not having thought proper to employ supernatural instruments in the establishment of empires, it is certain that everything has had to be done through men. But to say that sovereignty does not come from God because He employs men in establishing it, is to say that He is not the Creator of mankind because we have all a father and a mother. All the Theists in the world will doubtless agree that he who violates the laws opposes himself to the Divine Will and renders himself guilty before God, even though he violate but human ordinances ; for it is God who has made man sociable ; and since He has willed society, He has also willed sovereignty and the laws without which society cannot be. The laws, therefore, come from God, in the sense that He wills that there should be laws and that they should be obeyed ; and yet those laws come also from men, since they are made by men. In the same way sovereignty comes from God, since He is the author of everything, evil excepted, and is in particular the Author of society, which cannot exist without sovereignty. And yet this same sovereignty comes also from men in a certain sense, that is to say, insomuch as this or that form of government is established and declared by human consent. The partisans of Divine authority cannot, then, deny that the human will plays some part in the establishment of governments ; and the partisans of the contrary system in their turn cannot deny that God is, by excellence and in an eminent manner, the Author of those same governments. It appears, therefore, that these two propositions : "Sovereignty comes from God" and "Sovereignty comes from men" do not absolutely contradict each other, no more than these other two : "Laws come from God" and "Laws come from men."

He quotes Montesquieu's authority for the opinion that "every form of government does not suit every country ; liberty, for example, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of all peoples." He shows that Rousseau's notion of a "primordial contract" is extrinsically unfounded, as well as intrinsically absurd, and remarks that no historian has ever mentioned the "primary assemblies" of Memphis or Babylon.

Let us see now what De Maistre's "absolutism" was. He lays down the general principle that "every species of sovereignty is absolute by its nature ; place it on one or on many heads ; organize its powers as you will." But the illustration he gives shows what he means :—

Take, for example, the English Government : the sort of political trinity which constitutes it does not hinder the sovereignty from being one there, as

elsewhere ; the powers are balanced, but once they are in accord there is no longer but one will, which cannot be opposed by any other legal will ; and Blackstone was right to say that the King and Parliament of England together can do everything.

It is one thing to lay down a correct and, as we think, indisputable legal and political principle, which De Maistre does here, and it is another thing to proclaim, or avow, or indicate, as he nowhere does, a preference for a form of government giving the will of one man absolute control over the lives and liberties of multitudes. Sovereignty in England does not wholly reside in the person called the Sovereign ; but wherever it resides, there it is absolute, and there is no power above it to nullify, or to modify, or to question its decrees. It can revise them itself ; which is an attribute of all sovereignties, except, we suppose, that of the Medes and Persians of yore. The basis of such a sovereignty can be disturbed only by insurrection ; and when an insurrection is successful, it erects a sovereignty of its own as absolute as that which it has overthrown. Much the same truth was perhaps unconsciously spoken by the member of Parliament who lately taunted the Government with having substituted for the divine right of kings "the divine right of ministers" ; and, at many periods of history, there have been those who believed even in the divine right of mobs. The absoluteness of sovereignty consists in this,—that subjects must obey its commands without disputing its authority to issue them. If they were free to do that, the sovereignty would be null, and, if it admitted that it might be disobeyed, that would be an act of abdication. Therefore De Maistre's principle that "every sovereignty is absolute by its nature" can hardly be disputed when once it is understood.

Whether by study or experience, De Maistre knew a good deal about every form of government existing, or which had existed in his lifetime, not to speak of those recorded in history. He never disguised his admiration of the British Constitution, and still more of the public spirit in which it had its roots. But he approved every form of government which grew up naturally among the people who lived under it, and disapproved of all attempts, however well meant, to substitute forms that suited other lands, however good in themselves, or however preferable under circumstances favourable to their gradual and healthy development. Certainly, the Turkish system, especially as it existed in the last century, had no partisan in him ; but what, he asked, were you to do with people whose ideas are so different from ours ? It was

easy enough for a disgraced Vizier or Pacha to escape from the country and take refuge in Western Europe with a share of the treasures amassed during his term of power. But they never thought of such a thing. They waited for the bow-string with stoical tranquillity, and their families were proud of fathers who had died in such a way. He thought it a fault in Alexander I. that he was not monarchical enough or Russian enough for his people. He did not object to the Republic which he saw growing up beyond the Atlantic. It was the natural result of the ideas which the original colonists took with them from Europe, of the character and position of their successors, and of the habits which their life developed. Not foreseeing, however, the continued outflow of European labour in the same direction, he anticipated changes of an aristocratic tendency which have not taken place. Codfish, it is true, has given place to shoddy, which in its turn has been overthrown by petroleum; but no interest has succeeded as yet in establishing political predominance. He speaks with great favour of the hereditary aristocracy of Venice, a government which lasted for thirteen hundred years, declining only when the wealth and influence of Venice declined, not from political causes, but from the gradual loss of commerce consequent upon the discoveries of Vasco de Gama and the diversion of Eastern trade into other channels. But he evidently thought that a strong monarchy was the only government for France; and, when he saw the ruin to which the philosophers had reduced her, he could not help recalling the days of her greatness, when Louis XIV. held the sceptre and, with all his mistakes as a monarch and his vices as a man, made her queen of the nations.

What spectacle (he says) is comparable to that of the age of Louis XIV.? An absolute and almost adored sovereign, doubtless no one restrained him in the distribution of favours, and what man chose men better? Colbert regulated his finances; the terrible talents of Louvois presided over war; Turenne, Condé, Catinat, Luxembourg, Berwick, Créqui, Vendôme, Villars, led his armies by land; Vauban fenced France all round; Dugay-Trouin, Tourville, Jean Bart, Duquesne, Forbin d'Oppède, d'Estrées, Renaud, commanded his fleets; Talon, Lamoignon, d'Aguesseau, were seated in his tribunals; Bourdaloue and Massillon preached before him; the Episcopate received at his hand that same Massillon, Fléchier, Bossuet, and the great Fénelon, the honour of France, the honour of his age, the honour of humanity. In his royal academies the talents gathered under his protection shone with singular lustre; it was he who made France the true country of every kind of talent, the arbiter of renown, the distributor of glory. Perhaps it will be said that chance having placed under his hand a crowd of great men, he had not even the merit of selection. What then? Does any one imagine that

his age was deficient in men of small ability, thinking themselves fit for everything, and asking for everything? That species pullulates in all parts and at all periods.

France under Louis XIV. was indeed at the summit of her greatness. He was the monarch to whose sway the national character most perfectly adapted itself, under whom France was France as she had not been before, and as she was never after quite to be. In some sense, however, it is true that he still rules in France, and probably will rule till "chaos is come again." It is clear that Napoleon III. had studied his system profoundly, and whatever was successful in the Second Empire was borrowed from it. But, alas! for Colbert one could only see a Fould, and for Louvois a Lebœuf, and for Vauban the men who let his fortresses be taken. Other comparisons we will not draw, though some of them would not be wanting in consoling aspects.

The spirit of rebellion dates from before the angels' fall, and can be traced in human history back to the days of Adam. But in the form which makes it terrible in our own days, it had its rise at the birth of Protestantism. This thesis is maintained by De Maistre in an essay written in 1798, and entitled "*Reflexions sur le Protestantisme dans ses Rapports avec la Souveraineté.*" There is nothing, perhaps, which he has written calculated to give a greater shock not merely to modern liberalism, but even to opinions held by many who are not consciously unfaithful to Catholic teaching. We will add that, though accepting his principles, we are not bound in all cases to adopt his application of them. But the clearness and force with which he states his case may afford gratification even to those who differ from him,—at least as much gratification as one can feel who finds some cherished ideas not merely contradicted, but encountered with arguments likely to disturb, if not his old convictions, at least the satisfaction with which he has entertained them. That is one of the inconveniences which people who are content to take their opinions at second-hand, or who accept upon insufficient grounds a doctrine to which they have a personal inclination, are exposed to, when they fall in with some one accustomed to look at things from quite an opposite point of view, and well supplied with solid reasons in support of his conclusions. To the question, "What is Protestantism?" this is De Maistre's reply:—

It is the insurrection of the individual reason against the general reason, and consequently the worst thing imaginable. When Cardinal de Polignac said to the too-celebrated Bayle, "You say you are a Protestant; that word



is very vague : are you Anglican, Lutheran, Calvinist, &c. ?" Bayle answered, " I am a Protestant in all the force of the term : I protest against all truths." That celebrated sceptic thus gave the true definition of Protestantism, which is the essential enemy of every belief common to a number of men ; and that is what makes it the enemy of the human race, because the welfare of human societies rests but upon beliefs of that sort.

The essential and distinctive evil of Protestantism, therefore, he considers to be, that it is not only a religious heresy but a civil heresy, because it substitutes the pride of individual opinion for authority, and discussion for obedience. " It is born a rebel, and insurrection is its habitual state." He shows how entirely opposite is the spirit of Christianity, which never made any attempt against public authority or order, even when the number of Christians had become so large that they might have constrained their rulers to submission. When Christianity, however, mounted the throne (so to speak),—when the civil authority governed in the Christian name,—the state of things, of course, became different. But Protestantism, on the contrary, was born with arms in its hands ; it respected the civil authority only so long as it was gathering strength to overthrow it, and as soon as it could rebel it did so. Civil wars of the most sanguinary atrocity were its first fruits in Europe, and the excesses with which it reproached those who defended themselves against its attacks were, however deplorable, the consequences of its own crimes. Power, no matter of what sort, can only be exercised on earth by men, who are not beings of pure and impassive reason, and, when they have to defend their rights by arms, use those arms like all other men.

De Maistre thinks it very inconsistent in men who justify insurrection as a means of abolishing tithes or feudal privileges to dispute its morality in the case of the League, who opposed the succession of Henry IV. on far higher grounds :—

If Henry IV. had wished to impose a tax of a penny in the pound without the consent of the people, they would learnedly prove that the people had a right of resistance ; but when there was question of putting on the throne a detestable and deadly sect, of degrading the prevailing religion to the second place, of giving its rival an habitual and almost invincible means of seduction and of conquest, of raising a wall of separation between the sovereign and the great majority of his subjects, of kindling an unquenchable fire in the State—all this is but a trifle ; the rigid defenders of the rights of the people change parts at once ; St. Paul himself is not more eloquent than they on the right of sovereigns, and it is an inexcusable crime in the French to make the slightest opposition to the *Béarnais*.

Montesquieu authoritatively lays down the principle that it

would be a good law, when the State is satisfied with the religion already established, not to permit the establishment of another; but when another is established, it should then be tolerated. This principle is criticised by De Maistre in a passage which it is impossible to condense, and which we are sure our readers will not think too long:—

If I had lived (he says) in the time of this great man, I should have liked to put him a few questions. First, when is a religion *established* in the State? When a sect wishes to introduce itself into a country, it does not stop modestly at the frontier, and send a message thence to ask if it will be received. It glides in silently like a reptile, it disseminates its doctrines in the shade, unknown to the sovereign, and all at once it suddenly rises up, *caput a calvi regionibus ostendens*. Is it *established* then? Doubtless that is not what Montesquieu meant to say: otherwise, there would have been no distinction to make. This great man therefore means to speak of a legal admission founded on an express law, or on a tacit concession declared by time and prescription. Up to that it is not established, and he would not permit it to be established. Then it must be resisted: but how? That would be my second question, which appears to me very important. Should it be requested by proclamation to be good enough to leave the State? I am afraid that would not do. It would therefore be necessary, in order to follow Montesquieu's maxim, to command, compel, and punish. But up to what point is severity lawful, and what is that at which it becomes a crime? What can be said for certain is, that all needless severity is criminal, and that every severity is innocent if it is necessary. It can also be maintained with full certainty that the reaction of the sovereignty which defends itself ought to be proportioned to the action of the enemy who attacks it. On this principle, which cannot be contested, we are forced to be very economical of our pity respecting great acts of rigour which were really only misfortunes. You see this dead body stretched on the high-road; the murderer is beside it; he excites your indignation. But when once you learn that this murderer is a peaceful traveller, and that the other was a highwayman who has fallen the victim of a just defence, pity disappears. Right, though enlarged, is always the same. It is not by their severity, but by their necessity, that we must judge the morality of the executions by which a sovereignty defends itself when attacked. All that is not indispensable is criminal; but the utmost imaginable severity is lawful if there be no other means of defence. Let no one come and say to us, "I have seen deceit and fury on both sides." Yes, undoubtedly; human passions are indestructible, and men, even for the right, fight like men. But it is not a case for comparisons. If, in a war stirred up by rebels, there perish on each side a hundred thousand men, on the side of sovereignty have been caused a hundred thousand *deaths*, and on the other have been committed a hundred thousand *murders*. Truths so simple can escape no one.

He maintains that it was by a certain instinct of self-defence that Louis XIV., whose intolerance was so much denounced

by the philosophers, did his best to extirpate Protestantism from his dominions. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was justified, according to him, by the irreconcilability of the Calvinist sect with the French monarchy. Their conspiracy had divided France into "circles" (we suppose it was from them Mr. Stephens borrowed the name), and worked unceasingly against the established order of things. The King said one day to one of the leaders of their party, "My father feared you, my grandfather loved you; for me, I neither fear nor love you." It is true that, with the distractions of his amusements and his vices, he had many things to think of besides a general plan of anti-Protestant policy; but he aided his ministers and magistrates in the acts of repression which they thought the safety of the country required. The aristocratic mind of De Maistre sees only a "shopkeeping" objection in the argument that there was a loss to France of 400,000 men, who took to other countries their talents, their arts, and their manufactures, and made those countries richer at the cost of their own. He does not, however, look upon the Reformation as having produced in all other countries as evil consequences as in France, on account of the larger proportion of the elements of the old religion which some of those countries retained. The idea occurs here which is expressed more fully in the concluding chapter of his work "Du Pape": "The Anglican Church is more Catholic than she thinks herself, and one may believe that it is what is Catholic in her that has saved the State." It will be interesting and profitable to those who have the book to peruse that chapter again, and see how much is foreshadowed in it of the progress of subsequent events in England. But, as relevant to the points we have been referring to, we may mention here his *tu quoque* addressed to those who object to the deposing power—a "bugbear" as he justly calls it—that, in point of fact, the Protestants of England themselves do that which they say Catholic subjects cannot lawfully do; for they depose their sovereign if he does not hold their creed. It is a condition precedent to, and inseparable from, the inheritance and possession of the Crown.

It is evident enough that the opinions of Joseph de Maistre, as they may be gathered from the volume published by his grandson, justify the latter in saying that Revolution cannot claim him "either as an accomplice or an initiator." But the aims and agencies of the revolutionists of France and Italy are even more explicitly condemned in some of his previously published works. Because he was an enemy of Austria, and because Austria was, a few years ago, supposed to be the

Pope's best friend, many persons rushed to the conclusion that there was something heterodox in De Maistre's views, and that he could be claimed as identified in ideas and in policy with recent advocates of Italian unity. Now, one of the things De Maistre hated Austria for was precisely that she had robbed the Pope. In fact, she was not particular, he thought, about whom she took territory from, and his constant labour was to keep his royal master's eyes open to the dangers he ran from those imperial kinsmen upon whom he was sometimes too much inclined to rely. De Maistre, of course, drew delicate distinctions between the "family" and the "cabinet," and seemed to have great respect for the former, while holding the latter in entire distrust. It may be owned that this was a diplomatic affectation, and that, in matters of State policy, he did not really think much better of the Emperor Francis II. than of his ministers. In the reconstruction of Italy, which he foresaw as inevitable at the fall of Napoleon, he wished that the House of Savoy should become a strong power in the North; that the House of Bourbon should recover its continental territory in the South; that they should be united in a strict league with each other, and that they should incline towards France in foreign policy. By this means he believed that Italy would be delivered from Austrian predominance, and would have a happier destiny than when divided into a number of petty states. He held that the Pope should be restored to his dominions in their integrity, and that "his claims were, without contradiction, the most just of all." \* These views, which he constantly urged upon the King of Sardinia as well as upon the Emperor of Russia, were not without effect upon the latter sovereign, and it was undoubtedly to De Maistre's influence that the former owed the addition of Genoa to his hereditary dominions. Austria, who would not have given him anything, and perhaps would have taken something away, prevented his getting any more.

So far from there being any presumption that De Maistre would have been in our days at one with Cavour, it is very probable that he would have taken no part in Italian affairs, unless, perhaps, the part that Rossi took, and with Rossi's fate. He was devoted to the House of Savoy, but it is more than doubtful that he would have served the House of Carignan. He certainly would not have been a Minister of Charles Albert, not merely from his dislike to paper constitutions, but also because Charles Albert was a conspirator and a traitor before he was a king. Victor Emmanuel II. has very little in com-

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\* "Corresp. Diplom." t. ii. p. 129.

mon with the predecessor whose name he received in baptism ; not even near consanguinity, except through his Hapsburg mother ; but it might have done him good at an earlier period of his life to read these remarks, addressed to Victor Emmanuel I. on the 7th of June, 1811 :—

We receive also at this moment the news of the convocation of the Council of Paris, with the threatening letter of Napoleon, who has broken the ice and openly threatens to depose the Pope. This is a new order of things, and who knows what we shall see ? It seems to me impossible that some opposition, some sublime protest, should not be raised on some side or other. However this may be, your Majesty is receiving with us one of the greatest lessons of experience that can occur on this subject. Never has any sovereign laid his hand on any Pope whatsoever (with or without reason, is a point I do not examine) and been able to boast afterwards of a long and happy reign. Henry V. suffered all that a man and a prince could suffer. His unnatural son died of the plague at the age of forty-four, after a very troubled reign ; Frederick I. died in the Cydnus at thirty-eight ; Frederick II. was imprisoned by his son after being deposed ; Philip the Fair died of a fall from his horse at forty-seven. My pen refrains from less ancient instances. "That proves nothing," it will be said. Very well : all I require is that the like should happen to another, even though that too would prove nothing ; and that is what we shall see. (*Corresp. Diplom.*, t. i. pp. 14, 15.)

De Maistre was right ; the like did "happen to another," and the world saw what he had foreseen. Let us add another sentence : it is from the last chapter *Du Pape* :—

Catholic sovereignties have sometimes appeared to apostatise ; for it is an apostasy to lose sight of the foundations of Christianity, to shake them even, by openly declaring war against the Head of that religion, by overwhelming him with disgust, with bitterness, with shameful chicanery, which Protestant powers perhaps would not have permitted themselves. Among those princes there are some who will one day be inscribed in the rank of great persecutors. They have not made blood flow, it is true, but posterity will ask if a Diocletian, a Galerius, or a Decius did more evil to Christianity.

We shall be glad if our present review turns the minds of Catholic readers in these countries to the other works of this great writer, more important in many respects than that with which we have been chiefly engaged. They form a part of the education of every Continental Catholic who desires to understand the work of God in history, and they shed a most valuable light upon all the great questions of our time. They might, with propriety and advantage, be placed even by Englishmen who are not Catholics, beside the works of another great Conservative statesman, Edmund Burke, who wanted but the light of faith to judge of divine truths with the clear

comprehension which he applied to the solution of political problems. But we can hardly suppose that there are any longer Conservatives in England of the school of Burke and De Maistre, while the great party that usurps the name is led by one whose two latest works—an Act of Parliament and a novel—were produced in the interest of the International Revolution.

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#### ART. VI.—GALILEO AND THE PONTIFICAL CONGREGATIONS.

*The Pontifical Decrees against the Motion of the Earth considered in their bearing on the theory of advanced Ultramontaniam.* London: Longmans.

IN our April review of this pamphlet we argued against the author's amazing statement, that Paul V. condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*; and we flatter ourselves we showed that such a statement is not less than extravagantly mistaken. So much as this then is already established; viz. that no kind of argument can be deduced, from any supposed *ex cathedrâ* utterance of Paul V., against that dogma concerning Pontifical infallibility which has been defined by the Vatican Council.

In truth there are two facts which stand so simply on the surface throughout the Church's whole dealings with Galileo, that, had it not been for the case of our present opponent, we should have thought it impossible for any candid inquirer to miss them. These facts are: that on one hand no Pope ever condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*; and that on the other hand nevertheless a number of successive Pontiffs considered that theory repugnant to Scripture, and used every means in their power, short of an *ex cathedrâ* condemnation, to discountenance and repress it.

If we are to judge from one or two communications which have reached us, we should say that some few excellent Catholics wish us to leave the matter where it stood in April; and to ignore the *second* of the two facts just mentioned. They deprecate, as paradoxical and savouring of mere subtle refinement, our eulogy of the Congregational Decree against Galileo, and our allegation that a certain firm interior assent was due from all Catholics to its doctrine. They even think that so "eccentric" a line of argument as ours may injure Catholic interests,



by prejudicing candid inquirers against any high doctrine of Pontifical infallibility.

We have given the best consideration in our power to this very intelligible view; but we must say plainly that such consideration has only strengthened our conviction on the other side. It is most certain that there are various truths of vital moment on the Church's teaching authority—which may very possibly indeed be in some shape defined by the Vatican Council before its close—entirely over and above the mere infallibility of Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* pronouncements. For instance, all loyal Catholics earnestly desire, not merely to accept infallible definitions, but to *think with the Church*; "*sentire cum Ecclesiâ*." This is the "sacrifice of intellect," which Dr. Döllinger considers a "delusion;" but which S. Ignatius, as is well known, regarded as an object of such importance, that he laid down express "rules" for its attainment. Now most certainly all Catholics in Galileo's time, who laboured to "think with the Church," would have rejected Copernicanism as anti-Scriptural: for the Church exhibited her "mind" on the subject in every possible way, short of a definition *ex cathedrâ*. Then again one reason which induces some Catholics to dislike our line of argument about Galileo, is their opinion that it is intolerable tyranny to claim interior assent as due to a fallible judgment. Yet there is no fact more certain in all history, than that Paul V. and Urban VIII. did regard a certain interior assent as due to the doctrinal declaration of 1616. Is it a light thing then to admit, that Popes acting in their official capacity—acting with full deliberation and with fullest accordance of their legitimate ecclesiastical advisers—were guilty of intolerable tyranny? Lastly,—as the pamphlet before us points out,—Pius IX. has expressly declared, that full adhesion cannot be secured from scientific men to revealed truth, unless they yield interior assent to the doctrinal decrees of Pontifical Congregations. We heartily agree with our opponent, that such is the undeniable sense of the Munich Brief; and we shall argue in union with him for this view in the course of our article. Now it is an historical fact denied by no man, that one of these doctrinal decrees condemned Copernicanism as false and contrary to Scripture; and surely therefore any Catholic treatment of the Galileo case would be most lame and impotent, which should not fully confront this teaching of Pius IX.

We may further add that, of the six "anti-Ultramontane" inferences, (as our opponent calls them,) with which he concludes his pamphlet, one only (the third) has been touched

by the reasoning of our April number. Yet the remaining five are surely very serious. They run as follows:—

1. Rome—i. e. a Pontifical Congregation informed by the Pope—may put forth a decision scientifically false and doctrinally erroneous.

2. It does not follow from the Church's having been informed that the Pope has ordered a Catholic to abandon an opinion altogether as indefensible and untenable, that the opinion may not be true and sound.

3.

4. The Pope may command a Pontifical Congregation to promulgate, as a portion of the teaching of the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church, that which is scientifically false and doctrinally erroneous.

5. The true interpretation of our Lord's promises to St. Peter permits us to say, that a Pope may, when acting officially, confirm his brethren the Cardinals in an error touching the matter of faith, and use his authority as Pope to indoctrinate the Church with a false opinion respecting Holy Scripture.

6. It is not always for the good of the Church that Catholics should think as Rome does, even on a point of doctrine.

It will be involved in the argument of our present article, that no one of these five inferences can be legitimately deduced from the Church's way of dealing with Copernicanism and with Galileo.

But more may be said even than all this, in defence of the course we are pursuing. It is necessary to enter on such considerations as those of the present article, in order to defend the very Vatican Definition; in order to uphold the infallibility of *ex cathedra* Acts themselves. For our opponent alleges—and we on our part are cordially of his mind—that the Munich Brief, with its strong doctrine on the authority of Pontifical Congregations, was strictly *ex cathedra*; and that it is in the number therefore of those utterances, which the Vatican Council has defined to be infallible.

Nor can we admit for a moment that there is anything paradoxical, eccentric, over-refined, or subtle, in our own mode of dealing with the Galileo case. On the contrary, it seems to us that our view represents successive Pontiffs as having acted throughout with the simplest common sense. Had it not been for the extraordinarily brilliant career which Copernicanism ran through after Galileo's death, all Catholics of the present day would see how violently anti-Catholic was the position of that astronomer.

Our main contention shall be, that a certain firm interior assent was due from all contemporary Catholics to the doctrine of that Decree against Copernicanism, which was issued by the Congregation of the Index in 1616. In the course of our argument for this thesis, we shall be led to con-

sider nearly all the points raised by our opponent, which remain unnoticed from our former article; and what few still remain behind, shall then be separately treated. We must introduce our argument by three preliminary explanations.

1. The very notion has sometimes been denied as extravagant, that firm interior assent can be due to a fallible judgment; and yet there is no more ordinary and every-day phenomenon. I feel ill; and send for a physician of first-rate eminence, with whose integrity I am intimately acquainted. "Your case is distressing," he says, "but very simple: you have a rheumatic fever; there is no doubt about the matter." I must be very strangely constituted, if I do not yield firm interior assent to this judgment. My relations perhaps, who do not like to think me so ill, cry out: "Oh, but Dr. X. is not infallible." I readily admit this; I readily admit that the fact of my having rheumatic fever is not absolutely certain in the strictest sense of that term: yet I hold the conviction that such is my illness, no one whit less confidently than I did before. Such precisely is the assent which, as we maintain, is due to the doctrine of a Congregational decree: a firm interior assent, ordinarily not accompanied by any doubt whatever, yet not *so* firm as to be *incompatible* with the co-existence of doubt.

2. Then, when we say that such assent is due to such doctrine, we by no means mean that it is obligatory under pain of *sin*, whether mortal or venial. We have before entirely avoided this question, and we shall continue to avoid it now. So in the previous illustration. When it was said that my assent is due to Dr. X.'s dictum, this did not mean that I should *sin* in refusing assent, but that I should act unreasonably and like a fool in so doing; that such assent is my one reasonable response. We say in like manner, that firm interior assent was the one reasonable response of contemporary Catholics to the doctrine set forth by the Pontifical Congregation.

3. The essence of an *ex cathedrâ* Act is, that the Pope therein commands all Catholics to accept some given doctrine with interior assent. Whenever he gives such command, he speaks *ex cathedrâ*; whenever he speaks *ex cathedrâ*, he gives such command.\* If it be further asked, what *indications* may assure Catholics that in this or that pronouncement he

\* We do not for a moment forget, that in many instances there existed a strict obligation *sub mortali* of avoiding some heresy—Arianism, Pelagianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism, Monothelism—from the moment when it first sprang up. Still even in these instances, an *ex cathedrâ* condemnation added a fresh obligation to that already existing.

*intends* to issue such a command,—we have always replied that no general answer can be given; and that this issue must be determined by the circumstances, intrinsic and extrinsic, of each particular case. We consider ourselves however to have established conclusively in our last number, that Paul V. did *not* speak *ex cathedrâ* in his condemnation of Copernicanism.

Now it is plain that a Pope can very importantly influence the Church's doctrinal course, by methods entirely distinct from that of an *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement. Our present subject leads us to insist on one of these; viz., a disciplinary command of some Congregation, proceeding avowedly on a doctrinal basis. The same doctrinal *reasons* were expressed in the Decree of 1616, which might very possibly have been expressed in an *ex cathedrâ* Act; but the *command*, founded on those reasons, was essentially different in the two cases. Had Paul V. spoken *ex cathedrâ*, he would have said in effect: "Since the anti-Scriptural theory of Copernicus is rapidly spreading, I hereby command that all Catholics shall *accept with interior assent* the geocentric theory." By sanctioning the *Decree of the Index*, he said in effect: "Since the anti-Scriptural theory of Copernicus is rapidly spreading, I hereby forbid Catholics from *writing or reading Copernican books*." Those who maintain—as we ourselves strongly maintain—that firm interior assent was due from contemporary Catholics to the doctrine of this Decree, cannot at all events say that such assent was an act of *obedience to Papal command*; because no Papal command of interior assent was ever *issued* to contemporary Catholics.

Here then we are brought to our direct subject. There are various doctrinal declarations, officially put forth by Pontifical Congregations, approved by the Pope, and made by Pope and Congregations the basis of disciplinary enactments. We allege that firm interior assent is due from contemporary\* Catholics to these declarations. On what grounds do we rest this allegation?

We gave various reasons in our article of 1865; and as our opponent has attempted no reply,† we must begin with merely referring to them again.

\* We introduce the qualification "contemporary," with a special view to the case of Galileo; and before concluding our article, we shall explain ourselves distinctly on the reasons of the qualification.

† He says generally (p. 25, note) that "we have not succeeded in vindicating our doctrine on the subject"; but gives no reason for his opinion. He considers that our doctrine is irrelevant to the Galileo question, because, on his (most strange) view, Paul V. condemned Copernicanism *ex cathedrâ*.

1. Firstly we based our conclusion ("Doctrinal Decisions" pp. 134-6) on the maxim "*cuique credendum in sua arte.*" There is a very large multitude of Pontifical judgments, which are *ex cathedra* and infallible; far more than can be apprehended and mastered, otherwise than by sustained and intelligent labour directed to that end. Those who have devoted themselves to the task, will have their minds imbued with a vast body of infallible truth, to which other Catholics are comparatively strangers. Now the members of a Pontifical Congregation are precisely a body of men, who make it their business and profession to master methodically this body of truth; and who moreover, from position and association, are singularly free from all sinister and non-Papal influence. What can be more unreasonable, we had almost said more impudent, than that in any ordinary case a private Catholic should pit his individual judgment against theirs?

We gave the following illustration of our argument:—"I have never studied medicine systematically; but I am fond of experimentalizing in a quiet way, and have come to an opinion that a certain remedy would be serviceable for a certain disease. I publish my opinion, with its grounds; and find it repudiated by every one, young or old, who has gone through a medical education. All combine to assure me, that I am quite mistaken, and that my reasoning is absurdly insufficient to establish my conclusion. No one alleges that God has endowed the medical profession with infallibility: and yet it would not be so much presumption as actual insanity, so soon as I am satisfied that they have really pondered what I have written, if I hesitated to abandon my own opinion in deference to theirs; and this, though I were wholly unacquainted with their reasoning, or could see no force in it."

2. Then secondly these doctrinal declarations are ordinarily the exposition of Roman tradition. "In which" [Roman Church], says Pius IX., "always remains the infallible magisterium of the Faith, and in which, therefore, *Apostolical Tradition has always been preserved.*" "In which [Roman Church] alone religion has been inviolably preserved, and from which all other churches must borrow *the tradition of Faith.*" Surely much more is implied in these large statements, than the mere infallibility of Papal *ex cathedra* pronouncements; however numerous the latter may justly be considered. Such statements ascribe a certain singular authority to the endemic tradition of Rome. But of that tradition, the various officials of the Pontifical Congregations are, under the Pope, the special depositaries and guardians. Where they speak, the voice of Rome is heard. "I am convinced," says Zac-

caria,\* "that it appertains to Providence not to permit that Rome, even apart from cases where the Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ*, should condemn as erroneous a doctrine which is not so." And Delahogue † gives a very pertinent reason for this view; viz., that the Roman Church has "received pure doctrine from the continued series of Peter's successors." Nor is it only *material* purity of doctrine (if we may so express ourselves) which so remarkably characterizes Rome, but a subtle and refined doctrinal *sense*; whence results a ready discernment of what under given circumstances is perilous or otherwise to the pure Gospel.

3. Our next argument would require an article for its due development and elucidation; but a few words will sufficiently indicate its bearing. We will begin with a parallel. A devout Catholic is not content with performing those duties which are of actual obligation, but goes forth into various pious acts which are not strictly commanded; and for doing so is all the more pleasing to Almighty God. In like manner an *intellectually docile* Catholic is not content with accepting those doctrines, which are taught *ex cathedrâ* and cannot be doubted without mortal sin; he labours at studying all indications of the Church's entire mind, and bringing his own intellect into harmony therewith. Many doctrines (to use the modern expression) are proposed by the Church which she does not impose; and God is better pleased, in proportion as a Catholic more unquestioningly accepts these doctrines. "*Sentire cum Ecclesiâ*"—as we have already urged—is always accounted a signal intellectual excellence.

Now, short of an obligatory definition, there can be no surer indication of the Church's mind, than a doctrinal declaration expressly put forth, as the basis of an universally binding disciplinary enactment. Take the very instance which has led to these remarks, that of Galileo. Here was no case, such as often occurs, of a Pope imposing silence on both sides for the sake of peace. Catholics were encouraged to oppose Copernicanism, while they were peremptorily prohibited from defending it; and this on the avowed ground that it is "false and contrary to Scripture." If a procedure of this special sort does not conclusively prove the Church's present "mind," there can be no such proof, except an *ex cathedrâ* definition; and the "*sentire cum Ecclesiâ*" becomes an unmeaning sound.

4. Moreover it has always been recommended by authority as the reasonable and docile course, to accept interiorly such

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\* Quoted from Bouix, "Doctrinal Decisions," p. 132, note.

† Quoted in "Doctrinal Decisions," p. 137, note.



doctrinal teaching. Galileo himself was enjoined by Paul V. and by Urban VIII. to "desist from" "depart from," "desert" his "false opinion." Nay, as our opponent has importantly pointed out, very strong expressions were used by the Holy Office in 1633: "In no way," says that Congregation, "can an opinion be probable, which has been already declared and defined as contrary to Divine Scripture."\* Surely this is a very strong declaration, as implying a claim to interior assent. If a Congregational condemnation deprives a tenet for the time of all probability, the one reasonable course for contemporary Catholics must be, to renounce that tenet *interiorly*; and not merely to abstain from *defending* it.† Then—going beyond this particular case of Galileo—it is universally considered "laudable" that a Catholic, whose work is condemned by the Index, shall "submit himself" interiorly to the decision. "Laudabiliter se subjecit" is the form always used; nor does any one doubt, that the "se subjecere" here means "to subject the *intellect*." We will give one instance out of a thousand illustrating the same principle. When Mgr. Hugonin a few years ago was nominated Bishop of Bayeux, the Holy Father required him to retract certain philosophical doctrines maintained by him, which favoured the seven ontologistic propositions, condemned—not by the Pope speaking *ex cathedra*—but by the Holy Office: and he readily obeyed the requisition. And

\* We showed in April, how impossible it is to think, that these words describe geocentricism as having been *infallibly* defined.

† Our readers will be interested to see the following opinion of Caramuel, the well-known theologian, occasioned by this very Galileo case, and quoted by M. Bouix (de Papa, tom. ii., pp. 461-2):—"Quàm sint certæ et indubitatæ declarationes Cardinalium. . . . Ego auctoritatem practicam a speculativâ distinguo: et licet condendi articulos fidei, hoc est sentiendi et credendi, potestatem *soli Pontifici ex cathedrâ loquenti* concedam, condendi *præcicos* articulos loquendi, docendi, concionandi, dictandi et operandi auctoritatem concedo dominis eminentissimis, quos ad Ecclesiæ regimen practicum adsumpsit sanctissimus Dominus noster. Aio eorundem auctoritatem esse duplicem, interdictoriam et condemnatoriam. Quando liber vel sententia *interdicitur*, non assertitur esse probabilis sed neque esse probabilis; sed, jussa manere in gradu probabilitatis in quo antea, ob bonum publicum vel privatum nec dictari nec defendi præcipitur. . . . Quando aliqua sententia ab eminentissimis dominis *condemnatur, practicè* condemnatur. Propositio sic condemnata non pertransit in hæresim, sed perdit omnem extrinsecam auctoritatem et redditur *improbabilis practicè*. Quid si condemnatur tanquam *hæretica*? Tunc vi hujus condemnationis non fiet hæretica, quæ antea non esset hæretica: sed quæ antea erat hæretica, condemnatione declarabitur esse hæretica; idque tantâ certitudine, ut *eandem non esse hæreticam maneat improbabile*. In hoc et similibus casibus habent inquisitores auctoritatem interdicendi, præcipiendi, abjurandi; et subditi tenentur in conscientia obedire, sincere jurare. Ergo in ejusmodi casibus subsunt tribunali actus *externi* per se, et *interni* per accidens."

indeed all good Catholics—even those who have clung to the name of “ontologists”—have universally professed to reject interiorly those seven propositions, from the very time when the Holy Office declared “that they could not safely be taught.”

In all the cases we have named, the whole Episcopate has expressly or tacitly concurred with the Holy Father. And if the *Ecclesia Docens* is, by God’s gift, the Catholic’s infallible guide in faith and morals, his one reasonable course must be to adopt that line of conduct which she approves and recommends.

5. But the most conclusive argument of all is derived from Pius IX.’s words in the Munich Brief; a Brief which we heartily concur with our opponent (p. 38) in accounting *ex cathedrâ*. As this is a very important pronouncement on our present theme, and as there has been much discussion on its exact significance, we will begin by translating the whole paragraph.

“We give deserved praise to the men of this [the Munich] Congress, because, rejecting (as we understand them) the false distinction between philosophy and the philosopher, concerning which we have spoken in another Letter, they know and have declared that all Catholics in their treatises are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the infallible Catholic Church. And while we thus justly praise them for professing a truth which necessarily arises from the obligation of Catholic faith, we wish to believe that they did not intend to limit that obligation, whereby Catholic teachers and writers are entirely bound, within [the sphere of] those matters only, which are proposed by the Church’s infallible judgment as dogmata of the Faith to be believed by all. And we also persuade ourselves that they did not intend to declare, that that perfect adhesion towards revealed truths, which they have acknowledged as altogether necessary to achieving true progress of the sciences and to refuting error, can be obtained, if faith and obedience be only given to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church. For even if there were only question of that subjection which is to be yielded by an act of divine faith,—that nevertheless should not be confined to those things which have been defined by express decrees of Ecumenical Councils or Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but should be extended to those things also which are taught as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed over the world, and which are therefore recognised by Catholic theologians with universal and constant consent as appertaining to the Faith. But since the question is [rather] of that subjection, whereby all those Catholics are bound in conscience, who labour in the

speculative sciences that they may [thus] by their writings produce fresh benefits to the Church,—therefore the men of this Congress should acknowledge that it is not enough for cultured (*sapientibus*) Catholics to receive and venerate the dogmata of the Church, but that it is also necessary for them to submit themselves, as well to those doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations, as also to those heads of doctrine, which are held by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that the opinions contradictory to those heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure."

In dwelling on this momentous utterance, we will begin with a question, which has no direct bearing indeed on our argument, but which nevertheless cannot be possibly passed over by those, who would understand the force of this passage in its completeness. It might appear on the surface, that Pius IX. here makes no mention of certain ecclesiastical teachings, which are far more authoritative than two of those which he does mention. We refer to definitions infallibly put forth by the Church, which are not definitions of *faith*; definitions which infallibly declare, not revealed truths, but subordinate and ministrative Catholic verities; definitions which condemn the errors branded by them, not as *heretical*, but as deserving some *minor* censure.

We shall find however, on attentive consideration, that these minor infallible definitions are by no means passed over in the above-cited paragraph. The Catholics assembled at Munich had frankly confessed, that "all Catholics are bound in conscience to obey the dogmatical decrees of the infallible Catholic Church." There are two different errors however, says the Pontiff in effect, which are not necessarily disclaimed by this profession. For (1) those who utter it may possibly intend to admit no obligation of avoiding any tenet, in deference to the Church, which is not denounced by her as actually *heretical*: or (2) they may intend to imply, that they do enough by merely assenting to every truth which has been expressly *defined* by the Church, whether as a revealed truth or as a subordinate Catholic verity. These are two totally distinct errors; and both are compatible with the strict *wording* of the profession of the Congress. Those who fall into the *first* error, confine their assent to what the Church teaches *as of faith*; those who fall into the *second*, confine their assent to what she teaches *by way of express definition*. In opposition to these two errors, the Pope proceeds to lay down two fundamental principles. Firstly, even as regards the assent of *divine faith*, all

Catholics are bound to accept with such assent, not only the revealed truths which have been expressly *defined*, but all those which the Church magisterially teaches as revealed.\* And secondly,—whereas there are certain *further* verities which must be firmly held in order to secure the due *preservation* and *protection* of revealed truth—these verities are by no means confined to those which have been expressly defined by the Church in her infallible judgments, but cover a much larger area. It is this interpretation alone, as our readers may see by attempting any other, which gives full intelligibility and cohesion to the whole passage.

We may add that there is an evident allusion to the Church's two classes of infallible definitions, in the words "if faith and obedience be only given to the dogmata expressly defined by the Church." *Faith* is due to definitions of *faith*; interior *submission* and *obedience*, but not perhaps *faith*, to the Church's minor doctrinal judgments.† But *faith*,—so the Pope teaches,—is due to *other* revealed truths, and interior obedience to *other* Catholic verities, over and above those which have been expressly defined.

These Catholic verities, we have said, cover a much larger area than the Church's minor doctrinal definitions. What is that area? Let Pius IX. himself answer the question:—"It is necessary for educated Catholics to submit themselves, as well to those doctrinal decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations,‡ as to those heads of doctrine which are held by the common consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that the opinions contradictory to those heads of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure." Now what is the meaning of this phrase "submit themselves"? "Submit their *intellect*"? or only "submit their *will*"? The sentence itself would almost decide. "Subjiciant se" governs equally two different datives: viz. (1) "to the doctrinal decisions of Pontifical Congregations"; and (2) "to those heads of doctrine, which are unanimously held by Catholics in a certain special way." Now no one can possibly doubt, that the

\* This truth has been solemnly reaffirmed by the Vatican Council. See our remarks, July 1870, p. 190.

† It is a debated question among theologians, whether the absolute and unreserved assent, due to minor doctrinal definitions, should be called "faith." Some call it "*fides mediata*" or "*fides ecclesiastica*."

‡ We may observe in passing, that the Pontiff distinguishes expressly here, between the mere doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, and Pontifical *ex cathedra* Acts; whereas our opponent implies (pp. 15, 16) that, according to Pius IX.'s teaching, there is *no* such distinction.

"submission" due to these "heads of doctrine" is submission of *intellect*: hence one would naturally think that it is submission of *intellect* which is *also* due to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation. The same conclusion however is made absolutely certain by an earlier sentence. For the Pope declares, that the submission of which he speaks is necessary for "perfect adhesion towards revealed truth;" and evidently it is some *intellectual* process, which alone can give increased adhesion towards revealed truth.

Nor should we fail carefully to observe the peremptoriness of Pius IX.'s language. "All Catholics are *bound in conscience*," he says, to the "submission" of which he speaks. All Catholics then who give themselves to intellectual speculation, if they would really promote the cause of truth, should submit themselves with interior intellectual assent to every doctrinal decree of a Pontifical Congregation which concerns them. God so watches over those decrees, as to provide that such intellectual submission is a momentous security for the Catholic's more perfect "adhesion towards revealed truth." And we need hardly add, that the anti-Copernican Decree of 1616, in its bearing on contemporary Catholics, was precisely one of those to which the Munich Brief refers.

Of the various objections which have been raised against our thesis, some apply to the special case of Galileo, others to the general doctrine. We will begin with the latter class, as they can be far more briefly despatched.

I. Our opponent argues (p. 38) that the Munich Brief "apparently bids us to attribute the same authority to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, as to those heads of doctrine which Catholics are bound to account theologically certain": and that by so doing it claims for those decrees *theological certainty*. He does well however "not to press this point." Pius IX. teaches that intellectual submission is due to both the classes which he mentions; but he neither says nor implies, that their authority is exactly equal *in degree*.

II. "At all events," it may be rejoined, "it is impossible that increased adhesion towards revealed truth can be obtained from Catholics, by their acceptance of a *false doctrine*. It follows therefore from the Munich Brief that all "doctrinal decisions of a Congregation are *true*; or in "other words, that the Congregations are *infallible* in such "decisions."

We reply firstly, that a doctrine, in itself untrue, may nevertheless be the legitimate consequence of all the premisses cognisable at some particular time; and it is not at all difficult to suppose that, on such an hypothesis, its acceptance is

a very important security for orthodoxy. We have in fact argued throughout, that the case of Galileo is here precisely in point. Had he submitted his judgment, as he should have done, to his ecclesiastical superiors, he would have preserved very far greater "adhesion" towards that part of "revealed truth," which concerns the Inspiration of Scripture and the reverence due to that sacred volume. His refusal to accept interiorly the Doctrine of 1616 both exhibited and fostered in him a most anti-Catholic, proud, and irreverent method of dealing with God's Written Word.

We do not mean, however, that the Munich Brief necessarily implies so much as this. Its words, we think, do not necessarily imply, that in every individual case a Pontifical Congregation will teach precisely that doctrine, which legitimately follows from the premisses then cognisable; but those words may be verified, *without* claiming for the Congregations so very signal a prerogative. Let us suppose merely so much as this; that, through God's superintending Providence, the body of such decrees taken together contains immeasurably more truth than falsehood. If then we compare together the respective state of those who *accept* all those decrees as such and those who *reject* them as such, it will be found that the former have imbibed a very far larger amount of Catholic truth, than is (so far) possessed by the latter. "The youthful son," we said in a former article, "gains immeasurably more of real knowledge by accepting without hesitation the whole of his father's instruction, than he could possibly gain by questioning and sifting it, and believing nothing on his father's authority. In like manner, a Catholic would gain far more spiritual knowledge by interiorly accepting all these decrees, than by declining such acceptance; even though it might happen, on certain very rare occasions, that they led him into error."

At the same time we expressed in our article of 1865 (p. 186),—following part of his way that great theologian Zaccaria—a pious opinion or augury, that though the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation have no *promise* of inerrancy, yet we may humbly hope and expect that God will at no time permit them to err, regard being had to the circumstances of the time." Since these words were first written, we have seen no reason whatever for abandoning this pious opinion or augury, but much the reverse.

III. Some have maintained, in opposition to our view, that it never can be prudent to accept an opinion which in fact is false. But this notion is so very paradoxical, that it is difficult to regard its upholders as having quite considered what



they say. Whether there be question of a rustic instructed by his parochus or a hundred similar cases, it would be universally recommended that the instruction be accepted without question as a whole : though, as being fallible, there is almost a certainty of its comprising some subordinate mistakes. But the case may easily happen, in which there shall even be obligation under mortal sin of holding an untrue opinion. A. B. is accused of some crime, which he has really committed. I have no reason however of any kind for thinking ill of him, and I see that the alleged proofs are ludicrously insufficient. I am bound under mortal sin then to account him innocent ; and if I accounted him otherwise, I should show myself by that very fact to be actuated by uncharitable or otherwise reprehensible motives.

IV. Much more plausibly, a certain modification of the preceding has been suggested to us as an objection. Catholics, so it is argued,—through the Church's inalienable prerogative of passive infallibility—can never be unanimous in regarding a false opinion as a truth of their religion. But, so the objector continues, if interior assent could be due to a mistaken theological judgment—and this *must* be possible if such assent is due to a *fallible* judgment—all Catholics who act loyally and reasonably, would be unanimous in holding a false opinion as a truth of their religion. On our view then, such is the final inference, the Pope might lawfully and wisely sanction a decree, from which it reasonably results that the Church shall lose her inalienable privilege of passive infallibility. Quod est absurdum.

We can reply very unanswerably, without going beyond the particular case which has led to this whole discussion. It is a notorious fact, denied by no one, that for many centuries all Catholics did unanimously account geocentricism to be a truth of their religion, as being declared in Scripture. Such unanimity therefore cannot possibly be inconsistent with any inalienable prerogative of the Church.

In fact, while all theologians admit the existence of what is called passive infallibility, our impression is that they differ a good deal from each other in the sense they give that phrase ; though the subject is so subordinate a one in their treatises, that it is difficult to speak on the matter with confidence. We would ourselves suggest a slight modification of that sense, which is implied in the present objection. Instead of a "*false opinion*" we would substitute "*an opinion, which either contradicts revealed truth, or leads by legitimate consequence to such contradiction.*" With this alteration, the Church's prerogative of passive infallibility will import, that Catholics can

never be unanimous in holding\* any opinion, which either contradicts revealed truth or leads by legitimate consequence to such contradiction. If this view of passive infallibility be admitted, all difficulty vanishes. For no one will allege that the theory of geocentrism falls under either of these two categories; and one may be very confident that God will never permit a Pontifical Congregation to put forward any such heterodox opinion.

V. Lastly it has been objected, that the position we are here assuming invalidates one particular argument, on which we have heretofore laid great stress in vindicating the *ex cathedrâ* character of certain Pontifical Acts. We have argued again and again, that there are certain Papal pronouncements—such e.g. as the “*Unigenitus*,” the “*Auctorem Fidei*,” the “*Mirari vos*,”—of which it is manifest (so to speak) by an act of *eyesight*, that they are *ex cathedrâ*; because the Pope has expressly testified that he commands interior assent to their teaching. But if interior assent can be due to judgments which are *not ex cathedrâ*,—so runs the objection—the above-named argument falls to the ground. Our reply is most simple, and is contained indeed in the very definition we gave of an *ex cathedrâ* Act. “The essence of an *ex cathedrâ* Act”—we said a few pages back—“is that the Pope therein commands all Catholics to accept some given doctrine with interior assent.” We proceeded to point out, that those who claim ever so strongly interior assent as due to the doctrinal decree of a Congregation, cannot at all events say that such assent is an act of obedience to Papal command; because no Congregational decree, as such, implies any Papal *command* of interior assent. The argument therefore remains absolutely untouched, by which we established the *ex cathedrâ* character of the three Constitutions to which we have referred.

We are aware of no other objections to our view, except those derived from the particular instance of Copernicanism; and those objections indeed are reducible to one, though that very formidable. “If the DUBLIN REVIEW doctrine were admitted, it would follow that on one memorable occasion all Catholics who acted with the loyalty demanded by reason, were led by so doing to accept the false theory of geocentrism as a revealed truth.” We replied to this objection in Oct. 1865; and it is our business now to consider our present opponent’s *rejoinder* on that reply.

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\* In this version we omit one qualification while adding another; for we no longer say “*holding as a truth of their religion*.”

Our reply itself was substantially this (pp. 140—142): "Holy Scripture differs from all other books in the fact, that it is throughout the Word of God; that every proposition which it contains is infallibly true, in that sense in which God intended it." "No inconvenience however arises, nor is there any irreverence towards God's Written Word, though this or that text be understood in a very unobvious sense, if that sense be affixed in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established." Now when science\* has demonstrated the overwhelming scientific probability of Copernicanism, such demonstration may reasonably be accepted by the Church as God's authoritative explanation of His own language; even though it necessitate the understanding that language in a very unobvious sense. "But on the other hand, if a private individual may ascribe to any text of Scripture any unobvious sense he pleases, —not in deference to some definite objective rule proved to be reasonable, but according to his individual bias and caprice,—the same result would practically follow as from an actual denial of inspiration." In Galileo's time heliocentrism was nothing better than an arbitrary scientific hypothesis. If, on the strength of an arbitrary scientific hypothesis, "men are at liberty to contradict Scriptural texts as understood in that sense which is both the only obvious one and the only one hitherto heard of in the Church, what single text is safe? What is the difference of result, between openly denying the authority of Scripture in general, and explaining away every text one dislikes in particular? Such conduct is a very grave offence against faith." It was impossible then in Galileo's time to understand Scripture otherwise than geocentrically, without grave irreverence to the Inspired Word and grave offence against faith. That such was the one genuine interpretation of Holy Writ, was at that time the legitimate and reasonable inference from all cognisable data; and the Congregations did momentous service in authoritatively prescribing that interpretation.

Putting the matter more compendiously, our reply consisted of three propositions. Firstly, it is irreverent, unreasonable, unchristian, and uncatholic, to interpret Scripture otherwise than according to its one obvious and one traditional sense, except in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established. Secondly, geocentrism was at that time the one traditional, as it

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\* Here, as on former occasions, for convenience' sake, we use the word "science" in the very limited sense of "physical science."

is always the one obvious sense of Scripture. Thirdly, the Copernican interpretation was by no means at that time a rule, the reasonableness of which was sufficiently established; but was on the contrary a violent innovation, gratuitously trumped up to favour an arbitrary scientific hypothesis.

Now, however undeniable is the ability with which our opponent has treated this part of his theme, we have nevertheless much ground of complaint against him, in that he has not directly confronted these several propositions. In particular take the first, which is the foundation of all, as to the due mode of interpreting Scripture. We had a right to expect that he would directly meet it with a "yes" or a "no;" whereas we can find no reference whatever to it in his whole text, and only one obscure criticism at the tail of a note. "The real question at issue," he says (p. 40, note), "was, are the expressions of the sacred writers in regard to the physical order to be judged by the same rule as those relating to things moral and spiritual?" But no one has ever given an affirmative answer to this question; and it cannot therefore have been "the real question at issue." In our article of 1865 (p. 144), we cited with full agreement the words of an earlier contributor to this REVIEW, in the negative direction. "The prevailing opinion in the Catholic Church as to what Scripture says on matters" appertaining to *faith and morals*, "cannot be false, for it embodies the teaching of the authorized exponent of Scripture. But it has never been denied, that the common opinion of what is asserted in Scripture on *other points*,—such as belong, e.g., to the physical history of the universe—may be mistaken, and may be corrected and improved from time to time, by the progress of science, and the discoveries of history." This principle, however, was admitted by all the theologians who dealt with the Galileo case; and this therefore cannot be the distinction intended by our opponent. We might imagine him to mean, that the sacred writers are not *inspired* in their declarations concerning the physical order. But we cannot impute to him, without clearer evidence, an opinion which would so fatally affect his theological character. On this view, e.g., almost the whole first chapter of Genesis would be uninspired: although there is no single chapter in the Bible which more unmistakably *claims* to be a revelation from heaven (for the facts there set forth could not possibly be learned in any other way); and although God avowedly made those facts the basis for a permanent Jewish institution, the Sabbath.

We repeat then our fundamental principle; and we repeat it without further argument, because our opponent has given

no substantial reply with which we can grapple. It is irreverent, unreasonable, unchristian, and uncatholic, to interpret Scripture otherwise than according to its one obvious and its one traditional sense, except in deference to some definite, tangible, objective rule, the reasonableness of which is sufficiently established.

Our second proposition is, that Scripture, in its one obvious and in what was then its one traditional sense, declares the geocentric doctrine. Catholics of the present day have become so habituated to Copernicanism, that, unless they take special pains, they can do no kind of justice to the violent shock which that theory inflicted, on the Catholic's most legitimate and laudable prepossessions. Scripture, whether taken by itself or interpreted by the traditional theology, would not lead its readers so much as to *dream* of any other idea, than that this earth, as it is the moral,\* so also is it the physical centre of the visible universe. In Scripture statements, the earth is no satellite of the sun, but rather the sun is a satellite of the earth. "*In the beginning* God created the heaven and the earth:" whereas not till the fourth day did He create the sun; and then, "*that it might preside over*" the earth's "*day,*" and "*shine over the earth.*" Our opponent indeed fully admits this: he admits (p. 50) that "*the obvious earth of the Bible is an immovable earth,*" lighted by a constantly revolving sun. Such is the representation implied from the first verse of Scripture to the very last.

As one instance of the extreme repugnancy presented by Copernicanism, both to the obvious sense of Scripture and to received theological views, take the ancient doctrine concerning *heaven*. Undoubtedly Copernicanism has not a word to say against the truth, that there is a certain place called "*heaven,*" where God is present in some special sense, and which is inhabited by the Son in His Sacred Humanity, by the Blessed Virgin, by all the Beati. But Copernicanism does deny, what Scripture in its one obvious sense constantly affirms; viz., that this place is *above the earth*. It is physically

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\* In saying that, according to the obvious bearing of Scripture and theology, this earth is the moral centre of the visible universe, we mean to express such facts as these. According to that obvious bearing,—putting aside the angels who are immaterial—there are no living creatures, and much more no reasonable creatures, except on the earth. For man, and man alone, God became Incarnate: the blessed in heaven, the damned in hell, consist exclusively of angels and men. We are not here considering, whether those actually *contradict* Scripture who think that the other planets are inhabited by reasonable creatures; for that is far too serious a question to be treated episodically. But we are saying, that such an opinion is directly opposed to the *obvious bearing* of Scripture and theology.

impossible—since Copernicanism is true—that heaven can in any imaginable sense be “above” any given spot on the earth, for more than one instant in every twenty-four hours; while in regard to the earth’s surface *as a whole*, it is simply unmeaning in a Copernican’s mouth to speak of any place whatever as “above” it. Yet S. Paul says (Phil. ii. 10) by most inevitable implication that heaven is *above* the earth.\* Our Blessed Lord “*raised up* His eyes to heaven,” when He most earnestly prayed to His Father; and declared “*I ascend* to my Father and your Father,” when He announced His speedy departure to heaven.

There is one very tangible proof, by which our readers may test for themselves, how lively a contrast exists between Copernicanism and the obvious sense of Scripture and theology. We believe that the great mass of pious men whether Catholic or Protestant, when engaged in meditation and prayer, entirely forget for the moment their speculative Copernicanism, and are under a strong unconscious impression that heaven is above them and hell beneath them.

In addition to this uniform drift and implication of Scripture, there are particular texts, which we cited in our article of 1865, and which our opponent so criticises (pp. 49, 50), as only to make our case the stronger. For instance, “*Firmavit orbem terræ, qui non commovebitur*” (Ps. xcii. 1). Our opponent replies (p. 49), that “the mere expression ‘non commovebitur’ proves nothing; for the Hebrew is radically the same in these: ‘*perforce gressus meos ut non moveantur vestigia mea*,’ and ‘*non det in commotionem pedem tuum*,’” Certainly the words “non commovebitur” *by themselves* prove nothing; only they do not *stand* by themselves, but in connection with “*firmavit orbem terræ*.” Again, “*Qui fundasti terram super stabilitatem suam, non inclinabitur in sæculum sæculi*” (Ps. ciii. 5). He replies that the word “*inclinabitur*” is different from “*commovebitur*” (p. 50, note): which matters however the less, as he has pointed out that the word “*commovebitur*” would *itself* prove nothing. But we laid our stress, as is evident from our opponent’s own citation of our words (p. 50), on “*stabilitatem*.” We gave various other citations; viz. Job xxxviii. 4—6; Ps. xvii. 16; Ps. lxxxi. 5; Ps. xc. 10; Ps. cxxxv. 6; Prov. iii. 19; Prov. viii. 29: and with none of these has he attempted to deal.

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\* “*Ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ κατὰ θοῶν*.” All those of whom he speaks are, by the force of his expression, either *below* the earth’s surface, or *on* the earth’s surface, or *above* the earth’s surface. And this last class includes, at least as its principal member, the inhabitants of *heaven*.



He objects (p. 49) that "we give up all the passages on which theologians" contemporary with Galileo "mainly took their stand." We cannot admit this, except for argument's sake: but it is simply nothing to the purpose. We have alleged throughout, that Pontifical Congregations issue their doctrinal decrees under God's special guidance; and we have occupied ourselves with defending those decrees, not with praising up this or that theologian. They nowhere speak of one Scriptural text rather than another; but denounce Copernicanism generally as "contrary," "repugnant" to Scripture.

And in real truth it is indefinitely easier to show that Copernicanism is *contradictory* to the Scriptures in their *obvious* sense, than to show that it is *reconcilable* with them in *any* sense. We pointed out however in our article of 1865 (pp. 142-3) that there was a precedent of the very highest authority for a Scriptural exposition, even more forced and unobvious than that required for Copernicanism; and this moreover within the strict sphere of dogmatic theology: we refer to the Catholic interpretation of Mark xiii. 32. We fully admit then, that an unobvious exposition of the apparently anti-Copernican texts is possible; and indeed is (as we now know) the true one. We admit that our Blessed Lord, when He looked up to heaven and when He spoke of ascending to the Father, did but accommodate himself to existing physical beliefs. We admit that the Holy Ghost for wise purposes—as for instance that He might not violently interfere with the healthily slow progress of physical science—permitted the sacred writers to express themselves in language, which was literally true as understood by *them*, but was figurative in the highest degree as intended by *Him*. We only say, in accordance with our first proposition, that such an exposition of Scripture would be grossly irreverent, unchristian, and uncatholic, unless there were some overwhelming scientific probability to render it legitimate.

This then brings us to our third proposition. Copernicanism, we say, in Galileo's time, not only had no overwhelming scientific probability in its favour, but (to use a colloquialism) had no leg to stand on, in presence of such Scriptural evidence as we have adduced.

Our opponent speaks however in several parts of his pamphlet—see e.g. p. 46—as though the present writer had expressed some opinion of his own, on this part of the question; which certainly would have been absurd enough. But our words were unmistakable to the opposite effect:—"It is more straightforward and satisfactory to state at once, that the present writer has no knowledge of physical science,

which can warrant him in expressing any opinion of his own on such matters. He has taken, however, the best means in his power to insure scientific accuracy" (p. 145, note). We none the less however very confidently dissent from the opinion (p. 46), that M. Desdoutis's argument, grounded on the gravity of the air, was "a pretty piece of confusion": because it is no disparagement whatever of our opponent's scientific attainments to say, that he is an indefinitely less trustworthy judge of such matters, than was the "Protestant gentleman of great scientific eminence" to whom, as we stated (p. 151, note), we *submitted* that argument. But it is a very fortunate circumstance on the present occasion, that we are not necessitated to pursue further the very unsatisfactory course of consulting scientific experts. And we are entirely exempt from this necessity, because we can desire nothing better for our argument, than our opponent's own appreciation of Galileo's scientific position.

Both heliocentrism and geocentrism, he says (p. 47), "could account for the celestial phenomena—the *latter nearly or quite as well as the former*; but the former was by far the simpler explanation." "It was known," he further adds, "that the planets were globular opaque bodies, like the earth deriving light from the sun, and that they moved round the sun; and *it seemed to be* the law that the smaller body should revolve round the larger."

We may fairly take the words "nearly or," in the first sentence, as pleonastic; and we understand accordingly our opponent to admit, that in Galileo's time no cosmical phenomena were known, for which geocentrism could not thoroughly account. On the other hand, to our mind the argument from *analogy* is of the vaguest and most shadowy kind; such as is next to worthless, when tried by those more rigid and true scientific tests which Mr. Mill has been instrumental in recommending.\* And as to the argument from

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\* "An argument from analogy, is an inference that what is true in a certain case is true in a case known to be somewhat similar, but not known to be exactly parallel, that is, to be similar in all the material circumstances. An object has the property B: another object is not known to have that property, but resembles the first in a property A, not known to be connected with B; and the conclusion to which the analogy points, is that this object has the property B also. As, for example, that the planets are inhabited, because the earth is so. The planets resemble the earth in describing elliptical orbits round the sun, in being attracted by it and by one another, in being nearly spherical, revolving on their axes, &c.; but it is not known that any of these properties, or all of them together, are the conditions on which the possession of inhabitants is dependent, or are even marks of those conditions. Nevertheless so long as we do not know what the conditions are, they *may*

simplicity, we can only express surprise that our opponent has condescended to allege it. Considering the undeniable fact, that, as Mr. Mill expresses it, "nature in many of its operations works by means of a *complexity so extreme* as to be almost an insuperable obstacle to our investigations,"\* it does amaze us that an able writer should gravely adduce the complexity of geocentricism as a reason against its truth. Finally, we pointed out in our article of 1865 (p. 152),—and our opponent has not attempted to gainsay our statement,—that the one argument, on which Galileo laid incomparably his greatest stress, was vehemently controverted by the great body of scientific men, and is now universally admitted to have been the merest delusion.

Such then was the scientific position of Copernicanism during Galileo's life. As regards himself, we can only call the theory a random scientific conjecture; for his principal argument was a sham, and he was only right by a happy accident. But what we would say applies to *all* contemporary Copernicans, and not merely to Galileo. Considering the intimate connection of geocentricism with (one may say) the whole length and breadth of the Sacred Writings, no one who duly reverences the latter would dream of doubting its truth, until there were at least some appearance of its conflicting with known phenomena. But in Galileo's time, on our opponent's own showing, there was no appearance whatever of its conflicting with known phenomena: its opponents were reduced to arbitrary theories about "analogy" and "simplicity." The doctrine therefore, legitimately deducible from all facts then cognisable, was that very doctrine which the Congregations declared; viz., that Copernicanism was contrary to Scripture and consequently heretical. Our opponent speaks forsooth (p. 17) of a certain argument "*compelling*" us to admit that Paul V. sanctioned these declarations. Why our very point has been throughout, that the Pontiff would have failed grievously of his duty, if he had *not* opposed vigorously the heretically-spirited Copernican movement.

And here we are obliged reluctantly to express dissent from

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be connected by some law of nature with those common properties; and to the extent of that possibility the planets are more likely to be inhabited, than if they did not resemble the earth at all. This non-assignable and *generally small increase of probability*, beyond what would otherwise exist, is all the evidence which a conclusion can derive from analogy."—*Mill's Logic*, vol. ii. pp. 366-7. Seventh Edition.

\* We quoted this sentence in our former article; and our opponent cites it in p. 43, without attempting to invalidate its force.

one opinion of M. de l'Epinois, who on the whole has done such signal service in the matter of Galileo. According to his view,\* the Congregations spoke too absolutely: they ought only to have said, "contrary to Scripture in the present state of science." To us on the contrary it appears, that by so qualifying their judgment they would have fallen short of their duty. So soon as any one phenomenon had been observed, of which it was not easy to see how geocentricism could explain it—then, and not till then, should the ecclesiastical tribunals have officially admitted the possibility of that theory being mistaken.

We speak of *official declaration*; for the one *recognised principle* throughout was most indubitably that which we have set forth and defended. No doubt all theologians of the period were most strongly of opinion—and on what they had every reason to think abundantly sufficient grounds—that no scientific proof of Copernicanism would ever be forthcoming: but they were almost equally unanimous, that there was no absolute certainty that such might not be discovered; and that on that supposition the interpretation of Scripture must be changed into accordance with the new theory. If there be one theologian more than another who may reasonably be accounted exponent of the official view, it is most certainly Bellarmine; and Bellarmine (as we mentioned in our last number) distinctly admitted the possibility of some future Copernican demonstration, which should legitimise a change in interpreting Scripture. F. Grassi, S. J., another distinguished opponent of Galileo, expressed the same opinion. Long afterwards F. Faure called on Copernicans "to bring forward, if they can, any . . . astronomical observations which . . . are not explained by either hypothesis." Now F. Faure was so zealous a geocentrist, as to place Copernicanism on the same theological level with Unitarianism;† and yet even *he* implies, that he would withdraw his theological objections in the face of one crucial experiment. Lastly, the well-known theologian Amort lays down this as having been throughout the Church's recognised view; though he supposes, by a mistake of fact, that Urban VIII. had actually gone the length of *excommunicating* those who in his days professed heliocentricism. These are Amort's words:—

"Therefore it was that Urban VIII. prohibited under pain of excommunication the Copernican system, as temerarious and opposed to Scripture

\* "Revue des Sciences Historiques," livraison v. p. 144.

† Notes on S. Augustine's "Enchiridion." Passaglia's edition, p. 49.

in its proper sense, until some demonstration be adduced by Copernicans which compels Catholics to recede, on a matter of such grave importance, from the proper sense of Scripture, consecrated as it is by the judgment of the whole world. For so is the intention of the Pontifical Bull explained by F. Fabri, S. J., Canon Penitentiary of S. Peter's at Rome, where he replies in these words to a certain Copernican: 'It has been asked more than once of your leaders whether they possessed any demonstration of the earth's movement? They have never dared to assert this. There is no reason therefore why the Church should not understand those texts in their literal sense and declare that they should be so understood, so long as there is no demonstration to prove the contrary. But if any such demonstration hereafter be devised by your party (which I do not at all expect), in that case the Church will not at all hesitate to set forth that those texts are to be understood in a non-natural (improprio) and figurative sense: according to the words of the poet, "terraeque urbesque recedunt"'. This reply was inserted in the year 1665 in the acts of the English Royal Society.\*

Amort's own work appeared in 1734; and we do not see how there can be any fair doubt, that such as he describes was the Church's recognized principle of action from first to last.

One unmistakable indication of this principle was, that she fully permitted the publication of every discoverable scientific objection to geocentrism. In our article of 1865 we described the position of a Catholic astronomer under the Congregational Decree; and we here reproduce the description, with one or two insignificant additions and corrections. "He was not permitted to express himself, as though"—taking into account the declarations of Scripture—"Copernicanism were an *actually* probable hypothesis. But he was permitted and encouraged to use the hypothesis most actively, as his clue to fresh scientific results; and to treat with most ample justice the scientific arguments for and against. He was fully permitted to maintain that Copernicanism was *scientifically* probable in the highest possible degree;" and to show that there were phenomena, readily explicable on that theory, for which no geocentrist had been able to account. "But he was not (we imagine) at liberty to say in so many words, that it had received absolute and irrefragable scientific proof." His liberty then, as a man of science, was hardly curtailed in the slightest degree; for to attempt any discussion on the *absolute*

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\* Quoted by Bouix de Papâ, vol. ii. p. 465. We had not met with this passage when we wrote our article of 1865; and we are much struck with the coincidence between Amort's or Fabri's statement of the case and our own. We had spoken of the one *obvious* and the one *traditional* sense of Scripture; and so Fabri refers to the *proper* sense of Scripture, and that consecrated by the *judgment of the whole world*.

truth of Copernicanism, was ipso facto to play the theologian.\*

Our opponent, however (p. 53), thinks that we have stated the case too strongly. He admits indeed that a scientific man was at full liberty to "point out the weakness of this or that anti-Copernican objection;" but maintains that he was *not* permitted "to show that there were facts which nothing but the earth's motion would explain." And as this is an issue of much importance in appreciating the Church's attitude towards Copernicanism, we must by no means pass it over.

It seems to us that there is irrefragable evidence against our opponent on this particular. Bellarmine was undoubtedly the chief theological representative of the view taken by the Congregations; and he declared (as is well known) that if a scientific proof of Copernicanism were discovered, Scripture should then be Copernically interpreted. He said this moreover in 1620; viz., at a time when, according to our opponent, the Congregations had forbidden that any scientific proof of Copernicanism should be *adduced*. Then F. Fabri, as has just been seen, asks the Copernicans, and says they have frequently been asked, whether they possess any demonstration of their theory: but it is simply impossible he could so have spoken, if—as our opponent thinks—it was a notorious fact that astronomers were not suffered to publish any such demonstration.

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\* We say in the text that to discuss the *absolute* truth of Copernicanism is to play the theologian; for it is to debate, whether this or that degree of scientific probability warrants this or that degree of violence to the obvious and traditional sense of this or that Scriptural text. It must be remembered that, even at this day, Copernicanism is not proved in the strict sense of that word. One of the most eminent scientific men in England told the present writer, that he considered the probabilities in favour of Copernicanism to be about ten thousand to one. (We think it was ten thousand; certainly not a *higher* figure.) Well—it is not *axiomatic* that a scientific probability, estimated by contemporary physicists as ten thousand to one, should fix the sense of Scripture: this is a question for theologians and the Church. As we said in our article of 1865 (pp. 171, 172),—"There may be some declaration of Scripture or the Church so peremptory and unmistakable, as to outbalance any amount of scientific likelihood; and to engender absolute certainty, that of such proposition there will never be discovered a scientific proof. We are far from meaning that such a case has ever existed, but it is imaginable in the abstract." Suppose, e.g., contemporary men of science estimated the probability as ten thousand to one, against mankind being descended from a single pair: the Catholic would nevertheless hold with the certainty of divine faith that men are so descended, and that there will never be *demonstration* to the contrary.

The present writer, when he published his article of 1865, was not aware that no strict scientific proof of heliocentricism has yet been given; but was under the contrary impression. We have in one or two places altered accordingly the quotations from that earlier article.



Then consider what was in fact permitted. Even Copernicus's book was allowed with a few verbal changes; but there is another instance still more remarkable. Was *Newton* an obscure or feeble advocate of the Copernican cause? On the contrary it was precisely from him, according to our opponent (p. 3), that "Rome has learned to recognise" heliocentric "opinions as true and sound." Yet two religious were suffered to publish his whole treatment of the question; with no other reserve, than that of explaining that they did not themselves intend to treat heliocentrism except as an hypothesis. We gave their words in our article of 1865, p. 175. Before such facts as these, the arbitrary dictum of the two private theologians cited by our opponent shrinks into utter insignificance. We do not see how it is possible to doubt, that scientific men were allowed to do their very utmost for Copernicanism,—so long as they explained clearly that they confined themselves to its *scientific* probability, and left to theology and the Church all concern with its *absolute* truth or falsehood.

Our opponent indeed (p. 54) cites Galileo's trial of 1633 as corroborating his view. But it is plain on the surface of facts, that Galileo was always arguing for the *absolute* truth of his theory; and that he utterly set at nought Bellarmine's exhortation, that he "would keep outside the sacristy." Nor could his offence have been legitimately dealt with in 1633 as less than one of heresy; because he directly contradicted the one obvious and the one traditional sense of Scripture, at a time when (as we have seen) there was no pretext for doubting that this was also the one true sense.

Our opponent (p. 54) protests against our "quietly taking for granted" that the decree of 1633 "was purely personal to Galileo." But nothing can be plainer than that such was the fact, though it is not worth while to spend words on a matter so entirely irrelevant. We are the last to deny that, according to the Munich Brief, geocentrism was at that time the only legitimate belief for Catholics; and we are the last to deny or to be ashamed of the fact, that *any* astronomer of that particular period might have been tried for heresy, who advocated the absolute truth of Copernicanism: and this is all which our opponent desires here to establish. We should add, that one particular of the process had no bearing whatever on any one except Galileo. He had been forbidden, as a personal penalty, to treat Copernicanism in any way whatever, i.e. even as an hypothesis; and he could find no excuse for having indubitably violated *that* command, except by saying that he had really quite forgotten all about it.

And here we will consider one portion of our opponent's

argument, which we ought to have noticed in April, but accidentally omitted. He alleges that the Abjuration, required of Galileo in 1633, describes geocentricism as part of "that which the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Roman Church holds, preaches, and teaches." Well, most certainly this is not said in so many words; and he can only mean therefore that it is implied. We reply, that indubitably it is *not* implied. Both in the Judgment and in the prescribed Abjuration the Cardinals state distinctly, what (according to their view) constitutes the *heresy* of Copernicanism; viz. its opposition to the *Written Word*. That dogma of the Church then, which they treat Copernicanism as contradicting, is not geocentricism, but the Inspiration of Scripture.

Lastly, our opponent objects (p. 38) that "the Decree of 1616 was in full force in 1687;" and that consequently, on our principles, interior assent was due from all Catholics to the geocentric doctrine, at a time when Copernicanism had received an overwhelming increase of scientific probability.\* But Paul V., in sanctioning the Decree of 1616, merely forbade Copernican books: he did not command that interior assent should be given to geocentricism. We pointed this out at the beginning of our article; and we explained, that the interior acceptance of geocentricism, due from contemporary Catholics, was not due from them as an act of obedience to Papal command, but as an act of loyal and reasonable submission to the Church's evident mind. Now, as we have just been saying, from the very beginning of the Galileo controversy it was cognisably and indisputably the Church's mind, that whenever (if ever) Copernicanism should receive what might reasonably be called a scientific demonstration, the relevant texts of Scripture might legitimately be interpreted in a heliocentric sense. And it is simply preposterous to suppose Pius IX. to have claimed, that the doctrinal decree of a Pontifical Congregation should be understood in a different sense, from that which the said Congregation cognisably and indisputably intended. In proportion therefore as scientific proof accumulated, the Church's most loyal children reasonably thought it less and less improbable, that the Church might finally sanction a change of Scriptural interpretation. On this head we will quote a passage from our article of 1865, with some slight alteration of its wording.

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\* Our opponent's words are: "when every one up to the science of the day, knew the decision was false." But no one, even at this moment, *knows* that geocentricism is false; though all astronomers think this in the very highest degree *probable*.

"To simplify our statement," we said, "we will make the grotesque supposition, that one single man of science—an excellent Catholic—lived and pursued scientific studies through the whole period. He has the deepest deference both for the obvious and traditional sense of Scripture, and also for the Decree of 1616; and he enters therefore on his investigation with the fullest expectation,—nay, he considers it almost a matter of course,—that Copernicanism will be sooner or later disproved. Still it is his duty to fix his eye carefully on every vestige of scientific argument, on one side no less than on the other; and he thus finds to his amazement, as years go on, that the scientific presumptions in its favour are rapidly accumulating, while no fresh difficulty is discovered. This circumstance compels him to ask himself, what is the theological weight in the opposite scale. He has well known from the first that the Decree was no infallible pronouncement; and, again, he is either himself aware, or learns from theologians, that there is more than one text in Scripture, which the Church has always understood in some more or less unobvious sense. He also learns from them the Catholic principle, which we have already stated; viz., that the received and traditional sense of Scripture, on scientific or historical matters, is far less authoritative than on matters of faith and morals. Gradually therefore he comes more and more to think, that Copernicanism may very possibly turn out to be true. Yet, however great its scientific likelihood,—while remaining mere likelihood,—he will shrink from forming a decided and confident opinion of its truth, until the Church gives him some sanction for such opinion. It is her office, not his, to determine the sense of Scripture. We fully admit indeed that, supposing there had been an absolute scientific demonstration, there could be no further room for doubt; since that cannot be theologically false, which by a rigorous scientific demonstration is established as true." But then, from Galileo's days to this, no such rigorous demonstration has hitherto been given. Our astronomer then would not venture to hold confidently that Copernicanism is absolutely true, until the Church warranted his confidence by some such sign, as was given in Benedict XIV.'s suspension of the Congregational Decree.

If we have done what we intended in this article, we have shown that, throughout the whole Copernican controversy, the Church acted on one intelligible and consistent principle, and that principle the true one. The one obvious and the one

traditional sense of Scripture—such was the actuating motive of her whole conduct—must not be set aside, except in deference to some tangible rule, the reasonableness of which has been fully established. But no such rule was obtained in behalf of Copernicanism, until an overwhelming scientific probability had been found to exist for a theory, which was *a priori* so incredible to the Scriptural student. Moreover, it was for the Church and for her alone to decide, when scientific probability had reached that point, that this change of interpretation might be lawfully advocated by her disciples. We cannot see how anything done by her retarded the progress of physical science; because the most loyal Catholics had the fullest liberty of exhibiting scientific Copernican arguments in their very strongest light. But even if such a result had ensued, this would be no disparagement to the Church's procedure. It is immeasurably less important that physical science should advance rapidly, than that Scripture should be reverently handled; and gross irreverence would have been encouraged towards the sacred volume, if Galileo's contemporaries had been permitted to advocate as true the Copernican theory.

After two centuries and a half, a similar shock has come on Catholics of the present day; the shock of an apparent conflict in various particulars between Scripture and physical science. In one respect Catholics are now taken at a much greater disadvantage, than were Galileo's contemporaries; because European thought has been in the interval so deplorably decatholicized. Yet they have an inestimable benefit in the experience acquired from the earlier crisis. If they would obtain the true clue for guiding their steps through so bewildering a labyrinth, they will find that clue, in studying the principles which animated the Church throughout the arduous and anxious controversy on the earth's motion.

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After the preceding article had been sent to press, we received F. Franzelin's treatise on Divine Tradition and Scripture; containing a scholion on the Subject and Object of infallibility, which we translate in another part of our number. This scholion contains one or two statements bearing on the Galileo question, which this will be our best place for mentioning. Thus as to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation, F. Franzelin lays down that, though they do not possess infallible *truth*, yet at the time of their promulgation they possess infallible *security*; in such sense, that contemporary

Catholics cannot refuse them interior assent, "without violating the submission due to divinely appointed authority."

We have ourselves often said that, in sanctioning such decrees, the Pope acts as the Church's "gubernator doctrinalis." F. Franzelin's expression is, that the Pope therein exercises "the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision." There are three kinds of assent, he adds, here to be considered: (1) the assent of *immediately divine faith*, due to revealed truths; (2) the assent of *mediately divine faith*, due to non-revealed Catholic verities infallibly defined by the Church; and (3) *religious assent*, due to the doctrinal decrees of a Pontifical Congregation and to other similar pronouncements.

F. Franzelin also quotes a remarkable passage, from the well-known Gassendi, which strikingly illustrates the view taken by those of Galileo's contemporaries who were loyal Catholics, of the authoritative anti-Copernican declarations. We italicise a few words.

"For myself I reverence the decree whereby certain Cardinals are said to have approved the earth's stationariness. For though the Copernicans maintain that those texts of Scripture, which attribute stationariness to the earth and motion to the sun, are to be explained (as they speak) concerning the *appearance* of things and [as said] by way of accommodation to the vulgar understanding and mode of speech,—nevertheless since those texts are explained differently by men whose authority (as is manifest) is so great in the Church, for that reason I stand on their side and do not blush on this occasion *to hold my intellect captive*. Not that on that account *I deem it an article of faith*; for (so far as I know) *that is not asserted by [those Cardinals] themselves*, nor is it *promulgated and received throughout the Church*: but [I submit my view to them] because their judgment should be accounted a presumption [prejudicium] which cannot but be of the greatest moment among the faithful."

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## ART. VII.—THE CASE OF LOUISE LATEAU.

*Macmillan's Magazine*, April, 1871.*Louise Lateau*. Par le Dr. LEFEBVRE. Louvain, 1870.

**M**ACMILLAN is perhaps, next to the "Spectator," remarkable, for combining very decided Protestantism with a care, almost unknown among Protestants, not impatiently to deny patent and proved facts, if they appear to favour Catholics or the Catholic religion. In this number is an article entitled "Louise Lateau : a Biological Study, by George E. Day, M.D., F.R.S." Our readers have probably read accounts of the case which it details, in the Catholic papers. Louise is a peasant girl in an out-of-the-way village of Hainault, in whom the stigmata appeared April 24, 1868, when she was eighteen years of age, and have been, ever since the 17th of July in the same year, accompanied by a state of ecstasy, in which she witnesses the scenes of the Passion of our Divine Lord, but without hearing anything. The state of ecstasy lasts from between eight and nine every Friday morning until about six in the evening, sometimes till after seven, thus lasting between nine and twelve hours. The bleeding of the parts marked with the stigmata begins on Friday morning about one o'clock a.m., and lasts all Friday. As soon as she observed the first symptoms, which showed themselves on the left side and a week later on the feet, she mentioned them in confession to the Parish Priest, who encouraged her and bade her mention the subject to no one. When the bleeding of the hands developed itself, the matter could no longer be concealed, and crowds were attracted to the cottage to see her. The ecclesiastical authorities then felt it their duty to investigate the facts; and they requested Dr. Lefebvre, an eminent physician and Professor of Louvain, to "examine it with the most rigid scrutiny, and apply to it all the aids of modern science." "No better selection," adds Dr. Day (himself evidently a Protestant), "could have been made; for placed during a period of fifteen years at the head of the medical staff of two lunatic asylums, and having during those years regularly lectured on mental diseases, he was specially prepared by his previous duties, as well as by his personal tastes, to investigate a mysterious case of disturbance of the nervous system such as that



now presented to him. His attendance commenced on the 30th of August [1868], and has continued up to the present time." He informs Dr. Day by letter that he saw her on the 13th of January, 1871, and found her condition in all respects unchanged.

Dr. Day's account of Louise Lateau's case is taken, as far as we can see, entirely from a little volume by Dr. Lefebvre, entitled "*Louise Lateau de Bois d'Haine. Sa Vie, ses Extases, ses Stigmates. Etude Médicale, par le Docteur F. Lefebvre.* Louvain: Ch. Peeters, Editeur. 1870." Dr. Lefebvre says that he was requested to confine himself rigidly to the *medical* consideration of the case; and he refers from time to time to the fact, that a religious examination of it has been going on at the same time. So far as we are informed, nothing has been published on this subject. This, no doubt, leaves us without some information which we would willingly have. So far as we are yet informed, Louise in her past life has been nothing more than a peasant girl, ordinary in all respects, except an exceptionally regular and diligent discharge of all social duties, and of the offices of charity towards her sick neighbours. Her father died when she was a few weeks old, and she, with her mother and two elder sisters, has lived a hard life. Dr. Day gives a short sketch of it:—

Her health is good, and she is free from any scrofulous or other constitutional taint. She has always been accustomed to hard work, and has shown a large amount of physical endurance; and though her understanding is represented as good, she is unemotional and without any imagination—a girl of plain common sense, of a straightforward character, without enthusiasm, and very reserved. Her education is very deficient, although she has added considerably to the elementary knowledge she acquired in five months' attendance at school; she speaks French easily and with some degree of correctness, reads with difficulty, and writes very little and badly. She has on different occasions proved that she can act with great patience, courage, and determination. In the midst of domestic troubles, often for days without sleep, suffering many privations, and liable to the temper-fits of an unreasonable mother, she was constantly cheerful, calm, dutiful, and obliging. When only a child she was always ready to help and attend on the sick, and during the cholera epidemic of 1866 in the village (when she was sixteen) she nursed many of the victims without any aid, staying with them till they died, and assisting to lay them in their coffins and sometimes even to bury them. From her childhood she was remarkably religious, her piety being practical and entirely free from affectation or display; her religion, like her domestic life, being simple, earnest, and straightforward" (p. 490).

She is free from any hereditary morbid tendency on either side.

Dr. Lefebvre's book contains, first, a biography of Louise Lateau, pp. 5 to 21. Next, a statement of the phenomena observed, as to the stigmata, from pp. 23 to 34; as to the ecstasies from pp. 35 to 51. Then a third part on "the reality of the facts—a discussion of the hypothesis of a fraud," from pp. 52 to 74. The fourth part contains a "medical discussion of the facts," and first as to the stigmata. In this he examines, first, all the known diseases which produce or are liable to produce spontaneous bleeding; afterwards, all the recorded cases in which any phenomena of the kind have occurred (setting aside other cases of stigmatisation, which are in fact the very phenomena to be examined), although they are not capable of being classed under the head of any known disease, but belong to what are called in medical works "rare cases," i.e., separate phenomena which as yet are not capable of being reduced to system. In this chapter he examines each of these cases, and shows that the mode in which they came on and their whole phenomena were totally different from those of the case before us. The next chapter, pp. 162 to 259, contains a "Medical Discussion of Ecstasy." In this, again, he examines in the same way both all known diseases which may produce a condition of trance, &c., and also all the recorded cases not as yet capable of being reduced to system; and sums up by showing that none of these cases, under either class, have the least analogy to that of Louise Lateau. A great number of cases and facts bearing more or less on different parts of the subject are thrown into an appendix extending from pp. 263 to 349.

Our space will not allow us to follow the very interesting details given by Dr. Lefebvre, and very honestly translated by Dr. Day. We regret this the less, because any reader may obtain the number containing Dr. Day's essay for a shilling, and Dr. Lefebvre's work for about three times that sum. We should add that Dr. Lefebvre, though his work is professedly medical, has been most careful to make it intelligible to non-professional readers, by explaining and giving the derivation of all terms of medical science he has occasion to use; and also by adding notes in which he explains the healthy action of the arteries, veins, &c., and how they are affected by different diseases. In fact the volume would even on this account (if on no other) be very interesting to any man who, without having received a medical education, feels an interest in such subjects.

The only important fact mentioned by Dr. Lefebvre, so far as we have observed, which is not related by Dr. Day, is the following; and we are glad to add that we do not suppose Dr.

Day to have intentionally omitted it. He probably overlooked it, because it does not come in its natural place in the narrative of facts, but in the medical discussion of trances, &c. The reason of this we take to be, that it was not witnessed by Dr. Lefebvre himself, but is given by him upon the written reports of two eye-witnesses, "one a statesman who ranks amongst the most eminent of our country; the other Mons. D'Herbomez, Bishop of British Columbia." They had been observing the sudden coming on of her ecstasy at a moment when, in obedience to her spiritual directors (who had told her in all ways to resist its approach, by talking of general subjects, by continuing her work, &c.), she was busy at her sewing machine, although the copious bleeding from the hands and head made it very difficult as well as painful to her. "The machine suddenly stood still, her hands were motionless, she was wrapped in ecstasy." After they had watched her for some time, the Parish Priest came in: he had been administering the Sacraments to a sick person, and had with him a silken bag in which were two silver cases; one of these contained the holy oils, the other he supposed to be empty, it had contained the Blessed Sacrament which he had given to the sick person. It had been observed, that when any blest object was presented to Louise when in ecstasy, her custom was to kiss it with great reverence and apparent pleasure, although quite insensible of any other external object.

The Abbé Mortier tried to present the case containing the holy oils to her lips. When it was somewhat above two yards from the chair on which she was sitting, there came over her an extraordinary trembling, great excitement [*élans*], and a transport of joy. She suddenly got up and threw herself on her knees in adoration, her hands clasped, trembling, and stretched towards the sacred vessels; her countenance was truly seraphic. The Abbé Mortier drew back a little, still holding in his hands the sacred vessels. As he slowly retired she followed him. She was half kneeling, half raised up, and leaning forward with her hands clasped. One would have said that she was being drawn as if by a magnet, and that she glided rather than walked. In this way the Abbé Mortier and Mgr. D'Herbomez caused her to go round the room. Whenever they stopped Louise fell on her knees in an attitude of devotion. When again close to her chair, they withdrew the sacred vessels, and she sat down, relapsed into her immovable condition, and the ordinary course of her ecstasies went on as on other Fridays.

M. D'Herbomez thought that some particle of the Blessed Sacrament must have remained in the case in which it had been, unobserved by the Curé, who had not had time to make the usual ablutions. To assure himself he separated the two sacred cases. He then presented to Louise first, the case containing the holy oils. It was brought to her without her moving, and when it touched her lips she gave a sweet smile, as she does when touched by any

blest object. But when the other case was presented, at the distance of more than two yards, the same scene of adoration on her knees and of rapture which has already been described was repeated completely.

On leaving the cottage, after five hours, Mgr. D'Herbomez, accompanied by the three other witnesses, went to the parish church, and there, in their presence, opened the case. It proved, that there was left in the sacred vessel a pretty considerable particle of the consecrated Host. This fact was attested by persons, whose testimony no one will call in question. These scenes went on moreover in the presence of three other witnesses, the mother and the two sisters of Louise (p. 219).

It occurred to M. Lefebvre that it might be imagined by objectors that Louise was a clairvoyante of extraordinary lucidity, and that she had seen through the silk bag the silver cases; the holy oil in one case, and the particle of the Blessed Sacrament in the other. He therefore caused the case to be completely purified, and that an unconsecrated Host should be put into it. It was then placed in the same silk bag. Had she been clairvoyante, she would have seen the Host in the case which she knew to be always used in taking the consecrated Host to the sick, and would naturally have been affected as before. It was presented to her, and "there was neither transport nor act of adoration: she remained insensible and motionless."

Dr. Lefebvre remarks on the extreme inconsistency of which most people are guilty, when they come to judge of facts such as these. With regard to them they are either utterly incredulous, whatever may be the evidence adduced, or at least they demand the most rigorous proof possible; and then they turn suddenly round, and profess to bring forward other cases quite as extraordinary: but these they are really willing to accept on any proof, or indeed, to speak truly, on nothing that can be called proof at all. This inconsistency has been curiously illustrated, in the medical comments on Dr. Day's article. He himself is content to say, "It is evident that, for the present, Louise Lateau must take her place among the 'rare cases'; but the fact that no precisely similar instance has been recorded is no evidence against its authenticity." To his credit he rejects as absurd and impossible the theory of "fraud." He goes on to say that he says nothing of "any of the previously recorded cases of stigmatization about seventy in all—from St. Francis, in whose history I have no faith whatever, to Maria Mörl, the Extatica of Caldarno, who was born in 1812, became marked with the stigmata in 1833, and died only three years ago,—because none of them had been submitted to so rigid a scrutiny as that of the girl who forms the subject of this article;" but he admits, "I am more inclined than I formerly was to admit that some of

these—especially that of Maria Mörl, to which Görres, Lord Shrewsbury, a German physician, and others have borne witness—may have a certain substratum of truth." After all, is not the only reason why he disbelieves the history of St. Francis simply that he has never studied the evidence by which it is proved?

Next let us turn to the "Lancet" of April 22. It says the narrative is nothing extraordinary—

The only thing remarkable about the bleeding is the periodicity of its occurrence. The general law is quite clear, that the direction of attention upon any part or parts of the body may be followed by all manner of nervous and vascular changes; that this attention in order to be effectual must be automatic and complete; and that it most readily becomes so in uneducated persons, who have never gained from mental training the power to control the operations of the mind. Viewed in such a light as this, the history of Louise Lateau is sufficiently simple. A pious and good girl, of a reserved (i. e. introspective and contemplative) temperament, she was familiar with the details of the Passion, from the crucifixes and pictures which form so large a part of the apparatus of Roman Catholicism. The supposed approach of death had served to fix her thoughts upon sacred things, and her unexpected recovery only strengthened and deepened her religious impressions. With these there was in her little world nothing else to contend; and her meditations on the crucifixion, actively excited by the Friday, at last culminated in the flow of blood corresponding to that from the wounded side. Such an effect once produced, and as the narrative shows, brooded over for an entire week in silence, was *naturally enough* (italics ours) followed by the appearance of the other stigmata. The faculty of attention, growing and strengthened by use, soon attained the power of engrossing the whole force of the nervous centres, and the condition of ecstasy became developed. Such cases are *in no way extraordinary*; and they are only unusual, because the events of life so seldom leave any one set of feelings in the necessary predominance. Time and occupation and the various cares and duties of the home circle furnish the best remedies for ecstasy and analogous conditions; and these should not, as a rule, be encouraged, because they are capable of being turned to an evil account by the ignorant, the credulous, and the superstitious.

That is, the state of Louise Lateau is so far from extraordinary, that the real difficulty is to prevent people falling into it. "The general rule is quite clear." Now Dr. Lefebvre examines all the cases, both those of classified diseases and those of "rare cases," recorded in the books, and shows that, except the similar cases of persons having the stigmata, there is not one in the least like that of Louise Lateau, either as to the bleeding or the ecstasy; and more, that there is no one instance, in which a case of hemorrhage, even though quite unlike hers,

has been combined with a case of trance, even though again quite unlike hers. The "Lancet" does not attempt to answer his arguments, or to show that he is in error; all it does is, to assert that the case is nothing unusual or remarkable.

And then comes the "British Medical Journal" of May 6; which, after quoting the remarks of the "Lancet," thus proceeds,—

We believe that this explanation involves a physiological impossibility. It is common enough to see hemorrhage occur beneath the skin; but unless the cuticle be broken or ulcerated, no blood escapes through the skin; and with the ecstatic condition, closely allied as it is to some forms of hysteria, there is associated, as so often happens, a disposition to deceit, and especially to such forms of deceit as may excite the sympathy and surprise of the bystanders. In the ecstatic visions and bleeding skin of this Belgian hysterical woman, we are asked to believe that there is something opposed to or above the ordinary laws of nature. We protest against such a conclusion, as calculated to bring disgrace upon science and discredit upon theology.

That is, what the "Lancet" says is "quite natural" and "nothing extraordinary," the "Journal" says is impossible. But they are both agreed in resolving not to admit any facts, however clearly proved, which may look as if Almighty God really interferes with the events of the world. One avoids this, by saying that what is described is nothing out of the way, though without attempting to answer the medical arguments of Dr. Lefebvre, which prove that it is quite unexampled; the other says it could not happen naturally, and therefore says "it is fraud," without attempting to show how fraud could remain undetected by the tests he applied to it. What they both really mean is the same. They will not admit, upon any evidence whatever, the existence of any facts, for which they cannot account by the ordinary laws of physical science.

This is an instance of a state of mind painfully forced upon all who are obliged to observe how Protestants in general approach the consideration of any facts which may possibly bear upon the Catholic Church. Very few, indeed, are those who, rather than admit any fact which they only fear may tell in its favour, do not at once discard all the habits of thought upon which they have all their lives prided themselves. Men who delight in weighing evidence and observing exactly how much it really proves, and what it does not prove, at once admit as indisputable facts the wildest speculations, not merely on insufficient evidence, but, in truth, upon no evidence at all, if only they seem likely to explain away any recorded phenomenon the tendency of which they believe to be Catholic. Thus the



scientific writer in the "Lancet," beyond a doubt if he had been calmly considering any mere question of medical science, would have rejected with indignation the statement that the "direction of attention upon any part or parts of the body" could cause periodical bleeding like that of Louise. And yet in this case he assumes it as a first principle, without thinking it necessary to refer at all to the facts proved by M. Lefebvre that (setting aside the cases of *stigmata*, which are the phenomena to be explained), no one case has ever been recorded by any medical witness in any age or any country in which any bleeding analogous to hers, or the manner of its coming on, has taken place at all, by whatever it may have been caused; nor, again, has any one case been recorded in which the spontaneous hemorrhage, sometimes caused by certain rare diseases (utterly unlike as it is to hers in all other respects), has shown itself either in the parts of the body where alone hers are found (*i.e.*, the hands, feet, and side, all of which are covered by a complete system of skin), or on any other part similar to them. The hemorrhage in her case he shows to have first this characteristic, that it is accompanied by a condition of ecstasy (using the word in its merely medical sense). Now science knows of hemorrhage and of ecstasies, but there is no one recorded instance in which the two have ever been connected. Next, her hemorrhages have three characteristics: they are, (1) spontaneous, (2) periodical, (3) on certain particular parts of the body only. Now, he says, if I should require that any case put forward as parallel to hers, should show hemorrhage and ecstasy connected in the same patient; or, again, if even waiving this, I should require that the case selected should present these three characteristics, I might cut short my work at the beginning, for no one pretends there has ever been any one such case. The cases then which he examines are those in which there appears, at first sight, some analogy to some one of the characteristics he has already mentioned; and he shows that in each such case even that analogy totally fails.

Of course we do great injustice to the doctor's argument in thus compressing into a few words a medical treatise which occupies many pages of closely-condensed statements and arguments. But we have said enough to show that if the view of the subject taken by the writer in the "Lancet" had been merely medical and scientific, he would have felt bound to show some error in Dr. Lefebvre's statements or argument before he ventured to lay it aside. But his view of the case was not medical, but purely theological. And, therefore, he meets all the exact and detailed medical statements of the

Belgian physician by a general, vague, sweeping assertion, that "attention directed upon any particular part or parts of the body may be followed by *all manner* of nervous and vascular changes." That is, that rather than admit the facts stated, he departs wholly from science, from scientific terms, and from the scientific habit of mind, and has recourse to mere generalities.

So the other medical journal. Dr. Lefebvre shows in detail that no application known to science would produce the phenomena seen in Louise; that even if there were any which would produce them, she could not possibly have either known of their existence, or, without certain detection, either procured or applied them; and, lastly, that means were adopted which made it simply impossible that she should have practised any imposture, even if she had the means of doing so. The "British Medical Journal" does not even attempt to answer any of these facts or arguments, but contents itself with declaring that the explanation of the whole is "deceit."

We say nothing of the religious habit of mind which all this betrays. Our object is to note that nothing could be more contradictory to every principle of modern science. The first rule of science is to examine and ascertain with all care every fact and phenomenon, without troubling oneself with asking how they are they to be explained. If they cannot be explained by any known principle, they must, none the less, be examined, tested, observed with all possible accuracy, and recorded with minute exactness. Theory will come afterwards, in its turn, but to ascertain facts is the first object of science. Yet here are men professedly merely scientific, who read the description and analysis of the facts given in a purely scientific tone by Dr. Lefebvre. He draws no conclusions, whether religious or otherwise. He merely states the phenomena observed, and shows by a careful examination that medical books record nothing analogous to them. But they reject the whole without examination. And why? Most evidently because they fear that if they admit the facts they may be forced to admit an unwelcome religious conclusion from them. That is, they throw away all their own scientific principles lest if they retained them they should be found to admit what they do not like.

Protestant writers, we observe, commonly take for granted that ecstasies and visions, if they have to do with religious objects, are accepted as a matter of course by the Catholic Church as proofs of sanctity. M. Alfred Maury, a member of the French Institute, says (in a passage quoted by M. Lefebvre): "Theologians have regarded ecstasies as one of the

most signal favours ever accorded by the Creator to the creature ; and thus Rome has ranked among the Saints most of those who have experienced them." Our author says :—

Theologians in treating of the Divine ecstasy draw a distinction between an ecstasy of the understanding and an ecstasy of the will. In the former the soul is so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the *true* and the *beautiful*, that she remains as it were suspended in it, and wrapt out of the empire of the external senses. The ecstasy of the will is produced when the soul, drawn by the attractions of an object which appears to it to be good, is carried away out of itself to unite itself to that object.

It would be an error to imagine with M. Maury that the Church considers an ecstasy to be always a miracle, even when its object is God or some holy thing. Theologians say that God can give to a soul special graces to elevate it to contemplation or to the love of supernatural things. This contemplation and this love dispose it to the state of ecstasy ; and the ecstasy, if produced, is a natural effect of a supernatural cause. There is active co-operation on the part of the subject. This ecstasy is not considered a miracle. In a process of canonization it is admitted only as a sign of sanctity. The Church considers as a miracle (of the third order) the ecstasy in which the soul is suddenly *ravished* without previous meditation or contemplation, the subject being purely passive.

Theologians moreover distinguish between the natural ecstasy, the Divine ecstasy, and the diabolic ecstasy. (p. 223.)

We give these words as a specimen of the calm and sober spirit in which Dr. Lefebvre always writes in the few cases in which he is obliged to refer at all to the religious bearings of his subject.

We will conclude by saying that the ecclesiastical authorities by whom this remarkable case has been examined have evidently been as cautious as the medical men themselves. We read of their compelling poor Louise to resist by all possible means the access of the ecstasy. This prudence may perhaps make them think it undesirable that any account of the case in its religious aspect should be published, at least during the life of Louise.

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## ART. VIII.—BERKELEY'S LIFE AND WORKS.

*The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne, including many of his writings hitherto unpublished. With Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an Account of his Philosophy.* By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, M.A., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1871.

THE character of Bishop Berkeley is one on which the mind of the scholar loves to dwell. It is full of sweetness and light, of *geist* and of *voûc*, gracious, studious, and good-humoured. Without assigning to him, as Pope did, "every virtue under heaven," he may be well called, in the words of the same poet, "an honest man, the noblest work of God." And apart from the eminent honesty of his character, the qualities of his intellect were rare and original, and especially so in the age and in the country in which he lived. He had genius and yet good-nature. He was not quite sure of the existence of matter, but he never doubted the existence of God. It is a reproach to English literature that more than a century has passed since the death of this great and good man without having added to our libraries a classic edition of his works, and without even the attempt to produce an adequate memoir of his mind and life. Of his philosophy we shall say very little. It was but a wanton liberty to assert, as Hume did, that Berkeley's writings "form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted." On the other hand, we can hardly accept Professor Campbell Fraser's dictum, that "Berkeley's philosophy in its most comprehensive aspect is a philosophy of the causation that is in the universe, rather than a philosophy of the mere material world," as altogether sufficient; but we may surely say that no one can read the Dialogues of Alciphron without being as impressed by their simple and gracious piety as by the subtle force and charm of their style. The style of Berkeley is indeed not the least choice of his gifts. "The simple and transparent beauty of Berkeley's style," says Professor Fraser, "is not less remarkable than the ingenuity of his reasonings. He emerged in provincial Ireland the most elegant writer of the English language for philosophical purposes who had then, or who has since, appeared, at a

time too when Ireland, like Scotland, was in a state of provincial barbarism. The greatest master of nervous English prose then living was no doubt also an Irishman. But Swift had been in England, and was for years in the family of Sir William Temple, who brought English style to perfection, and was accustomed to employ language that is less antiquated at the present day than that of any of his contemporaries. The case of Berkeley is unique." We cannot altogether agree with this criticism. The style may or may not be, as the French say, the man; but it certainly is to a considerable extent characteristic of the country to which the man belongs. The swiftly changing lights and shades, the easy breezy freshness, the picturesque which appears to be a distraction but in reality both illustrates and attracts, the deep natural earnestness of the tone, and the delicate melody of the periods in Berkeley's style, are to our mind essentially Irish, as, on the other hand, there is a fierce intensity of epithet, a downright energy in invective, and a wild exuberance in the quality of his not always too delightful humour, which, even if he had not been born in Dublin, would, we think, have led a keen critic to suspect that Jonathan Swift had, if not Irish blood in his veins, the Irish vein in his genius. Deduct the great Irish writers, Swift, Steele, Berkeley, Goldsmith, Burke, and Francis from the English prose of the last century, and the loss would be great; but in each case it is possible, we think, to demonstrate that the loss would be of qualities essentially characteristic of the Irish mind. Berkeley, too, like Swift, was an Irish patriot, not in the spirit of that fierce avenging indignation against the wrongs of his people which lacerated the heart of the dour Dean, but in the diligent sowing of seeds of thought, some of which have ripened since and some rotted, but all had the object of producing peace and, if possible, prosperity, in what was then, at all events, the most unhappy country on the face of the globe. In summing up his character, we must finally observe that the name of Bishop Berkeley is for ever associated with tar water. Tar water at least was to him an actual and potent reality. His devotion to it gives a ridiculous twist to a character eminently sober and gentle, much as if he had devoted himself to the search for the philosopher's stone. In the "*Siris*," a treatise which is on the whole, perhaps, the most characteristic display of all the qualities of his mind, its philosophy, its poesy, its learning, and its humour, everything nevertheless is touched with tar. The fame of tar water died away soon after Berkeley's death, but it may be submitted that the medical principle which he preached with such a fanatical and empirical zeal is perhaps the medical principle most in the ascendant at the

present day. It is the principle of antiseptic treatment; but in place of tar itself, figures one of its principal constituents, the by no means odorous deodoriser carbolic acid.

George Berkeley was born near Thomastown, in the county Kilkenny, on the 12th of March, 1684. His family claimed to be a branch of the Berkeleys of Stratton. Many Berkeleys had settled in Ireland, chiefly in the contiguous counties of Carlow, Wexford, and Kilkenny, during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I. While George Berkeley was yet in his childhood, Ireland was for the last time the scene of a great war; and its sounds were at least heard in the valley of the Nore, as the Irish army retreated from the Boyne to begin that stubborn struggle which only ended with the capitulation of Limerick in the following year.

In his twelfth year, young Berkeley was entered in the second class, at the school now called the College of Kilkenny, founded by Pierse, Earl of Ormond, in the sixteenth century, but which had been lately rebuilt by the great Duke. The class in which he entered affords a proof—for there were five classes in the school—that he had already received the rudiments of a classical education, probably from some Irish philomath of the hedge. In the same school, and in the immediately preceding generation, Jonathan Swift had been taught. His kindred, too, had settled in Kilkenny. Hence probably arose his great affection for George Berkeley, whom, in after-years, he introduced to his own patron, Lord Berkeley, in the following fashion:—"My Lord, here is a young gentleman of your family. I can assure your lordship it is a much greater honour to you to be related to him than it is to him to be related to you." Lord Berkeley at the time was Master of the Rolls in Ireland and, by a plurality of office almost inconceivable in the present day, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster at the same time. George Berkeley was a Junior Fellow of Trinity College. Scandal alleged that George Berkeley's father, or grandfather, was a natural son of a previous Lord Berkeley, an accident which, if true, would make the form of the introduction not less characteristic of Swift, and certainly not more flattering to the noble lord. But there seem to be really no grounds for the scandal.

Berkeley entered Trinity College in 1699, was admitted scholar in 1702, graduated Bachelor of Arts in 1704, and was elected Fellow in 1707. The salary of a junior fellow was then £10 a year, and the examinations were intended to reach the limits of general knowledge. Berkeley passed with distinction. He was already a celebrity of the University, famous among undergraduates for his genius and acquirements, and also notorious for a quaint and placid eccentricity. Anxious to ascer-



tain what were the exact sensations of strangulation, after having seen a man hanged at Kilmainham, Berkeley got his chum Conterini (the uncle of Oliver Goldsmith) to suspend him by the neck to the ceiling of his room. On a given signal, Conterini was to have cut him down; but owing presumably to the sudden flow of blood to the brain, Berkeley became instantly unconscious. Conterini waited in vain for the signal. At last observing that his friend's appearance was becoming decidedly cadaverous, Conterini cut the rope in a hurry. Berkeley fell to the floor. The shock brought him to his senses; and it is recorded that his first expression on recovering was, "Bless my heart, Conterini, you have rumpled my band." Dublin, and even Trinity College have altered in many ways within the last two centuries; but even now the man who would have the nerve to attempt such an experiment, and take its nearly fatal end so coolly, would not want for such esteem and sympathy as freshmen and sophisters have got to give.

The society of Dublin was not so barbarous in those days as Professor Fraser thinks. The Dublin Society had lately been founded by Mr. Molyneux, member for the University, who gave a remarkable impulse, not by any means adequately recognized in their histories, both to the political and scientific culture of his countrymen. He was an intimate friend of Locke, and to him is probably due the great and indeed inordinate repute in which the writings of Locke have always been held in the Irish University. His "Case of Ireland being bound by Acts of Parliament in England," was the opening of the modern Protestant movement for legislative independence, which achieved its apparent end in 1782, only to perish of its own intolerance and corruption in 1800. Mr. Addison was appointed Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant a year or two after Berkeley was elected Junior Fellow, and many of his best papers in the *Tatler* were written at the Castle. There never was a more popular Chief Secretary. "Come over again when you are at leisure," wrote Swift to him, "and we will raise an army and make you king of Ireland. Can you think so meanly of a kingdom as not to be pleased that every creature in it, who hath one grain of worth, has a veneration for you?" In an analysis of Berkeley's style, it is impossible not to recognize the chaste and neat influence of Addison. He had at least the opportunity of anticipating, almost in the presence of the master, the advice of Johnson,—“Whoever wishes to attain an English style familiar but not coarse, and elegant but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the study of Addison.” Mr. Addison no doubt was to be daily seen in Dame street, walking from the Castle to Parliament. Mr. Addison probably read

sometimes in the only library Dublin then contained, that of the College. Mr. Addison was writing from Dublin for Mr. Steele in the *Tatler*, and Mr. Steele was the son of a Dublin lawyer, who had been Secretary to the Duke of Ormond. Naturally the *Tatler* and *Spectator* would be read in Trinity College with a peculiar and familiar interest. At the same time, Doctor Swift was residing, twenty miles north of Dublin, at his living of Laracor. He was at the time regarded as a high Tory of course, but, above all things, as a staunch Irish Churchman. Dublin did not then afford such quarry as that to which his genius in its loftiest flights could soar; but it was an eagle which, for want of better prey, would swoop at the cock on his dunghill, and even stoop to carrion on occasion. Lord Wharton, then Lord-Lieutenant, was little loved by Swift, and would probably have heard with much more equanimity that a rising was apprehended in Connaught, than that a squib was about to be projected from the parsonage at Laracor. Swift had no great regard or respect for his own university; but, how we know not, he had learned during the years he spent near Dublin to love and esteem George Berkeley. The reputation in which Berkeley was held in England before any of his really great works were published was evidently due to the friendship and the authority of Swift. Referring to the introduction to Lord Berkeley, which preceded the publication of the "Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous," Swift writes in his Journal to Stella, "I went to court to-day on purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one of our Fellows of Trinity College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. Mr. Berkeley is a very ingenious man and a great philosopher, and I have mentioned him to all the ministers, and I have given them some of his writings, and I will favour him as much as I can. This I think I am bound to—in honour and conscience to use all my little credit towards helping forward men of honour and worth in the world."

Berkeley was very fortunate in the time of his advent to London. It was in the spring of the year 1713, when Swift, though he had lately lost an English see by announcing the fact that the Duchess of Somerset had red hair, was nevertheless at the very height of his reputation and influence—the influence of a genius quite capable of attracting admiration, respect, even love, but which rather willed to inspire terror, and which the greatest were not ashamed to dread and propitiate. It was one of those periods of political transformation in which even a mean man, who happens to be an organ of opinion, can by studying opportunity produce extraordinary effects. But Swift was a man to whom all the forms of political thought, from the lowest lampoon to the highest state paper, were equally easy. In his amiable aspects he exercised

a surprising fascination; and it pleased him to exercise it on Berkeley's behalf. So Berkeley was made at home with the statesmen and the poets between whom Swift divided his leisure. He was admitted to write for the *Guardian*; and he wrote against Free Thinkers, in the capacity of a free-thinking Anti-Free-Thinker. His characteristic views of philosophy had been already outlined in the unfinished essay on the "Principles of Human Knowledge," which had been published, but had hardly attracted any attention, three years before. The essays in the *Guardian* gracefully insinuate the same views. But he had already composed the work which was to be the real warrant of his fame, and the publication of this book was no doubt the cause of his visit to London. It is probable that he believed the dry and systematic style of the "Principles" had prevented the due consideration of his philosophy by an age indisposed to serious studies; and no doubt the example of Plato tempted him to attempt the difficult but seductive method of imaginary dialogue. It is certain, at all events, that he had composed the "Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous" before he came to London; and the visit to Lord Berkeley was with a view to solicit his permission to dedicate them to the head of the philosopher's house. The noble lord graciously accepted the dedication, and also introduced his young kinsman to Bishop Atterbury. "Does my cousin answer your Lordship's expectation?" said the peer to the prelate when Berkeley had left the room. Atterbury raised his hands to his head and exclaimed, "So much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels until I saw this gentleman." After all, there is no testimony to Berkeley's character equal to the fact that all this praise by men so gifted and to him so venerable, administered too in such a sudden douche, did not for a moment spoil the homely sweetness and grave simplicity of his character. He was in his thirtieth year, and the fancy might well have seized him that were he to remain in London, a position hardly inferior to Swift's in intellectual influence, and whose sway might, unlike his, maintain its hold on the affections as well as the understandings of men, would gradually form itself for him. Why might not the shady side of Pall Mall and the coffee-room at Will's serve as well for the discussion of the new philosophy as the Palæstra of Taureas or the Porch of the King Archon did for the old? But he does not seem to have ever wished to lead the city life, to dwell between the club and the crowd. The case of Swift, too, had its warning. It is related, and there has been much pathetic, some sarcastic comment on the incident, that after the Dean's death a lock of

Stella's hair was found among his papers, on the envelope of which he had written in the splenetic sadness of his spirit the words, "Only a woman's hair." To George Berkeley, in the May days of 1713, under the shade of tender green leaves in the Park, it is not improbable that he may have uttered the same words in a very different key. It was all because her Grace of Somerset had red hair—born two centuries too soon or two centuries too late to be reckoned a beauty—that he was now not merely to forego the mitre of Hereford, but to be banished to a dingy Deanery in the Liberties of Dublin. It is recorded that the Archbishop of York went, on the occasion of his nomination for Hereford, to the Queen's closet and warned Anne that before she made Dr. Swift a bishop, she ought to be sure he was a Christian. The Queen did not see so much harm in the "Tale of a Tub"; but when the Duchess of Somerset showed her the "Windsor Prophecy," she vowed she would never sign his *congé d'élire*. And so the reign of Jonathan came to an end. For three years he had used and abused in every conceivable way his versatile faculties, his vast capacity, and his unprecedented influence. The haughtiest peers humbled themselves before his dignified disdain. Women were fascinated by the half-mocking, half-tender gleam of his blue eyes. His writings again and again whipped Harley's discordant majority together. One of his pamphlets dissolved a formidable "Cave" (as we have learned to call it), the October Club. Another suddenly reconciled the English people, then in its most bellicose humour, to a not very glorious peace with France. In the journals of the House of Commons there are no documents more remarkable for their weight, precision, and dignity than the "Representation of the State of the Nation" and the subsequent "Address to the Queen." They were both written by the Irish parson, who loved to make ministers run his errands, who knew the secrets of the Cabinet before it met, who patronized those who exercised the patronage of the Crown, who could bend the will of Parliament with his pen, and who made friends for everybody, especially every poor poet or Irishman whom he happened to know, with almost as much zeal and assiduity as he made enemies for himself. No one spoke so well the language proper to Westminster, yet he much preferred to speak the language of Billingsgate. But why, it may even still be asked, why if the locks of that Duchess must be treated in verse, why aggravate the offence by the hardly less heinous imputation that she was privy to the murder of her first husband? Why not rather expatiate on their ruddy radiance, with the same melodious idolatry that Mr. Pope devoted to the lock of Belinda? In that case, Jonathan Swift

might have worn the horse-hair wig, the sleeves of lawn, the apron of silk, the claret-coloured cutaway coat, and all the mysteriously suggestive symbols of English episcopacy. The quarrel of Harley and St. John need not have ripened into the ruin of the Tories. The Irish nation might have been as well content with Wood's copper as they had been a generation before with James the Second's brass. Vanessa might have resigned herself to marry an alderman, and Stella died in a green old age of some commonplace complaint. But it was Swift's doom to return to Ireland; and hence all these tears and all these rows. Berkeley, on the other hand, neither wished to return to Ireland nor to stay in London. At this period of his life a strong desire possessed him to travel in the classic lands, through which Mr. Addison had lately shown the way in an elegant quarto. Swift's friendship secured for him the privilege of being included in the suite of a very remarkable person of quality, for whom, however, Swift himself was perhaps the only man of his age quite fitted to be a travelling companion,—that illustrious and captivating lunatic Lord Peterborough. In his Diary Swift records how one day at dinner at the Lord Treasurer's it was announced that Lord Peterborough had just returned from abroad, and how Harley and Bolingbroke rushed to the door to welcome him. But when he saw Swift he would not even wait to salute the Duke of Ormond, though he too had conquered Spain off-hand, but runs and kisses him before he speaks to any one else. The man of genius with a craze was drawn to his fellow rather than to his peers. But for the craze, Lord Peterborough would probably have been the greatest man in England. Soldiers may still study with advantage his Spanish war; for energy, originality, and dexterity it bears comparison with Napoleon's early campaigns; nor, when his mind was clear, did he give a less wise and weighty opinion on affairs of state than St. John himself. He was gazetted in 1713 Ambassador Extraordinary to Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, on his accession to the crown of Sicily; and he appointed Berkeley to the by no means onerous office of Chaplain to the Embassy. A Queen's Letter to the Provost and Fellows of Trinity College directed them to dispense with the usual statute which forbids a Fellow to be absent for more than sixty-three days in a year, and gave Berkeley "leave to travel and remain abroad during the space of two years for the recovery of his health and his improvement in learning."

In November, 1713, he started for Paris, where he spent a month. "I have some reasons," he says, "for declining to speak of the country or villages that I saw as I came along." The road from Calais, notwithstanding occasional poplars,

probably reminded him of some of the meaner aspects of Irish inland scenery. From Paris he proceeded to Italy, crossing Mont Cenis on New Year's day. "We were carried in open chairs," he writes to his friend Tom Prior, "by men used to scale these rocks and precipices, which in this season are more slippery and dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high, craggy, and steep enough to cause the heart of the most valiant to melt within him." What a vision it would have been to Berkeley of all men, that the Alps should be both tunnelled and scaled by steam-engines and wired for the language of lightning in the course of this century! Lord Peterborough visited Sicily in disguise, leaving his household at Leghorn, whence the Embassy was to proceed in state by sea. "I am here," Berkeley writes to Pope in May, "in quality of chaplain to the Earl of Peterborough, who about three months since left the greatest part of his family in this town. God knows how long we shall stay here." They appear to have stayed there until the Embassy came to an end, which happened on the death of the Queen in August. Then followed the great Hanoverian deluge. Harley and St. John had quarrelled utterly when Swift went to Ireland. He returned and made a vehement effort to reconcile them. It failed. The Queen died, and while their quarrel was at its height both found they were in imminent danger of the block. Peterborough, on the road from Paris to Calais, met Bolingbroke getting out of the way of impeachment, and cut him dead, not indeed because the late Secretary was suspected of being a traitor, but because Peterborough had discovered, while he was absent from England, that he had not been treated with complete confidence in the negotiations preliminary to the Peace of Utrecht. Berkeley, too, made his way but less rapidly back to London; and it would seem to Dublin also—but for a few months only. The passion of travel had fairly possessed him; and the Bishop of Clogher, Dr. Ashe, proposing to him to take charge of his eldest son through the grand tour, in 1715 he started for the Continent with two further years' leave of absence from his college.

At Paris he made the acquaintance, and (so to speak) "was the death" of Malebranche. An anecdote of the time relates that having called on the famous Oratorian, he found him suffering from inflammation of the lungs, but eager to discuss Berkeley's system with him nevertheless. "In the heat of the disputation he raised his voice so high and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity of a man of parts and a Frenchman, that he brought on himself a violent increase of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after." Upon this sad, but (it must be added) not quite certainly authenticated catastrophe,



Berkeley vanishes from his biographer's gaze for nearly two years. Then he reappears in not the least characteristic and perhaps the most picturesque of all possible positions,—on the top of Mount Vesuvius, craning over the crater during an eruption, and evidently as free from fear as if he were only watching the chafing of the sea against Bray Head. No better description, we believe, has ever been written of the phenomena of an eruption, and we may quote part of it at least :—

With much difficulty I reached the top of Mount Vesuvius, in which I saw a vast aperture full of smoke, which hindered the seeing its depth and figure. I heard within that horrid gulf certain odd sounds, which seemed to proceed from the belly of the mountain ; a sort of murmuring, sighing, throbbing, churning, dashing (as it were) of waves, and between whiles a noise, like that of thunder or cannon, which was constantly attended with a clattering like that of tiles falling from the tops of houses on the streets. Sometimes as the wind changed, the smoke grew thinner, discovering a very ruddy flame, and the jaws of the pan or *crater* streaked with red and several shades of yellow. After an hour's stay, the smoke, being moved by the wind, gave us short and partial prospects of the great hollow, in the flat bottom of which I could discern two furnaces almost contiguous : that on the left, seeming about three yards in diameter, glowed with red flame, and threw up red-hot stones with a hideous noise, which as they fell back, caused the fore-mentioned clattering. May 8, in the morning, I ascended to the top of Vesuvius a second time, and found a different face of things. The smoke ascending upright, gave a full prospect of the crater, which, as I could judge, is about a mile in circumference, and an hundred yards deep. A conical mount had been formed since my last visit in the middle of the bottom : this mount, I could see, was made of the stones thrown up, and fallen back again into the crater. In this new hill remained the two mounts or furnace already mentioned : that on our left was in the vertex of the hill which it had formed round it, and raged more violently than before, throwing up every three or four minutes, with a dreadful bellowing, a vast number of red-hot stones, sometimes in appearance above a thousand and at least three thousand feet higher than my head as I stood upon the brink : but, there being little or no wind, they fell back perpendicularly into the crater, increasing the conical hill. The other mouth to the right was lower in the side of the same new-formed hill. I could discern it to be filled with red-hot liquid matter, like that in a furnace of a glass-house, which raged and wrought as the waves of the sea, causing a short abrupt noise like what may be imagined to proceed from a sea of quicksilver dashing among uneven rocks. This stuff would sometimes spew over and run down the convex side of the conical hill and appearing at first red-hot, it changed colour, and hardened as it cooled, showing the first rudiments of an eruption, or, if I may say so, an eruption in miniature. Had the wind driven in our faces we had been in no small danger of stifling by the sulphurous smoke, or being knocked on the head by lumps of molten minerals which we saw had sometimes fallen on the brink of the crater, upon those shots from the gulf at the bottom. But, as the wind

was favourable, I had an opportunity to survey this odd scene for above an hour and a half together, during which it was very observable that all the volleys of smoke, flame, and burning stones came only out of the hole to our left, while the liquid stuff in the other mouth wrought and overflowed as hath been already described.

He spent some time at Rome, and wrote a journal there, but it is somewhat commonplace. In a letter to Pope, a few months later, he gives a charming description of the island of Ischia, which he says is "an epitome of the whole earth, containing within the compass of eighteen miles a wonderful variety of hills, vales, ragged rocks, fruitful plains, and barren mountains all thrown together in a most romantic confusion." After describing the cornfields and vineyards, the chestnut groves and myrtle hedges, the limes and oranges, the streams and fountains, and the magnificent view from old Mons Epomeus, ranging from the promontory of Antium to the Cape of Palinurus, he extols the inhabitants. "The inhabitants of this delicious isle," he says, "as they are without riches and honours, so they are without the vices and follies that attend them; and were they but as much strangers to revenge as they are to avarice and ambition, they might in fact answer the poetical notions of the golden age. But they have got an alloy to their happiness—an ill habit of murdering one another on slight pretences. We had an instance of this the second night after our arrival, a youth of eighteen being shot dead by our door; and yet, by the sole secret of minding our own business, we found a means of living securely for three or four months among this dangerous people." This sentence is, we are afraid, decidedly Irish. An Englishman, who had had a lad shot dead at his door the day after he arrived in a strange island, would probably take himself off to some other island without delay, and would hardly hesitate to form a very strong *primâ facie* prejudice against the character of the inhabitants. But Berkeley was a philosopher, and, moreover, he was born in very nearly the latitude of Tipperary. Accordingly, he attended to his own affairs, and left the Ischians to indulge that one unfortunate ill habit of theirs, the sole streak of alloy in the perfect metal of their character. After this letter to Pope we lose his track again. It is known that he explored Sicily on foot, and probably found its brigands no worse than the contemporary rapparees of his native island. It was reported at Dublin that he had even ventured so far as Cairo. The College was obliged again and again to renew his term of absence. He spent in all seven years thus wandering about the Old World, and returned to England in the year 1720.

When he arrived in London he found the city in the agony of the earliest and the vastest of financial panics. The South Sea Company had collapsed. Hundreds of private fortunes were swallowed in the gulf. The credit of the whole kingdom appeared to be imperilled. Berkeley believed that the ruin of Great Britain was imminent, and wrote an essay towards preventing it, which had as great a run as the "Battle of Dorking." "I know it is an old folly," he said, "to make peevish complaints of the times and charge the common failures of human nature on a particular age. One may nevertheless venture to affirm that the present hath brought forth new and portentous villanies not to be paralleled in our own or any other history. We have been long preparing for some great catastrophe. Vice and villany have by degrees grown reputable among us; our infidels pass for fine gentlemen and our venal traitors for men of sense who know the world. We have made a jest of public spirit and cancelled all respect for whatever our laws and religion repute sacred. The old English modesty is quite worn off, and instead of blushing for our crimes, we are ashamed only of piety and virtue. In short, other nations have been wicked, but we are the first who have been wicked on principle. The truth is, our symptoms are so bad that, notwithstanding all the care and vigilance of the legislature, it is to be feared the final period of our State approaches." Professor Fraser is, we think, right in his conjecture that it was in the horror and disgust with which he contemplated and exaggerated to himself the state of society in England—so different from that of the Ischians, for example, with their one solitary peccadillo—that the resolution to attempt a great foundation to diffuse learning and virtue in the New World first took form in his mind. Compare with the sentences we have quoted the fine and famous lines which he wrote on the "Prospect of Planting Art and Learning in America":—

There shall be sung another golden age,  
The rise of empire and of arts,  
The good and great inspiring epic rage,  
The wisest heads and noblest hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay,  
Such as she bred when fresh and young,  
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,  
By future poets shall be sung.

Westward the course of Empire takes its way,  
The four first acts already past,  
A fifth shall close the drama with the day,  
Time's noblest offspring is the last.

Alas, had Berkeley only foreseen the brand-new golden age of shoddy and of greenbacks; the rise of those American arts, of which the manufacture of wooden nutmegs is the finest; the epic rage of Hans Breitmann in celebrating the achievements of his good and great Bummers; the days of Hard Shells, Copperheads, Know Nothings, Miscegenists, and Mormons, he would hardly have felt so happy as to the prospects of Time's last and noblest offspring! But the Yankee was yet in the womb of time. Berkeley applauded the Ischians, but the English revolted, nor did the Irish even altogether content his soul. Shocked by the bursting of that South-Sea bubble, which a New York speculator of genius would in our day regard as a trivial incident, which ought hardly to affect Wall Street for twenty-four hours, his thoughts and hopes turned steadily towards the great new world of the far West.

He returned to Dublin, however, in the summer of 1721; and there were not wanting inducements, if his own ease and distinction were to be considered, why he should be content to remain in Ireland. Lord Burlington introduced him to the Duke of Grafton, then newly appointed Lord-Lieutenant, and he was at once named a Castle chaplain. In his absence, he had been elected Senior Fellow of the University. He was appointed, on his return, Divinity Lecturer and University Preacher. The following year he was made Dean of Dromore; and about the same time appointed Hebrew Lecturer and Senior Proctor of the College. His income cannot at this time have been less than a thousand pounds. A year later occurred the tragic ending of Swift's intimacy with Miss Van Homrigh—the letter to Stella, the Dean's gallop down to Marley, and the scene which slew Vanessa. Berkeley is, as it happens, the sole authority for the fact of Swift's marriage to Stella. If Miss Van Homrigh had been moved to consult him instead of appealing to Stella direct, they might all have been saved some misery. She knew Berkeley so well, and so much esteemed him, that, when she cancelled the will she had made in Swift's favour, she left him half her property,—about four thousand pounds. Vanessa died in May, 1723. A year later, the best deanery in the Irish Establishment became vacant. In the April of 1724 the Duke of Grafton appointed Berkeley Dean of Derry. A moderate prosperity, such as one might suppose exactly suited to his tastes and temperament, thus continued to attend him. At that moment the Dean of Derry might have been reckoned a very fortunate man. He seemed to combine all the advantages of interest and of character. After wandering for seven years wherever his taste or his fancy led him, he returned to receive in swift succession all the rewards

due to assiduous labour and the diligent doing of duty. Every one seemed to be in the conspiracy to help the incorrigible but irresistible vagrant. In three years he had attained the highest honours and emoluments of his University, a Court chaplaincy, two livings, and two deaneries. Had he been the son of the Primate, or the cousin of the Chief Secretary, he could not have fared much better. The age in which it was his unhappiness to live was doubtless a very scandalous age; but we apprehend there must have been more good-nature among men in those days than there is in these. Junior fellows do not get seven years' leave to travel now, and even if they climb the Matterhorn, tramp the Ghauts, and find the Patagonians, but for a propensity or two, the pleasantest people on earth, Mr. Gladstone does not feel moved, immediately on their return, to send to their address a Crown living after a Regius Professorship, and deanery on top of deanery. Such good luck not always comes to so good a man; but good George Berkeley only looked upon what men called his good luck as a temptation of the Evil One. Whether the course of Empire was to wend westward or not, his feet willed to wander anew that way.

Berkeley's scheme of his Western mission was characterized by a grandeur of conception and a generosity of devotion, of which we do not believe there is another example in the history of the Protestant sects. He proposed to occupy the island of Bermuda, and to treat it as a base of operations, itself secluded from the corrupting influences of the great world, out of which to bring all the influences of civility, morality, science, and religion to bear on the new and vast Empire, recruited by the hardiest and most earnest spirits of Europe, which he foresaw was about to arise beyond the Atlantic. What the Irish schools and the Irish missions had been to the barbarous but not indocile inhabitants of France, Italy, and Germany in the fourth and fifth centuries, he and his disciples might hope to prove to the great people whose sway, within a century or two, should spread from ocean to ocean and from the Pole to the Equator. All that Judæa and Greece and Rome, and France and Italy and England, had hived of thought and of knowledge might here be preserved and condensed and transmitted, perhaps amplified and refined, under the influences of an air as clear and sunny as that of Athens, and a liberty as assured as that of Britain, while remote from the passions of party. The site and clime of Bermuda fascinated his imagination. Shakespeare and Waller had embalmed the image of its summer storms, its sun-loved coast, its strand of coral and ambergris, its woods full of fragrance and music and colour, its ocean-tempered air, its fruitful virgin soil. The orange and

lemon, the cocoa-nut, the arrow-root, the plantain had already been planted by nature, the vine and olive would soon be reared by man. But there were homely pleasures, dear to the habits of Berkeley, which he would have pined after on that gorgeous rock. He would have found it hard to get grass enough all the year round to make milk for his tea, and he would have been obliged to eat his mutton an hour or two after it was killed. As it happened, he never saw the island of so much promise. His apostolate of the West was a vision, not a vocation. His design was very noble, very liberal, very large, but, after all, it was a Protestant mission. It depended for its success, not on the grace of God and the zeal of holy poverty, but on the support of statesmen and on stated supplies of money. Still such enthusiasm and such gentleness have a magic charm. When he first went to London to prepare the way, Swift thus introduced him to the Lord-Lieutenant, Lord Carteret.

Your Excellency will be frightened when I tell you all this is but an introduction ; for I am now to mention his errand. He is an absolute philosopher with regard to titles, money, and power ; and for three years past has been struck with the notion of founding a university at Bermudas, by a charter from the Crown. He has seduced several of the hopefulest young clergymen and others here, many of them well provided for, and all in the fairest way for preferment ; but in England his conquests are greater, and I doubt will spread very far this winter. He showed me a little Tract which he designs to publish ; and there your Excellency will see his whole scheme of a life academico-philosophical (I shall make you remember what you were) of a college founded for English scholars and missionaries ; where he most exorbitantly proposes a whole hundred pounds a year for himself, fifty pounds for a fellow, and ten for a student. His heart will break if his deanery be not taken from him and left to your Excellency's disposal ; I discouraged him by the coldness of courts and ministers, who will interpret all this as impossible and a vision ; but nothing will do. And therefore I humbly entreat your Excellency either to use such persuasion as will keep one of the first men in the kingdom for learning and virtue quiet at home, or assist him by your credit to compass his romantic design ; which, however, is very noble and generous, and directly proper for a great person of your excellent education to encourage.

Lord Bathurst invited him to dine with the Scriblerus Club. He related afterwards that "they all agreed to rally Berkeley on his scheme at the Bermudas. Berkeley having listened to all the lively things they had to say, begged to be heard in his turn ; and displayed his plan with such an astonishing and animating force of eloquence and enthusiasm that they were struck dumb, and after some hours rose up all together with



earnestness exclaiming, 'Let us all set out with him immediately.' They were not, perhaps, the companions whom Berkeley would have chosen to edify Puritans or convert Cherokees. But they did what they could do. They commenced a subscription, which rose to five thousand pounds. They helped to get state favour for his design. It is said that a Venetian Abbate, whom he had known abroad, secured to Berkeley the ear of the king. He got a charter in June, 1725. He canvassed the House of Commons so effectually that in May, 1726, they adopted, almost unanimously an address to the Crown "praying such a grant for St. Paul's College in Bermudas, out of the lands of St. Christopher's, as might seem to his Majesty sufficient for the purpose." Sir Robert Walpole promised a grant of £20,000. What is rather more remarkable, he gave a private subscription of £200. In these negotiations Berkeley spent a period of four years—in these negotiations, and also, it must be suspected, in the not less arduous enterprise of making love. He had got his charter in 1725, his Commons' address in 1726, but he did not sail for America until September, 1728. He never visited Derry at all. He visited Dublin, but with such precautions of mystery that one might have supposed he was a Jacobite envoy, a Jesuit provincial, or a crimp for the Irish Brigade. "Now it is of all things my earnest desire" (he writes to his friend Tom Prior), "and for very good reasons, not to have it known that I am in Dublin. Speak not, therefore, one syllable of it to any mortal whatsoever. When I formerly desired you to take a place for me near the town, you gave out that you were looking for a retired lodging for a friend of yours; upon which every one surmised me to be the person. I must beg you not to act in the like manner now. . . . In this affair I consider convenience more than expense, and would of all things (cost what it will) have a proper place in a retired situation, where I may have access to fields and sweet air provided against the moment I arrive. I am inclined to think one may be better concealed in the outermost skirt of the suburbs than in the country or within the town. Wherefore if you cannot be accommodated where I mention [at Ballybough], inquire in some other skirt or remote suburb. A house quite detached in the country I should have no objection to, provided you judge that I shall not be liable to discovery in it." This letter was written in April, 1728; on the 1st of August Berkeley was married to Anne, daughter of the Right Hon. John Forster, sometime Chief Justice of the Irish Court of Common Pleas, and Speaker also of the House of Commons. There can be little doubt, we assume, that she was the cause of those visits to Dublin shrouded in such elaborate secrecy, which appear to have

somewhat retarded the civilization and evangelization of the continent of North America. The mysterious method of Swift in these delicate relations seems to have been studied and improved upon by his brother Dean. It is indeed curious, and, alas, comical, to conceive this truly zealous divine, whose whole soul was set on reclaiming from fanatical extravagance and sordid cupidity the children of the Pilgrim Fathers, and on shedding Gospel light through the dusky masses of the Indian race, suddenly vanishing from the sight of men, disguising himself in some smart suit, ruffles and rapier, flowing peruke, and embroidered vest (we may be sure he did not land at Dunleary in the remarkable hat and solemn habiliments of a Dean), and so arriving at the place adjacent to "fields and sweet air" already provided by Tom Prior. In the character of Berkeley innocence and cunning were finely blended. Even from Tom Prior, the confidant of all his affairs, and the crony of his early affection, the romantic mystery was kept a strict secret. "To-morrow, dear Tom," he writes on the very eve of his sailing from Gravesend, "to-morrow, with God's blessing, I set sail for Rhode Island, with my wife and a friend of hers, my Lady Handcock's daughter, who bears us company. I am married since I saw you to Miss Forster, daughter of the late Chief Justice, whose humour and turn of mind pleases me beyond anything that I know of her whole sex." The marriage had, in fact, already taken place, according to Dr. Stock's memoir, more than a month before—where, it is not recorded, but evidently not in Dublin.

The long winter voyage came to its term. Near the end of January, 1729, Berkeley saw beyond the noble expanse of the Narragansett waters, studded with spacious and verdant isles, the low rolling green hills of Rhode Island, and rounding the long projecting point, sailed into Newport Bay. It was a holiday in the island. The pilot sent a letter from Berkeley to the minister of the Episcopal Church, which was delivered to him in the pulpit. He read it to the congregation, dismissed them with his blessing, and then "Mr. Honeyman with the wardens, vestry, church, and congregation, male and female, repaired immediately to the ferry wharf, where they arrived a little before the Dean, his family, and friends." *The New England Weekly Courier* adds: "He is a gentleman of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and erect aspect. He was ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen, to whom he behaved himself after a very complaisant manner." Here he remained for three years, awaiting the fulfilment of Walpole's promises. Bermuda being his base of operations, he seems to have intended to make Rhode Island what soldiers would call his first decisive

strategical point. He cultivated cordial relations with all men, Quakers, Moravians, Jews, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, sixth and seventh principle Baptists,—they were all there, it seems, and “as many others besides—four different sorts of Anabaptists,” he writes to Tom Prior: and the hues of a tricolor pervaded the complexions of the colony. There were white men, and red men, and black men. In a pleasant country house which he built in a green vale not far from Newport, where an easy stroll brought him to the shore of the Atlantic, and a neighbouring height allured the eye to peer far into the ruggedly undulating lands of Massachusetts, he dwelt,—waiting, not perhaps with the patience of a saint, but rather with the easy tranquillity of a Platonic philosopher, for the signal to go to Bermuda and commence his crusade. The serene and pleasing clime, the homely and verdant scenery, add a constant charm to the most beautiful and popular of his works, “*The Dialogues of Alciphron*,” which were written in this “Eden of America.” So Rhode Island is still called; and the time he spent at Rhode Island seems to have been to Berkeley in some respects a time of Eden. But it came to an abrupt end. In the winter of 1730 Gibson, Bishop of London, having jurisdiction under the Second George over the souls of men in the Western hemisphere generally, and being anxious that the enterprise of converting the American continent to Christianity should be simply on or off, put the question plump to Walpole. “If you put the question to me as a minister,” replied Walpole, “I must and can answer you that the money shall most undoubtedly be paid as soon as suits with public convenience; but if you ask me as a friend whether Dean Berkeley should continue in America, expecting the payment of £20,000, I advise him by all means to return to Europe.”

The twenty thousand pounds intended to enable Berkeley to establish Christianity and civilization in America went quite another way. It formed a fourth of the dowry voted by Parliament in 1733 to the Princess of Orange. Berkeley at Rhode Island heard at last the fatal news with unaffected serenity. He sold off his negroes, conveyed his farm to Yale College to endow three classical scholarships, waited a few months for the birth of his second child, finished “*Alciphron*,” and then set sail from Boston for England. The first page of “*Alciphron*,” which was probably the last written—for the book bears all the marks of long incubation and elaboration, and was almost certainly not composed in the interval between the communication made to him by Bishop Gibson and his arrival in London,—reveals the tranquil spirit with which he bade farewell to the

great vision and vocation, which he had so long associated with the isles of Bermuda. The book begins :—

I flattered myself, Theages, that before this time I might have been able to send you an agreeable account of the success of the affair which brought me into this remote corner of the country. But, instead of this, I should now give you the detail of its miscarriage, if I did not rather choose to entertain you with some amusing incidents, which have helped to make me easy under a circumstance I could neither obviate nor foresee. Events are not in our power ; but it always is to make a good use even of the very worst. And I must needs own, the course and event of this affair gave opportunity for reflections that make me some amends for a great loss of time, pains, and expense. A life of action, which takes its issue from the counsels, passions, and views of other men, if it doth not draw a man to imitate, will at least teach him to observe. And a mind at liberty to reflect on its own observation, if it produce nothing useful to the world, seldom fails of entertainment to itself. For several months past I have enjoyed much liberty and leisure in this distant retreat, far beyond that whirlpool of business, faction, and pleasure which is called *the world*. And a retreat, in itself agreeable, was made much more so by the conversation and good qualities of my host Euphranor, who unites in his own person the philosopher and the farmer, two characters not so inconsistent in nature as by custom they seem to be.

He never even glanced at the goodliness and glory of the Summer Isles. He twice sailed past the place that was to have been to him what Iona was to Columbkille, what Bobbio was to Columbanus, what Monte Cassino was to Benedict, what Clairvaux was to Bernard ; and he did not pause to see whether the soft clear air, the balmy fruitful groves, the crystal wells, and emerald waves, the animating sun and willing earth, were such as he had dreamed and described. Bermuda was to him a dream, and no more than a dream ; the bluff Minister did but whisper a word, and he awoke at once. To imagine such a man as S. Bernard having to deal with such a man as Sir Robert Walpole in regard to such an enterprise as the foundation of a great institute at Bermuda for the conversion of a whole continent is to strain the brain in such a way that it would take much tar-water to allay. The statesmen are the last people whom the Saints consult touching such enterprises ; but Berkeley was not a saint ; he was, as Mr. Pope said, " an honest man "—with a small family, for whom, after all, it was now more and more becoming necessary to provide. He had the luck or the knack of getting preferment in a degree rarely possessed, not to say by saints, but even by honest men in the holy orders of the Church of England. He returned to London, published the "*Dialogues of Alciphron*," and loitered for a

year in the paths that lead to promotion. The Protestants of Derry are such truly good Protestants—the blood of a few Catholic martyrs, shed annually to celebrate the closing of the gates, having doubtless a continuously germinating effect on the quality of their holiness—that they could of course easily afford to dispense with the services of their Dean. He was welcome to go to Bermuda or to Burmah, so far as they were concerned. Their piety could live for ages on bonfires and big drums. Berkeley never took possession of that Deanery, nor yet did he resign it; but he contrived also—and this is to the credit of his ingenuity, even in an age of pluralities and a country whose Government was one vast job—to hold the Deanery of Dromore as well as the Deanery of Derry during all those seven years that he had been brooding over his Bermuda scheme and knocking about Pall Mall and the Atlantic Ocean. He had hardly arrived in London when the Deanery of Down and Connor fell vacant. Down was even a better Deanery than Derry, and accordingly it so fared that the Lord-Lieutenant, the Duke of Dorset, was directed to translate Dean Berkeley from Derry to Down. His Excellency had, however, exercised his patronage before the rescript reached him from London; but he declared (Berkeley writes to Tom Prior, after the “opportunity” referred to had occurred) “that he intended to serve me the first opportunity, though at the same time he desired me to say nothing of it.” Sprats and salmon, deaneries and dioceses have their relations. Berkeley said nothing; or at most he only said something calculated to lead that unsophisticated Irish Protestant Tom Prior, who remembered those mysterious visits to Dublin, and then the marriage only announced from Gravesend, to wonder whether his bosom friend had not perhaps imbibed somewhat of the Jesuit in his long and perilous foreign travels. “That without my intermeddling I may have the offer of somewhat,” Berkeley writes to him on the 15th January, 1733-4, “I am apt to think, which may make me easy in point of situation and income, though I question whether the dignity will much contribute to make me so. Those who imagine, as you write, that I may pick and choose, to be sure think that I have been making my court here all this time, and would never believe (what is most true) that I have not been at the Court,\* or the minister’s, but once these seven years. The care of my

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\* Bishop Stock says that after his return from Rhode Island “the Queen often commanded his attendance to discourse with him on what he had observed worthy of notice in America.” In one of Berkeley’s own subsequent letters he says, “the Queen expressly enjoined the Archbishop of Dublin not to oppose me.”

health and the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever ambition might have come to my share." Three days after he wrote the words, he had kissed the king's hands and was Bishop of Cloyne.

There was one of Berkeley's companions to whom (it may well so seem to us), for the sake of the supernatural and generous devotion with which he had embraced the scheme of the Bermuda College of St. Paul, it pleased God afterwards to give the grace of faith. This was Sir John James, of Bury St. Edmonds, a man of fine learning, and of a singularly noble and elevated nature. He was of the expedition to Rhode Island, and remained in America with Mr. Dalton, another of his companions, for several years after Berkeley's return, not altogether despairing of their enterprise perhaps. Many years thence the news reached Cloyne, apparently at about the same date, that Dalton had married for the third time, and that James was about to join the Church of Rome. The first item of intelligence Berkeley received with an exuberant delight, which, in our invincible ignorance touching what may be considered edifying as an expression of opinion on the part of an Anglican bishop in regard to the marriage of three wives, whether successively or simultaneously, we refrain from characterizing. "When," the Bishop writes, "I expected to have heard you were an exile at Rome or Paris, I am agreeably surprised to hear you are the happiest man in London, married to a young and beautiful nymph. *O ter quaterque beate* in this degenerate age, when so many are afraid to marry once, you dare to do it a third time. May all happiness and success attend your courage. Were I a dictator, there should be a *jus trium uxorum* for those who magnanimously endeavour to repair the late breaches made upon the public by famine, sickness, and wars." He follows up this jubilant epithalamiad with a letter to James, in which, having spoken of his own domestic happiness "with a wife, three sons, and a daughter—of star-like beauty—rejoicing literally under our fig-trees," he dwells on the example of the *ter quaterque beatus* Dalton. "Mr. Dalton," he says, "who, I expected, was abroad with you, is, it seems made happy the third time (*O ter quaterque beate*). I wish you could once [marry to have that natural comfort of children] dare to do what he does so often." But on that grave and gentle nature it had pleased God to lay the kindling touch of a higher grace, and to bless him with a blessing not to be numbered. "I know," wrote Berkeley to him then, "your making the *unum necessarium* your chief business sets you above the world. I heartily beg of God that He would give me the grace to do the same, a heart constantly to pursue the truth, and abide in



it, wherever it is found." He then writes at large on the subject, but in a rather uneasy and commonplace manner. The infallible authority of the Roman Pontiff seems to have been the point at which the conversion of James became decided. Berkeley, after telling him he will find no Popery in the Fathers, urges him to read a book of Lord Falkland's on the subject. "I have not read those writings," he however adds; "but on the reputation of Lord Falkland, venture to commend them to your perusal." And then in a passage which almost indicates that the gleam of the same grace had now and then flitted across his own mind, and had not been roughly rejected, he goes on:—

The years I have lived, the pains I have taken, and the distempers I labour under, make me suspect I have not long to live. And certainly my remnant of life, be it what it will, could be spun out delightfully in the sun and the frescos, among the fountains and grottos, the music, the antiquities, the fine arts and buildings of Rome, if I could once recommend myself to her religion. But I trust in God those . . . things shall never bribe my judgment. Dress therefore your batteries against my reason; attack me by the dry light . . . assign me some good reason why I should not use my reason, but submit at once to His Holiness's will and pleasure. Though you are conqueror, I shall be a gainer. In the work of truth I am ready to hear and canvass with best of . . . skill, whatever you shall be so good as to offer.

He adds, "My wife sends her compliments, but knows nothing of the subject of our correspondence. If she did, I doubt it would make her think better of the Church of Rome, in which she liked some things when she was in France." It does not seem that there was any further correspondence between the Bishop and Sir John James. The grace of faith was to that generous soul only the precursor of the Angel of Death. In the autumn of the same year, he was called to be *Beatus*, where it is written that they marry not nor are given in marriage.

Berkeley was Bishop of Cloyne for nearly twenty years, during which political economy and medicine exercised his mind more than philosophy, although it is to this period that we owe the "*Siris*," a book that may be regarded as his *Summa*. The ultimate residuum of his sublime American project, the one consolation which from so many years of visions and voyages he carried away with him to ponder upon under the ancient shadow of the Round Tower of Cloyne, was the prophylactic, tonic, alterative, curative, and restorative virtue of tar. While at Rhode Island he had visited a camp of the Narragansett Indians, and from some great Sachem of the red men he had learned that there was but one medicine in their pharmacopeia, but that that medicine was a panacea for all maladies, from small-

pox to delirium tremens, and that it was very simply made by steeping a quart of tar in a quart of water, and drinking of the infusion. Berkeley's health became unsettled upon his return to England, and after the manner of men who know a good deal, think a great deal, and are not over-occupied, he constructed a few theories as to the nature of his maladies. He had had gout, that was certain, and then gout complicated with colic; and for some time he seems to have been uncertain whether the gout was the inspiring cause of the colic, or the colic was the germinal source of the gout. Calculus for a while received all the attention and consideration it so well deserves. "I for a long time," he writes to Sir John James, "suspected my colic to be an effect thereof." But a new light dawned upon him in the course of the year 1741; and in the comforting conviction that he had at last reached the truth, he seems to have thenceforward abided. "Of late," he tells James, "I am satisfied that it is a scorbutic colic, and that my original disease is the scurvy." But whether for scurvy or gout, calculus or colic, there was one remedy, and only one—tar-water—the aperient, astringent, solvent, febrifuge, anodyne, cardiac, deobstruent, diaphoretic, anthelmintic, anti-spasmodic, anti-scorbutic, which contained in itself all the virtues of blue pill, laudanum, tartar emetic, asafœtida, Jesuit's bark, and Turkey rhubarb. If there was disease in the neighbourhood, it was good to drink tar-water to prevent infection. If there was none, it was at least a more wholesome drink than wine, or than beer, or even than water which had not enjoyed the advantage of being impregnated with that ever-exquisite aroma. It was good to take it for all sorts of maladies in all their several stages—good for teething infants, for sea-sickness, for the plague, for fits. It had been known to dispel a pleurisy and to expel a peripneumony. It was a famous cure for the dysentery. It had been observed to drive a cruel colic into the extremities, where that malady at once assumed the comparatively innocent and playful character of gout. In still more severe cases, possibly in hydrophobia or lock-jaw, it would be well to mix tar and honey into a sort of conserve or electuary, and to take it by the tea-spoonful. Pounded resin, which, after all, is only crystallized tar, had also been observed to exhibit a rare inner energy in connection with sweet milk. The difficulty that first occurs to the reader, who gravely considers these remedies with their list of carefully-vouched cures, is the simple question how the dose was swallowed. Who in this degenerate age, were he in the keen agony of tic, or the doleful dumps of bile, or the shrieking stage of gout, could be tempted to the deglutition of a tea-spoonful of tar, or a thimble-

ful of pounded resin, or even to drink a quart of tar-water in the course of twenty-four hours? Chemistry first debased, homœopathy has since corrupted us. We no longer understand the penitential qualities of physic. In Berkeley's days a medicine was accounted of little or no use if it was not nauseous. Black draught is the last feeble link that binds us to the age when our great-grandmothers took their morning gulp of pitch and licked their rosy lips. Tar surpassed the electuary of Mithridates, and tar-water the elixir of Hoffmann. But was tar only and merely a drug? Was it not rather a vital principle, nay the very vital principle itself? Merely materially considered, tar-water blended principles supposed to be sharply discordant. It was both a soap and a vinegar. Then tar itself, being the highest form of vegetable juice, might perhaps be more exactly described as inspissated sunshine. So the "Siris" argues link by link. But what in reality is that fine subtle spirit peculiar to all vegetables, so as to be remarkable even in the commonplace character of cabbage and not altogether absent in the dull and vapid turnip? After all, it is something absorbed from the air, that common seminary of all vivifying principles. And what is that something? Is there not within the air itself a finer air, the pure ether, or spirit of the universe which operates in everything? Is the world an animal? and is its soul fire? Before now, men have worshipped fire, and Aristotle thought the heat of a living body to be somewhat divine and celestial, and Plato supposed that the tunicle of the soul was composed of pure ether. Is flame then life and life flame? Are both, if they be both and not one, only expressions of brimstone? Is sulphur, as Mr. Homberg thinks, the one universal active chemic principle? Not quite absolutely perhaps. Let something at least be said for tar—"whereas the luminous spirit lodged and determined in the native balsam of pines and firs is of a nature so mild and benign, so proportioned to the human constitution as to warm without heating, to cheer but not inebriate,\* and to produce a calm and steady joy like the effect of good news, without that sinking of spirits which is a subsequent effect of all fermented cordials." Tar-water rightly considered is in truth the vehicle of a certain "benign and comfortable spirit." It assists the *vis vite*—it subdues the *fomes morbi*. It elicits things already "pre-existent, latent, and dormant in the soul," as Plato would say; and once in the company of Plato, even tar-water is for a time forgotten. *O Socrates, et Socratici viri! nunquam vobis*

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\* Mr. Cowper stole this phrase, and, adding insult to injury, applied it to the infusion of tea.

*gratiam referam.* So doubtless Berkeley often murmured the words of Cicero, as he paced up and down the lane which he had planted with myrtles in honour of the shade beloved by the sages of old—with myrtles, at the root of each of which however was set a ball of tar, and which grew forthwith "with no more trouble or art than gooseberry-bushes, to the height of seven or eight feet." There, where the tall tower, the most sublime and enduring relic of the Irish arts, served as a not too careful dial of the time, and while he paced towards the mysterious cave which, in the days of the Druids, gave its name to Cloyne, and to the end whereof no man has penetrated, a ghostly train attended his steps—the wise of ancient Athenian days, "who still rule our spirits from their urns," Callicles and Chærophon, Parmenides and Zeno, Theætetus and Crito, and Simmias and Cebes; and the great master who died so calmly the death inflicted of injustice; and the greater he, to whom they all owe their long and far-spread fame, and to whom, as the "Siris" is careful to show, God had even vouchsafed some not altogether vague conception of the awful mystery of the Trinity. Memory, too, brought back the half-real, half-ideal circle of scholars, who on the green hills that overlook the bright broad bay of Narragansett, and the motley throng of the streets of Newport, discussed "the minute philosophy," while preparing to give a form and a soul to the genius of the Empire of the West—Euphranor and Lysicles, and Theages and Aleiphron, and Crito come to life again in Massachusetts. And lo! of the vision and the voyage, only remained the mystery taught by the Red-skin Sachem—the mystery that the one true absolute *arcanum naturæ* is tar.

Berkeley's life at Cloyne was strictly recluse. He only attended one session of Parliament, and only made one speech as a spiritual peer, in support of Lord Granard's committee to inquire into the society of Blasters. The society of Blasters was founded by Peter Lens, of Dublin. Lord Granard's Report relates that "the said Peter Lens professes himself to be a votary of the devil; that he hath offered up prayers to him and foolishly drank to the Devil's health; that he hath at several times uttered the most daring and execrable blasphemies against the sacred name and majesty of God; and often made use of such obscene, blasphemous, and before unheard-of expressions, as the Lords' Committee think they cannot even mention to your lordships, and therefore choose to pass over in silence." Berkeley smote the Blasters with a counter-blast. His "Discourse addressed to Magistrates and Men in authority" is said to have utterly extinguished the new Dublin sect of Devil-worshippers; but the tradition of their

incomparable skill in blasphemy seems, we submit, to have descended by direct inheritance to the Orange Society. The toast of "the pious, glorious, and immortal memory" has many marks of having been composed in a moment of complete obsession by some energetic, voluble, and accomplished Blaster.

The period of Berkeley's residence in Cloyne is perhaps the most melancholy in the whole history of Ireland. A few years before, the Penal Code had been completed by Primate Boulter's Act, depriving the Catholic population of all civil and political franchises whatsoever. The English Privy Council had, about the same time, refused to sanction an Act authorizing the infliction of a nameless penalty on the profession of the Catholic priesthood; but the refusal had not come from any serious disposition to interfere with the persecuting propensities of the Irish Parliament, but was due to the urgent representations of the French Government. The sky was at its darkest, and there was not a sign of the dawn. A whole generation was growing up upon whom the law of the land had imposed, so far as it could, the condition not merely of slaves but of savages, and not merely of savages but of heathens. It was a felony for any Catholic to teach another Catholic how to read and write. It was a felony for a Catholic priest to administer the rites of his religion. The Catholic had no right to hold property of free tenure, to carry arms, to vote, to practise any liberal profession, to belong to any civic corporation, or to serve the Crown in any capacity. He might be deprived of all he possessed by any of his children who chose to apostatize; and the character of his possessions soon came to be rigidly limited, so that he could not farm more than a certain number of acres, or own a horse of a higher value than £5, without being deprived of it by any Protestant who pleased to take it at that price. If a code, constructed upon such principles, had been imposed upon any other country conquered by England, upon India, for example—if it were made penal to belong to the order of Brahmins; if it were the law that the son of a Rajah, or even the son of a Ryot, who had been seen to eat animal food could depose or evict his father; if the temples were closed or confiscated to uses of English worship, the study of the Vedas and Puranas forbidden, caste solemnly abolished, purification made a misdemeanour,—who would wonder if, in one bloody massacre, every vestige of British authority between Cashmere and Travancore were swept away? In Ireland, after the Penal Code was completed, there followed, on the contrary, a period of ghastly tranquillity. The will of Parliament had made it the law of the land, and there it stood, surrounded with all the

solemn appanage of power, projecting its awful shadow over the daily lives of men in all the relations of society. But the Irish Protestant was not the compound of devil and wolf the Irish Parliament, when it made the law, supposed him to be. It was so wicked a law in its conception that it could not get itself steadily and persistently executed by men made in God's image. Nor could the thousands possibly execute it against the millions. The people, against whom its penalties were directed, endured it, ignored it, defied it to do its worst. None but a race which knew its religion was best represented by the Crucifix could have borne such a code for the space of nearly three generations without endeavouring to abolish it in blood on the one hand, or submitting and conforming on the other. The Irish did neither. They emerged at last from the long ordeal with faith intact, with spirit unbroken. They had even learned to love their persecutors, and they willingly gave to such of them as had the common qualities of Irish gentlemen some share of the loving loyalty that had united them so long to their banished and deposed chieftains. But, though the Penal Law could not extinguish the faith, or debase the gallant and generous temper of the Irish nation, its secondary effects sunk deep and spread far, and they are still to be felt and seen. At a time when England and Scotland were laying the foundations of the great industrial and commercial system which, within a period of a little over a century and a half, has increased their resources a hundred-fold, and changed the whole character and constitution of society, the law deliberately condemned the Irish Catholic to a state of ignorance, indolence, and poverty. He could not obtain a safe hold of any sort of solid property; he could acquire no certain guarantee for the enjoyment and investment of the produce of his industry. It was not until the year 1771 that the law was so far relaxed as to allow a Papist to reclaim bog on a lease of sixty-one years. Adam Smith says that in a country which has acquired its full complement of riches, it becomes the fashion to be industrious. "The province of Holland," he says, "seems to be approaching near to this state. It is there unfashionable not to be a man of business. Necessity makes it usual for almost every man to be so, and custom everywhere regulates fashion." If custom regulates fashion, law also enables custom to grow. But the custom and the fashion which were formed by the Penal Code in Ireland were very different indeed from those which Dutch policy produced.

"Do not the corruptions and villanies of men eat your flesh and exhaust your spirits?" said Swift to one of his friends in those days. He sympathized with the Catholics, but no digni-



tary of the Established Church, not even he, dared in those days openly attack the Penal Laws. What Berkeley may have felt in regard to their atrocity, and still more their absurdity, is to be inferred from the fact that he only for one session attended Parliament during the nineteen years of his episcopate. He lived in perfect peace with the inhabitants of his diocese, who were almost to a soul Catholics. He gave liberal, nay, munificent alms. He wore home-spun cloth and even a home-made wig. In times of distress—and he witnessed one fearful famine—he gave soup to the starving and tar-water to the sick. He did not meddle with the faith of the poor, but he once ventured to direct a pamphlet, which has the character of a Pastoral, to the Catholic clergy of Ireland. He urged them to preach the virtue of industry to their people. "Industry," he said, "never fails to reward her votaries. There is no one but can earn a little, and little added to little makes a heap. In this fertile and plentiful island, none can perish of want but the idle and improvident." He urged them to make the best rather than the worst of their situation. True, the laws "damp industry and ambition"—there is "small encouragement to build or plant on another's land with only a temporary interest"—"the hardness of the landlord cramps the industry of the tenant"—and "some of our squires and landlords are vultures with iron bowels"; nevertheless "the want of a spirit of industry is the true cause of our national distress"—"whether it be from the heaviness of the climate or from the Spanish or Scythian blood that flows in their veins, or whatever else may be the cause, there still remains in the inhabitants of this island a remarkable antipathy to labour. You, gentlemen, can alone conquer this innate hereditary sloth. Do you, then, as you love your country, exert yourselves." "Many suspect your religion," he concludes, "to be the cause of that notorious idleness which prevails so generally among the natives of this island, as if the Roman Catholic faith were inconsistent with an honest diligence in a man's calling. But whoever considers the great spirit of industry that reigns in Flanders and France, and even beyond the Alps, must acknowledge this to be a groundless suspicion. In Piedmont and Genoa, in the Milanese and the Venetian state, and indeed throughout all Lombardy, how well is the soil cultivated, and what manufactures of silk, velvet, paper, and other commodities flourish! The King of Sardinia will suffer no idle hands in his territories, no beggar to live by the sweat of another's brow. It has even been made penal at Turin to relieve a strolling beggar. To which I might add that the person whose authority will be of the greatest weight

with you, even the Pope himself, is at this day endeavouring to put new life into the trades and manufactures of his country." The answer to this was only too easy, unhappily, if any Irish priest of that day had felt disposed to controvert a sentiment felt or a word said by one who meant so well as Bishop Berkeley. Pope Benedict XIV. was endeavouring to increase the industry and prosperity of his people, and with good effect; but the Irish occupied a peculiar and indeed a unique situation among the nations of the earth, in this respect, that they lived under the rule of a Parliament all whose exertions were directed to their abasement and impoverishment. How much the national character of the Irish owes to the Spaniards, how much to the Scythians, is a nice ethnological issue, but it may be questioned whether history affords any instance of industry becoming in Adam Smith's words, "the fashion," and the hereditary habit of a race, which, having just emerged from a succession of civil wars, lasting for over a century and a half, finds itself interdicted from the possession of settled property, the acquirement of liberal knowledge, the use of civic rights, and the public profession of its religion. The time has come at last when Bishop Berkeley's political writings may be studied with complete practical advantage by all who have influence over the Irish mind; and a cheap un mutilated edition of them would be a true benefit to his countrymen. The priests of his own day read his Pastoral with openly-expressed thankfulness and wonder.

But how many a patriotic editor, who sounds the praises of Berkeley from time to time without having ever read a line of his writings, would be taken aback by some of the strongest opinions of the "*Querist*"! For example, "Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrong-headed distrust of England?" And again, "Whether it be not delightful to complain? And whether there be not many who had rather utter their complaints than redress their evils?" As also, "Whether my countrymen are not readier at finding excuses than remedies?" Again and again he urges the foundation of a National Bank, asking "Whether National Banks are not found useful in Venice, Holland, and Hamburg? and whether it is not possible to contrive one that may be useful also in Ireland?" Had he but lived in these days, he might have felt tempted to add the query—"Whether, in case a National Bank were founded in Ireland, there be not such a large capacity of mutual malignity among our countrymen that they would cheerfully see the one of themselves, who principally promoted its prosperity, deposed and cried down, even though they should only be damaging their own property all the while?" The "*Querist*," indeed, suggests such questions by the

score; but the "Maxims concerning Irish Patriotism" are indeed for all time. For example:—

A man rages, rails, and raves—I suspect his patriotism.

Gamesters, rakes, bullies, stockjobbers : alas ! what patriots !

He that always blames or always praises is no patriot.

It is impossible a man who is false to his friends and neighbours should be true to the public.

Every knave is a thorough knave, and a thorough knave is a knave throughout.

Where the heart is right, there is true patriotism.

We have no room for any sustained disquisition on the merits and demerits of Berkeley's philosophy. Such an attempt would occupy of itself a long article. We will very briefly only indicate the verdict which we should be disposed to give. Never was a writer on these abstruse subjects more easily to be understood, for his style is a marvel of lucidity and precision. And there are three especial doctrines, which in all philosophical history will be connected with his name.

First there is his repudiation of the then received theory on abstract ideas. The old-world controversy about universals is ever cropping up under fresh shapes. When Berkeley began to write, it was commonly held that the mind can form an "abstract idea"; can conceive a triangle, which is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene; can conceive an animal, which is neither rational nor irrational; can conceive a colour, which is neither white, black, nor intermediate. This was Locke's express doctrine. Berkeley certainly did great service by finally exploding it.

Secondly, there is his theory on vision, to which we have referred in an earlier article. Whether or no his conclusions are likely to find ultimate acceptance in the precise shape he gave them, at all events he has effected an important philosophical progress by his speculations on the theme.

Lastly comes his peculiar theory about *matter*, which has led Hume and others to hail him as the very apostle of scepticism. It seems to us, that his general conclusion is, on Locke's principles, simply irresistible; and we must further confess, that his own most sincere effort to harmonize his view with his strong religious convictions is about the poorest piece of philosophical argument to be found in his writings. The fault really lay with the principles which he took for granted. It is sometimes imagined by non-Catholics, that the scholastic philosophy is in its foundation identical with Locke's; but this is a serious mistake. We cannot express the distinction more clearly, than in the words of a very able unpublished Catholic essay. "The

intellect," says the writer, according to S. Thomas, "reads by its own native light characters in the information of the senses, which they are powerless to perceive; just as the man of education perceives in the sentences read to him by a child all which they signify." When the senses perceive a group of material phenomena, the intellect cognises, not only a substance which is the substratum of those phenomena, but also externality and space. This is not the place of course for vindicating this doctrine; we are only explaining *where*, according to our view of the matter, lay Berkeley's philosophical mistake.

Nevertheless his philosophical works are full of interest and instruction, nor can any one be really informed in the controversies of the day who has not made them his study. And we should be guilty of gross injustice, if we did not express our sense of the great additional facility given to that study by Professor Fraser's admirable prefaces and notes. He is himself a philosopher of deservedly high reputation; yet he keeps himself entirely in the background, and devotes his whole energy to the task of illustrating his author. Seldom indeed in the annals of our literature have the duties of an editor been discharged with more thorough fidelity, conscientious care, generous zeal, and abounding industry.

In 1752, Berkeley, then in the sixty-eighth year of his age, felt again the longing which had animated so many years of his youth, no longer indeed as to a fountain of hope, but rather as towards a haven of rest. In the letter in which he endeavoured to dissuade Sir John James from joining the Church of Rome, he said, "I should like a convent without a vow or perpetual obligation. Doubtless a convent or monastery receiving only grown persons of approved piety, learning, and a contemplative turn would be a great means of improving the Divine Philosophy and brightening up the face of religion in our Church. But I should expect still more success from a number of gentlemen living independently at Oxford, who made divine things their study and proposed to wean themselves from what is called the world. . . . Oh, that you had a farm of a hundred acres near Oxford." As he grew old and feeble and friendless, and felt perhaps what a miserable mockery of the Apostolic ideal the best Bishop of such an establishment as the Irish Church must be, he desired to exchange his see for the headship of an Oxford college—and when he found that could not be managed, to resign the mitre of Cloyne absolutely. But when George the Second heard the unprecedented proposal, he declared that Berkeley should die a Bishop in spite of himself, but that he might live where he pleased. He chose to live—it was in truth to die—at Oxford. In that famous and beautiful vale, adorned

with so many palaces and churches, amid their groves and gardens, and fair streams, the old scholar arrived early in the autumn of 1752, to spend his remaining days. They were to be but a short span. He had been obliged to make the journey from Bristol in a litter. But he edited a volume of "Miscellanies" and prepared a third edition of "Alciphron" within the next few months; and he does not appear to have had any distinct warning of his approaching end. On the evening of Sunday, the 14th of January, 1753, his wife had been reading the 15th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians to their children, while he explained now and then a difficult passage or phrase. He was resting on a couch, and the family waited for the evening meal. By-and-by, his daughter brought him tea. She thought at first that he slept. He was dead. But a few minutes before, and he had read, "Behold, I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump (for the trumpet shall sound) and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."

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#### ART. IX.—THE JUBILEE OF PIUS IX.

*Civiltà Cattolica*, June 17, 1871; Arts. "The Conclave of 1846," "Pius IX. and the Church," "Pius IX. and Civil Society." Florence.

TO those who hold, as we firmly hold, that the Apostolic See is in every way an object of God's very special providence, it cannot but appear a most remarkable event, that at length a second Pontiff has "seen the years of Peter." Such a fact would lead us confidently to anticipate, that the Pontiff in question is among the most remarkable who have ever occupied S. Peter's Chair; and this truth indeed all alike are ready to proclaim. Some thirty years ago, most non-Catholics thought that the Catholic Church had become in the nineteenth century a kind of ancient machine, which proceeds as it were spontaneously in its habitual steady-going course; and that the reigning Pope had no more anxious or critical task, than the performance of routine duties. Such a notion, as applied to any period, was utterly shallow and false; but as

applied to the reign of Pius IX. it would be ludicrous. At this moment externs are as ready to admit as Catholics to declare, that a personage of extraordinary power and resolution has come across the world; and that he will have left behind him when he dies, both on the Church and on society, a most special impress of his personal character.

We cannot be surprised then, that the "*Civiltà*" has devoted no less than three articles, on occasion of his Jubilee, to his character and history. For ourselves, we spoke on this subject at so much length last January in reviewing Mr. Maguire's volume, that little remains to be said on the present occasion. There is one characteristic however of the Holy Father, on which Mr. Maguire's biography did not prominently touch; and on which a few words may be here in place. We refer to that love of dogma and zeal for purity of the Faith, which has been evinced in his whole course of action as the "teacher of Christians."

We know not that any Pope in any age has ever put forth so frequent *ex cathedrâ* definitions as Pius IX. "No single year has passed," says the "*Civiltà*" (p. 670), "in which, with Consistorial Allocutions, and Apostolic Letters in the form of Briefs, and Universal Encyclicals, the voice of this supreme teacher of truth has not been heard, to warn the faithful of" errors and proclaim the relevant verities. Nor have even these been his only *ex cathedrâ* Acts. "Few Popes," proceeds the "*Civiltà*" (p. 678), have "occupied themselves with so much zeal in the canonization of saints and the beatification of servants of God. . . . Under his Pontificate very many of those long, wearying, and most grave processes have been brought to a conclusion; many have been started and are now proceeding with vigour." And the canonization of a saint, as our readers are well aware, is nothing less than an *ex cathedrâ* Act. But three special and (as it were) central instances may be named of his *ex cathedrâ* teaching: (1) his defining the Immaculate Conception; (2) his issuing the Syllabus; (3) his confirming the Vatican Definitions. Each of these instances presents characteristics of its own, on which it may be worth while briefly to dwell; and we will begin with the first-named.

If we consider that body of theology which is presented by the Church's formal definitions—such a body, e. g., as is contained in Denzinger's invaluable manual—we shall find, that on the one hand it is most harmonious in mutual balance and proportion, but on the other hand most irregular in its process of structure. Successive Popes, and the Councils which they have summoned to aid them, were called on to analyse this or that



dogma, not at the precise moment when that analysis would be most serviceable to theological science or again to Catholic devotion, but at that moment when some emerging heresy required express counteraction. The Incarnation, e.g., was defined in the early centuries with a care and precision, immeasurably exceeding that bestowed on any other dogma, simply because Arian, Nestorian, Eutychian, Monothelite heretics succeeded each other with such disastrous rapidity. On the other hand those momentous dogmata which concern Divine Grace were less expressly defined in earlier than in later centuries, because Calvinists, Baians, and Jansenists belong to the later epoch, and only Pelagians to the earlier. Now, as has been repeatedly pointed out, it was no heretical outbreak which required that the Immaculate Conception should be defined. In fact this was the very first definition of faith, which ever was issued from motives (as they may be called) purely internal; for no other reason, than the advancement of Catholic devotion and theological science. In other words (looking at the matter from its human side), Pius IX. was impelled to his Act—not by any peremptory obligation such as would have been recognized by every conscientious Pope—but by his own personal zeal for dogmatic truth.

Never indeed was there a more peaceful definition than this. The whole Church received it with acclamation and delight; while no clamour was raised against it from without. The followers of Dr. Pusey indeed seem to have regretted it, as a kind of bar to their fantastic schemes of union: but the Protestant religious world regarded the doctrine with complete indifference, as the natural spawn of Antichrist; while the more intellectual non-Catholic accounted it as legitimate and suitable, that those who were already content to believe the Trinity and Transubstantiation, should go on to believe the Immaculate Conception. The whole question belonged to that sphere of dogmatic meditation and devotion, which is entirely alien to the world's practical life, and has no tendency to arouse the world's indignation. Catholics, says the "*Civiltà*" (p. 678), hailed the Pope as "Pontiff of the Immaculate Conception"; while non-Catholics entertained towards him, in consequence of his pronouncement, no parallel feelings whatever of repugnance and aversion.

Great was the contrast between this earlier Definition and the Syllabus of 1864. This, being aimed directly against those errors which most widely pervade modern thought and modern society, drew down on itself naturally the heartiest *detestation* from modern thought and modern society. True it did but recapitulate condemnations, which had

already in one shape or another been pronounced by the Pontiff; but those earlier condemnations had attracted very little attention from externs, whereas the Syllabus violently arrested—as it was intended to arrest—the attention of all. The Pontiff seemed to be throwing down the gauntlet—as in fact he *was*—against the most universally accepted maxims of this age. Nor even within the Church did the Syllabus receive by any means the same unanimous welcome, which had hailed the Definition of 1854. We will not here enlarge (see “*Civiltà*,” pp. 670-1) on the various anti-Catholic philosophical errors, with which divers excellently intentioned Catholics had been unwittingly imbued, and which they were startled to find thus publicly condemned in very bad company. But take such social doctrines as these: that liberty of worships and of the press is—not legitimate under deplorable circumstances—but in itself a reasonable and desirable arrangement; or again that the State is not subjected by God to the Church’s direct or indirect jurisdiction in things temporal, however intimately connected these may be with the welfare or ruin of souls. Such fundamentally anti-Catholic doctrines had not been advocated more earnestly by Mr. Buckle and Signor Mazzini, than by many a Catholic who had no intention of disloyalty to the Church; and such men were now compelled to choose, between ecclesiastical principle and their most cherished convictions. The Pontiff must have well known how violent a storm he was exciting; but his zeal for Christian doctrine, now on every side assailed—nay, and the more dangerously assailed when by devout and well-intentioned Catholics—would not permit him to abstain from energetic action.

And here a somewhat curious circumstance presents itself. Pius IX.’s holy predecessor had, in the “*Mirari vos*,” condemned the modern “liberties” with even greater emphasis and severity of expression, than the reigning Pontiff himself. Yet the French “liberal Catholics” were not restrained by this so indubitably *ex cathedrâ* Act, from the most unrestrained and unblushing advocacy of their characteristic errors. Montalembert’s unhappy speech at the Congress of Malines was long subsequent to the “*Mirari vos*.” But things have been far different since the Syllabus was published: the most disloyal Catholic would not venture for very shame to utter such thoughts; so patent throughout the world is the Church’s true doctrine on these subjects. We think that this change of feeling may be explained, by the circumstance on which we are insisting in this article. In the case of Pius IX. the Syllabus was no isolated Act: it was one of a long series, in which—unmindful of the temporal perils which he thereby incurred

—he was ever admonishing Catholics on the deadly tendencies of religious liberalism. It became more and more impossible for the most prejudiced, to misunderstand the mind of the Holy See.

The Syllabus was hardly in any point strictly dogmatical; for it dealt with the errors of this age, and this age is not religious enough for its errors to be dogmatical. Even those condemned on the doctrine of marriage, had not been advocated in any dogmatic interest, but merely as a means for enfeebling the Church's authority over civil society. On the other hand in his most recent dogmatic Acts—his confirmation of the Vatican Definitions—Pius IX. has retired within the purely dogmatical sphere; not however, as before, by adding to the structure, but by exhibiting and securing the foundation. If those doctrines on Faith, defined by the "*Dei Filius*," had not been implicitly received in the Church from her very origin, she could neither have gained her members nor retained them. Then again it is obvious on the surface, that the whole fabric of the Church's authority rests on her absolute supremacy in spirituals and on her infallibility. But as to this supremacy and infallibility—there is no imaginable theory which admits of being drawn out, which can be represented with the faintest plausibility as the doctrine of Scripture and Tradition, except the precise theory defined in the "*Pastor Æternus*." It is no slight glory in Pius IX.'s reign, that he has issued these two magnificent Constitutions.

At the same time, as regards the dogma of Papal infallibility, it does seem to us (but we speak entirely under correction) that in this case, unlike that of the Immaculate Conception, definition could not have been forborne without a violation of actual duty, such as that justly ascribed to Honorius. It does seem to us that those so-called Catholics, who denied the infallibility of such *ex cathedrâ* Pontifical Acts as are accepted by the Episcopate, were as simply heretics before the Vatican Council, as Arians were before the Nicene and Lutherans before the Tridentine. This fundamental subversion of Catholic dogma, so soon as it openly displayed itself some two years ago, was simply an overt heresy clamouring to be anathematised. Although therefore Pius IX. indubitably displayed his characteristic firmness when he so strenuously resisted the various solicitations made to him for postponing the Definition,—yet in issuing that Definition he did no more, than any Pontiff must have done under penalty of future reproach.

Was there ever in Christendom a more intellectually contemptible heresy and schism, than that started in consequence

of the Definitions by Dr. Döllinger? We can feel no bitterness towards one, who has done in his time much service to the Church, and whose personal position inspires no other sentiments than those of sorrow and compassion. But his intellectual stand-point is simply contemptible. His followers call themselves, as if by a fatality, "old Catholics," in contradistinction to those who accept the Vatican Constitutions: just as Catholics have been called by Anglicans "Tridentines," and by Eutychians "Chalcedonians." Now, how stand the facts? The whole body of Catholic bishops have accepted the Definitions, unless (which is quite uncertain) Mgr. Strossmayer be an exception.\* How keenly the recent apostates feel this fact, is plain from their incredibly unscrupulous resistance to evident truth in the case of Mgr. Darboy. It is as certain as any historical fact can be, that this martyred prelate† expressed his submission to the "Pastor Æternus" as to an infallible pronouncement; and received the Holy Father's hearty congratulation on the occasion. And in fact no one,—Catholic, Protestant, or infidel,—can possibly deny, that (morally speaking) the whole Episcopate concurs with the Supreme Pontiff, in excluding every one from their communion who does not accept the Vatican Definitions with absolute and unreserved assent. The position then of Dr. Döllinger and his accomplices comes to this. He alleges that, according to the "*old Catholic*" view, Pope and bishops when teaching in harmony are so totally destitute of infallibility, that they may be permitted by God to exclude every one from their communion, who will not consent to hold with divine faith a tenet directly contradictory to revealed truth. Now our readers must remember very clearly, what *was* the "*old Catholic*" doctrine; i.e. what was the Church's doctrine two years ago. Was that doctrine such as Dr. Döllinger maintains? or was it not rather the very reverse? Dr. Döllinger himself cannot answer otherwise than as we do.

We cannot imagine in what quarter he expects to find recruits. He now denies explicitly, what he has long implicitly rejected, the existence of any living infallible authority. There may be a little coquetting between him and the followers of Dr. Pusey; but otherwise what can he expect? There is no

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\* The *Guardian* of June 28 ascribed to this prelate an oration, repudiating even S. Peter's primacy, and doubting whether S. Peter ever was at Rome. The ridiculous forgery has been exposed by the English translator of Quirinus's Letters.

† He may fairly be called, we think, by this noble appellation; for he fell a victim to his assassins' hatred of religion and of God.

doubt an extremely strong anti-Catholic current of thought at this moment; but what thinkers are there in the world, who will submit to such dogmata as the Blessed Trinity, Transubstantiation, the Inspiration of Scripture,—while they reject that doctrine of a living infallible authority, which alone can give to those dogmata full evidence, unity, and logical cohesion? What thinkers are there, who will accept as a revealed truth the divine gift to S. Peter and his successors of primacy over the whole Church, while *separating* themselves from that one communion over which the Pope is Primate? Dr. Döllinger himself cannot possibly stay where he is; and all who remember his past services, will earnestly pray that his movement may be upwards and not downwards.

Pius IX. then has carried through a dogmatic Definition, than which none more momentous was ever promulgated, with such success, as to carry with him the whole Episcopate, and to leave behind no more unfavourable symptom, than a schisma numerically weak and intellectually contemptible. Nor is there any Act of his whole Pontificate which will have added greater strength to the Church, than the exclusion from her body of such treacherous and injurious members as the followers of Dr. Döllinger.

We have referred to the great Pontiff's actual dogmatic achievements; but those must not be forgotten, which have not yet travelled beyond the region of proposal and intention. It is well known that he considers others to be of much importance, because he has proposed others to the Vatican Council: one in particular, which was to contain much further teaching on the Church's constitution, and especially on that momentous question the objective extent of her infallibility. For ourselves, we have always expressed our humble conviction, that in these times even the conflict against Gallicanism\* is less momentous than that against minimism. And even if—which God avert—circumstances still prevent any reassembling of the Council, we cannot but indulge a hope that Pius IX., before he is taken to his reward, may crown his course by setting this vital controversy finally at rest. It is evident that he feels most strongly the unsettlement of Catholic minds on this subject. In his answer to one of the French addresses on his Jubilee, he declared that Liberal Catholicism

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\* It must be remembered, as already mentioned in the text, that the extreme existing error condemned in the "Pastor Æternus" is one, which it would be as absurd to call "Gallicanism" as "Ultramontanism": for it denied infallibility to Pontifical *ex cathedra* Acts accepted by the Episcopate.

(Libéralisme Catholique) is a greater calamity to the Church, than even the existence of such men as composed the Paris Commune. Of course. The Church's strength is her doctrinal unity; and it is a greater evil—as regards the final triumph of God's cause—that the Church should be weak, than that the world should be wicked. Yet there are certain Catholics—thoroughly well-intentioned and pious Catholics—who shut their ears to the Church's most indubitable teaching, when the errors which she condemns are not strictly within the dogmatic sphere. As we said just now, the world is now not religious enough for its errors to be dogmatic; and on those very matters therefore which are now most critically and vitally momentous in their relation to religious truth, these Catholics actively support the Church's enemies against the Church's doctrine. We cannot but earnestly hope and pray, that the Holy Father may follow up his most seasonable admonition by some *ex cathedrâ* pronouncement worthy of his dogmatic antecedents.

We have been speaking of the great Pontiff's demeanour, in one only of the many offices committed to him by Christ: but one is a sample of all the rest. This great occasion of his Jubilee has shown, that the reverence and affection felt for him by his flock is so wide, so profound, so universal, as to take not externs only but even Catholics by surprise. It has resulted from the unprecedented length of his reign, that his thought and image have had time (if we may so express ourselves) to engrave itself on the heart of Catholics, and identify itself with their highest thoughts and noblest aspirations. Governments, called Catholic but imbued profoundly with antichristian and revolutionary principles, may play him false, as they are now doing. Half-hearted Catholics in high place may affect to deplore his conduct as "violent" and "injudicious." But the Catholic peoples throughout the world feel towards him a personal and devoted reverence, such as hardly one of his predecessors has excited. The other day a most pious English priest, who was at Rome on the recent occasion, told us that the Pope's presence seemed more like the presence of Christ Himself, than of Christ's Vicar. Nor can we better conclude our feeble remarks, than as the "*Civiltà*" concludes one of its articles; viz., with the Church's own prayer: "*Oremus pro Pontifice nostro Pio. Dominus conservet eum; vivificet eum; beatum faciat eum in terrâ; et non tradat eum in manus inimicorum ejus.*"



## Notices of Books.

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*First Report from the Select Committee of the House of Lords on University Tests, Session 1871. London.*

THE Evidence presented in this Report is so afflicting, that its memory might haunt the very dreams of one who loved Oxford as it was some thirty years ago. We hope in our next number to treat it, as illustrating the kind of education now imparted at that University; and on a future occasion to consider the light which it throws on the whole present state of English philosophical opinion. But we do not wish one quarter to pass, without drawing our readers' attention to the general subject.

"Cases have come *within my own experience*," says Canon Liddon (p. 69), "of men who have come up from school as Christians, and have been earnest Christians up to the time of beginning to read philosophy for the final school, but who during the year and a half or two years employed in this study have surrendered first their Christianity and next their belief in God, and *have left the University, not believing in a Supreme Being.*" A similar account is given by Mr. Appleton (p. 44). "I think it is quite impossible for any man to throw himself into the system of education for the final classical school, not as so much knowledge but really to assimilate it, without having *the whole edifice of his belief shaken to the very foundation.*" Other witnesses, even among those who detest the present state of things, think there is exaggeration in this statement; but the circumstances must be deplorable, under which any man of ability could be led to make it. And Mr. Appleton's evidence is the more remarkable, seeing he does not count this state of things an evil; because "the agencies which are brought to bear on the student not only destroy but *ultimately reconstruct* belief." This "reconstructed belief" must be quite a theological curiosity. There is no need however at present to quote more, from the great mass of evidence which establishes the fact we are pointing out; because we shall have so much to say on future occasions.

It should be explained indeed, that this unbelief is not *directly* imbibed, except in the school of classics and philosophy. "Almost all men in Oxford," says Mr. Appleton (p. 52), "who are under *religious influences*, go in for the *Law and Modern History school.*" At the same time we have this gentleman's testimony, for what otherwise could not have been doubted; viz., that the evil is by no means avoided by this course, though lessened. "Those who read" these soul-destroying books "are few; *those who get their ideas from them indirectly by means of others, are many*" (p. 56).

We shall have to revert to the whole subject again and again : for the moment we will content ourselves with three remarks.

1. It is not so long ago since it was said with at least much plausibility, that the Establishment serves as a kind of breakwater, against errors more fundamental than its own. This can no longer be said with any plausibility whatever. Oxford, the capital of Anglicanism, has given up the profession of Christianity in its educational capacity. "It would be quite ridiculous" indeed, as Professor Jowett, the Master of Balliol, says (p. 297), "to banish philosophical books" because of their theological danger ; but this is shutting his eyes to the real issue. Certainly in such times as these it is not the office of a Christian university to *banish* the books in question ; but it is precisely its office to train a student carefully in seeing through their anti-religious fallacies. No one witness has implied ever so distantly, that this is so much as *attempted* by those who give philosophical instruction. "In Roman Catholic seminaries," says Mr. Appleton (p. 51), a false "philosophical opinion is read with a view to *controverting* it ;" but there is nothing like this, he implies, at Oxford.

Now let the present state of things be carefully considered. At this moment philosophy is an enormous power in England ; and two anti-Christian philosophies in the very opposite poles of thought are striving for pre-eminence. These are transcendent and pantheistic Hegelianism on one side, and the phenomenism of Messrs. Mill, Bain, and Huxley on the other. The Christian holds most confidently that, if mental phenomena are accurately and exhaustively contemplated, they will be seen to testify, what is in profoundest harmony with Christian dogma, and what is irreconcilable with every anti-Christian philosophical theory. Christian parents and Christendom have a right to expect then, that every organization, professing to educate Christian youths, shall take special pains towards their mastering this fact in general and in detail. The system which deliberately neglects this task, is no system of Christian education whatever. Nor is there any sphere within which our Lord's words are more emphatically true, "he that is not with Me is against Me."

2. Such philosophical study as we have mentioned, is invaluable for mere discipline of the intellect. What is the substitute for it given at Oxford ? "Men have to read against time," says Canon Liddon (p. 68), "with almost physical pain, a certain number of writers, whom they master with difficulty, and whose words they reproduce without at all in many cases mastering their whole meaning." What intellectual profit can come from such a process as this :\*

3. The present efforts of Oxford liberals appertain to a movement, as simply *propagandist* as any *Catholic* movement could be : their whole exertions are

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\* We should have felt much greater respect for Canon Liddon's position, had it not been for his last public step : his proposing an Oxford degree for Dr. Döllinger. Finding himself unable to bring his University into any kind of unanimity even on the Being of a God, he has turned his efforts for the moment into the opposite direction. If Oxford will put forth no corporate protest against atheism, at least—such was his hope—it shall put forth a corporate protest against Papal infallibility.

directed to propagate the dogma, that dogma is unimportant. The mere admission of dissenters is valueless in their eyes. By such a plan, says Professor Jowett (p. 316), "I should have brought the Dissenters to a place called Oxford, where they might have a portion of the endowments and be examined like other persons, but that would be all: they would still be educated in Wesleyan, Independent, or Presbyterian seminaries." His object is to convert students from zealous Wesleyanism, Independentism, Presbyterianism,—still more, from zealous high-church or evangelical Anglicanism—most of all (if he had the chance) from zealous Catholicity,—to the dogma of anti-dogmatism.

The most distressing fact exhibited in the evidence is one with which we were otherwise acquainted. There are some few Catholic parents—thank God! only a very few—who have had the amazing courage (if courage be the right name for so very undesirable a quality) to despise the urgent warning of ecclesiastical authority, and commit their children's highest interests to this slaughterhouse of souls.

Lord Howard of Glossop, who has conferred such signal benefits on the Church in the matter of poor-school education, has increased the debt of gratitude which Catholics owe him, by drawing emphatic attention to the facts declared in this report.

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Since the above was in type, the "Month" for July has appeared, containing an excellent article on "Oxford in 1871," written apparently by some Catholic resident at Oxford. Liberalistic principles, says the writer (p. 113), "are accepted almost as axioms by the more influential teachers, and are practically adopted even by those who in theory disown them." According to these principles, "the young Catholic, if he is to reap the full benefits of the higher education, must begin by *ceasing to be a Catholic*." What possible safeguard could have been found (to speak of a project now condemned and abandoned) in the existence of a Catholic College at such a place? "The experiment" of the Keble College itself "is one of very dubious success; because the *whole spirit of Oxford* is destructive to" even "Protestant orthodoxy" (p. 117).

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*History of the Restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in England.* By the Right Rev. Bishop ULLATHORNE. London: Burns, Oates, and Co.

**B**EFORE our present number is issued, it is almost certain that the Ecclesiastical Titles Act will be repealed. It is thus the rare lot of the present generation of Catholics to have seen a penal law passed in a tempest of popular fury, with the common consent of both Whigs and Tories, after having remained on the Statute Book for twenty years quite inopera-

tively, withdrawn again by common consent, and passing through the various stages of its repeal with not so much noise as has often been made over a Turnpike Bill. It will ere long be our duty to review the history of this last, as we hope, of the Penal Laws—a history which is surely not without enduring interest for the Catholics of the United Kingdom.

To the ecclesiastical history of this period Bishop Ullathorne has made a valuable and most important addition. In a small volume of little over a hundred pages, he has reviewed the historical antecedents, the episcopal deliberations, the negotiations at Rome and in England which led to the establishment of the Hierarchy; and has discussed the character of the Pontifical Decree, the question whether episcopal titles are territorial, the policy of the Titles Act, and the fruits of the Hierarchy. The book, it need hardly be said, abounds in interesting historical anecdotes, and is written in the lucid and nervous style of which the Bishop is a master. It is in fact by far the most important contribution yet made to the history of these transactions. We barely record its publication now, having, as we have intimated already, the intention to devote an article to the topic which it treats ere long.

*La Questione Romana nel Congresso, pel Barone di Letino Carbonelli.*  
 Genova Società della Indipendenza. 1870.

**T**HIS pamphlet (of 113 pages) has reached us too late, for any such notice as it deserves in the present number. It is an argument against the existing state of things in Rome, by an Italian; and it is just one more proof of the want of practical liberty under the system imposed upon Rome by the Piedmontese invasion, that it has to be printed, like the Pope's own papers, at Geneva. That cradle of Protestantism is now the nearest place to Rome, where those who are faithful to the Church and the Holy Father are now allowed to publish their convictions. The author treats first, the Decree of October 9, 1870. He shows that, while declaring "Rome and the Roman province annexed for ever to the Kingdom of Italy," it goes on to guarantee to the Supreme Pontiff the dignity, inviolability, and all the personal prerogatives of a monarch; and promises that laws shall be passed "to secure together with territorial franchise the independence of the Supreme Pontiff and the free exercise of the spiritual authority of the Holy See." Then he shows, that the things which this decree declares it necessary to preserve to the Holy Father, really imply sovereignty: and that therefore it is clear that this very decree commits its author to solve what is called the Roman question in the opposite sense to that in which it was solved by iron and fire on the inauspicious 20th of September,—or "as the only alternative, that that act of the month of October is only the completion of the falsehood and infamy, which have been perpetrated for the last ten years in homage to the foul dreams of the Revolution." The next chapter is on the real impossibility of the separation of the Leonine city as a separate State. In fact,

the whole decree is an absurdity and a falsehood ; the real reconciliation of the Government of Victor Emmanuel and the Church is impossible. Then follows a discussion of the history of the Papacy :—that Rome never was at any time the capital of Italy, nor Italy ever one State :—and of the origin of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. Then follows a discussion of the general advantage derived by the civilized world, and by Italy in particular, from the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. The latter part of the pamphlet is occupied with a discussion of the late events,—the proceedings in the Chambers at Florence, Cavour, Garibaldi, Mazzini, &c. We have no space to enter into any of these particulars, but hope to be able to treat the pamphlet more at length in our next number.

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*Joannis Bapt. Franzelin, S. J., Tractatus de Divinâ Traditione et Scripturâ.*  
Romæ.

THIS volume of F. Franzelin's contains so much highly interesting matter, in reference to the most momentous theological discussions of the day, that we can do no kind of justice to it in a notice ; and we hope therefore in a very early number to publish an article on its contents. But there is one particular scholion, which contains a brief statement of very pregnant principles, on a matter with which this REVIEW has often been engaged : viz., the Subject and Object of Infallibility. We think our readers will be glad of our placing before them a translation of this scholion in our present number ; \* and our present notice shall be entirely confined to it. It contains seven "Principles," and various "Corollaries" from each ; the first Principle referring to the Subject, the other six to the Object of Infallibility.

In regard to the former, F. Franzelin speaks according to what seems to us the more obvious sense of the Vatican pronouncement. He implies, that Ecumenical Councils are no otherwise infallible, than inasmuch as their confirmation by the Pope is a Pontifical *ex cathedrâ* Act. Infallibility, says our author (Corollary A), may be said to reside, either in the Pope regarded by himself, or the Pope regarded as ordering and informing the *Ecclesia Docens*. For, as had been just explained, the "formal cause" whereby the Successors of the Apostles are constituted as the *Ecclesia Docens*, is their union and consent with their visible head.

As to *ex cathedrâ* Acts, there is no determinate form (Cor. D) to which they are confined, and which may serve as a test of their *ex cathedrâ* character ; all that is requisite is, that the Pope shall in some way or other manifest his intention of obliging Catholics to assent. In fact there are various Pontifical Acts (Cor. E), in regard to which there is real doubt whether they are or are not *ex cathedrâ*.

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\* In this translation we have omitted two quotations given by F. Franzelin, because they appear in our article on Galileo.

Passing to the Object of Infallibility, F. Franzelin lays down (Prin. II. Cor. A) three classes of verities, contained in the strict Deposit of Faith : dogmatical, ethical, ecclesiastico-political. He adds however (Cor. C), that some of these verities at some given time may not be so sufficiently proposed, as that all are obliged to accept them with divine faith as revealed.

In addition to those verities which all are obliged to accept as revealed, there are others (Prin. III.) of the same three kinds (viz. dogmatical, ethical, ecclesiastico-political)—either not revealed, or at least not yet imposed *by the Church* as revealed—having nevertheless so close a connection with those which *are* revealed and sufficiently proposed, that without them the latter cannot be adequately protected. Among these protective truths, F. Franzelin instances such doctrines as those concerning the intrinsic sanctification of the Sacred Humanity and the like ; those which relate to the dogmatical sense of books ; historical facts, such as the Ecumenicity of some Council ; ecclesiastico-political facts, such as the moral necessity of the Pope's civil principedom. All these verities (Cor. B) are included in the Deposit, if that word be used in its widest and most proper sense.

Now it is the very fundamental dogma of Catholicity (Prin. IV.)—to deny it is the root of all heresies—that Infallibility extends over the whole Deposit in the *strict* sense of that word ; and from this truth it follows, that Infallibility extends over the whole Deposit in the *full* sense of that word. To deny this extension of Infallibility would at least be most grievous error ; and would, according to many theologians, be actual heresy. It would be a most grievous error to deny (Cor. A) the *ex cathedrâ* character of some Act, on the ground that the errors therein denounced are not condemned as *heretical*, but only as meriting some minor censure. Every proposition, on the contrary, infallibly deserves that particular censure, which the Pontifical Act declares.

Of these various verities, which are thus infallibly defined and yet not as revealed truths, it can hardly be said that they are believed simpliciter with divine faith (Cor. D) ; for they are believed, not as themselves revealed, but because of the revealed infallibility of the defining authority. They are believed, however, with a faith *mediately* divine.

Various human sciences (Prin. VI.)—philosophy, history, geology, ethnography, &c., &c.—contain matter closely connected with Revelation. These sciences therefore, when sophistically pursued, may be understood as involving results, which are in fact not only false, but injurious or even contradictory to revealed truth. The Church has no power of condemning them, if they are but *scientifically* false ; but she has that power, if they are contradictory or injurious to the Faith. Whenever therefore the Church condemns scientific error, she thereby teaches that the condemned error is in some way injurious to Revelation.

Lastly (Prin. VIII.), the Pontiff may authorize his Congregations to pronounce doctrinal decrees ; which are not indeed infallibly true, but which nevertheless demand from the faithful a certain interior assent. On this subject we need not further speak, having discussed it at so much length in our article on Galileo.



*The Month.* July—August, 1871. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have quoted from this number in a previous notice. Our object in recurring to it is, that we may give all the currency in our power to some admirable remarks on Catholic education and literature.

"It is with literature as with education. Those who are most in need of each are the very persons whom it is most difficult to convince of their need ; and, in consequence, there are two classes of men among us at present who are forced to labour, in season and out of season, to seem importunate, men of but one idea, hobby-riders, and the like, because they are also forced to din into ears more than half deaf the necessity of very great and united exertions on behalf of both the causes they have at heart. These two classes contain the few who are fully alive to our deficiencies in Catholic literature and our deficiencies in Catholic education. We speak at present only of the former. The cause of Catholic literature is happily not hopeless : but few are aware of the difficulties which beset those who try to serve that cause—difficulties which would be more than half removed by a hearty co-operation from Catholics themselves, which is now wanting, mainly on account, not of want of power, but of want of heartiness and zeal. The flourishing state of the literature of Protestantism in general, and of many various divisions and sects among Protestants in particular, who are in many cases not to be compared to Catholics in influence or numbers in this country, is the result of many combined causes. It is the result of a taste for reading, and reading not merely of the lightest and most frivolous kind, which taste is carefully formed and promoted by those who have the education of the young. There can hardly be a better test of the good quality of the education given to the younger members of any body whatsoever, than that which is furnished by the answer to the question, 'Do the boys and girls leave their schoolroom and go out into life with a real taste for reading, with some sort of thirst of knowledge, with some power of selecting subjects of interest, with some habits of digesting and assimilating what they read, and of giving an account of it to themselves and theirs?' And yet how is this question to be answered with regard to a great number of Catholic educators, who are in other respects deserving of all praise ? How many young men and young women grow up to what seems, but is not, an age beyond childhood, with the idea that no day is well spent which has not seen some time devoted to mental improvement and the acquirement of knowledge, and that it might be a possibly laudable action to go without an extra pair or two of gloves, a superfluous bonnet, or a box of cigars, for the sake of buying a Catholic periodical or a new book ? We have here touched upon one only of the many sources of that prosperity of literature which exists even among the members of various 'denominations' not by any means coextensive with the nation, as the Evangelicals, the Puseyites, or the Ritualists. There are of course many more : an *esprit de corps* which makes them support their own organs, their own booksellers, their own publishers, and so make it incumbent upon Messrs. Mudie and other potentates of the same class to beware of inflicting upon their magazines and other publications that ostracism to which Catholics tamely submit in the case of their own, and the like. We quite agree with the Preface, from noticing which we have been led to make these remarks. It costs in reality very little to guarantee to a Catholic writer or a Catholic book a sufficient remuneration to let the labourer have the reward he deserves, and in many cases grievously wants : and among the good works open to the men of our generation this is certainly not the last nor the least useful to society and the Church."

*Secular Judgments in Spiritual Matters, considered in relation to some Recent Events.* By the Rev. ORBY SHIPLEY, M.A. Masters. 1871. Pp. 88.

WE have read this pamphlet, and we give ourselves some credit for the patience it required. For the greater part of it is a legal argument, from statutes, &c., against the authority of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Anglican Church—the Judicial Committee of Privy Council. Now, a legal argument from a clergyman is seldom worth much. However, we do not say much about that, because Mr. Orby Shipley's argument really seems clear and ingenious. But it is impossible to read it without a strong sense of unreality. He argues, 1. Historically, that by the rules of the Catholic Church and of Christendom spiritual questions ought not to be decided by secular judges and in secular courts. During all this part we feel inclined to do as Lord Brougham is said to have done one Sunday in church, when he interrupted a preacher, who was going on with a lengthened argument to prove some self-evident point—“Well, sir, the court is with you so far,—proceed.” No one doubts that before the sixteenth century this was an invariable rule. Nay, we will add, that any one who knows the history of the so-called Reformation in England will fully admit that there was not the least intention of setting it aside. Henry VIII. and his ministers never thought of claiming for secular courts the right of judging of spiritual questions. What they said was, that the King, as supreme governor, was head both of the temporal and the spiritual in his dominions. A court which sat to represent the king in his temporal capacity had no right whatever to meddle with spiritual questions. No man would have resented it more than Henry VIII. if the Court of King's Bench had taken on itself to decide a question of heresy, because although it represented him and sat in his name, it represented merely his temporal authority. So the spiritual courts represented him as much as the King's Bench. But they would not have been allowed to judge upon a criminal suit, or one merely of property, because they represented him merely in his spiritual capacity. It is quite true that the first Act of Parliament which acknowledged this authority in him did recite that temporal questions should be decided by the temporality, and spiritual by the spirituality. But even then, any court, even if its members were all lay, would have satisfied this condition, if it represented the king's spiritual authority, because he was a spiritual person. And, accordingly, Cromwell, as his Vicar-General in Spirituals, sat in the House of Lords on the bench of bishops above the Archbishop of Canterbury. And a very little later the Act was passed which authorized the king to appoint delegates to hear all spiritual causes in his name, leaving it absolutely to him to name whom he would,—bishops, clergy, ecclesiastical lawyers, common lawyers, or men not lawyers at all; and this court remained the supreme judicial authority of the Anglican Church until 1832.

Mr. Orby Shipley argues at length and ingeniously that this court cannot have been intended to hear spiritual causes, because, as a matter of fact, none were brought before it for a century and a half, or until 1690. But this is

a fallacy. The reason was, because very soon after it was created, another Act authorized the king to exercise his spiritual authority by another court, which was found more convenient, because more absolute—the Court of High Commission. This court also was, according to Anglican principles, strictly spiritual, because it represented the king in his spiritual capacity, and before it all strictly spiritual questions came, till it was abolished by the Long Parliament. It is remarkable that the Act by which it was abolished fully recognized that its spiritual authority resulted, not from the fact of any of its members being bishops, but from the fact that the judges in it, be they who they might, derived “spiritual and ecclesiastical power by commission from the king.” After this, the Parliament, then Cromwell, and lastly Charles II., exercised a real headship; but we are not aware that (we speak under correction) judicial cases were brought before any supreme authority until James II. illegally restored the High Commission. This was again abolished at the Revolution of 1688, and immediately afterwards we find the first strictly spiritual case coming before the Court of Delegates. It is plain, then, that our Anglican ancestors understood that, according to Anglican principles, the royal authority is supreme both in temporal and spiritual questions. That the manner of its acting, and the persons by whom it should be exercised under the king, was from the first regulated by Parliament; that Parliament authorized, 1. the Court of Delegates, then, 2. the High Commission; and that when the second was abolished the first remained the only court in which the judicial authority of the king, in his spiritual capacity, could be exercised.

It is true, and is pointed out by Mr. Orby Shipley, that between 1690 and 1832 hardly any questions of the sort were brought before it; but that seems to have been because the nation was theologically in a deep sleep. As soon as it awoke, such questions were sure to arise, and if the Acts of 1832 and 1833 had not been passed, the Court of Delegates would most assuredly have come into active operation as a spiritual court long ere this.

In 1832 it was abolished (as far as relates to England, not to Ireland) by an Act which transferred its authority to the Privy Council, and next year that authority was further transferred to a Judicial Committee of the same body, which is still the supreme spiritual court of the Anglican body.

So far, then, from being anything new, or inconsistent with the principles of Reformation statutes, that court is strictly founded upon those principles. For it is a court which sits by the sovereign’s authority to judge spiritual questions in virtue of the supreme authority over them, which it is the fundamental principle of the Anglican Communion to recognize in the sovereign. The whole, therefore, of Mr. Shipley’s argument falls to the ground. He takes for granted that whatever is done by that court is done by “the State,” and that its authority is only “State authority.” Now this, on Anglican principles, is not the case. To deny that the king is a spiritual, as well as a temporal person, and to say that what he does in his spiritual capacity is done by the State, not by the Church, is to deny the first principle of Anglicanism. Catholics, of course, do deny it; so did the Puritans, in times past; so do the Protestant Dissenters now. But for a man who, like Mr. Orby Shipley, professes to be an Anglican, to take that line, is absurd and self-contradictory. It is true that the Judicial Committee has really only State authority; but it is

true only because the Anglican Communion itself is not a Church at all, but merely a body with State authority ; and whatever spiritual authority it may be supposed to have, is certainly exercised by the Committee of Privy Council.

In page 50 Mr. Shipley raises a legal question certainly curious and interesting, and we incline to think he is right upon it. He argues that the Act under which the Committee acts does not authorize the sentence of suspension which it pronounced on Mr. Mackonochie, because it only authorizes it to advise the Sovereign what sentence she should pronounce, and not to pass any. Some lawyers say that it is inherent in the nature of a court to have power to punish contempts. We incline to think it could only do so by imprisonment, &c. But this is practically an unimportant question, because an Act of four lines long could unquestionably give the Committee the power, if it has it not as yet. There is an absurdity about the affair. Mr. Mackonochie was suspended for six months. If he had chosen to try at law whether the court had power to pass such a sentence, it is certain the six months would have been over long before the question could have been decided, and nothing real would have been left—except his lawyer's bill of costs. We are of opinion, therefore, that he did wisely in submitting.

As for the question whether the Anglican clergy (so long as they acknowledge the Anglican Communion as a Church) are bound in conscience to submit to the judgments of the Committee of Privy Council, we must own we are amazed that any honourable and honest man can doubt it. Every one of them promises at his ordination "so to minister the doctrine and sacraments and discipline as this Church and Realm hath received the same." Most unquestionably "this Church and Realm," so far as it is Anglican at all (of course no farther), has "received" both the principle that the Sovereign has supreme authority in matters spiritual, and that the mode of the exercise of that authority is to be regulated, from time to time, by Parliament. It is equally certain that Parliament has, as a matter of fact, authorized the Committee of Council to advise the Sovereign in all spiritual causes which come before her. It seems, therefore, to us that no Anglican clergyman can resist the authority of that court legally exercised, as long as he remains an Anglican clergyman, without violating his ordination vow. We are utterly at a loss to understand how any man can deny this by arguing, in open opposition to facts, that "this Church and Realm," *i.e.* the Anglican Communion, has not "received" the authority of the court ; still less by arguing, what is really nothing to the point, that it ought not to have received it. Mr. Shipley does not agree with us. He writes :—

"Speaking for myself only, though I think others will agree with these principles, if I were in the position I do not fill—of a parish priest under prosecution, I should act thus :—Believing in my inmost being the rightfulness of my principles and the wrong which my opponent is doing, both to them and to himself, as well as to his God, I should leave no stone unturned to frustrate his endeavours. I should make every defence short of pleading before the courts of the State, in my defence. I should take advantage of every accident in my favour to turn the flank of the enemy, to disappoint him, to wear him out and exhaust his supplies, and to do that by indirect methods which I was powerless to do directly. Any technical flaw I should grasp at.

Any legal quibble I should cling to. Any theological loophole I should pass through sideways. Any double meaning in language I should take advantage of. Any indefiniteness in the sentence or monition I should strive to make yet more indistinct; and, under the cover of a friendly cloud of mist, to make my escape. And I should thus deliberately act, not as liking these bypaths, far from it, but because I am forced into them; from no innate love of subtilty, rather the reverse; but in order not to be caught with guile, I should act thus simply on the defensive; and as weaker than the law as at present administered, I should take refuge in the all-powerful defence of the weak. I should act simply on principle—the principle to do God's work as best I might under difficult circumstances, for His glory, and the good of my neighbour, and my own salvation" (p. 10.).

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*Remarks on some parts of the Report of Judicial Committee in the case of Elphinstone against Purchas, and on the proper course to be pursued by the Clergy in regard to it.* A letter to the Rev. CANON LIDDON, D.C.L., from the Right Hon. Sir J. T. COLERIDGE. Murray.

THIS is a very interesting pamphlet on the same prolific subject. Sir John Taylor Coleridge is a man who has passed an active and laborious public life, not merely without stain or reproach, but carrying with him the reverence of his country. He was a few years senior to John Keble at Oxford, and, being a member of the same small college, the two were thrown together from the first day when Keble, then a mere boy, came into residence. A close intimacy was maintained between them until Keble died, March 29th, 1866, aged seventy-four, and the senior of the two friends survived to write the memoirs of the younger. Sir John Coleridge has always united to distinguished talents, exquisite culture, and high principles, so much kindness of disposition and "flowing courtesy towards all men," that while respect and admiration for him have been general among his countrymen, personal affection has somewhat taken their place in the minds of all who have had the privilege of his personal acquaintance. Such a man, having had many years' experience of judicial duty, and having besides continued to serve as a member of the Judicial Committee of Privy Council after his retirement from the Queen's Bench, has a right to speak with special authority when the conduct of the judges in that court is called in question. With Anglicans he has a still higher authority, as being understood to represent the opinions of John Keble, the only man, not a king, whom the Anglican Church may in some sense be said to have canonized, in the three centuries of its existence.

This pamphlet was occasioned by a letter published in the *Guardian*, and written by Canon Liddon. Mr. Liddon had said:—

"The late Mr. Keble said to me, not many months before his death, 'Depend upon it, we shall never have God's blessing on our work in the Church of England, while we continue quietly to acquiesce in the present constitution of the Court of Final Appeal.' Mr. Keble had been dwelling on the contra-

diction which he held to exist between our Lord's own provisions for the maintenance of His Truth and authority in His kingdom, and the purely human device for dealing with these solemn interests which we have in the Final Appeal Court. He had also insisted on the further contradiction which is observable between the Court as recently constituted and the original terms of the Reformation settlement" (p. 3).

Here we must point out the contrast between this tone and that of Mr. Shipley in the pamphlet noticed above. Mr. Shipley treats the Court exactly as we Catholics should treat it if it presumed to lay down what our priests ought to teach, or how they should minister. He says, "It is a purely secular court, which has no authority whatever in things spiritual. In conscience I owe it no obedience, and if I pay it any, it is merely as a matter of prudence." Of course, if that were the case, the Anglican Church would have nothing to do whatever with the question, "How is the Court constituted." It would be merely an enemy and persecutor. Mr. Keble, on the other hand, assumes that the Anglican Communion is more or less responsible for the constitution of the Court. Therefore he assumes that it is an Ecclesiastical Court of the Anglican Communion, although not such as it ought to be. We insist on this, because, although the two views are really inconsistent—nay, actually contradictory—most of the writers upon the subject seem to us sometimes to adopt one, sometimes the other. We shall give examples of this below. Sir John Coleridge (as might be expected from his legal habits of thought) always assumes consistently that the Court is a Church Court; from which it follows, that, while it exists unchanged, Anglicans remaining such are bound—not merely in prudence, but in conscience—to obey its decrees; and also that the Anglican Communion shares the responsibility, if it be (as Keble lays down, and as we should have expected all earnest men to feel) unfit in its nature to exercise ecclesiastical authority.

Canon Liddon then went on to say: "I can only account for the different verdicts of the Court [in the case of the *Essays and Reviews* and that of Mr. Voysey] by supposing that, for the moment the Court adopts a popular, as distinct from an accurate and theological, estimate of the language before it." Then comparing the "Westerton" judgment with the Purchas judgment, he says: "It is not easy to believe that the Court is quite incapable of interpreting the documents before it by real or supposed considerations of policy! That, in short, it never regards these documents in the light of a plastic material which may be made to support conclusions held to be advisable at the moment, and on independent grounds." Canon Liddon then went on to say, that if things go on as they are, "Churchmen will, to a very great extent indeed, find relief . . . in co-operation with the political forces which, year by year, more and more steadily are working towards disestablishment."

This letter is the text of Sir J. T. Coleridge's pamphlet. He begins by a statement important from such a man: "I venture to say that I think Mr. Purchas has not had justice done to him in two main points of the late appeal—I mean the use of the vestments complained of, and the side of the Communion Table which he faced when consecrating the elements for the Holy Communion" (p. 6).

Upon the first point he thinks the judgment may be "conclusively shown



to be wrong," and gives his grounds for thinking so. The law, he says, requires the use of such things as were in use "by the authority of Parliament in the second year of King Edward VI. And it is conceded in the Report" (as he correctly terms what is usually called the "judgment") "that the vestments, the use of which is now condemned, were in use by authority of Parliament in that year. Having that fact, you are bound to construe the Rubric as if those vestments were specifically named in it, instead of being only referred to." As to the "long inquiry" made in the Report into things which have passed since the second year of Edward VI.—

"I forbear to go through it—not, I am sure, out of any disrespectful feeling to the learned and reverend authors of the Report, but because it seems to me wholly irrelevant to the point for discussion. This alone I must add, that even were the inquiry relevant, the authorities on which they rely do not appear to me so clear or cogent, nor the analogies relied on so just as to warrant the conclusion arrived at. For it should never be forgotten that the defendant in a criminal case, acquitted as to this charge by the learned judges below, is entitled to every presumption in his favour, and could not properly be condemned, but by a judgment free from all reasonable doubt. And this remark acquires additional strength, because the judgment will be final, not only on him, but on the whole Church for all time, unless reversed by the legislature.

"Upon the second point [the position of the Anglican minister in reading the 'prayer of consecration'], I have less to say, though it seems to me much the most important. The Report, I think, cannot be shown conclusively to be wrong here, as it may in the other; still it does not seem to me to be conclusively shown to be right" (p. 9).

Sir John says his own *feelings* are for Mr. Purchas's practice on the second point, and against him on the first, so that he is more impartial in the judgment he gives.

But he writes, because Mr. Liddon's letter "speaks of the Court of Final Appeal in terms, and with a conclusion or view, to neither of which I can agree; and, further, you speak of the disestablishment of the Church in a way which I hope I may misunderstand, and, if I do not, I would implore your reconsideration of."

"The first point "was a subject, almost the only one, on which I had the misfortune to differ from my dear and venerated friend John Keble." Mr. Keble wrote that our Lord had appointed a judicial power as to "alleged offences against the Faith." The ex-judge pleads with touching modesty against this. It is plain Keble was thinking chiefly of the Faith, Sir John chiefly of the precautions necessary for the fair trial of an accused person. Then he defends the judges in the Committee of Council, in a manner equally beautiful, from the charge of "partiality and corruption"; and speaks, as a judge only could speak, of the difficulty of the judicial office and the qualifications for it. To us there is something not beautiful only and forcible, but really affecting in this part of the pamphlet, when we remember all the experience and feelings of the writer. Next he passes to the main points suggested by Canon Liddon's letter. First:—

"The necessity for a repeal of the law by which jurisdiction in case of alleged religious offences is given to the Judicial Committee. That is undoubtedly the

true point for those to aim at who agree with you generally. I am told indeed that many good men are united in a determination to resist the law while it remains unrepealed. I venture to think they can hardly have considered calmly the character or the consequences of that course, nor how mischievous an example they will be setting to their flocks" (p. 14).

Here it should be observed that the real difference between the judge and those of whom he is speaking is, that he consistently assumes (what to us is so clear that we marvel to find any honest man doubting it) that the Court (whether well constituted or not) actually is the Supreme judicial authority of the Anglican communion. They, on the other hand, (not we think always or consistently, but whenever they talk of disobeying it) assume that it is merely a secular court, which has no authority at all over their consciences, but whose interference is simply a tyrannical usurpation, as it would be, for instance, if the Court of Queen's Bench were to claim to give or refuse to Catholic priests in England facilities to say Mass or hear confessions.

Sir John then argues that the Church of England must have some supreme court, and that any of those suggested (especially one composed of all the Protestant bishops) would be worse than that which now exists.

Sir John therefore (while he thinks the Court mistaken in the judgment on Mr. Purchas) is yet of opinion—1. that while it exists the clergy are bound to obey its decrees for conscience sake. 2. That it would be impossible to substitute a better for it.

At the end of the pamphlet Sir John insists on the benefits of the Establishment, and exhorts the clergy not to join the attempt now making to overthrow it. Then he says—

"Disguise it as we may, ours is, in one sense, a divided Church. Within our pale are two great parties at issue on more than formal points—on points no less important than the 'two sacraments generally necessary to salvation.' This is a fact never enough to be lamented, yet which it is idle to attempt to conceal; but good and wise Christians have thought—and happily teach us—that considering how far we agree, and the mysterious nature of those points as to which we differ—our unhappy differences are not such as to prevent both parties from being united in one Church. . . . If we may so stand, may we not stand in peace with each other as to all things not essential to the Faith, and in charity even as to them? May we not cease to waste our energies in conflicts, such as have occasioned the Purchas litigation? I do not forget what is behind and thinly covered by it—the fear of Rome,—a fear, as I think, wonderfully excessive; but if there be ground for it, even against that danger we shall be more safe if, first, we are united among ourselves; and secondly, if we will, with one heart, direct all our energies against a worse enemy than Rome, and now, I believe, a more powerful one—I mean infidelity. That contest is enough for our day. You know as well as—perhaps better than—any man, how it presses,—where it touches us, whom among us it assails, under what colours it fights, and with what various weapons. You know how it troubles where it does not overthrow, how it weakens where it does not destroy; and every thinking man, I suppose, knows what misery, what destruction ensues where it conquers. . . . May not high and low meet in the discharge of their common duty? I believe that if the good men of both parties laboured together, shoulder to shoulder, in such works as these, they would come to know and love each other better; they would see the good more clearly, they would judge the

evil in each other more charitably, and have not merely a truce but a permanent peace, without unworthy compromise on either side" (p. 23).

We have dwelt at some length on this pamphlet, and in particular we have quoted this last page because we know nothing which will more clearly set before Catholics both the strength and the weakness of the Anglican communion. Its strength is the hold which it has got upon such men as Sir John Coleridge; its weakness when the utmost that such men can hope for is, that clergymen should agree to work together, while they are directly opposite to each other upon fundamental questions, such as that to which he alludes,—whether any grace is given in Baptism; and whether in the Holy Communion men "receive mere bread and wine in memory of an absent Christ," to borrow Mr. Liddon's phrase, or whether they receive their Lord and Saviour Himself. As long as the Anglican Communion was sound asleep, such differences might be left as open questions. Can they remain so when those who maintain both sides are in real earnest?

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*The Purchas Judgment.* A Letter of acknowledgment to the Right Hon. Sir J. T. COLERIDGE. By H. P. LIDDON, D.D., together with a Letter to the Writer, by the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. London: Rivingtons. Pp. 71.

WE must treat this pamphlet more briefly than that of which we have just given rather a full account. It falls into the confusion which we have already pointed out. Canon Liddon pleads for making the whole Bench of Anglican bishops the Supreme Court of the Anglican Communion. He says: "The Queen would still judge spiritual causes, but though the spirituality, and the bishops would no doubt be assisted by legal advisers to prevent collisions with the civil law." We may then justly say, that if an Act of Parliament were passed giving the Queen power to settle all doctrinal questions which might be brought before the judicial tribunals of the Anglican Communion, and requiring her to refer them, not as now, to the Judicial Committee, but to the six-and-twenty Protestant Bishops, who should "report" to her their advice how the question should be decided—in that case he would be satisfied. Yet surely it must be clear to every thinking man who knows anything of ecclesiastical subjects, that if the Committee of Privy Council is really a "secular court," or "State court," that new court would be so no less. It might, or might not, be likely to give better judgments. That is not the question. But, first, it would derive its power, not from any ecclesiastical authority, but from an Act of Parliament, quite as much so as the present court; next the real supreme authority would be the Sovereign, not the Anglican bishops. Any one will see this at once, if he asks himself what would be said, if it were proposed that an Act should be passed making the Queen, in the same way, the supreme judge of all ecclesiastical, spiritual, and doctrinal

questions which might arise among her Catholic subjects, only requiring her to refer them to the thirteen Catholic bishops, who should report to her their opinion after hearing the cause. Every one knows that there is not a Catholic, who deserves the name, who would not resist to the death such an Act, and that if it passed it would be simply disregarded by them, because the principle it would involve would be that the Sovereign is a "persona mixta," head of the Church as well as of the State within her dominions. Canon Liddon then, in asking for such a court as satisfactory, distinctly admits the principle of the existing court (as much as Sir S. Coleridge) but proposes to reform it.

And yet he is inconsistent enough to say, in answer to the remarks of the Protestant Bishop of Gloucester, who advised those who could not in conscience obey the decrees of the court, to leave the Establishment—

"If the apostolical precepts about submission to the powers that be could apply to the case of a secular court dealing with strictly religious interests, there would be reason for part of this advice; but no one imagines that S. Paul would have submitted to a decision of Nero's on the subject of Justification, or in any particular which implied one or other doctrine about it" (p. 44).

That is, he assumes that the existing court has no more authority in the matter it judges, than would a heathen emperor. How inconsistent, then, to propose to reform it in detail. We are clear that our Anglican friends will only "beat the air," unless they begin by making up their mind whether the Sovereign, as such, has authority in spirituals. If so, then the present court is a spiritual court. If not, then the Anglican Communion has possessed, from the beginning, merely secular, and not any ecclesiastical or spiritual authority and jurisdiction. This question, we say, they must settle, one way or other, first of all. Men who keep going backwards and forwards upon so vital a question within the compass of a few pages will never really carry their object, because in truth they do not know what the object is which they want to carry. To go to other subjects, Canon Liddon explains that, in what he said in his first letter, he never intended to charge the judges in the Judicial Committee with

"Any dishonourable conduct. Any such insinuation would have been absurd on the face of it, and I claim no credit for not having been guilty of what the world would have deemed a blunder as well as a crime. But I did suppose, and meant to suggest, that the judges looked upon themselves as entitled to exercise a discretion which is more properly an attribute of the makers than of the administrators of the law. No one would imagine this to hold good in the case of any other English court of justice; but the anomalous circumstances of the Church appeared to yield an explanation of the apparent exception. . . . I certainly meant to impute no sort of 'dishonesty' to members of the Committee for taking a view of their duties which such circumstances would make sufficiently natural; and persons of very high authority who look upon these matters from an altogether different point of view from any that I could adopt, agree in this estimate of the functions of the court" (p. 19).

The Canon enlarges upon the contradictory character of the judgments given in proof of this, and examines them in detail with much ability, but at much

greater length than our space will allow us to follow. Upon this subject, as is very natural, the Canon does not feel that he is making any imputation upon the honour of the judges by a supposition which the ex-judge feels to imply a very intolerable one. He answers the argument of the judge that the clergy should "obey the law," by showing that the Protestant bishops themselves not only do not require the "Low Church" clergy to obey it, but openly violate it themselves, as *e.g.* the other day when they omitted a large part of the Marriage Service required by law to be read at the late royal wedding. This is a telling *argumentum ad hominem*. He says that when the Anglican Archbishop Tait tries to comfort the Ritualistic clergy by writing that—

" 'Not all the clergy are expected by their parishioners or required by their bishops rigidly to observe every point in the rubrics at all times and under all circumstances: ' he is keeping within the truth, since the statement probably applies to nine-tenths of the clergy of the Church of England. It is applicable in a very emphatic sense to the Low Church party, as every one knows who attends their ministrations and is moderately acquainted with the Prayer Book and its rubrics" (p. 27).

But he shows first, that the Anglican bishops will be obliged to "enforce the law" in all cases that are brought before them, and next that the leading members of the so-called "Church Association" call upon their members to bring before the Anglican bishop every case in which any clergyman practises any of the things for which Mr. Purchas was condemned. Its chairman calls upon them to "let the bishops have no peace till they interfere." The result, no doubt, is that what is called Ritualistic worship will be entirely impossible in the Anglican Communion if this judgment stands—and stand it must unless it is overthrown either by some future judgment of the same court, or by an Act of the legislature. The chance of either of these seems very minute. We therefore look upon Ritualism, as we have seen it of late years, as a thing gone by, in parish churches. Already, indeed, Mr. Orby Shipley and others are proposing to build churches which shall not be under the authority of the Anglican bishops; and in these they may, if they please, follow minutely the Roman Missal, except, indeed, that, not being priests, all they do will be like what Catholic children are fond of doing,—playing at saying Mass. What a queer position, moreover, for Episcopal ministers to be building new churches on purpose that the "bishops" may have no authority in them. We think this likely to be carried out.

Canon Liddon says that, under these circumstances, disestablishment is not desired indeed, but may be inevitable. He adds, we are sorry to say, that "secession to Rome" is "out of the question," since the decrees of the Vatican Council; although that was the way in which "some of the noblest and purest souls whom God has ever given to the Church of England" solved such perplexities as these in 1845 and 1851. We are comforted by remembering, that already many a man who honestly thought that resource "out of the question" has lived before very long to find it the only thing which solved all his difficulties, satisfied all his needs, and exceeded all his hopes. We have, must have, patience. Men's eyes are not opened at once, and when they begin to see, they see only "men as if it were trees walking."

Dr. Pusey's letter at the end of this pamphlet is highly characteristic of himself. He, too, falls into the confusion of desiring the reform of the existing court, and yet calling it a "State court" (p. 62). He fears that the doctrine of the Eucharist itself will be condemned when the Bennett case, now pending, comes on for judgment. The reform he proposes is that of Canon Liddon, that a "Provincial Council of Bishops" should judge. He does not seem to have asked himself by what authority does the present court sit, or by what authority would that which he suggests sit, and if one is a State court, what will the other be. Of disestablishment also he speaks as a probable result.

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*Queen Elizabeth v. the Lord Chancellor, or a History of the Prayer-Book of the Church of England in relation to the Purchas Judgment.* By the Rev. W. WATERWORTH, S. J. London: Burns. 1871.

FATHER WATERWORTH comes to the rescue of the Ritualists by arguing, not that the Committee of Privy Council is not the Supreme Spiritual Court of the Anglican Communion—he is too clear-headed and too well read in history for that—but that its judgment in the Purchas case is clearly wrong. In this, it is to be observed, he takes exactly the same line with Sir J. T. Coleridge. The conclusion of the two pamphlets is exactly the same, viz., that the "ornament rubric," as it is called (i. e. that which orders that all ornaments of the Church and its ministers shall remain as they were by the authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI.), is part of the law of England, and cannot possibly be set aside by any neglect of the Protestant clergy to obey it, any neglect of the Protestant bishops to enforce their obedience, or any neglect of the civil government to compel the Protestant bishops to act. But F. Waterworth arrives at this same conclusion like a historian, Sir John T. Coleridge like a judge. The Judge says, I will not enter upon the events which have happened since the second year of Edward VI., except to that I do say not think they bear out the judgment. The historian goes at length into those facts, and proves what the other only asserts. The net result of this pamphlet is that there was a continued attempt on the part of Queen Elizabeth's Puritan bishops and clergy to get rid of the Catholic vestments and ceremonies authorized, nay, demanded, by this rubric, but that Elizabeth refused to give way. At last, however, custom prevailed over law—for *quid leges sine moribus?* But the late judgment is the first attempt of a court to set aside the law by making the illegal custom compulsory. This pamphlet is worth reading by those who care to know the real history of the Protestant Church in England, which F. Waterworth has studied far more accurately than the great majority of its own members and even clergy.



*Galileo and the Roman Inquisition. A Lecture delivered on Wednesday Evening, April 11th, 1860, by the Hon. DANIEL BRENNAN. Charlotte's Town, P. E. I.*

THIS lecture, delivered in 1860, has been forwarded to us for notice, apparently in connection with our April article on Copernicanism. We do not entirely sympathize with its line of argument as a whole ; but it puts together very interestingly the facts of Galileo's case.

To show how ludicrous is the claim made for Galileo of holding heliocentrism on reasonable scientific grounds, Mr. Brennan draws attention (p. 24) to the prominence given by the astronomer to his absurd argument drawn from the flux and reflux of tides. Galileo scoffs in one of his chapters at the sympathy shown by Kepler, in ascribing that phenomenon to "the moon's influence and other like *puerilities*."

In p. 28, note, Mr. Brennan quotes a long passage from a lecture of Cardinal Wiseman's, with which we were before unacquainted. "What was Galileo doing?" asks the Cardinal. "He was insisting on the Church to adopt a system, not demonstrable and contradictory to the words of Holy Scripture ; and he would have the Scriptures bend to his theory, rather than make his theory bend to the admitted view of the Holy Scriptures." This is at last the common sense of the matter.

*Claims of the Irish College at Paris on the British Government in Virtue of Treaties with France. Cork : Mahony. 1871.*

WE would call the attention of our English, and most especially that of our Protestant, readers to the facts exhibited in this pamphlet. It no doubt requires that a man should be a lawyer, or at least that he should have some turn for legal questions, in order that he may judge fully of some of the arguments of the writer. But the question is not one of dry law that is about to be brought before the imperial Parliament, the body which makes law and is in one sense above the law. And even if it should be the case, which we very greatly doubt, that as a question of mere law the claims of the Irish College are barred by the judgments given upon them many years ago by the Privy Council, even that ought not to be a conclusive argument with the British Parliament, if justice is clearly on the other side. The whole Irish policy of the present Government notoriously goes upon the principle, that the government of Ireland in times past, and most especially in the times when Lord Eldon was the ruling spirit in the administration, was both unjust and impolitic. On no other principle, manifestly, can the Irish measures urged by Mr. Gladstone and passed by overwhelming majorities of the present Parliament be defended. Even, therefore, if the sentence pronounced upon the claims of Irish College could be proved to have been demanded by the unjust laws passed in those times, it would by no means

follow that justice as well as liberality would not be violated by the present Parliament if it should avail itself of that sentence for the pecuniary advantage of the present Government and the loss of the Irish College.

The facts in few words are these. There existed in France, before the great revolution, several colleges, founded and endowed by Irish Catholics at their own expense, for the education of Irish priests, at a time when they were forbidden either to receive any education in the British dominions or to go abroad for it, at a time when Lord Macaulay says (if we remember right) that the life of a Catholic priest was less secure than that of a wolf. These colleges were purely and simply Irish, although driven by persecution from Irish soil. They were, and always have been, admitted by the French Government to be, not French, but Irish institutions. This had been admitted by every successive Government which had existed in France for the last three hundred years—by the Monarchy of the *ancien régime*, by the Revolution, by the first Empire, the Restoration, by the Monarchy of July, by the second Republic, by the second Empire, and by the third Republic as late as September 14, 1870. Nothing could more strongly prove this than the fact that when the property of all French colleges, churches, &c., was confiscated under the first Revolution “the Irish College was seized upon by the Government as being comprised in the decree confiscating all French ecclesiastical property. But Lord Gower, British ambassador at Paris at the time, and acting in that capacity, interposed, and claimed that the college should be exempted as being the property of the subjects of the British Crown. A committee on the part of the French Government was appointed to inquire into the matter, and it reported that the college should be exempted, as claimed by the British ambassador, from the general confiscation of French ecclesiastical property.” The great importance of this is that it proves that both the French Government and the English Government (and that at a time when they agreed in little else) agreed in regarding and treating the Irish College in Paris as belonging not to France nor to French subjects, but to British subjects.

And this was made more clear in 1793, when war broke out between Great Britain and the French Republic. The French Government then issued a decree confiscating all property belonging to English, Scotch, and Irish subjects in France, and in virtue of this decree seized upon the Irish College and its endowments, not as ecclesiastical property, but as the property of British subjects.

Peace came at length, and the Government of the Restoration agreed by treaty to compensate all British subjects whose property had been confiscated by the French Government since Jan. 1, 1793. A mixed commission, partly English and partly French, was appointed to carry out this treaty, and before it the Irish College made its claim, and that claim was admitted by the commissioners to be “legitimate, *i.e.*, to be within the meaning of the treaty they had to administer: they registered the claim as such, the only thing remaining being, according to the treaty of 1815, to verify the *items*, and ascertain the amount of the claims.”

In 1818, however, a change was made. The French Government paid over a large lump sum to the English Government to meet the demands (one

of which was that of the Irish College), and a commission exclusively English was appointed to pay the claimants out of that sum, it being especially provided by treaty that if the money paid was more than should be awarded, the balance was to be repaid to France.

It is almost incredible, yet we believe there is no question that it is true, that only a year later, an Act was passed by which the commissioners were to apply any balance "to such purposes as the Lords of the Treasury should direct," and the commissioners were expressly released from all accountability. This act Lord Truro declared in Parliament (see *Times*, August 22, 1853) to be "wicked, fraudulent, and unjust." What use was made of that Act we shall see.

Meanwhile claims were made before the committee both by the Irish and also by the English colleges in France. Of these latter we have not yet spoken, but it now becomes necessary to refer to them. The commissioners (no one can be surprised to find) rejected both claims. An appeal was allowed by law to the Privy Council, where the claim of the English College came on first, and Lord Gifford (then Master of the Rolls) decided against it on the ground that they were "French corporations, because, although their members were British subjects, and their property derived from funds contributed by British subjects," yet "they were locally established in a foreign territory because they could not exist in England. Their end and object were not authorised by, and were directly opposed to, British law, and the funds dedicated to their maintenance were employed for that purpose because they could not be so employed in England."

When the case of the Irish Colleges came on, Sir John Leach, then Master of the Rolls, held himself bound by this judgment, and adds, "Lord Gifford gives two reasons for that decision—one that the establishments were opposed to the law of England. It is, however, questionable whether that reason ought to prevail in the case, there being, as is argued, a difference in material respects between the laws of England and the laws of Ireland, and to that reason therefore we have not applied ourselves. The other reason is that they were French establishments, founded under the authority and with the permission of the King of France, and that they could not therefore be considered within the meaning of the term British subjects. Now it appears by the papers before us, that the French Government had at all times exercised a control of these establishments. We find first the control of the Convention—we find next the control of the Consulate—we find next the control of the Empire—and lastly we find the control of the Monarchy after the restoration in the edicts of Louis XVIII. This case comes, therefore, plainly within the reasons given by Lord Gifford for the prior decision. These colleges were French establishments, and that fact is conclusive. We are therefore most clearly of opinion, that we are precluded by the Douay case from any farther consideration of the subject."

We have quoted this judgment at some length because we wished to point out that Lord Gifford decided the Douay College to be a French institution because from the nature of the case it could be only either English or French, and could not be English inasmuch as its object (*i.e.* Catholic education) was forbidden by the laws of England; therefore it must of

necessity be French. Sir John Leach virtually admits that (whatever may have been the case in England) the Irish law allowed the college in question to be an Irish institution. The argument, therefore, by which Lord Gifford proved that the Douay College was not English did not apply in this case. To say that the French Government exercised "control," is only to say that the college was, locally, in France; and we have already shown that the "control" it exercised was that of a foreign Government over an Irish institution, not that of a French Government over a French institution. It does not, therefore, seem that this case was really decided by the Douay case.

It should also be observed that both in England and in Ireland Parliament has, of late years, allowed charities to be placed under the protection of the Charity Commissioners which, when they were founded, were beyond all question contrary to law. Therefore the grounds on which Lord Gifford decided the Douay case do not apply at all to prevent Parliament in the present day from giving redress in opposition to his judgment.

To all this we can foresee only one plausible objection, viz., that the petition to Parliament comes too late; that the compensation money has long ago been applied and exhausted; and that it is therefore unreasonable to ask now for a share of it, however strong the claim may have been fifty years ago.

But the answer to this is complete. The fund is not exhausted. We have already seen that the claim of the Irish College was formally admitted by the mixed commission (English and French), and that it must therefore have been one of those which were intended by the French Government to be liquidated out of the money paid by it to the English Government for that express purpose, and with a provision embodied in a treaty that if the money paid should be found to be more than was required for the purpose the residue was to be repaid to the French Government. We have seen also that an Act of Parliament called by Lord Chancellor Truro "wicked, fraudulent, and unjust," but which we prefer to suppose was passed by the British Government and Parliament inadvertently, the treaty stipulation being overlooked, directed that the commissioners should put this residue, if any, at the disposal of the Treasury, specially exempting them from any liability. The question is, then, first,—Was there any surplus? And next,—What became of it? It appears from our author's statements that no less than £718,292. 13s. 2d. were misapplied in virtue of this Act. Some of the items are, "for the coronation of George IV., £130,000; for the improvement of Buckingham Palace, £250,000." This last sum is said to have been repaid "in various instalments;" but our author adds, that a sum of £34,822. 10s. remains yet to be accounted for since 1827. We think therefore that no man will have the face to say that the British Parliament can plead the exhaustion of the fund as an excuse for not satisfying any claim which has so much as the least show of reason.

We leave it to lawyers to decide whether in strict law the fact of Lord Gifford's judgment having been given, on whatever grounds, and the subsequent judgment of Sir J. Leach, might be held to bar the legal claim of the college. Let it be assumed, if so be that such is the case. The question now is whether the Parliament which authorized the expenditure on such objects as the coronation of George IV. of many thousand pounds of French money

paid by France expressly to meet claims, of which that of the Irish College had been admitted to be one, by a mixed commission representing both France and England, is not morally bound to do more than could be demanded in strict law (if such is really the case) to meet that claim. It seems to us that there never was a case in which the honour of England was more directly implicated.

There is also another view which ought to be taken. This present Parliament has voted half a million to the Protestant Episcopalians of Ireland as compensation for the endowments given to the Irish Establishment since 1660. Mr. Gladstone himself, in proposing this grant, pointed out that it could not be doubted that a large part of those endowments had been intended by their donors, not for the Protestant Episcopalian communion, but for the established religion, and that therefore in giving it to the disestablished sect Parliament was going beyond the intention of the donors. Yet the grant was cheerfully made, and we believe never opposed or even complained of by so much as one Catholic. This was a grant then equally beyond the enactments of the law and the intention of the founders. Shall the same Parliament be less liberal towards the communion which provides for the spiritual wants of all the poor of Ireland, when it remembers that the money applied by it (for it was the act of a British Parliament) to defray the expense of the coronation of George IV. was given at a period much later than 1660, and confessedly intended by the donors to be spent in educating Catholic priests for the people of Ireland? If this is refused is it possible that the Irish people should fail to see in the other grant an act of favouritism towards the religion of the few compared with that of the Irish people, and can they attribute that favouritism to anything else than the fact those "few" are the "English Colony," and their religion that of the ruling class of the English people?

We will only add that we have given a mere outline of the arguments of the able pamphlet before us, and that space has obliged us to pass over many important parts of it.

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*Christianity as taught by S. Paul. Eight Bampton Lectures in the year 1870; to which is added an Appendix of the continuous Sense of S. Paul's Epistles, with Notes and Metalegomena.* By W. J. IRONS, D.D. Oxford: Parker. 1870.

THE author's main principle in this volume is, that inasmuch as S. Paul's writings are letters, those who would understand them must put clearly before themselves the condition and state of mind both of the people to whom they were written and of the writer—a most just principle, and one which, always kept in view, would have preserved those who have read and quoted S. Paul's writings from numerous errors. For instance, nothing is more common than to hear Protestants urge, that if the Catholic system were true

we should have more distinct and positive statements of it in the New Testament. When they explain themselves, they mean by the "New Testament" the writings of S. Paul. And indeed this is so far reasonable that by far the larger portion of that part of the New Testament which treats of the state of men under the new dispensation is by him. The argument is commonly and truly met, by replying that in truth there are many passages in which those Catholic doctrines which Protestants deny are stated, or at least taken for granted; the reason why honest Protestants do not see the real meaning and force of these passages being only, that they have been trained up from their earliest years to read them, and to associate with them a different meaning, so that now that other meaning seems to them the natural, obvious, *primâ facie*, sense of the words, whereas any unprejudiced man who read them only for the first time would say that the Catholic interpretation is the natural one. But true as this is, it is a very small part of the truth; for it is also true that the Protestant objection assumes, as its first principle, that the New Testament (and especially the writings of S. Paul) must be expected to furnish such a systematic statement of the Christian system as will teach it to a man who comes to them for the first time with no knowledge of it. Now no man could possibly think this, if he realized to himself the unquestionable fact, that they are letters, written to men whose daily life for years more or less before they were written, had been that of members of the Church, and occasioned by one or other circumstance humanly speaking accidental. No man, for instance, would expect, that if letters from Mr. Gladstone to the chief members of his Cabinet should ever be published, he would be found to have laid down the first principles of Parliamentary government, or of the routine of business in the Government offices, as they would be detailed by a man who was drawing up a paper constitution which had never yet practically worked, for the benefit of the men who were to work it. Yet men do expect to find a detailed system of the working of the Christian Church, in letters written by S. Paul to men who had long been living under it.

Our author recognizes this (p. 101) where he says, speaking of the Epistles to the Corinthian Church—

"It may appear perhaps to some, that the account of the Christianity taught by S. Paul at this time has still but little of completeness. It certainly has nothing so definitely written as many might wish, either as to the Godhead which he adored or the mysteries of grace in Christ Jesus. It does not minutely explain how the Apostolate, 'as in Christ's stead,' was to reconcile men to God. No precise theory of Atonement or of the intermediate state can be found, and no anxious inquiry which is the true Church. The remark, however, is obvious, as has been said, that his Epistles here as everywhere, assume that his own teaching had preceded his writing. We have the whole range of Christian theology implied, mixed up indeed with the incidental expostulations and memories of informal letters, but standing there as the subject matter always. It is not for us to give incongruous additions to these Epistles, to make verbal utterances in our opinion more harmonious with the present. All that we can say is, that these Epistles were not everything known at Corinth, or inherited by us now. The society founded by S. Paul was there, the Church which he had personally instructed between two and three years."



The result, as the author says, is that if we look at the Epistles of S. Paul in this light, we find them strictly practical, i. e. going directly to the wants of those to whom he was writing, both as to faith and morals, but—

“On the other hand we must have noticed that some supposed doctrines popularly connected with the name of S. Paul have not been met with. Endeavouring to take the direct and coherent sense of our Apostle's teaching, omitting nothing pertaining at all to its drift or its completeness—desiring, that is, to lose nothing and to add nothing—we simply have not encountered the antithesis of faith and merit, nor the incongruous supposition of faith as a substitute for righteousness, nor the notion of grace as license, nor of election as a warrant of personal security for heaven, nor of foreknowledge or predestination as implying a settlement of moral details beforehand. These ideas, whatever their worth, do not occur; and we have perceived they could not in these writings, without breaking the connection, and indeed destroying the whole course of thought” (p. 144).

This is most true. Modern notions, so far as they are founded on a mis-interpretation of Scripture, and not (as is often the case with thinking men) merely human speculations, for which their authors after having thought them out, then go to Scripture to find authority, are often come at by taking texts by themselves, without thinking how they came in the mind and intention of the inspired writer. Thus the notion that all acts of “an unconverted man” are but sins, is founded on the text “Whatever is not of faith is sin,” although any one who considers the context must see at once that S. Paul was not thinking of that notion one way or another, either to assert or deny it. This way of using Scripture, which is very common in England, is really quite as absurd as the argument against “the plurality of worlds” from the text “*Nonne decem facti sunt mundi, sed ubi sunt novem?*”

Thus the fundamental principle of the book is true and important. It should be added that it is evidently the result of long and conscientious labour, and of a real love for the glorious Apostle. Indeed how could any man study him without that love kindling into a flame? Bampton Lectures we suspect have very often been written by men who having selected their subject, have studied more or less diligently during the year between their appointment and the delivery of the lectures upon topics bearing on it. It is evident that Dr. Irons took this subject because he had long and carefully studied it. His Appendix, as he says, is that “on which the whole must rest.” It consists of what he calls “the continuous sense,” a sort of paraphrase of each of the Epistles and speeches of S. Paul, arranged in what he considers their chronological order. To each is affixed a short preface. He says himself of this part—

“In concluding this continuous sense of S. Paul's Epistles, containing so much that will seem new, it is impossible to avoid the consciousness that it falls far short in exactness and life-likeness of what was desired, yet it is believed that for every vital part of it may be alleged some judgment or interpretation of approved teachers of the Church, and that in no place is any authoritative doctrine of the Church contravened. It would not be issued but with the conviction that, with whatever defects, it really represents to the English reader the unequivocal teaching of S. Paul throughout” (p. 497).

The notes which follow show much care and diligence. He first gives authorities upon a subject terrible yet most important, and of which it is impossible to give an adequate idea,—the moral degradation of Rome and the Empire at the time when God became Man to redeem the world. Another is on "Some Special Words and Phrases of S. Paul"; another on the use of twelve Greek words of the same family, *δικαίον*, &c., in which every instance in which they occur in S. Paul's writings is examined.

We have no doubt that the volume is calculated to be extensively useful. But, alas! Dr. Irons wants at least one main qualification, if not the first, for forming the judgment which, as he truly says, is necessary. He misconceives in very many important respects what the nature of that system was which the converts of S. Paul had received from him, and, misconceiving this, he naturally and unavoidably falls into mistakes as to the meaning of the Epistles. For instance, he actually supposes, that the sense of the words with which the seventh chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians opens is this—

"I come now to the subjects of which you have written to me. And first, your proposition that 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman.' It would be far safer to affirm the very opposite, namely, that every man had better have a wife of his own and every woman a husband. Such is my advice at least, for I am not commanding all to marry" (p. 340).

"What must be the force of the prejudice against asceticism, which could make a learned and thoughtful man so paraphrase S. Paul's words! In another place he speaks of the falling away of Europe from the Faith.

"Civilization is now hesitating, or seemingly hesitating, between two ways. It seems resolved to part company with that which has for ages passed as Christianity, that which has been, alas! without power to quicken the nations. The question is not at present who is to blame for this paradox of our Christian civilization. If Europe should ultimately reject a form of godliness which, though useful in many things, has supplanted individual conscience by external authority, let us hereafter remember that the catastrophe followed, and did not precede, some demoralization of Christianity itself" (p. 90).

How false a notion must he who could write this nonsense have formed of the system established by S. Paul!

In other cases he seems to us misled by his own care in fixing the exact sense of the words used by S. Paul. When he has satisfied himself that a word meant, in S. Paul's use, this or that, he does violence to some passage rather than admit that it is used in it in a different sense. Thus, for instance, he lays down that the *μυστήριον* means "the secret of God's moral government of the world," by which the family of Abraham was first made His instrument, as the "first fruit" of His creation, and the Gentiles afterwards brought in. "Hence the word is used by S. Paul to describe the bringing in of the Gentiles, the union of Christ and the Church, and the final glory of the kingdom of God." This is well drawn out; but the author is so rigidly bound by it that he actually explains the "mystery of iniquity" (in 2 Thessalonians ii. 7) in the same sense. "The *ἀποστασία* is the falling away of Judaism—the *μυστήριον* is the fulness of the Gentiles—the *ἀνομία* is the destruction of the Mosaic Law—the *ἀνομος* its Pagan destroyer—the *παῖς* that at Jerusalem—the *καρίχων* Divine Providence."

In the same way he always interprets *ἄγιοι* to mean only the Jewish converts, and the *ἐληθοὶ* those called out of the Gentiles. It is strange that he could have gone over the passages in which the words occur (which he has diligently collected in Note E) without seeing that in S. Paul's time Christians, whether Jews or Gentiles, were already recognized as the Saints. Thus he interprets the salutation in Romans i. 7, "Gentile and Jewish believers alike," the words being *ἐληθοῖς ἁγίοις*. Surely the old interpretation "called to be saints" was the Apostle's meaning. In the same way he paraphrases "the Israel of God," in Galatians vi. 16, "especially my own countrymen." Surely the argument of the whole of this Epistle and of that to the Romans requires that it should mean "those who are in Christ."

We have a misgiving whether we are not unjust in mentioning so many points in which we protest against Dr. Irons's translation, when there are so very many more in which he brings out the sense well. But this is the necessary consequence of giving a new rendering of words which have become dear to the reader by years of admiring and affectionate familiarity. Where the new translation does not really add something material to the rendering it is intolerable. On the whole Dr. Irons has conferred a great benefit on his countrymen, and we should heartily wish to see the same work done with equal care by one who can cast on the injured text the full light of Catholic truth.

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*The Annual Address of the Victoria Institute, or Philosophical Society of Great Britain, May 22nd, 1871. By Rev. W. J. IRONS, D.D. London: Robert Hardwicke.*

A SOCIETY that proposes as its end and object to investigate the bearing of modern science on Religion and Revelation, and to base its philosophy on faith in God, is deserving, so far, of all respect and encouragement. On looking over the list of papers that have been printed in the "Transactions" of the Victoria Institute alone (which has already been in existence since 1866), we find that the subjects which they treat are decidedly those about which the world is talking most at the present day; that is to say the physical and scientific theories of development, of geology, of physiology, of astronomy, of philology, &c., in their relations to Sacred Scripture, to Revelation, to Miracles, to Creation, to Morality, &c. The names of the authors are not, as a rule, familiar to us. That may be our own fault. We recognize Professor Kirk, Dr. McCausland (who does not seem to belong to the Institute), Dr. Irons, and one or two others. Dr. Irons undertakes, in the address before us, to reply to Professor Huxley on Protoplasm, and to Mr. Darwin on Man. Perhaps the subject is too large for treatment in a platform discourse of thirty pages. The author could not help being meagre and scrappy; and, accordingly, the Address is rather a protest than a reply. Our first curiosity was to find out what Dr. Irons's own principles were. As well as we can make out, he confines himself to four; viz., the existence of a Creator, gradual creation (or formation), life, which he calls "the indwelling

Activity of some creatures, as an endowment distinct from the visible structure," and the original supremacy of man over creatures. These principles he considers to be laid down in the Bible, and to them the Victoria Institute holds itself pledged. It does not seem very clear whether Dr. Irons is of opinion that the instantaneous successive creation of varieties of creatures, or of life, is to be found in the Bible. He argues as if he maintained the fact to be so, but he hardly asserts that the Bible says it; or, at least, he allows great latitude in details (p. 15). Farther on he admits, with regard to man, that there may have been human beings before Adam was placed in Eden (p. 17). A few lines lower down, however, he seems to assert that such pre-Adamites were not really human, but only apparently so, because they had not Adam's divinely-breathed "life." We should like him to have stated what, in his opinion, the Bible reveals about Adam's "body." It seems to us that the formation of the body out of the slime is given quite as explicitly as the in-breathing of the soul. If you can let the one go without derogating from Holy Scripture, why is it "a principle" to retain the other? We suppose that Dr. Irons, who is a controversialist of much experience, will not be surprised if we point out that people who interpret the Bible out of their own heads cannot object if other people refuse to accept their "principles." It is impossible to face science and its attacks, if you have nothing but the text of the Bible to tell you what is vital and what is not. On the one hand you will find yourself clinging to unnecessary details or mistaken translations; on the other hand, you will be sure to surrender essential truths. If Dr. Irons gives up the miraculous formation of the bodies of Adam and of Eve, we do not see why he holds to the Garden of Eden. And the unsatisfactory nature of his theological or biblical stand-point is matched by the more pardonable haziness of his psychology. What on earth is that "Generic Life" which is shared, in certain ways, "by the highest moral agent as well as by the lowest organic growth"?—a vitality which "we inhale bodily," and which is also "in the field-flower on which we gaze"? If this "unseen generic reality" is anything more than the continuation of the creative act of God, it would have been better not to have talked about "inhaling it bodily." This kind of vague and high-sounding language will only mystify the orthodox, and certainly not confound Mr. Darwin. Dr. Irons does not see that any clear and sharp distinction can be drawn between instinct and reason. He seems to grant that animals have a kind of reason, distinct from that of man only in degree. In our opinion, if this be granted, the whole question falls to the ground. If the brute have the power of which we are conscious—the power of viewing one thing as an attribute of another, or, as it is generally called, of forming "the universal," then there seems no reason why the brute should not have a spiritual and immortal soul. The proper answer to Mr. Darwin on this point, it seems to us, is to prove from consciousness the existence of this higher faculty in man, and to deny that it can be proved in the brutes from any of their actions whatever. And how can Dr. Irons admit that some animals have a "rudimentary knowledge, that some things *ought not* to be, and that some things *ought*?" (p. 28). The word "rudimentary" contains the difficulty. If it means that an animal has any idea whatever of the formula of morality, or the affirmation of

moral relation between two terms, then animal only differs from man in degree ; for Aristotle's *Ethics*, or S. Thomas's *Secunda Secundæ* are only a series of combinations of this primitive element. If, on the other hand, it only means that the animal has a sense or feeling, a want or an appetite, consequent on certain external and internal conditions, it is quite a mistake to call such a state knowledge proper, or rudimentary morality. It is no more the rudiment of morality, than a man's hair is the rudiment of his hat.

We are sorry that we cannot praise more unreservedly Dr. Irons's well-meant defence of revelation. But no Protestant can defend revelation effectively, because he cannot be sure what is revelation. He may defend a point of natural reason, such as the existence of a Creator ; but if he undertakes the Bible, where must he stop and what may he give up ? And even if Dr. Irons were sure of his own ground, he would not be a very effective apologist, for his style is heavy, laboured, and sometimes obscure. This we partly attribute to the natural haziness of all Protestant theology, partly to the necessity in which he here finds himself of keeping within his limits as the deliverer of an "Annual Address." But both of these reasons will hardly suffice to excuse such a paragraph as this one which we quote ; it is a very ploughed-field of reading, and few will get through it without heart-breaking toil. He is proving Mr. Darwin's "Development-theory" a logical contradiction :—

"If the lower *generate* the higher, in what respect was it lower ? It [what ?] may have existed *among* the lower, but was potentially higher. And how its potentiality was acquired in the lower group of beings where it was found, would still lead to the unsolved question. It is, perhaps, always more conceivable that vitality from a higher rank may first cast its force beneath, and thence re-act in the upper direction. But where is the proof of either assumption ? Anyhow, a careful thinker will perceive that the passage of life upward would imply a new and special element of power in the individual of a seeming lower class that led the ascent, so that, logically, the theory of evolution from below answers itself, and rather establishes the truth it sought to deny. The utmost that any evolutionist could say would be, that in a lower groove of being some individual appeared who, from some cause unexplained, *was* potentially higher than the rest, and proved it by rising to the higher sphere—a fact which confirms rather than opposes the original distinction of the grooves, the species themselves" (p. 25).

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*Meditations on the Life of the Blessed Virgin for Every Day in the Month—suitable for all Seasons and especially for the Month of Mary.* Preceded by a Letter from Mons. DUPANLOUP, Bishop of Orleans, with a Preface by his Grace the ARCHBISHOP OF WESTMINSTER. Richardson.

THIS strikes us as a specially interesting and valuable work of its kind. The life of our Blessed Lady is divided into one-and-thirty meditations ; and although in one sense specially suitable for the month of Mary, there is nothing to make it less so in any month of the year. We do not

understand why the title-page does not state what appears in many parts of the volume itself, that it is founded upon a French original. We say founded, because there are passages here and there, for instance pp. 119 to 125, which refer so directly to England and the history of the Church in England as to show that the book is not exactly a translation. It seems to us eminently simple, practical, and suggestive of good meditations. The Bishop of Orleans says in his letter to the French author,—

“Accept my most sincere thanks for the pleasure with which I have read your little book. To turn to pages pure and fresh as these, amid all the struggles and labours to which my life is devoted, is like resting the eyes, after a long night of weariness, upon an image from which Jesus and Mary smile down on us surrounded by fresh flowers.

“Your book is excellent in thought, in style, in composition, in tone. I must say that I sometimes distrust books written in honour of the Holy Mother of God. Some authors try to imagine in her what it has pleased God not to reveal to us; others hide her beautiful form under ill-chosen ornaments. There are very few pens, as there are very few pencils, which are capable of depicting the lovely and majestic simplicity of the Mother of God and of Men.

“You, Madame, have succeeded in avoiding these snares. I would wish to see your book in every Christian family, in the hand of every mother and daughter, and above all, on the little shelf near the crucifix, on which lie the two or three old works which form the whole library of the poor villager's cottage. It is especially for dwellers in the country that you have intended your ‘Month of Mary.’

“In the home evenings, in schools, in churches, it may serve as reading, at once useful, safe, instructive, and touching. With my whole heart I ask of Him its success, and sincerely desire you to receive, Madame, the assurance of my profound respect.”

The preface of the Archbishop of Westminster is on the devotion to our Blessed Lady itself. He sums it up by saying,—

“My object in what I have said is to offer three things. First, that the Author and Founder of the devotion to the Mother of God is Jesus Himself. Secondly, that the chief promoters of it were the Apostles and disciples of our Lord. Thirdly, that in nothing do we go beyond them. They believe of her Divine Maternity and of her Immaculate Sanctity all that we believe now; they loved her and venerated her with more sensible and filial affection than we do in these chill and twilight days. I may add yet further that no one can be a true disciple of Jesus unless he love and venerate the Mother of Jesus, if not in the same degree, which is impossible, at least with the same affection in kind, after His Divine example. The devotion we bear to the Blessed Mother is a sign of the true child of Jesus Christ. The absence of it is a sign fatal to those who have it not. To speak evil of the love and veneration which the Church bears to the Mother of God, must be a sign of a heart cold, dim, and dark. It may even be a sign of reprobation; for it is certain that if we love God as we ought,—if we bear to our Divine Redeemer tender and grateful hearts,—if we realize the communion of Saints and the living and loving relations which bind them to us and us to them,—if we be conscious of their love to us and their prayers for us,—if we have childlike hearts, lowly, loving, and filial towards our Heavenly Father,—then it is certain that, next after Jesus, our veneration and our love will be given to her whom He loves with all the filial reverence, and all the tender love of His Sacred Heart.”



We have so often to complain of the insufferable language (we cannot call it English) into which books are rendered from foreign languages, and we must say (for obvious reasons) none so much as French books, and of French books none so much as books of devotion, that it is an unwonted pleasure, as well as an act of mere justice, to add that this little volume is a striking contrast to the great mass of them. The English is excellent throughout ; so much so, that if subjected to the most trying test which it is possible to apply—that of reading out loud—we doubt whether there is a single passage which would suggest to the hearers that they are not listening to an original English book. It is not possible to bestow higher praise on any translation.

*Bells of the Sanctuary. Mary Benedicta.* By GRACE RAMSAY, Author of "A Woman's Trials," "Iza's Story," &c. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

IT is difficult to describe this brief, touching history of an elect soul without applying to it words which the author would not like. She does not mean it for a poem or a drama, and she has no thought of herself in the writing of it, but is filled with the contemplation of the miracle of God's grace which she records, and the wonderful beauty of the soul in which it was wrought. And yet this little book is a poem and a drama,—the poem of a beautiful life and an early death, the drama which all great artists have striven to work out, of the tremendous problems of thought and struggles of the soul to free itself from the "fleshy life" which "wars against it," and mount towards the God who created, redeemed, and is sustaining it. It is an unspeakably solemn book, and wonderfully simple ; a convincing, unanswerable narrative of how a human being was called out of the life of the world to the highest order of sanctification, to the renunciation of everything in which she had taken delight, and how "she arose and went quickly." It is a story not to be read without wonder, awe, prayer, and tears.

It is not a narrative of whose beauty we can give a notion in an extract, but this is a passage we must quote, because it has such direct meaning for many to whom the severe action on family relations of religious vocations are trials and temptations.

"The world went on ; the wheel went round, pleasure and folly and sin kept up their whirl with unabating force ; all things were the same as when Mary Benedicta, hearkening to the voice from Zion, turned her back upon the vain delusions, and gave up the gauds of Time for the imperishable treasures of Eternity. Nothing was changed. Was it indeed so ? To our eyes it was. We could not see the changes that were coming of it, nor the work which her sacrifice was doing, nor measure the glory that it was bringing to God. . . . What do we discern of all the mysterious travail of humanity in God's creation ? The darkness and the pain, little else. . . . We think the world is irretrievably darkened and saddened by the sin and the misery, forgetting the counterpart that we do not see : the sanctity of repentance and the loveliness of compassion. We see the bad publican flaunt-

ing his evil ways in the face of heaven, brawling in the streets and in the market-place. We do not see the good publican who goes up to the Temple, standing afar off, striking his breast, and sobbing out the prayer that justifies. We forget that fifty such make less noise climbing up to heaven, than one sinner tearing down to hell. So with pain. When sorrow overtakes a man, turning his heart bitter and his voice sour, we find it hard to believe that any good can come out of it, so much dark let in any light. . . . One more virgin heart is given up to the Crucified, one more victory is gained over the kingdom of this world, one more life is being lived away to God, in the silence of the Sanctuary, and who heeds it? Who sees the great things that come of it, the graces obtained, the blessings granted, the dangers averted, the temptations conquered, the miracles of mercy won for some life-long sinner, at whose deathbed, miles away, with perhaps the ocean between them, the midnight watcher before the Tabernacle has been wrestling in spirit with God? Only when the seven seals of the Book in which the secrets of many hearts are written, shall have been broken, will these things be made manifest, and the wonders of sacrifice revealed."

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*Tales of the Childhood and Youth of Celebrated Men.* London :  
Burns, Oates, & Co.

**T**HIS is a useful and interesting little volume, of a kind which is much needed in Catholic literature, and which, we remark with pleasure, is beginning to be supplied. Books for children, which shall not be heavy, too exclusively religious, to afford them natural amusement, and which shall yet put forth the Catholic verity as the basis of all that is meritorious in effort and glorious in success, the motive and the crown of every career worth record and remembrance, are now to be found in rapidly-increasing numbers—a fact which cannot be too heartily welcomed.

The subjects of these *Tales* are admirably chosen, for they are connected with the sciences, the arts, and the professions in which it is the fashion of the world to believe, or to assert, that there lies the contradiction and the refutation of the Church of God. Here, for instance, we find a simple, beautiful story of the early years of Gassendi, the "young astronomer" and fervent Catholic, to whom it was at one time in contemplation to have confided the education of Louis XIV. Again, we have a beautiful incident in the boyhood of Ribera, the painter, when he was tended, after he had nearly lost his life in saving a drowning boy, by the Emperor Charles V., then a monk, not yet out of his noviciate (at sixty) at St. Just. The wonderful little scholar Amyot, whose immense learning was one of the boasts of the age, and who became Grand Almoner of France in the reign of Henry III., figures as a wilful little "vagrant" in these pages; and Watteau, the painter, and pride of Valenciennes, slates the roofs of the humbler houses of his native place not too zealously. Peter Paul Rubens, noble, painter, and ambassador, is introduced as a beautiful page; and the story of his illustrious life, as great in all respects as in that of his art, is followed by the famous episode of the discovery by Velasquez and Rubens of the splendid genius of the slave Juan de

Paréga, and his immediate emancipation by Philip IV. The celebrated scholar and antiquarian Valentine Broal is given as an example of the vast results which may be achieved by a diligent and persevering application to study, combined with the force of a powerful and energetic will, and as a beautiful instance of one whose great prosperity never diminished his humble modesty, whose scientific attainments never obscured his fervent piety. Charming anecdotes of the youth of Canova, Guttenburg, and Turenne, complete this comprehensive and instructive volume, which is calculated to realize the intentions and wishes of the writer.

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*A Memoir of Jane Austen.* By her Nephew, J. E. AUSTEN LEIGH. Second Edition. To which is added "Lady Susan," and Fragments of the other unfinished Tales by Miss Austen. London : Richard Bentley and Son.

**M**R. AUSTEN LEIGH'S admirable memoir of his aunt, Miss Austen, was received with the alacrity and approbation which it so well merited, and he has now offered the public a second edition, containing a good deal of additional matter, for which no doubt his readers will be very grateful. He has earnestly endeavoured to supply the lacunes in the brief, interesting, and worthy story of the life of the gifted author of five immortal novels, and this narrative is considerably fuller than the former one. The writer says, with his usual expressive simplicity, that it is difficult "to record little facts and feelings which have been merged half a century deep in oblivion." He has surmounted the difficulty with much skill and success. The fragments which are now permitted to see light are most interesting, and convince us that the last work in which Miss Austen was engaged, and which is slightly sketched for us by Mr. Austen Leigh, would have been equal to those which we possess. There is a Mr. Parker in this sketch, who promised to be as amusing as Mr. Woodhouse, with his absolute faith in his own doctrine and entire disbelief in every one else's. Mr. Parker was an amiable man, with more enthusiasm than judgment, whose somewhat shallow mind overflowed with the one idea of the prosperity of Sanditon, a village on the Sussex coast, just struggling into notoriety as a bathing-place under the patronage of the two principal proprietors of the parish, Lady Denham and Mr. Parker. He entertains a jealous contempt of the rival village of Brinshore, where a similar attempt was going on. To the regret of his much-enduring wife, he had left his family mansion, with all its ancestral comforts, gardens, shrubberies, and shelter, situated in a valley some miles inland, and had built a new residence—a Trafalgar House—on the bare brow of the hill overlooking Sanditon and the sea, exposed to every wind that blows ; but he will confess to no discomforts, nor suffer his family to feel any from the change. The following extract brings him before the reader, mounted on his hobby :—

"He wanted to secure the promise of a visit, and to get as many of the family as his own house would hold to follow him to Sanditon as soon as possible; and, healthy as all the Heywoods undeniably were, he foresaw that every one of them would be benefited by the sea. He held it indeed as certain that no person, however upheld for the present by fortuitous aids of exercise and spirit in a semblance of health, could be really in a state of permanent health, without spending at least six weeks by the sea every year. The sea-air and sea-bathing together were nearly infallible; one or other of them being a match for every disorder of the stomach, the lungs, or the blood. They were anti-spasmodic, anti-pulmonary, anti-bilious, and anti-rheumatic. Nobody could catch cold by the sea; nobody wanted appetite by the sea; nobody wanted spirits; nobody wanted strength. They were healing, softening, relaxing, fortifying, and bracing, seemingly just as was wanted, sometimes one, sometimes the other. If the sea-breeze failed, the sea-bath was the certain corrective; and when bathing disagreed, the sea-breeze was evidently designed by nature for the cure. His eloquence, however, could not prevail. Mr. and Mrs. Heywood never left home. . . . The maintenance, education, and fitting-out of fourteen children demanded a very quiet, settled, careful course of life, and obliged them to be stationary and healthy at Willingden. What prudence had at first enjoined, was now rendered pleasant by habit. They never left home, and they had a gratification in saying so."

Lady Denham is quite admirable. The description of her is full of Miss Austen's rare, subtle, delightful humour. It is plain that the world has lost, by the incompleteness of Lady Denham, a worthy *pendant* to Mrs. Norris. There is another indication of this sketch of a precious gem of humour and character drawing, never to be disclosed. Mr. Parker has two unmarried sisters who live together; Diana, the younger, always takes the lead, and the elder follows. It is their pleasure to fancy themselves invalids to a degree and in a manner never experienced by others; but, from a state of exquisite pain and utter prostration, Diana Parker can always rise to be officious the concerns of all her acquaintance, and to make incredible exertions where they are not wanted. While there is no resemblance between those sisters and any of Miss Austen's world-familiar types, there is the same delicious humour and *finesse* in her portraiture of them. The following letter from Diana Parker to her brother is not surpassed by anything in "Northanger Abbey" or "Emma":—

"MY DEAR TOM,—We were much grieved at your accident, and if you had not described yourself as having fallen into such very good hands, I should have been with you at all hazards the day after receipt of your letter, though it found me suffering under a more severe attack than usual of my old grievance, spasmodic bile, and hardly able to crawl from my bed to the sofa. But how were you tended? Send me particulars in your next. If indeed a simple sprain, as you denominate it, nothing would have been so judicious as friction—the hand alone, supposing it could be applied *immediately*. Two years ago I happened to be calling on Mrs. Sheldon, when her coachman sprained his foot, as he was cleaning the carriage, and could hardly limp into the house; but by the immediate use of friction alone, steadily persevered in (I rubbed his ankle with my own hands for four hours without intermission), he was well in three days. . . . Pray, never run into peril again in looking for an apothecary on our account; for had you the most experienced man in his line settled at Sanditon, it would be no recom-

mendation to us. We have entirely done with the whole medical tribe. We have consulted physician after physician in vain, till we are quite convinced that they can do nothing for us, and that we must trust to our knowledge of our own wretched constitutions for any relief; but if you think it advisable for the interests of the *place* to get a medical man there, I will undertake the commission with pleasure, and I have no doubt of succeeding. I could soon put the necessary irons in the fire. As to getting to Sanditon myself, it is an impossibility: I grieve to say that I cannot attempt it; but my feelings tell me too plainly that in my present state the sea-air would probably be the death of me; and in truth I doubt whether Susan's nerves would be equal to the effort. She has been suffering much from headache, and six leeches a-day for ten days together, relieved her so little that we thought it right to change our measures; and being convinced on examination that much of the evil lay in her gums, I persuaded her to attack the disorder there. She has accordingly had three teeth drawn, and is decidedly better; but her nerves are a good deal deranged: she can only speak in a whisper, and fainted away this morning on poor Athur's trying to suppress a cough."

No one will be inclined to doubt that Miss Austen would have made the novel in which such amusing people were to have played their parts, thoroughly successful; every one will echo Mr. Austen Leigh's belief that "it is probable these personages might have grown into as mature an individuality of character, and have taken as permanent a place amongst our familiar acquaintance, as Mr. Bennet, or John Thorp, Mary Musgrove, or Aunt Norris herself." In this selection from among her numerous characters, her nephew discovers his own predilections, and on the whole, we agree with him. Mary Musgrove has not been sufficiently appreciated—for humour, and for truth she is the equal of Mrs. Jennings.

All the additional particulars which now find a place in the memoir are of a tranquil, homely kind of interest, strengthening the reader's sense of the simple and refined worth and beauty of Miss Austen's character.

"The Watsons" is the title given to a fragment without a name, the composition of which is fixed, by the watermark on the paper, at a date prior to her removal from Bath, in 1805. It is very clever and amusing, but Miss Austen seems to have abandoned the intention of finishing it. Mr. Austen Leigh gives a conjectural explanation of her having done so, which is very characteristic at once of her and of his own mind, as it comes out in his treatment of his subject.

"My own idea is," he says, "that the author became aware of the evil of having placed her heroine too low, in such a position of poverty and obscurity as, though not necessarily connected with vulgarity, has a sad tendency to degenerate into it; and therefore, like a singer who has begun on too low a note, she discontinued the strain. It was an error of which she was likely to become more sensible as she grew older and saw more of society; certainly she never repeated it by placing the heroine of any subsequent work under circumstances likely to be unfavourable to the refinement of a lady." Such a scruple is to be regretted. Miss Austen might not have been able to work in a wider groove than her habitual one, but then she might. Her family have always believed "*Lady Susan*," a short tale now published for the first time, to have been an early production. "It is

scarcely one on which a literary reputation could have been founded," says Mr. Austen Leigh; "but it may perhaps be supported by the strength of her more firmly-rooted works." It is an admirable tale, and the workmanship of it is perfect, of a very difficult kind—a story told by means of letters. It abounds in humour and *finesse*, in common sense and just perception, and, only that it would be presumption to offer an opinion where her family have pronounced theirs, we should rather conclude it to be the production of the writer's maturity. The character of Lady Susan Vernon is too deep, too subtle, and too well sustained, helped and indicated as it is by slight touches of rare power and effect, to have been drawn by a "prentice hand." In one respect it is far stronger and more dramatic than anything Miss Austen did besides. The daring effrontery, the consummate falsehood, and the unblushing hypocrisy of Lady Susan, her coquetry, her avarice, her cold-heartedness and her utter want of principle, all disguised by a fascination which the reader is made to understand perfectly, if not to share, make up a character which flies higher and farther in the direction of the "villain" of fiction than any other drawn by the author. All the contents of this book, while they render us grateful to Mr. Austen Leigh for the efforts he has made to satisfy our curiosity and interest, increase our admiration for the great, simple, refined novelist, and make us more deeply regret the early termination of her life and labours.

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*On some Disorders of the Nervous System in Childhood, being the Lumleian Lectures delivered at the Royal College of Physicians in London in March, 1871.* By CHARLES WEST, M.D., Fellow and Senior Censor of the College, Physician to the Hospital for Sick Children. London: Longmans.

WE have read this book, not indeed without feeling that in many parts we were getting out of our depth, as unprofessional readers, but with great interest. Throughout, it bears the strongest testimony to the author's possession of the qualities most necessary to a physician; among which we class almost, if not quite first, an observant eye (and there is no faculty in which men naturally differ from each other more than that); a strong sense of the narrow limits which science has attained; and hence an unaffected modesty, a determination not to veil real ignorance beneath learned language, nor to think that we understand diseases and their causes because we classify them; and perhaps more than all, a strong principle of humanity. Continual familiarity with suffering in all its shapes cannot fail to blunt the sensitive part of our nature. Were it otherwise, who could pass through a world, in which a whole generation of men are at every successive period hastening through sorrow, pain, and tears, to death and judgment, with the degree of calmness and self-command which is an indispensable condition to the exercise of active benevolence; but that active benevolence



is a habit formed and matured by practice, and no man has more opportunities of forming it than a medical man.

The little volume before us will be useful to intelligent persons, not professional, who have the care of children. If it does nothing else, it will impress upon them the extreme delicacy of the beings with whom they sometimes deal very roughly, and it will enable them to a considerable degree to judge whether the symptoms of a child are such as to make it desirable to call in medical aid. The author treats of "Neuralgia and Epilepsy," "Chorea and Paralysis," and in the last lecture of "Disorder and loss of the power of speech;" and of "Mental and moral peculiarities and their disorders." This last lecture is to a non-professional reader by far the most interesting. The facts observed by our author are exceedingly curious, especially as to that strange phenomenon—the loss of the power of speech. He is not ashamed to confess, that in many instances at least, the causes of this are as utterly mysterious to medical men as to other people.

We are specially struck by the peculiar fitness the author exhibits for dealing with children, among whom, as he says, "his life has been spent." He gives in the last chapter some cautions as to the method of dealing with them, which are well worth the study and consideration of every mother and nurse, as well as of medical attendants; for instance, as to "the importance of not ministering to the tendency to exaggerated self-consciousness by talking of children's ailments in their hearing, or by seeming to notice the complaints they make, as though they were something unusual, and out of the common way." This tendency he attributes to "the intense craving for sympathy so characteristic of the child;" and things which superficial observers would attribute to motives more natural in grown-up people, he, with real discernment, refers to this cause—

"It is this which often underlies the disposition to exaggerate its ailments, or even to feign such as do not exist; and in such attempts at deception it often persists with almost incredible resolution. Over and over again have I met with instances, both in private and in hospital practice, where the motives to self-deception were neither the increase of comfort nor the gratification of mere indolence, but the monopoly of love and sympathy which during some bygone illness had been extended to it, and which it could not bear to share again with its brothers and sisters. The feeling, too, sometimes becomes quite uncontrollable, and the child then needs as much care and judicious management, both bodily and mental, to bring it back to health, as would be called for in the case of some adult hypochondriac or monomaniac" (p. 129).

It is impossible to read without deep sadness the following words, to the absolute truth of which we can ourselves speak from experience.

"One word, and but one, I would add here, and I trust I may do so without incurring the suspicion of want of respect for religion, or of want of faith in its doctrines. Some of the most painful death-beds which I have ever witnessed have been those of children whose over-anxious friends have striven to force upon their minds the deepest verities of our faith in that definite form in which they are embodied in catechisms and formularies. It is easier to frighten than to console—the dark grave is realized, or at least imagined, more vividly than its Conqueror, and the little child driven to look within for the

evil which it does not know and cannot find, but vaguely dreads, and would be sorry for if it knew it, has moved me to compassion only less than that I felt for its broken-hearted torturers, who have failed to learn that the little children—of whom our Saviour said that of such were His kingdom—were not called on to recite any creed, to profess any faith, but, just as they were in their helpless ignorance, were deemed fit to be folded in His embrace, and to be held up as our example" (p. 119).

The author speaks as a man naturally may who, being religious, kind-hearted, and sensible, and having experienced the realities of death-beds, cannot help seeing that the religious teaching of Protestantism makes sad the hearts which God has bidden above all things to rejoice; and yet who, not knowing the reason, imagines that it must be because little children are taught more religion than is fit for them. If only he were accustomed to Catholic children, he would know by experience that the Calvinistic system of which he speaks, saddens those little ones whom God would have rejoice, not because it is intended for others but not for them, but because it is in itself the worst and most deadly kind of falsehood, the corruption and perversion of truth. Children are sad because they are taught that they need a new birth; that unless they have experienced it they cannot enter into the kingdom of God. The practical working of this is, that the child is taught to try to obtain what has already been freely given to it in its baptism (if, indeed, the poor little one ever was baptized), and which, except it had been freely given, it could never have attained. It is anxiously looking into itself for the signs of a new birth. It believes that if it has experienced it, there must have been some time before which it was a child of wrath, and after which it became a child of God. The mischief done by this false teaching is unspeakable. Many, very many, are the children to whom God has given a vivid faith in the unseen world, and a tender conscience, whose lives are made miserable by their having been taught these doctrines of men, and who would enjoy heaven upon earth, if they had been taught the Catholic truth, that they are the objects of the tenderest love of their Heavenly Father, members of the very Body of His Beloved Son; that the great change needful for them has been wrought for them, and in them, by His Almighty power; that they are now "fellow-citizens with the Saints and of the household of God"; and that if it pleases Him to call them hence, it is to take them into His own immediate presence in His kingdom.

And yet there are those to whom this detestable doctrine is far more injurious; those in whom it takes the form, not of fear and despondency, but of presumption, who are confident that they are regenerate, and those around them unregenerate, and under God's wrath. In a word, children suffer by it in the same manner as adults. It is, in its own nature, poison, although the poison acts in one way upon one, in another way upon another.

We can assure our author that if only he knew the best-instructed Catholic children, he would wholly lose the idea that the evil he sees and most truly describes, is caused by too much religious teaching. Nothing can be more bright and sunny than the religion of a thoroughly-instructed Catholic child.

WE are unable to notice in detail in our present number the exquisitely executed translation by F. Meyrick, S.J., of F. Genelli's most vivid and careful biography of S. Ignatius Loyola, lately published by Messrs. Burns, Oates, and Co. ; and we are obliged also to defer a notice of Dr. Melia's very interesting and affecting memoir of F. Pallotti. We must not omit to acknowledge, among several Catholic works of much interest lately issued, the publication by Mr. Washbourne of a second edition, with a new and very touching preface, of Mr. Allies's "S. Peter, his Name and his Office."

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## F. FRANZELIN ON THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT OF INFALLIBILITY.

(See notice in a previous page of *F. Franzelin's treatise on Tradition and Scripture.*)

**W**HAT has been so far discussed concerning the magisterial and ministerial means for preserving Tradition, seems to demand a more distinct statement of principles at least, concerning the Subject and Object of the power of infallibly teaching and judging. The full exposition and demonstration, however, of this most important point belongs to its own proper Treatise on the Church and the Roman Pontiff.

**PRINCIPLE I.**—Indefectibility in the truth of that Faith which is *one in Catholicity*, or *infallibility in believing* has been, by God, promised to and conferred upon the *Universal Church*, which is “the house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth” (1 Tim. iii. 15), “built upon a rock, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it” (Matt. xvi. 18). Whatever, therefore, the universal Church believes as of faith, that by Christ's promise and ordaining is evidently infallibly true. Of this *infallibility in believing*, which is commonly called *passive*, the *Subject is the universal Church herself*.

The Church is kept in the unfailling truth of one Faith by the Holy Ghost by means of an *authentic ministerial and magisterial power*, through the *Pastors and Doctors* whom Christ has given for the building up of the body of Christ (Eph. iv. 11, 12), to teach the Church of God with authority; to which was to be due from all the faithful, as corresponding effect, consent and “obedience of faith.” Wherefore to this magisterium instituted, by Himself, Christ promised and upon it He conferred *infallibility in teaching* all that He himself and the Holy Ghost had taught.\*

The *Subject then of this infallibility in teaching* are all and only those, to whom has been entrusted by God the right and office of teaching with authority the Church Universal.

(a) Thus the *Teaching Church*,—that is the body of *Pastors and Doctors* in union, agreement, and subordination towards the visible head of the Church,—is infallible: and that (a) in her universal and consentient preaching of doctrine on faith or morals; (β) in her solemn judgments or definitions of the same doctrine. For to the Teaching Church so constituted has been said: “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth: go ye therefore and teach all nations; baptizing them . . . teaching them to keep all things whatsoever I have

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\* Because the magisterium, furnished with this charisma of infallibility, by its ministerial action guards, proposes, developes, and protects revealed doctrine, and keeps all the faithful in unity of faith: hence *infallibility in teaching* is commonly called *active*, and has for its end indefectibility in believing, which through the “obedience of faith” is the *passive infallibility* of the whole body of the Church.

commanded you : *and behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world*" (Matt. xxviii. 18, seq.). "And I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete, to abide with you for ever, the Spirit of truth. . . . He will teach you all things, and will suggest to you all things whatsoever I have told you (*ἀ ἐκὼν ὑμῖν*)" (John xiv. 16, 26).

These promises do not appertain to the individual successors of the Apostles, because individually they do not succeed the Apostles in the office of teaching with authority the whole Church ; an office which in the Apostles (excepting only Peter, head of the Church, who was always to continue in his successors) was not ordinary, but extraordinary and personal to themselves : but the promises were made to the body of the Apostolic succession in common, in so far as they are the Teaching Church. But they are not the Teaching Church, except in so far as they remain united, consentient, and subordinated towards the visible head of the whole Church.

Wherefore the *efficient cause* of the infallibility of the teaching Church, whether in its universal preaching or in its solemn definitions and judgments, is without doubt the promised assistance of the Spirit of truth ; but the *condition without which* the successors of the Apostles are *not* the Teaching Church, and the *formal cause* by which they are constituted as the Teaching Church to which has been promised Christ's guardianship and the assistance of the Spirit of truth in teaching, is the visible head of the Church set up by Christ, and the union and agreement of the members with that head ; just as the form of the unity of the visible Church in general is the Church's visible head itself. Hence it is that the ordinary office of infallibly teaching,—that is, the office instituted in the case of the Apostles to be passed on to their Successors,—was explained by Christ our Lord in words which were addressed, never to the individuals, but always to the entire College in union with Peter.

(b.) For the opposite reason, the words of Christ by which the primacy and infallibility of magisterium included in the primacy is promised and granted to Peter, designate him alone not only as expressly distinct from the rest, but also in relation to the rest as who should confirm and shepherd them. "Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona . . . . and I say to thee, thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. xvi.). "Simon, Simon, behold Satan hath desired to have you . . . . but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not, and do thou turn and (*ἐπιστρέψας*) confirm thy brethren" (Luke xxii.). "Jesus says to Simon Peter : Simon, son of John, lovest thou me more than these ? . . . . He says to him : Feed my lambs . . . . feed my sheep" (John xxi.).\*

Thus Peter, as ordinary endowment for himself and for each of his Successors, received from Christ the power and office of feeding and teaching the Universal Church in faith and morals, in such sort that this very power, conferred in the person of Peter upon each of his Successors, demands by divine institution the obedience of faith and consent of the whole Church ;

\* In the published Greek the reading is Σίμων Ἰωάνᾳ ; in other unpublished Codices, Ἰωαννου, or Ἰωανου, or Ἰωαννά, or Σίμων only.

and that hence the *infallibility of the whole Church in believing* cannot stand, except in so far as upon the head of the Church, successor of Peter, together with such right of exacting consent of faith, there has been simultaneously conferred *infallibility in teaching*; when (that is) he proposes a doctrine on faith or morals, with such a definitive sentence as binds the whole Church to consent. The Subject then of infallibility is Peter's Successor himself; through the divine assistance which has been promised to him *per se*, as teacher of the Church, and not on condition of the concurrent judgment or consent of the other pastors and doctors who, *compared with the Pontiff so teaching the Church*, are the most noble part of the Church so built upon this rock that the gates of hell may not prevail against it, are brethren to be confirmed, sheep to be shepherded; although, compared with the faithful they continue pastors and doctors, to propose to the faithful, to teach and to defend with authority the defined doctrine itself.

"It is a revealed dogma of faith that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of his office as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, is endowed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, with that infallibility with which our Divine Redeemer willed that the Church should be furnished in defining doctrine of faith or morals; and, therefore, that such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves and not in virtue of the consent of the Church" ("Definition of Vatican Council," Constit. I., de Eccl. Christi, cap. 4).

*Corollary A.*—There is not a twofold *adequately distinct* Subject of the infallibility promised by Christ to definitions of doctrine on faith or morals; but [the Subject of infallibility] is both the visible head of the Church regarded *per se*; and the same visible head taken as ordering and informing the body of the teaching Church, which, thus constituted, is itself infallible by the assistance of the Spirit of truth. This *inadequate distinction* in the Subject of infallibility is pointed out in the Vatican definition itself just before cited.

*Corollary B.*—Whatever is to be believed with Catholic faith or is to be held with theological certainty, on the *objective extent* of infallibility [de *extensione quoad objectum*] vested in the Church defining or in a general Council, the same, in the same way, is to be believed and held on the infallibility vested in the Roman Pontiff speaking *ex cathedra*. This is the very point defined by the Vatican Council.

*Corollary C.*—The antecedent consent of the Church may indeed be the objective means by which the Pontiff arrives at the knowledge of the definability of a doctrine: but it is not of itself and from the nature of the case the sole and necessary means of knowing; for doctrines on faith or morals may be recognized as definable from other sources and by other means as well, and questions hitherto doubtful and controverted even within the borders of the Church may be defined. And by no means is such consent of the Church or Bishops, whether antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, necessary by way of authentic judgment concurring with the judgment or definition of the Pontiff. The Gallican opinion requiring this consent of the



Church as necessary to the infallibility of the Pontiff's definitions,—in such sort that the sole Subject of infallibility should be the body of the teaching Church, namely the Pope with the bishops,—is now a heresy directly and explicitly condemned by the Vatican Council. The subsequent consent of the whole Church, however, is always the *effect* of the Pontiff's definition.

*Corollary D.*—According to the declaration of the Vatican Council itself, the Pontiff is said to speak *ex cathedrâ* “when in discharge of his office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians he defines, in virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, a doctrine of faith or morals to be held by the universal Church.” For the *Apostolic Chair* is nothing else than the supreme authentic magisterium, whose definitive doctrinal sentence binds the universal Church to consent. This intention of *defining* doctrine, or of teaching with definitive sentence and with authority obliging consent of the universal Church, should be made plain and cognizable by clear signs. No settled form however, to be necessarily used by the Pontiff in making known this his will, is essential. For although there be certain solemn forms which of themselves express a speaking *ex cathedrâ*, and which accordingly the Pontiff uses only when speaking *ex cathedrâ*,—such as, for example, dogmatic Bulls,—yet this form is not so essential and exclusive, that without it the Pontiff cannot, as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, define doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, condemn in the same way errors opposed to it, and make plain his will to that effect.

*Corollary E.*—In the documents themselves of Councils and Pontiffs in which it is without doubt proposed to publish *definitions* of doctrine, there may be, and usually are, contained many things which it is not intended to define: *obiter dicta* which are usually enunciated indirectly; mostly, also, the arguments brought to prove the definitive sentence itself, &c. Although these things are of weighty authority, yet they are not infallible definitions.

So also there may be and there are public Pontifical documents, in which certain matters connected with faith or morals are the subject of warning, recommendation, or blame, or whose purpose is to forbid the spread of any opinion or error, but whose scope is not to proclaim a definitive sentence binding the whole Church, and which, for that reason, are not pronouncements *ex cathedrâ*. “For the Pontiffs often reply to the private questions of this or that bishop, by explaining their own opinion on the matters set forth, not by passing a sentence by which they will the faithful to be bound in believing” (Melch. Canus, l. vi., c. 8, ad. 7). To this category are justly referred, for instance, the two letters of Honorius I. to Sergius of Constantinople.\* That doubt may arise as to whether certain Pontifical documents contain a pronouncement *ex cathedrâ* and *definition* of doctrine, we do not deny: but the same thing occurs sometimes in respect of Conciliar documents also; a fact of which we have an example in the diverse opinions which have existed and still exist in some quarters on the Instructions for the Armenians published in the Council of Florence, on the point whether the teaching therein contained, especially on the matter and form of the Sacraments, is to be con-

\* In the Tract. de Incarnat. we have spoken of the (by no means heretical) sense of these letters.

sidered dogmatic or merely as practical instruction. Whenever such doubts occur, theologians properly warn us "that in discriminating these matters the judgment of wise men, and (more especially) the sense and consent of the Church, is of much force" (Tanner de Fide, q. 4, dub. 6, n. 262).

This will be sufficient for our scope on the *Subject of infallibility*. Our present treatise is more particularly concerned with the doctrine on the *Object of infallibility*.

PRINCIPLE II.—The Deposit of the Christian Faith, strictly understood, embraces all and only those things, which have been *explicitly* or *implicitly* revealed to the human race by God to be believed, done, or followed; in other words, which have been made known by *Catholic* revelation (as distinct from *private* divine revelations) for the eternal salvation of mankind.

Corollary A.—In the Deposit of the Faith are contained theoretical doctrines (and among these also truths which, in so far as they are cognizable by reason, are commonly said to appertain to natural religion)—practical laws (and among these also the natural law written in the hearts of men as reasonable beings), as also certain perpetual and fundamental institutions, such as the Church, its power, its form of government, &c. In other words, these are contained in the Deposit), revealed and supernatural *dogmatics, ethics, politics* (πολιτικά).

Corollary B.—Only truths revealed by God, when duly proposed may and ought to be *believed with divine faith*; because faith is assent on account of the authority of God revealing.

Corollary C.—In the Deposit of Faith may be objectively contained truths, not yet duly proposed, so that all should be bound to believe them as revealed with divine faith.

PRINCIPLE III.—With truths revealed and duly proposed are connected and related many things, without which those revealed truths themselves either could not, or could not so well, in all their fulness, be guarded, developed, and defended; although these [connected truths] are either not themselves revealed, or are not yet duly proposed to be believed with divine faith.

Such are many theoretical and practical truths in that triple order, dogmatic, moral, and (so to speak) constitutive, which we have pointed out; as truths theologically certain, e.g., on the procession of the Holy Ghost *by way of love* in connexion with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity; on the sanctification of the humanity of Christ *by the created gifts also*, on its [enjoyment of] the Beatific Vision from the first moment of its existence, in connexion with the mystery of the Incarnation, &c.: then again certain circumstances bound up with revealed truths, when these are to be practically applied, e.g., if there is question of the genuine sense of texts in such and such books, in so far as they are agreeable or opposed to the Deposit of Faith; facts again of themselves historical, e.g., the legitimate celebration of a particular Council, &c.; furthermore, certain special dispositions of divine providence pertaining to the better estate and government of the universal Church, e.g., if there is question of the opportuneness or moral necessity of political independence and temporal dominion in the case of the Supreme Pontiff, in order to the [good] government of the Church, &c.

*Corollary A.*—The Deposit of Faith is violated ; not only by direct denial of revealed truths and by heresy, but may also be attacked, and in the mind of the faithful exposed to dangers, by errors contrary to truths, not in themselves revealed, yet connected with revealed truths, and consequently theological or religious.

*Corollary B.*—Although the Deposit of Faith strictly understood comprises revealed truth only, nevertheless the deposit to be guarded in its entirety, with all its outworks and modes of application, is of wider extent : "O Timothy, keep the Deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. vi. 20).

PRINCIPLE IV.—The authority (infallible under the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost) of that authority to which Christ has entrusted the office of infallibly keeping the Deposit, and of guarding it against threatening errors, appertains in the first place to guarding, setting forth, and developing the truths which, in the strict sense, make up the Deposit itself of the Faith ; that is to say, revealed truths : and by consequence, to warding off errors directly opposed to them,—in other words, to condemning heresies. This is the fundamental revealed dogma of the Catholic faith ; and hence its denial is not a heresy only, but the very root of all heresies.

Herein it is contained and hence it immediately follows, that the infallibility promised for guardianship of the Deposit reaches to the whole extent of the Deposit to be guarded ; that is, to truths even in themselves not revealed, in so far as they are in contact with revealed truths, and are needed to the custody, proposition, development, and defence of the latter. This extension of infallibility, by consent of all theologians, is a truth so certain in theology that its denial would be most grave error, or even, according to many, heresy ; although up to the present time it has not been explicitly condemned as heresy. (Vide Card. de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 106, 114 ; Bañez, 2, 2, q. 11, a. 2, concl. 2 ; Suarez de Fide, disp. v., sect. 6, n. 4, 5, 8 ; sect. 8, n. 4.)

*Corollary A.*—Not only revealed truths, but also truths connected with revealed, in so far as the connexion extends, may be infallibly defined by the infallible magisterium ; and similarly, not only heresies may be condemned, but minor censures may be pronounced with infallible authority under the assistance of the Holy Ghost. Because therefore a doctrine is not defined as in itself revealed ; or because errors are not one by one condemned with the note of heresy, but are proscribed with no particular censure or with minor censures, or with several censures *in globo* ; for these causes, taken by themselves, it cannot be affirmed without grave error that a definition is not infallible, or is not a pronouncement *ex cathedra*.

*Corollary B.*—No Catholic may deny that [the quality of] infallible definitions [belongs to] the dogmatic Constitutions of the Council of Constance against the articles of Wycliffe and John Hus, confirmed by Martin V. ; of Leo X. against Luther ("Exsurge") ; of Clement XI. against the Jansenists ("Unigenitus"), &c., in which propositions are condemned under different censures *in globo* ; as also the Constitution of Pius VI. against (the synod of) Pistoja ("Auctorem Fidei"), in which a very large number of propositions are severally proscribed under minor censures. And this Corollary, which is

certain on other grounds also, in turn demonstrates the truth of the Principle laid down, because without it the present Corollary itself could not stand.

*Corollary c.*—A quality which is *defined* to belong to a proposition, infallibly belongs to it in the sense and way intended in the definition. Hence those who are of opinion, for instance, that a proposition is said to be *temerarious* which is asserted against strong reasons and weighty authority without due foundation, also affirm that it is this quality, and not per se the falsehood of the proposition, which is defined in the censure of *temerity*. This same thing, —viz. that the definition does not touch the *falsehood* of the proposition, but some other quality worthy of condemnation,—they more especially affirm in the case of censures, by which propositions are branded as *scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears*. (Vide Card. de Lugo de Fide, disp. xx., n. 114 ; Canum, l. xii., c. 11, ad finem.) And at all events, when the Council of Vienne considered that an opinion (that about the infusion of grace and the virtues in the case of infants) was to be chosen as the *more probable*,\* this per se is not a definition of the truth (of the opinion), but only of its greater probability. (Cf. de Lugo, l. c. n. 115–129.)

*Corollary d.*—The Infallibility of the Church and of the Roman Pontiff is believed with divine faith, on the authority of God revealing ; an opinion proposed by the infallible definition of the Church or the Pontiff as true but not as revealed, is believed on the revealed authority of the proponent. Whence we may call *mediately divine* that faith, which some call *ecclesiastical*.

PRINCIPLE V.—If the Church is infallible in guarding the Deposit of Faith at least in the strict sense, and therefore in declaring the true sense of revealed dogmas,—she is, by this very fact, infallible in judging of the true sense, the import and extent (*intensione et extensione*), of her own authority and infallibility ; or, which comes to the same thing, in judging of the conditions and objects on which authority belongs to her by divine right and on which the assistance of the Spirit of truth has been promised her. For this authority and infallibility is undoubtedly a revealed dogma.

*Corollary.*—It involves a contradiction, to admit the infallibility of the Church in revealed dogmas, and at the same time to deny the authority of a definition admitted actually to exist, on the ground that the point defined is not a dogma of the Faith.\*

PRINCIPLE VI.—As it is certain from the principles of revelation itself, as they are understood and proclaimed by the Church, that truth appertains to

\* In order that I may not seem, in a plain matter, to be fighting against shadows, here is a proof of this contradiction, openly published in our own day by schismatical priests (*presbyteris sectariis*). "The conditions therefore required for the judgment of the Pope to be certainly infallible are two : 1st, that the judgment turns upon matter revealed ; 2nd, that it be accompanied by the consent of the Episcopate. Failing this second condition, it is not certain that the judgment is infallible ; failing the first, it is certain that it is not infallible. . . . However unanimous (which they are not) the Pope and the bishops might be in deciding that the Church has need at this time of the temporal power of the Pope, and in declaring excommunicate all who think otherwise, *this decision, as coming not from the teachers of the Church and the custodians of revealed truth but from private doctors, would have no authority to bind consciences.*"—*Mediatore*, August 9, 1862.

her infallible magisterium, and errors are subject to her infallible judgment, for no other end than the custody of the Deposit of the Christian religion, and its protection and advancement among the faithful ;—so is it equally certain that in most sciences, as they are, and ought to be, cultivated by mankind on principles purely natural and from sources non-revealed, in philosophy especially, theoretical and practical, in history, geology, ethnography, &c. there are found truths, which are likewise revealed or are connected with revealed truths. The reason is, because revelation contains not only supernatural truths, but many cognizable by reason also and from natural sources ; in other words, because revelation and natural sciences have in many points a common object-matter. Equally is it evident, that in these sciences, not indeed by right use of reason, but by its abuse and through ignorance, hypotheses may be laid down as principles, and conclusions may be deduced, opposed, directly or indirectly, to truths of revelation, rational or supernatural ; and consequently (since truth cannot contradict truth) containing errors cognizable and capable of condemnation on revealed principles.\*

The Church's magisterium therefore teaches truths of this sort, and may infallibly judge of errors of this sort, not by teaching human sciences on their principles, but by judging of them on hers.† Wherefore the infallible Church never judges, and in virtue of her promised infallibility the Holy Ghost can never even permit her to pass a *definitive* judgment, on truths or errors, except in order to the custody of the Deposit and in virtue of her divinely-imposed office of guarding the Deposit.

*Corollary A.*—Although philosophy and the other natural sciences rest on their own proper principles, which are known or so far as they are known, not from revelation and the authentic magisterium of the Church, but by reason and from natural sources ;—nevertheless the magisterium of the Church can, and indeed ought, from revealed principles, point out for avoidance errors opposed to the integrity and safety of the Deposit to be guarded. Catholic scientific men, therefore, should keep this standard before their eyes. Reason prescribes this course, lest they fall into error ; faith prescribes it, lest they fall into error contrary to the truths thereof.

*Corollary B.*—Those who profess themselves Catholics and consequently acknowledge the authentic magisterium of the Church, and yet affirm that philosophy, in the mode explained, is not subject to this norm, that the progress of science is impeded by the same, that the Church should let philo-

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\* "As theology (*sacra doctrina*) is founded on the light of faith, so is philosophy on the natural light of reason. Whence it is impossible that the truths of philosophy should be contrary to the truths of faith. . . . And whatever in the sayings of philosophers is found contrary to the Faith, that does not belong to philosophy, but is rather an abuse of philosophy arising from defect of reason."—S. Thom. in Boëth. Trin. Proleg., q. 2, a. 3.

† "The proper knowledge of this science (theology) is that which comes from revelation, and not that which comes from natural (objective) reason. And hence it does not appertain to it to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge of them. For whatever in other sciences is found to contradict truths of this science, is wholly condemned as false."—S. Thom., i. q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

sophy correct her own mistakes (Syllab. Pontif., propp. x., xi., xii., xiv.),—such men demand liberty to embrace error by an abuse of philosophy, and deny the Church's right and duty of providing for the integrity and soundness of the doctrine of faith.—Vide Con. Vatic. Constit. de Fide, cap. 4, can. 2.

PRINCIPLE VII.—The Holy Apostolic See, which has had committed to it the custody of the Deposit, the power of shepherding the universal Church for the salvation of souls, may prescribe theological opinions or opinions bearing on theology as to be followed, or proscribe them as to be avoided, not solely with the intention of infallibly deciding the truth by definitive sentence, but also *without* such intention; from the need and with the intention of looking to the *security*, absolute or relative, of Catholic doctrine. In such declarations, although there is no *infallible truth* of the doctrine, because by the supposition there is no intention of deciding such truth; yet there is *infallibly security*:\* security, I mean, both objective of the doctrine declared (absolute or relative), and subjective in so far as it is safe for all to embrace it, and unsafe and incompatible with the submission due to the divinely-constituted magisterium to reject it.

Corollary A.—The authority of the magisterium instituted by Christ in the Church is to be regarded, in the present matter, from a twofold point of view:—*a*, as in individual acts it is aided by the Holy Ghost to define the truth infallibly,—in other words, as it is *the infallible authority*; *β*, as the same magisterium acts; with the pastoral authority indeed divinely entrusted to it, but not with all its intensity (if we may say so), nor as defining the truth in the last resort, but so far as shall have seemed needful or opportune and sufficient for security of doctrine; and the magisterium in this point of view we may perhaps call the authority of *universal ecclesiastical provision*.

Corollary B.—The *authority of infallibility* cannot be communicated by the Pontiff to others, as his ministers acting in his name. If at any time, therefore, an infallible definition is published by any sacred Congregation at Rome, the Congregation itself merely performs the function of consultor and ministerial promulgator, while the Pontiff alone defines. Here then must be found those tokens which, we have said above, make clear the Pope's intention.

The *authority of universal ecclesiastical provision*, as we have termed it, not indeed independently but in dependence upon the Pontiff, is communicable, and is by the Pope himself communicated with greater or lesser extension, to certain sacred Congregations of Cardinals.

Corollary C.—It is a mistake (to suppose) that the only authority to which intellectual assent is due, is that of divine revelation or of an infallible definition of the Church or the Pope. There are manifold degrees of religious assent. For our present purpose [it is sufficient to] distinguish assent of *faith properly and immediately divine*, on the authority of God revealing; assent of faith which we called above *mediately divine* on the authority of him who

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\* That these two things, infallible truth and infallible security, do not coincide, is clear even from the fact that otherwise no probable or more probable doctrine could be called sound and secure.



infallibly defines a doctrine as true, but not as revealed ; *religious* assent, on the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision in the sense explained.

This very doctrine has been clearly set forth by the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX., in his letter of December 21st, 1863, to the Archbishop of Munich, beginning, "*Tuas libenter accepimus.*" "We wish to believe that [those who attended the literary Congress at Munich] were not desirous of restricting the undoubted obligation of Catholic teachers and writers to those points only which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all. . . . For, even though the question concerned that submission which is to be yielded in an act of divine faith, yet that would not have to be confined to points defined by express decrees of Ecumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but to be extended to those things also which are handed down as divinely revealed by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and are accordingly held to appertain to the faith by the universal and consistent consent of Catholic theologians. *But since the question concerns that submission by which all Catholics are bound in conscience who apply themselves to the speculative sciences with a view to conferring new benefits on the Church by their writings, hence the members of the same Congress should recognize that it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and revere the aforesaid dogmas, but that they must also submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions put forth by Pontifical Congregations, and to those heads of doctrine held by common and consistent consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain that opinions opposed to those heads of doctrines, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure.*"

Further, although the authority of universal ecclesiastical provision (as we have called it, resides primarily and directly in no individual except the pastor of the whole Church, yet a *particular* [power of] provision, subordinated to the Chief Pastor, belongs to each bishop in his own diocese. Nay, in foro interno, and in order to the direction of the spiritual life, it belongs in a way to the directors of souls. And this example (as in general the evangelical counsel of obedience, not only of the will but also of the intellect) is perhaps the easiest way of explaining, how infallibility in him who gives a command is not a necessary condition [for the propriety] of intellectual submission and obedience.

*Corollary D.*—The infallible authority and supreme magisterium of the Pontiff defining, had never anything whatever to do with the case of Galileo Galilei, and with the Abjuration of opinions enjoined him. For not only did not even a shadow of a Pontifical definition enter into that case, but in the whole of that decree of the Cardinals of the Holy Office, and in the form of Abjuration, the name even of the Pontiff is never found expressed. The documents may be read in full in "John Baptist Riccioli Almagist," Nov., p. 11, l. ix., sect. 4, c. 40, p. 496, seqq. Nevertheless, in the then state of the question, the matter not having been yet cleared up, since the truth of the astronomical system, at that date by no means proved, supplied no foundation for interpreting the passages of Scripture in any other than the obvious sense, and since the most learned men of that time in physics and astronomy, as

Tycho Brahe, Alexander Tasso, Christopher Scheiner, Antonio Delfino, Justus Lipsius (*vide Riccioli*, l. c. p. 495), judged Galileo's opinion contrary to Scripture, it was certainly the business of the *authority of ecclesiastical provision* to take care that the interpretation of Scripture was not injured by conjectures and hypotheses, which seemed by no means likely to most people at the time. No examination of doctrine was instituted preparatory to its *definition* for the universal Church, for no one thought of such a thing; but a criminal process was held in the year 1633, in which, under these circumstances, no other judgment could be come to, than that which is contained in the final sentence of the judges. "In order that your serious and harmful error and transgression\* may not remain altogether unpunished, and that you yourself may become more cautious for the future and be an example to others to abstain from such faults, we decree that the book of the Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be forbidden by public edict, and yourself we condemn to the common (formalem) prison of this Holy Office for a period to be fixed at our will; and as a wholesome penance we command that for the next three years you recite once in the week the seven penitential psalms; reserving to ourselves the power of moderating, changing, or taking away, wholly or in part, the aforesaid pains and penalties." †—*Vide "Revue des Sciences Ecclésiastiques,"* 2<sup>e</sup> série, t. iii., pp. 105 seqq. 217 seqq.

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\* Galileo had broken the command enjoined him in 1616, which he had promised to obey, to the effect that "for the future he should not be allowed to defend the aforesaid false opinion, or teach it any way by word or writing." —*Vide "Riccioli,"* l. c. p. 498.

† This is not the place to speak of the falsehoods by which, long after the affair was finished and after Galileo's death, imaginary tales began (to be spread) about threats and tortures used against him. To refute them, it will be enough to read merely the narration of Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's pupil and friend, in "Opp. Galilei, ed. Ticini," 1744., t. i., p. 64. See also "Marino Marini Galileo e l'Inquisizione." Roma. 1850. "La Vérité sur le Procès de Galilée," ("Mélanges Scientifiques, etc., de M. Biot." Paris. 1858, tom. iii. pp. 1, seqq.